

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 25, 26, 27, 1988

PART 1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

82-220

WASHINGTON : 1988

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

5201-6

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NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
Washington, DC.

STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR NATO DEFENSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, caucus room, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Quayle, Gramm, Symms, and McCain.

Also present: Senator Stevens.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Gerald K. Bankus, Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Sherri Wasserman Goodman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Norman G. Mosher, Frederick F.Y. Pang, Patricia L. Watson and Daniel J. Wildfong, professional staff members and Lucia M. Chavez and Michelle M. Turner, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig and William J. Lynn, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Robert K. Griffith and Thomas Scott Bunton, assistants to Senator Wirth; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Robert P. Savitt, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

This morning the Armed Services Committee initiates a lengthy series of hearings on "NATO and the INF Treaty." In a sense these hearings are a continuation of the committee's examination of U.S.

national security strategy and its military strategy component, initiated with 16 hearings at the beginning of the last session of the Congress. In contrast to last year's comprehensive strategy review, this year's hearings will focus sharply on strategy for NATO defense.

Between now and the end of February, the committee will conduct approximately 25 hearings on this subject. The schedule for the first 11 hearings, through the first week in February, has been provided both to the membership of the committee and to the public. Initially, the committee will examine the broader context of NATO's security posture. Later, the committee will, in the context of this strategic framework, review key features of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, in coordination with the Foreign Relations and Select Intelligence Committees.

The committee will focus on three key questions during these hearings.

First, where is the NATO alliance today in relation to its overall security goals?

Second, what political and military goals should guide NATO's efforts for the foreseeable future?

And third, how can NATO attain these goals?

In formulating answers to these three fundamental questions, the committee will need to make assessments in a number of areas. We will examine the many dimensions of the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance: conventional forces, theater nuclear forces, strategic forces, and chemical warfare capabilities.

The committee will seek to assess political developments in Europe that have security implications, either directly or indirectly.

We will also need to examine the potential contribution of arms control to enhancing NATO's security posture. We will be particularly interested in ideas on conventional arms control, a subject that we are seriously beginning to undertake in NATO. Foremost in this regard will be the INF Treaty which has been negotiated with the Soviet Union and which President Reagan has submitted today for the advice and consent of the Senate. We will need to assess whether the elimination of all intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear forces, as called for in the treaty, will have the effect of enhancing or eroding the deterrent value and defense capabilities of NATO's military forces. But other arms control efforts—especially for conventional forces—are just as important to NATO's security and deserve very serious consideration.

The committee's hearings have been developed to give appropriate attention to each of these subjects. Based upon our hearings and analysis, the committee will prepare a report to the Senate presenting our findings and recommendations.

As we begin this important undertaking, the committee is fortunate to have as its initial witnesses today the most senior civilian official and the most senior military officer of the U.S. Military Establishment. On behalf of the committee, I extend a warm welcome to Hon. Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, and to Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., U.S. Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs.

This is Secretary Carlucci's first appearance before the committee since his appointment as Secretary of Defense. The committee not only looks forward to his testimony today, but also to working closely with Secretary Carlucci during what is certain to be a very challenging year for all of us.

Admiral Crowe has appeared before this committee many times, and I know that I speak for the entire committee when I say that his testimony has always been thoughtful and candid. I should note for committee members that both Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe will appear before the committee on specific budget issues in mid-February when the revised defense budget for fiscal year 1989 is ready.

I would also like to extend a warm welcome to Senator Ted Stevens, an ex officio member of the committee, who will be joining us for these hearings. The committee looks forward to your participation, Senator Stevens. Senator Stevens has been very active as a cochairman of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. I know you have devoted many hours studying the subject of arms control, and the negotiations on the treaty. We appreciate your participation here.

There is widespread consensus that the NATO alliance continues to be plagued by a number of serious shortcomings in its defense capabilities. Correcting these deficiencies will be difficult in an alliance environment which is increasingly being characterized by:

Severe constraints on resources available for defense;

A growing nuclear allergy;

More benign public attitudes toward the Soviet Union under the leadership of General Secretary Gorbachev; and

Less favorable European public attitudes toward the United States. The alliance faces fiscal and political constraints in a dynamic period of both opportunity as well as danger. NATO's highest priority need is for a strategy that provides an enduring framework in which various challenges and opportunities can be meaningfully assessed and effectively managed. Hopefully, the committee's hearings on "NATO Defense and the INF Treaty" will help promote the formulation and development of a clear, coherent, and consistent NATO strategy.

Senator Warner, we would be delighted to hear any comments that you have at this time. I will then ask for opening statements of other committee members who have them, before we turn to the opening statements of our witnesses.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you and other members of this committee for making these arrangements today, and I welcome our two witnesses and indeed our distinguished colleague from Alaska.

Mr. Chairman, I join in extending these warm welcomes today to the Admiral and the Secretary. We have worked with these gentlemen for many years on many important issues. I look forward to embarking on the ratification process with the benefit of their testimony.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you again for providing the framework for these hearings in which the committee can examine the implications of the INF Treaty for our

national security strategy today and in the future. And the future is most important.

This is an entirely appropriate endeavor for this committee. I am certain that our Senate colleagues will benefit from the findings that emerge from these hearings as they take up their role in the ratification process.

The treaty elimination intermediate nuclear forces is of historical precedence and importance. It is the first to eliminate rather than just limit nuclear forces. Its verification provisions are the most comprehensive in the history of arms control. The elimination of two entire classes of nuclear weapons, the precedent setting verification provisions, however open up new issues and questions about the future of arms control and nuclear deterrence.

The INF Treaty has important political and military implications. Politically the treaty raises questions about the future role of nuclear weapons in the alliance deterrent strategy.

What impact will the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons have on the alliance cohesion? What impact will it have on future NATO nuclear modernization and the need to increase, redirect spending on conventional forces in a post-INF situation?

A primary concern with the INF Treaty rests with its impact on the NATO alliance and the future of NATO flexible response. That doctrine has worked well for some 40 years.

In West Germany for example, an apparent sentiment exists within some political quarters to remove all nuclear weapons from German soil. If such a movement were to succeed, it would have a devastating impact on the alliance, and the doctrine of flexible response. It could begin a fracture to unravel the alliance and end the commitment to nuclear deterrence, which has been instrumental in keeping the peace in Europe for these 40 years.

Thus, we must ensure that in ratifying this treaty, if that is the will of the Senate, we do not encourage the elimination of all NATO ground based nuclear forces. The chances of this eventuality would be reduced greatly if the United States and the alliance remain committed to permitted tactical nuclear modernization programs after the ratification of the treaty.

Militarily, consideration must be given to the impact of an INF Treaty on the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.

For instance, if the United States continues to rely on the threat of escalation to the nuclear level as the main deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe, will this place a correspondingly greater reliance on U.S. central strategic systems.

In this context, the potential impact of the INF Treaty on START, the future talks and the U.S. modernization program must also be clearly understood. Much of the credibility of the nuclear guarantee rests on the survivability, flexibility, and strength of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.

The treaty then may require a more solid commitment to strategic modernization in order to buttress the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee.

Finally, in the area of conventional and chemical weapons, we will also examine the balance in Europe to identify weaknesses and recommend improvements.

The administration has declared its intention to try and try hard to negotiate a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty before the next summit meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. That meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev is scheduled, as we understand it, in late spring.

If completed in time, the START Treaty may include verification procedures comparable, but I imagine quite expanded from those before us today in the INF Treaty.

Therefore, it is imperative that this committee give the INF verification provisions the most careful of consideration. We want to ensure that these provisions are a sound basis for developing such future START framework of a treaty as may emerge.

This committee has a solid record of testimony and reports detailing Soviet noncompliance with their existing arms control commitments. It is against this background that I and other members of this committee in the Senate intend to examine very carefully, both within this hearing structure and on the floor and elsewhere and in the Committee on Intelligence, of which Senator Nunn and I are also members, to determine if there verification provisions, so central to this agreement, are adequate.

I also intend to explore what safeguards we intend to have in place to deter against noncompliance, what actions we are prepared to take should such safeguards fail to enforce compliance. Our witnesses this morning are among the most qualified to address these concerns.

The INF Treaty being transmitted to the Senate today is a culmination of years of effort, and it is a tribute to the resolve of the NATO alliance, to the negotiators and especially to the President of the United States.

I have no reason to believe that this is not a good treaty. But I also firmly believe that our constitutional responsibilities demand nothing less than pursuing every question, clarifying every ambiguity and resolving every issue.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you have set us on a course that will enable us to fulfill those responsibilities.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. I would like to echo your last statement, because I think most Members of the Senate, not speaking for all, have a positive view toward this treaty. I also believe that the Senate of the United States feels keenly its responsibility, under the Constitution, to take a very close look at every aspect of the INF Treaty, which we will be doing. At times I am sure our questions may appear more negative than positive, but I think our witnesses will understand that that is part of our duty. We will reserve judgment, most of us, on the details of the INF Treaty until we have concluded our hearings.

We will now have opening statements from any other committee member who would like to be heard at this time. I will start on my right with the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, an individual that has chaired this Armed Services Committee, and I think an individual all of us would describe as a Senator's Senator. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Mississippi.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I am certainly not going to take very much time. I do want to express my complete satisfaction

with the indications I get from the nature and character of these hearings. I know men who have worked on it in preparation, the Senator from Georgia and others, and there is some excellent staff work that I have read fairly hurriedly here. But this is nothing second rate, this is first class from beginning to end so far.

It is a must too, I think Mr. Chairman, a must on the list of problems to be given the very best possible attention that we can. We have made, you have made a good start on that. And it seems to me in the selection of the first two witnesses, I read with the utmost interest all of their statements. It indicates a way, and I commend them highly and thank them too. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Next I will turn to Senator Thurmond, a distinguished member of this committee, former chairman of the Judiciary Committee and one of our most valuable members. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add my welcome to Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe. It is a pleasure to have you gentlemen here today to receive your testimony on NATO defense and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

While I support arms control efforts that can be verified and that improve stability, I am concerned about the INF Treaty from the "post" INF standpoint. In Admiral Crowe's opening remarks, he indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will seek a relaxation on the numerical constraints of artillery launched atomic projectiles.

That may be a prudent military goal, but it conflicts sharply with the growing sentiment of the Federal Republic of Germany to move forward to the third, or "triple zero" option. Western European leaders expended a great deal of political capital during the deployment of ground launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles.

Since that time, the European perception of the Soviet threat has been altered through a combination of more adroit leadership and more skillful public relations. The image of Soviet leaders as brutish is a thing of the past. Mr. Gorbachev, in fact, is viewed by a large portion of the European population as being more committed to peace than President Reagan. The improved Soviet ability to influence public opinion in Europe may have a dramatic impact on NATO in the post INF environment.

I am concerned about the common will within the alliance to proceed with necessary nuclear and conventional modernization programs that will be the underpinning of deterrence for years to come. Dwindling defense budgets and improvements in conventional capability and sustainability may turn out to be mutually exclusive concepts.

In the era of no growth budgets, our domestic political constraints can also be expected to have a negative impact on policy considerations. Last year for example, the Air Force sought to deactivate a tactical fighter wing for fiscal reasons. The Congress prohibited the Air Force from taking this action.

In light of the projected force structure reductions expected in the budget submission, we can expect congressional action to protect interests of the United States at the expense of our overseas commitments.

It is for these reasons that I am concerned about the post-INF environment. It will require very skillful leadership on the part of the next administration regardless of which party or candidate that occupies the White House.

I desire to support this treaty and intend to do so, unless our research and the evidence we receive indicates it would be contrary to the best interests of the United States.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the fine work you have done as chairman, and for the fine ability in which you have handled this committee. I also wish to express my deep appreciation to Senator Warner for the great work he has done.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Thurmond. Next, the chairman of our Strategic Subcommittee, one of our most valued members in the overall area of nuclear strategic areas, Senator Exon of Nebraska.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and welcome gentlemen, we are delighted to have you here this morning. I am going to be very brief because we want to move ahead with the questioning.

I am pleased to see that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces. Achieving this was extremely difficult, I know, for our Nation and for our NATO allies. I congratulate the President on his leadership and the success with this treaty.

As the chairman of the Senate Armed Services' Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, I look forward to playing an active role in the Senate debate on the consent to ratification of this important treaty.

We should aggressively pursue this opportunity to eliminate the category of INF weapons, but should keep several concerns in mind as we do.

As unpleasant as our long reliance on nuclear weapons has been, that reliance has served as a partial offset to the Soviet's superiority in certain areas of conventional defenses. By eliminating certain types of nuclear weapons, we do not want to make the world safe for conventional war only, but also reduce the overall danger of all major wars.

I have urged the President to call for a summit of the NATO allies to address concrete ways in which our conventional deterrent may be strengthened. And I know that you are going to have something specific on that for us here this morning.

I intend to carefully review the details of the proposed treaty as well as the overall military balance between the superpowers and their allies. However from what I know now, as I have said on the floor of the U.S. Senate, I intend to support the INF Treaty and work for its ratification with your help and that of the President of the United States. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Next will be Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good morning, welcome Mr. Secretary, Admiral. Either this treaty is in the national security of the United States, either it adds to our security or maintains our security or detracts from our security and that of our allies. It seems to me that our task is to arrive at the answer to

that question as objectively and as dispassionately as we can. That is our task. And that is my intent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Next, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In looking at the INF Treaty, some emphasize the opportunities that it offers, and some focus on its risks. Some fear what it might lead to, others look forward to the doors that it might open.

As our committee begins its assessment of those opportunities and risks, I would like to make just a few comments for openers.

Fundamentally, we must realize that the status quo is also full of risks and is draining resources. One of the risks of the status quo often overlooked is that the nuclear deterrent has lost a lot of credibility. Fewer and fewer people believe that the United States would nuke the Soviet Union and thereby commit suicide in response to a Soviet conventional attack somewhere in Europe.

As a result, we must rely more on conventional deterrence if we are going to have credible deterrence. In assessing the opportunities and risks we should look realistically at the current conventional balance. We should go beyond the bean count—the quantitative comparisons—to analyze all the components of the conventional balance. We should look at where we can strengthen that balance, which could well be achievable with a few added dollars, and a lot more political will and NATO cohesion.

If we judge the balance only by the bean count, we could do harm to NATO security by convincing ourselves and possibly the Soviets that a conventional defense of Western Europe is not possible, and that conventional deterrence is not feasible. The former could lead us either to seek the wrong conventional improvements, or unnecessarily to increase our reliance on nuclear weapons. The latter could result in the Soviets concluding in a crisis that a conventional attack on NATO is a viable option and thus lead to war.

The debate over the INF Treaty is not going to be over the details of the treaty as much as over the directions in which it leads us. The number of weapons it covers is relatively small, but its symbolism is large in terms of the precedent it sets for extensive verification and on-site inspection and the doors that it opens to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. If properly managed, we should welcome that reduced reliance.

The NATO alliance with a greater population and Gross National Product than the Warsaw Pact and with more reliable allies than the Warsaw Pact, and hopefully with an intense determination to defend our freedom should be capable of defending itself with conventional weapons and of relying less on nuclear weapons.

Those weapons have lost much of their credibility to deter because of their massive overkill and suicidal features; and to the extent they retain their deterrent effect, if the deterrent ever fails, the use of those weapons could extinguish life on this planet, perhaps the only life in the universe.

Mr. Chairman, let me commend you and Senator Warner for what you have done in laying out the hearings. They are typical of the comprehensive and fair approach which you take and I want to commend you on it. And I join in your welcome of our very distinguished witnesses this morning.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin, we will have an opportunity to hear you as a witness before the committee since you have done so much work on the subcommittee panel on conventional arms control and conventional posture. We are going to invite you to testify at some point and then we will get to ask you questions, something we have all looked forward to for a long time.

Senator LEVIN. You did not tell me that when you extended the invitation, that there would be questions too.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My congratulations to you and to Senator Warner for putting us on a path to have very thorough and comprehensive hearings. I look forward to them. I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of my statement be incorporated in the record at this point.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Quayle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

Before these INF Treaty hearings get underway, I'd like to comment on at least three things I believe the Committee must accomplish in the hearings ahead.

First, we must determine what the military implications are of removing our INF missiles from Europe and establish what we and our allies should do to maintain deterrence once the missiles are removed.

Second, the Committee must clear up any key ambiguities in the treaty to prevent any major legal or interpretative problems that might otherwise arise with the Executive, our allies, and, most important, the Soviets.

Finally, the Committee must identify what's good and bad in the treaty so the good precedents might be built on and carried over to future arms control talks and the bad ones acknowledged and discarded.

Each of these tasks will require serious deliberation and discipline. Each of us will have to put aside whatever views we may have about the desirability of ratifying this treaty and focus instead on the tasks identified.

Whatever our views might be about the INF Treaty, though, there ought to be no dispute that it has challenged us to reevaluate what NATO's defense requires. The British and French, for example, are quite anxious that the INF Treaty not lead to the denuclearization and eventually the demilitarization of NATO.

Our own Defense Department has also begun to reassess how we should defend our allies without abandoning NATO's agreed strategy of Flexible Response. Certainly, NATO now will depend more heavily on its conventional forces to deter Soviet attack. What the Committee must address is what NATO's new mix of nuclear and nonnuclear forces should be and how this mix might best be achieved.

One of the most promising approaches to guide us in this effort, I believe, is competitive strategy, which seeks to align enduring Western strengths against persistent Warsaw Pact weaknesses. As detailed in this Saturday's New York Times, the Defense Department has just completed a Competitive Strategy Task Force Report on defending Europe, which spells out what changes and new conventional weapons programs NATO should emphasize to optimize its defense.

These changes are not get-well programs, such as increased ammunition and spare parts stocks, but highly leveraged programs that will help deter conventional attacks not only against NATO's central front, but against NATO's Northern and Southern flanks, as well as attacks against out-of-area nations whose security is critical to NATO's well being.

To improve NATO's forward defenses along the Inter-German Border, the Task Force Report emphasizes the need for longer range artillery, improved anti-armor mine laying capabilities, extended air defenses, and low-cost terrain barriers. To replace the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons against any Warsaw Pact breakthrough against these forward defenses, the Task Force Report also emphasizes the need for both long and short-range nonnuclear cruise missiles and real-time intelligence collection and fusion capabilities. The Task Force also outlines several organizational and operational changes to the existing commands in Europe.

The Task Force Report makes clear, however, that none of these conventional upgrades will enhance NATO's security unless they are mated with improvements to

NATO's nuclear forces that have long been overdue to assure their survivability and, if necessary, their discriminate military use. The reason why is simple: Without a credible, survivable NATO nuclear threat against Warsaw Pact forces, the Soviets might feel free to use nuclear weapons first against NATO's conventional forces to stand the alliance down.

More important, without credible, survivable NATO nuclear forces, conventional Warsaw Pact forces would be more likely to concentrate for an attack against NATO. What currently compels Pact forces to stay relatively dispersed into waves or echelons is the fear that any major concentration of their heavy armored divisions would present too tempting a target to a limited NATO tactical nuclear strike.

Without this threat, the Soviets could focus their armor to gain impressive force ratio advantages and punch through NATO's key weak points. On the other hand, so long as Pact forces remain echeloned, there is hope that NATO can cope with their conventional attacks without resorting to nuclear weapons by attacking Pact reinforcements with conventional deep-strike weaponry.

It's important to note that to assure a credible, survivable NATO nuclear force, NATO does not need to deploy more nuclear weapons than it already has. It simply needs to modernize the weapons it has. At a minimum, NATO should follow the guidelines it agreed to in 1983 at Montebello when the removal of INF missiles was not a serious prospect. Through modernization NATO should be able eventually to reduce the number of nuclear weapons below current levels.

The specific package of Montebello nuclear upgrades has been identified and the Competitive Strategy package of conventional upgrades has also been prepared. Both, in fact, are highlighted in the Byrd/Quayle "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990s" report required by Congress. The Defense Department should identify and protect these programs against further cuts in the current Executive budget review.

Beyond identifying and protecting these programs, though, the Defense Department and the Senate Armed Services Committee should consider the desirability of placing all of these theater-related programs under unified management.

This, in essence, is what the NATO Defense Initiative or NDI is all about. Creation of an NDI, which I proposed at the end of last year's Congressional session, would have several advantages.

First, it would give the Defense Department time to identify and consolidate the key programs mentioned above under the management of a specific individual that Congress and the Services could easily identify. Second, it would allow the Executive and Congress to tie any funding of these programs beyond current levels to allied burden sharing in their development or procurement.

In this way, we could assure truly useful, leveraged arms cooperation beyond existing long-range research and development agreements at the same time as we assured that the NDI did not become a new, costly defense burden to the U.S. In fact, NATO could pay for NDI within existing budgets simply by altering its priorities. At the very most, NDI should cost no more than 5 percent of what NATO is already expected to spend over the next 15 years. If we can't cooperate securing such a modest amount, we need to rethink what we are doing.

I have already discussed the NDI with the Administration. The Wall Street Journal and Defense News have endorsed the idea. It deserves the attention of the Committee as well. Certainly, the NDI or something like it will be necessary to assure that NATO doesn't take the wrong cue from our agreement to the INF Treaty.

This, then, brings us to what I believe is the Committee's second key responsibility during these hearings—to assure that there are no ambiguities in the treaty that might cause major disputes with the Executive, our allies or the Soviets after the agreement is ratified.

The key purpose in reaching an INF agreement, after all, is to reduce tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Europe. The last thing anyone wants is a set of misunderstandings or fights over the INF Treaty like those we have had over the various interpretations of the ABM Treaty.

In this regard, there are at least four major areas where clarification is needed.

First, the precise meaning of Article 14 of the treaty, commonly referred to as the noncircumvention clause, must be determined. Under this article the parties agree to comply with the treaty and not to assume any "international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions."

What is the purpose of this language? Is Article 14 simply redundant, a political statement? Or is it substantive and establishes specific obligations beyond those contained in the treaty's earlier provisions?

Might this article prevent the U.S. alone or in cooperation with its allies from deploying needed additional cruise missiles (either nuclear or nonnuclear), desired

dual-capable aircraft, a follow-on missile to the Lance, or new hypersonic boost guide vehicles or other hypervelocity weapons?

If so, we need to know and be certain that whatever is binding against us is also binding against the Soviets. If not, we need to make this clear both to the Soviets and our own defense planners.

Second, there is no clear definition or understanding of what future INF-capable missile systems might be covered under the treaty. Article 7 of the treaty considers "... all missiles of (a certain) type" to be weapons delivery vehicles if they were tested in this mode and prohibits them. This seems definitive. Yet, nowhere in the treaty is the critical word "type" defined.

This would not be a serious problem if the treaty only discussed missile "types" when attempting to ban weapons. Unfortunately, though, the treaty also tries to define permissible new "types" (e.g., dedicated air defense missiles or unarmed missiles tested to ranges less than 500 kilometers or more than 5500 kilometers).

This creates several problems. For example, how much modification of an existing prohibited missile such as the SSC-X-4, would be necessary to allow it to be considered to be a "new type" and, thus deployable so long as it is claimed to be unarmed? Such missile type questions will be critical in determining what will or will not be banned—much more important than questions concerning whether or not the missile is armed or not or has prohibited range since these qualities are virtually impossible to verify with confidence under the treaty. Finally, there may also be difficulties in verifying Soviet claims that a certain missile type will only be used for air defense applications.

Certainly, the Senate has already had bad experiences with disputes over permitted and prohibited missile types under SALT I (the SS-19) and SALT II (the SS-25). It must see to it that such missile type problems are not carried over into INF.

Third, the treaty currently lacks any clear missile data base against which the elimination of banned missiles can be effectively measured. Treaty supporters rightly celebrated the treaty's unprecedented exchange of detailed missile information contained in a Memorandum of Understanding on November 1, 1987 as a critical aid to validating the destruction of banned systems. Here was a precedent for future arms agreements.

I was mildly shocked, then, when I learned that the real data base against which compliance will be measured isn't what we agreed to November 1, but rather another data base that won't be forthcoming until 30 days after the treaty comes into force. What is even more disturbing is that this new data base can't be reviewed or challenged. Whatever it is, the U.S. must accept it.

This potentially creates a major loophole. Under the treaty the U.S.S.R. may claim to have eliminated weapons systems and facilities before we receive the final data base. This would allow them to delete these missiles or missile facilities from their tally without our having exercised any of our inspection rights provided for under the treaty. This eliminates the confidence we might have gained from having an agreed data base and leaves us with no recourse if the final data base conflicts with our own intelligence.

Fourth and last, Article 6 of the treaty appears to allow the Soviets to produce first and second stages of the SS-25 that could be virtually identical to the first and second stages of the prohibited SS-20. Administration sources have stated that only the first stage of the SS-25 shall be allowed to have such close similarity and not the SS-25's second stage. If so, it appears that Article 6 is in direct conflict with the stated U.S. position. This matter needs to be clarified lest the ambiguity allows the Soviets to produce the very missiles the treaty was intended to prohibit.

These are four concerns I have with the treaty itself. There may be others. Beyond these INF Treaty issues, however, the Committee must also consider what impact the agreement might have on future arms negotiations. At a minimum, the Committee should make clear what bad INF Treaty precedents our negotiators should avoid in the future.

At least three deserve the Committee's attention. The first is the INF Treaty's ban on conventionally armed ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) that have a range between 500 and 5500 kilometers. Frankly, I consider this ban to have been a mistake.

General Galvin, our NATO commander, was about to complete a requirement for such a missile when he was told that missiles of this type had been banned.

The argument made to support this prohibition is that it was necessary for verification purposes. Because we cannot verify the difference between nuclear and conventionally armed missiles with high confidence, it was argued, both nuclear and conventionally armed GLCMs had to be banned.

If long-range conventionally armed GLCMs were unimportant to defend our allies, this might be tolerable. In fact, such missiles would have helped NATO cope conventionally with the threat of a Pact attack. Instead of having to depend so much on planes located on vulnerable air bases or sea-launched cruise missiles that might not reach their targets or ever be launched in a timely fashion, NATO could have deployed conventional GLCMs.

More important, it is unclear why it was necessary to ban conventionally armed GLCMs for verification purposes but not unarmed surveillance and target missile drones. Can we tell the difference between armed and unarmed missiles any better than we can between nuclear missiles and conventionally armed missiles?

The answer I believe is clear—no. In the first case, however, the Soviets wanted the ban in order to cap NATO's conventional deep-strike capabilities and our own military had no near-term requirement yet formally established. In the second case the Soviets had less of an objection and our military had a formal requirement already on the books. These concerns, not verification, explain what happened.

When we get to START, our approach to the issue of conventional cruise missile limits should be more serious. If it isn't, the Soviets will be almost certain to secure bans on both our option for long-range conventional SLCMs and ALCMs, systems the President's Commission on Long-range Integrate Strategy identified as being Western systems critical to our defense in Europe and our allies abroad.

A second bad precedent established in the INF Treaty that must be avoided in START is the treaty's lack of any right to demand on-site inspections of suspect sites. We sought such inspection rights up until the very close of the INF Treaty negotiations but failed to get them. As a result, the Soviets might well produce or store missiles prohibited by the treaty at sites we would have no right to inspect. Without such inspection rights, we will lack an important means of both deterring and validating possible violations. This cannot be tolerated in START where the noncompliance stakes are much higher.

A third INF precedent to avoid that has already been discussed is the treaty's lack of an agreed data base prior to ratification and the loophole this may create for unverified missile or missile facility "eliminations." With START we should sign nothing until we have an agreed, final data base.

More, of course could be said and will be in the weeks ahead detailing other precedents we should avoid or improve upon. What I have laid out, however, is a fairly full agenda. However, it is the minimum if we are serious about performing the Senate's constitutional advice and consent role.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Chairman, I welcome our two distinguished witnesses here today, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The issue that is before us is not if this treaty is going to be ratified but how is it going to be ratified, how are these deliberations going to take place, what are the questions, how are they going to be answered.

One of the key things that I am interested in is making sure that we do not have any ambiguities in this treaty or misunderstandings. I daresay I do not want to repeat any kind of revisitation of the whole heated debate that we had on the ABM Treaty and its interpretation, particularly with Agreed Statement D.

Chairman NUNN. I can say that I agree completely with that statement.

Senator QUAYLE. At all costs, we ought to make sure that we do not have to go down that road again. It has not been pleasant for a number of us. Important, but not terribly pleasant.

There are three areas, Mr. Chairman, that I will be concentrating my efforts on during these hearings and hopefully incorporating them in the report and how we proceed in this debate.

One, I think it is important to see where we are now, particularly in our military posture, and I believe our witnesses today can give us some very good answers to that.

We do not need to do new things because we are ratifying the INF Treaty. I think what we need to do is to take an examination

of what we had planned to do and perhaps separate out some of the important things we planned to do and move forward.

I am very hopeful that we will come forth at some time with a NATO defense initiative or a theater defense initiative that will take some things that have been outlined in the Competitive Strategies Task Force report and protect those programs along with the implementation of Montebello. I believe that we have a good, positive response. It is not a new response. It is something that we are doing now. But it needs to be highlighted, it needs to be coordinated, it needs to be elevated.

I believe that it is very important that we begin to work with our allies in a coordinated and cooperative manner. That is one major concern I have, how we are going to proceed on a military balance.

There are some concerns and, I believe, ambiguities that are in this treaty that need to be articulated, to be laid out in the record. One that concerns me greatly is what is the interpretation and understanding of article 14, the so-called noncircumvention article. What does this article mean? Does it have a new meaning? Are we talking about things beyond what we are prohibiting in this treaty?

Noncircumvention, or the word is actually not noncircumvention but conflict in the article. What does article 14 mean in relationship to other provisions in this treaty? It does not say in the treaty, but our witnesses will certainly be able to answer that.

A second concern that I have is with article 6, where we have said publicly that the Soviet Union would only be able to produce the stage I similarity of the SS-20, which is also very similar to the SS-25, but not the second stage. That has been our public pronouncement.

But a quick reading, or a careful reading of article 6, it may just be a mistake or maybe that I am just not reading it right, it looks like it might allow the production of that second stage, which we have said that we do not want. If we look at that and examine it at least to make sure that my understanding is what has been publicly stated.

Another concern that I have is the lack of definition of what a new type of missile is. There is no definition of this. We have had this come up in the SALT I agreement and in the SALT II agreement and we will probably have it come up in this agreement too. What do we mean by a new type of missile that would be prohibited by this treaty?

That is certainly not defined and certainly not articulated, and it certainly must be to clear up any ambiguity.

A final concern that I have, and these are just on the first reading of this treaty, is that we may have a potential problem with the data base. We have made a lot of public pronouncements that we have a very thorough data base in this memorandum of understanding. That is true, but on reading the treaty, the real data base that counts is not the one that is incorporated here, but the one that will be given to us 30 days after this treaty is implemented. What kind of inspection rights we have to any investigative discrepancies that we find there.

And finally Mr. Chairman, I believe that we ought to look forward to and discuss some precedents in this treaty that we might want to follow in other treaties, like START. The ground launched

cruise missile, conventional cruise missile that is banned in this treaty, over 500 kilometers, I believe is a mistake. I hope that we do not repeat that mistake in START.

I hope that we continue to have an expansion of on-site inspection to include suspect sites. We do not have that in this treaty, but I hope that we do in START. And I also hope that we have a data base understanding more precise than what we have in this treaty.

So I think Mr. Chairman, as we proceed, these are areas of my concern and my focus. I certainly look forward to the witnesses today and the witnesses that we have in the future and to working with you and other members of this committee for a very thorough discussion of this treaty and how it impacts our national security.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Quayle. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with those members of the panel that have commended you and Senator Warner for working out a hearing schedule and program to evaluate national security policy over these next several weeks. I think this will be an enormous help, not just to the members of this panel and of the Senate, but for the American people. It is probably as comprehensive a review as this committee has undertaken in any recent time.

I want to join in welcoming our witnesses. I would like to have my statement filed in its entirety in the record and then make some additional brief comments.

Based on my reading of the prepared statements of the hearing, I have some pressing concerns about the fate of this treaty. The issue is not ratification, which I believe will be readily forthcoming, but whether the administration is on a course that will within months snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by rendering this agreement meaningless, both militarily and politically. Two dangers threaten the treaty.

First, Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe note that the treaty contributes significantly to our security and that of our allies in Europe and Asia. For example, they point out that eliminating these INF systems will improve our conventional situation in Europe by reducing the Soviet's ability to mount a massive preemptive strike against the crucial centers for reinforcement of NATO—the air bases, ports, supply depots and command and control nodes.

These benefits will be only fleeting unless they are followed by progress in strategic arms control. Without limits on strategic weapons, the Soviets can simply add SS-24's and SS-25's to take up the slack left by withdrawing INF missiles.

The INF Treaty cannot be considered, I believe, in isolation. To be militarily meaningful, it must be accompanied by a strategic arms control agreement. The INF Treaty is only the first step in what must be a comprehensive arms control regime.

Mr second concern involves the tactical nuclear modernization that both witnesses call for in their testimony. The ink is hardly dry on the INF Treaty and the administration is pressing for immediate new nuclear deployments. These deployments would undercut the substantial gains of INF.

New nuclear weapons will reignite the European concern of the early 1980's. They will exacerbate the already significant pressures in Germany for the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons. The significant achievement of the INF Treaty is not only military, but political—the remarkable unity of the Western alliance that it demonstrates.

New nuclear deployments will fracture that cohesion and provide a political windfall to the Soviets. The challenge that we face is to solidify the military gains of the INF Treaty, not to undercut them. And I intend to do all that I can to see that the ratification process in the Senate meets that challenge wisely. We cannot afford to take one step back from the nuclear brink with INF and two steps toward the brink by launching a new arms race in tactical and strategic weapons. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

I too want to welcome Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe to these auspicious and unique hearings on the INF Treaty. The treaty is a worthwhile contribution to U.S. and NATO security by cementing progress on three levels.

First, it is a major step toward re-establishing a broad, bipartisan consensus in the United States on national security policy: A welcome sign that we can and should negotiate arms control agreements with our principal adversary to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

The Nature of the ratification process, however, presents an opportunity for a few Senators to chip away at this consensus by attaching conditions and reservations designed to derail ratification or destroy the possibility of a future arms reduction agreement. These efforts must be resisted.

The impasse on arms control since the early 1970s can be broken by the breadth of support for this treaty. It was negotiated by a Republican Administration—and it can be ratified overwhelmingly by a Democratic Senate.

Second, on the level of the Western Alliance, the INF Treaty represents a triumph for NATO. The 16 democracies of NATO have sustained a difficult political and military judgment—the 1979 decision to pursue a dual track of missile deployments and negotiations for their removal. As long as NATO retains this impressive unity, Soviet challenges to its military preparedness will be ineffective.

With this NATO victory secure, U.S. failure to ratify the treaty would be a tragedy for Western Europe. The United States could no longer be trusted as a serious and reliable partner in arms control. The ability of NATO to engage in future arms control negotiations and modernization of its remaining nuclear forces would be crippled.

Third, with respect to U.S.-Soviet relations, the INF Treaty has significance beyond the narrow area it specifically addresses. On a broader level, it establishes an indispensable precedent for future arms control agreements. It demonstrates that both sides now have the will to seek agreements in their mutual interests; and it suggests that the achievement of a START agreement this year has moved from the status of impossible dream to realistic possibility.

The INF Treaty itself affects only four percent of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, but it is historic nonetheless, because it is the first agreement ever to require the dismantling and destruction of nuclear delivery systems. Previous agreements simply capped additional systems that could be built. By actually eliminating weapons, the INF Treaty signals a genuine commitment to deeper nuclear reductions.

I also welcome the INF Treaty because of its advances in verification. This treaty has the most elaborate and intrusive verification regime ever negotiated. In particular, the Soviet Union's acceptance of on-site inspection and monitoring of production is a major breakthrough that will greatly facilitate the negotiation of a strategic nuclear arms control agreement.

For all of these reasons, the INF Treaty is an impressive achievement, and both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev deserve real credit for bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. I am confident that the United States Senate will not break with this historic agreement and the opportunity it has given us for even greater progress in the year ahead.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy. Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, let me join my colleagues in welcoming our distinguished guests today.

We begin today a historic debate. Historic not because the debate, in my opinion, is going to affect the outcome of the INF Treaty, which I believe is going to be ratified, but historic because we are going to begin the process of defining exactly what we have agreed to, and what the Soviets believe they have agreed to.

We are going to make a decision as to whether this treaty should be altered. Altered not so much in areas related to verification, but potentially altered in areas where we set out a policy as to what we want to do if we verify that the Soviets are not complying.

But I think most importantly, we are setting the framework in this debate for START, to follow the INF Treaty which is going to have a dramatic impact on American security. I think this debate is going to be vitally important to that process. It is vitally important that we present our concerns, that we debate the issues, and that everybody understand the security implications for the United States and for our European allies, not only in INF but in the likely follow-on.

I, for one, am concerned that we are beginning the debate with the old process I see around here a lot, and that is debating strawmen. Most of the criticisms I read of the INF Treaty are criticisms that in essence are written on the faulty premise that this treaty denuclearizes Europe.

As I read the treaty, we still have roughly 4,500 nuclear weapons in Europe. That is plenty of firepower in my mind to keep Ivan back from the gate. The relevant question, it seems to me, is what do the Soviets lose in terms of ability to project military power and blackmailing Europe, by losing short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles; and what do we lose in terms of deterrence by losing them?

What does it mean in terms of conventional balance? Are we stronger conventionally in the absence of these missiles, or are we weaker? How should our policy change as a result of this change that will be produced by this treaty?

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is vitally important, as several of our colleagues have said earlier, that there be a thorough debate as we move into a Presidential election. With the INF Treaty clearly on a fast track to ratification and with the potential of the most far-reaching arms control agreement in history clearly on the horizon, I think it is vitally important that we all know what is happening, that we all have at least the capacity to look at the same facts.

I believe that our debate is going to be vitally important to the future of America's security. I look forward to it, and I appreciate your leadership, and I appreciate the fact that we have very able people running the Pentagon representing the interests of our Nation and its people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gramm. I believe Senator Bingaman is next.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just compliment you and Senator Warner also for holding this set of hear-

ings. Obviously, the issues that are going to be addressed are extremely important. I am particularly interested in the verification issues that surround the INF Treaty and the implications that those have for any future treaty.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Bingaman, on that point our committee will be going into the issue of verification to some extent, but we are also going to try to maximize our coordination with Senator Boren and the Intelligence Committee. The members of this committee will be invited to attend the Intelligence Committee hearings. We are going to try to avoid duplication, but we are going to be very involved in the verification aspects.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much. I look forward to the testimony of Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe and the rest of the distinguished witnesses you have scheduled.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being here. I know that we are embarked on a discussion of a very complex set of issues, and perhaps a historic arms control agreement.

I know that Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe and their colleagues are going to do their best to ensure that we can both make the kinds of arms reductions, actually reduce the risk of war, and carry out such reductions in a way that will preserve our Nation's security.

There are three major areas that I am deeply concerned about. The nature of the INF Treaty, its impact on NATO, and its impact on the long-term risk of nuclear war. I believe that the witnesses today can provide us with the expert information and facts as opposed to many of the other witnesses who will give us the benefit of their opinions.

I am looking for the kind of detailed answers, net assessment analysis and budget impact statements for the record that will give this committee and the American people the facts that they really need to understand the INF Treaty.

My first major concern is with verification in the broadest possible sense. I know that the Intelligence Committee will touch upon the technical issues involved in verification, but I am deeply concerned about the issue of whether we can detect and predict the overall pattern of change in the Soviet and Warsaw Pact nuclear force posture, and can do so in time to react to any increase in the threat.

Let me illustrate some of the reasons for my concern. There are major contradictions between virtually all of the data that the Department of Defense furnished us on the Soviet nuclear threat at the start of 1987, and the data furnished in the annex to the INF Treaty.

For example, the data annexed to the treaty says that there are 115 deployed SS-12 launchers, and 220 missiles. The 1987 addition of the Department of Defense report on Soviet military power makes no reference to the nodes for the SS-12, which is a missile system with a range of 900 kilometers. It also does not mention the fact that the U.S.S.R. turns out to have some 506 more nondeployed missiles. Similar problems emerge in trying to understand

the differences between past estimates of the strength of the U.S.S.R.'s SS-4, SS-23, and SS-15 forces.

Since all of these estimates are unclassified, I would like an unclassified explanation for the record, by individual type of missile system, of the differences between the estimates of Soviet missile and launcher strength and the data annex to the treaty and the Department's estimates in its posture statements, reports and briefings.

More broadly, I would like to have a detailed statement of the confidence that the administration and the Defense Intelligence Agency have in their ability to detect any overall change in the Soviet nuclear force posture of a kind that might materially affect the theater nuclear balance.

I would like to know the warning time we are likely to have of typical changes in the U.S.S.R.'s force posture, and I would like a detailed statement of how we could react to such changes by redeploying theater nuclear systems or taking other measures to protect ourselves and our allies.

I am deeply concerned that there is ultimately only one way to enforce an arms control agreement, and that is by both being able to detect any increase in the threat and being able to react to that change.

I am also deeply concerned with the adequacy of our national technical means to support the INF Treaty in addition to performing all its existing tasks and expanding its tactical support of our theater nuclear commanders. I do not want to impinge on the role of the Intelligence Committee, or move into sensitive areas.

I would, however, like a general statement for the record of whether you feel our intelligence programs are adequate and are adequately funded to perform both their existing and program tasks, and the additional workload of monitoring all of the changes that will take place in Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic and theater nuclear forces as a result of an INF and START Treaty.

My second major area of concern is the NATO-Warsaw Pact and global military balance. The real issue in judging the treaty is not how many INF forces are cut, but the impact of these cuts on the military balance and the risk of war. The Department has shown on many occasions that it can produce unclassified estimates of the military balance, and I look forward to a comprehensive estimate on this issue.

I would like, for the record, to see every possible technique of analysis applied in depth to provide this committee with a current and projected theater nuclear balance, with and without an INF Treaty. I would like to see this balance projected forward for at least the same time period as in the past estimates, in this case to the year 2000.

I would like to see this analysis discuss how the nuclear balance with and without INF reductions affects four critical issues. Soviet and Warsaw Pact incentives and capability to launch a nuclear first strike against NATO, Soviet and Warsaw Pact incentives and capability to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological weapons, Soviet and Warsaw Pact capability to decouple the nuclear capabilities of the United States from the defense of Europe, and Soviet ability to substitute strategic systems

and bombers like the Backfire for INF forces without seriously impacting on Soviet strategic capabilities.

Further, I think it is very important to see an assessment of the effect of rushing into the kind of "triple zero" option to reduce theater nuclear arms that has just been proposed by the Soviet Union. I am deeply concerned with this issue because NATO has already removed so many of its shorter range systems from Europe, while the latest estimates by the Department show a massive buildup in Soviet short range nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities.

I think it is absolutely vital that this committee review and express its views on the impact of theater air breathing systems and short range land based nuclear systems on the balances with the treaty, and on the need to modernize them.

I am deeply also concerned with our ability to get the Department's views on conventional balance. I agree with Senator Levin that it is not enough to do "bean counts." I also want to make absolutely sure that the Department gives us a clear classified and unclassified picture of the projected trends in the conventional balance. We are after all talking about the next 10 years.

I also must stress that I only want to see what is actually included in the Department's program and NATO force plans to be honest. One grows a bit weary of hearing about new tactics and about force multipliers and new technologies which we have not budgeted and which are not in the FYDP. When I look at the most recent budget information and intelligence data coming out of the Department, I see estimates that the U.S.S.R. is producing 3.5 times as many tanks, 10 times as many artillery weapons, 12 times as many bombers, 2.2 times as many fighters, 2.5 times as many helicopters and on and on.

Finally, I am concerned about all the rhetoric I am hearing about how improved conventional forces will compensate us for reductions in nuclear forces. I feel this disguises a single lack of the financial resources to buy those options. I want to see the Department's estimate of what we would have to do to the current 5-year defense program, and what our allies would have to do to their force plans to give NATO a robust conventional option in the central region as a substitute for intermediate range nuclear weapons.

I think it is important that we need a specific picture of what would have to be done to each line item in the ensuing budgets in the rest of the current 5-year defense program.

Quite frankly, I am afraid that we are going to see our conventional forces grow weaker rather than stronger. We have shifted in the last 5 years from defense budgets with more than 3 percent real increases in defense spending, to budgets with cuts of more than 3 percent. We are now procuring about half of the major conventional land and air weapons we planned to procure just 5 years ago.

We cannot create a conventional option through analytic revisionism by having outside analysts trying to readjust our understanding of the balance. We need to have a clearly defined conventional option that the Armed Services Committee can act on in response to the INF Treaty, and we need it in the form of a possible supplement to the fiscal year 1989 defense budget.

I also cannot think of anything more destructive than to engage in "burden sharing" attacks on our allies that concentrate on trying to get them to spend more on their total defense budgets rather than seek the kind of specific improvements in their forces that will actually improve deterrence for the military balance.

I make no claim to be an expert on the existence or nonexistence of "voodoo economics." I am not a Presidential candidate, one of the few. I am however absolutely certain of my ability to define "voodoo defense." There is only one real issue in burden sharing, and that is whether the Department feels allied military forces are adequate or can become adequate. All the econometrics in the world cannot provide an answer to that question.

I have the highest regard for President Reagan. I have equal respect for his arms control negotiators, and I believe in arms control. I want to be able to fully support the INF Treaty and to be able to believe that we can safely move toward a START Treaty and even conventional force reductions.

I, and the American people, need to be sure however, that we do not rush into an agreement without being certain that we will in fact reduce the risk of war. I want to know that once we reach that agreement, our Nation's defense planners are fully confident that we will be able to enforce the treaty, and we will have a defense program that will keep our Nation safe.

I want to be sure that we do not avoid the issue of our dependence on nuclear deterrence by claiming we will create a conventional option that we will not fund.

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, as we embark on this very difficult and complex treaty before us.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. I believe next on the Democratic side is Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, first of all, may I insert my rather lengthy statement in the record in the interest of time.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection it will be inserted.

Senator DIXON. Let me just briefly say that I think that this is a historical moment, and I hope very much to be able to support this INF Treaty. I am delighted to see Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe here. I look forward to their testimony and their answers to questions that are on the minds of all of us.

I am sure that we all agree that we want to be satisfied that proper verification is clearly and readily apparent in this treaty, on-site eyeball type verification will satisfy our deepest suspicions.

Beyond that, I'm sure that I speak for many other Members of the U.S. Senate when I say that I want to be confident that this is only the first step. If it is not just the first step I would be very concerned, because I think that we need to have a treaty on strategic nuclear weapons. I think we have to have an arms control agreement on conventional weapons and chemical weapons.

I am very concerned about the imbalance between us and the Warsaw Pact nations in connection with our conventional capabilities. As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and Sustainability and Support I know my other colleagues on that subcommittee are concerned about those questions.

Mr. Chairman, you and I visited many times about the course of our hearings last year. Notwithstanding all the money that we

have spent since I came to the U.S. Senate with the election of President Reagan, it is apparent now I think that by 1991 we will be in about the same position as 1981 with respect to our ammunition, our spare parts, our depot maintenance, real property maintenance, and any of the other important considerations for maintaining adequate readiness and sustainability of our forces.

Those are vital concerns, Mr. Chairman. And I think that as we look at this treaty, we have to look at it in light of those developments. Our challenge is with respect to what we are going to do on the conventional side, if we do not have very quickly an arms control agreement in connection with conventional and chemical weaponry as well as strategic nuclear weaponry. So I thank the Chair for this opportunity. I will place my rather lengthy statement in the record and I look forward to the testimony.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, today's hearing marks the beginning of a long careful process as we consider the ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty with the Soviet Union.

This treaty, is the first step in what ultimately must be a four step process to bring about true, verified arms control and lasting peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. I consider this treaty only a first step because the administration must continue to seek an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons, on conventional forces as well as on chemical weapons. However, the first step is always the most difficult and most important step in any peace process.

The INF Treaty would require the United States to destroy 850 missiles and the Soviet Union 1,990. The agreement provides for the destruction of all missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,000 miles, along with their launchers and support equipment. To ensure verification of this treaty, both countries may conduct inspections beginning 60 days after enactment of the treaty. Provisions of the treaty also require an inventory of all designated sites to verify, through on-hand and eyeball inspections, that all banned equipment and weaponry has been removed and destroyed. The treaty further requires an inspection team to be stationed full-time at the final missile assembly plants of both nations for thirteen years.

Mr. Chairman, Senate consideration of the treaty is of unquestionable importance and requires the total attention of this committee and the entire Senate. However, I must stress the undeniable consequences ratification and implementation of this treaty will have on the NATO alliance and our capability to maintain a credible deterrence in Europe. I believe many will agree that the Soviet Union began serious negotiation of an INF Treaty because they clearly realized their vulnerability to nuclear attack, with marginal warning time, from intermediate nuclear missiles based in Europe. The Soviets now realize that the removal of NATO intermediate nuclear missiles will force us to, once again, rely upon U.S. ICBM strength. I believe there is no question NATO's deterrence capability is reduced through this treaty. With the exception of a few of our European allies, NATO conventional forces are extremely weak and highly vulnerable. The conventional superiority of Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies represents a destabilizing force in Europe and must be reduced if our intermediate nuclear forces are going to be withdrawn and destroyed.

Our NATO allies have historically relied on nuclear weapons as an option in the event of a Soviet attack which cannot be checked or defeated conventionally. As you have stated in the past, Mr. Chairman, our conventional forces in Western Europe are considered by some of our allies as simply a nuclear tripwire. When the United States has called upon our allies to build up their conventional forces, we are told it is politically, militarily and fiscally impossible. However, our allies point to our strategic nuclear forces and our battlefield nuclear forces as a viable deterrence. Clearly, NATO must realize that there must be a fundamental change in their force structure and their conventional logistics planning as a result of this treaty. Rather than spending tremendous sums of money on the development of new fighter planes, perhaps the money would be better spent on building up their conventional ammunition programs.

Mr. Chairman, NATO's conventional forces are not the only problem. In fact, we are facing many of the same problems. Do we have the capability to supply our

forces in NATO? Are a sufficient number of merchant ships available for transportation? What consequences would we face if we have to fight in Europe while having to fight on a second front. It has happened before, it is entirely possible once again. Is the United States defense industrial base prepared to support not only our military requirements, but that of our allies? Can we realistically depend on the industrial base of our NATO allies in a European conflict? As I have stated before, our own defense industrial base has been deteriorating before our very eyes. The ability of our armed forces to fight anywhere in the world, for a requisite period of time, is only a dream. It is imperative that we pass a defense industrial program for the United States during the 100th Congress.

Often we have called for commonality of military systems with our NATO allies, yet we do not have this compatibility among our own military forces. The Defense Department will be facing lower defense budgets, not only this year, but over the next few years. Obviously, the services realize that they will not be able to develop several new weapons systems they desire. However, neither can our defense experts offer a budget which contains further cuts in our ammunition accounts or maintenance requirements. Rather, we must work with present systems and improve existing weapons. For example, the Air Force cannot expect us to approve a new aircraft for close air support. The AV8-B aircraft already exists and is being used successfully by the Marines for the same type of mission.

Mr. Chairman, these are a few of the many concerns I have prior to these hearings and hope to have answered by the conclusion. Although I am pleased at the negotiation and signing of this historic treaty with the Soviet Union, it must not stand alone. These hearings must explore every possible ramification resulting from this agreement and serve as a guide to our negotiating team in the ensuing push for strategic, chemical and conventional arms treaties.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Dixon. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my statement also be included in the record. I have a couple of more remarks to go along with it.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection it will be included.

Senator GLENN. Basically, today we are addressing the INF Treaty and I think it is a breakthrough—a psychological breakthrough on the inspection and verification techniques for the future.

I am very concerned about verification and inspection. I took the break as an opportunity to visit some of our national weapons laboratories that are directly involved in that, and I must say that I was encouraged by what I found there. The planning that had gone on well in advance of this treaty is excellent.

I am concerned, though, about one other area. I think most people are looking at this treaty as a basis that can be followed in subsequent treaties in future agreements such as START. That may be the case or it may not. I found an appalling number of people and colleagues in the Senate, not necessarily on this committee, who were not aware that this treaty does not destroy one single nuclear explosive device.

Most newspaper people I talked to over the break were not aware of that and were surprised when you told them that this treaty destroys only the method of delivery. And the explosive devices are taken out completely to be used again.

Now I question whether that could automatically be our basis into the indefinite future. As we look at the START treaties, with possible 50 percent or 25 percent reductions, where do we say we are safe if we still have all of our nuclear weapons just sitting there waiting for different types of delivery devices.

The INF Treaty looks good, I am glad we have it. But I question whether we can feel that we can just negotiate on this same basis into the future on further reductions. I will be making some other statements on this issue.

As we have other hearings on the conventional balances, I would hope that you could use and advise your people over in the Pentagon when they come over to the committee to use the net assessment approach in addressing the offensive-defensive balances between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Too often we come up with the Time and Newsweek approach to weaponry, in that they say the Soviets have so many bombers and we have so many bombers, therefore we need more bombers. Well if you are in combat, bombers do not go out and fight bombers. What you have to do is use the net assessment approach I know you use internally over there. For some reason, historically it has been the case that usually you come over here and present it on a different basis.

That is the combat basis that we have to consider along with you in knowing what to buy and where to put our money. So I hope you could use that approach in the future.

I think in the future as we go down this track toward START, it is highly important that we know what the conventional balances are going to be as we take the nuclear equation into a lesser role. Also somewhere along here we have to bring other nuclear powers into the negotiations. We cannot contemplate the Reykjavik ultimate zero option without bringing China in, or we just make the P.R.C. predominant as a nuclear power. Somewhere we have to bring other nations into this process.

I am glad to welcome you back to the committee again. And my entire statement will be in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Glenn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

Mr. Chairman, I would like to join my colleagues in welcoming Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Admiral Crowe as the first witnesses in our committee's hearings on the national security implications of the INF Treaty. Their testimony today not only begins the committee's series of hearings on this important topic, but today's hearing begins this session's review of the formidable challenges facing us in the final year of the Reagan administration. Not only will the Department of Defense play a crucial role in the implementation of the INF Treaty, but it must confront the fourth year of negative growth in the defense budget.

Mr. Carlucci and Admiral Crowe have their work cut out for them, but I am confident that they are up to the job. I look forward to working closely with them in the days and weeks to come.

Senate scrutiny of this treaty and its implications, not only here on the Senate Armed Services Committee, but on the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, is of crucial importance as we in the Senate fulfill our constitutional role in the treaty-making process. To that end, I traveled with the Senate Arms Control Observer Group to Geneva last October and met with both Soviet and American negotiators as they were in the process of putting the final touches on the INF agreement. Just a few weeks ago, I visited the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico to review the verification technology that will be used to implement the provisions of this treaty. Our Senate hearings on the treaty will be indispensable in placing this agreement in its proper national security perspective.

I am pleased that the superpowers have signed an INF Treaty to ban all medium- and shorter-range missiles. Although this agreement will affect only a small percentage of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, this is a very positive step in U.S.-Soviet relations. If formally ratified, this treaty will be the first-ever reduction in existing nuclear missile stockpiles rather than a limitation on the deployment of

future nuclear delivery vehicles, as was the case with previous arms control agreements.

However, it is important to remember that while the INF agreement will bring about the destruction of an entire class of nuclear delivery vehicles, both sides will be permitted to retain the fissionable material and the guidance packages of their weapons for possible use in other nuclear weapons—a deficiency that must be addressed as we negotiate more militarily significant reductions in our strategic offensive forces.

The concern expressed by some that this agreement will somehow distance or “decouple” the United States from our NATO allies is greatly exaggerated. The most tangible expression of our military commitment in Europe is not nuclear missiles, but the presence of over 300,000 American troops in Western Europe as a tripwire for American involvement in the face of any Warsaw Pact aggression. Furthermore, this treaty will not result in the denuclearization of Western Europe. At the tactical, or battlefield level, NATO forces in Europe will still retain sufficient nuclear weaponry to deter attack from the Warsaw Pact.

It is important to remember that arms control agreements with the Soviet Union should not serve as a reward for Soviet behavior in other areas of superpower relations or merely as a symbol of trust and goodwill—they should be entered into because it is in our national security interest to do so. A vital element of arms control agreements is whether or not they contain sufficient provisions for each side to independently verify the compliance of the other.

Soviet acceptance of intrusive, on-site inspection is the most important aspect of the INF Treaty and represents a fundamental change in the Soviet approach to arms control. This concession gives hope for future strategic arms control agreements that truly will be militarily significant.

The Senate must play its constitutional role in the treaty ratification process, and I will closely scrutinize the details of this agreement—particularly the provisions for verification. Assuming that the INF Treaty's total verification package—including on-site inspection—proves adequate to detect militarily significant violations, I feel that the Senate should approve ratification of this agreement.

Mr. Chairman, one final point. Regarding the conventional force balance in Europe, I have always objected to force comparisons using numbers of like military equipment (e.g., tank versus tank, bomber versus bomber). I believe that such comparisons tend to obscure the broader, overall qualitative differences in our forces.

I have long advocated net assessment of military capabilities and am glad to see that we have made some progress with the JCS net assessments now being provided to SASC. I hope that the testimony on NATO and Warsaw Pact comparisons will be based on this approach.

I join my colleagues in welcoming Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe today.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn. On the point about nondestruction of some of the nuclear materials, Senator Stevens made a suggestion to me this morning and I will bring it to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

Some people in the administration have already been contacted. It would be very helpful to the committee if we had a mock up of a launcher, a missile, a warhead, the guidance system, so that we could then go through and have a description of what is and is not being destroyed in this arms control treaty.

I do not suggest for you to produce it today. But if you could coordinate with the State Department on that; Senator Stevens, is it correct that you have talked to some people in the administration?

Senator STEVENS. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. I think it would be very helpful to the committee. It is a good suggestion, so Mr. Secretary I will make that by way of a suggestion to be developed later on as we proceed. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I just returned from 2 weeks of discussions with our military leadership in Central Europe and with the British and German

military leadership and with political and military leaders in Poland.

One cannot come back from that kind of experience without being struck by a variety of themes.

First, the overwhelming support that exists right across the board for the INF Treaty.

Second, the changing climate in Europe, which impressed me from the time of my last visit, of being very dramatically changed in terms of pressures for rationalizing our relationship with the U.S.S.R., which of course has to be done. All one has to do is to look at the budgets on both sides of NATO and the Warsaw Pacts to understand the imperative of taking the steps that are envisioned here.

More importantly and for further steps after INF, one is struck by the historic imperative. If we read Professor Paul Kennedy's brilliant new book on the rise and fall of the great powers, it is very sobering to put our experience and leadership of the alliance in that perspective and to make us think long term over a scope of time the responsibilities that we have.

I was also struck Mr. Chairman, by the potential that has been referred to this morning by you and others of next steps, the START talks as envisioned by the President, conventional arms control which you discussed in your opening remarks, and also the potential for some other steps.

There was a good deal of discussion about the opportunities that we have in developing broader confidence building measures, building on top of the agreements that were reached in Stockholm in 1986 with which we have had a good deal of experience so far, and for which I would say our military commanders are very enthusiastic, and the potential for opening discussions on strategy and doctrine on both sides, so that we each better understand what the other side is doing, is intending, and is structured to operate.

I was also struck, Mr. Chairman, by the conventional capability and confidence of our NATO forces, and would commend to all of my colleagues Senator Levin's good report recently finished and distributed to all of us which I believe helps constructively to open the discussion as to what is and what is not in the conventional balance in Europe.

Finally I was struck by the great confidence that our military leaders have in their ability to verify. I think that reflects also some of Senator Glenn's discussions over the break on the issues of verification here. I think we will hear a good deal about that in co-operation with Senator Boren's committee. But there is a great sense of confidence here.

The opportunities ahead of us, Mr. Chairman as you pointed out in your opening remarks, are very significant. I join in congratulating you on these hearings and look forward to working with you and others in this.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here this morning.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you Senator Wirth. I have also received some preliminary reports on your trip and look forward to having a chance to discuss it with you in more detail. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation to you for scheduling what I believe to be a comprehensive set of hearings designed to carefully assess the effect of the INF agreement on the Atlantic alliance both militarily and politically and to thoroughly investigate the treaty itself and its wide ranging implications.

Also Mr. Chairman I would like to extend my personal welcome to our witnesses before the committee, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe. The committee will be analyzing the effect of the INF Treaty on NATO's conventional force structure and nuclear capabilities. The possibility of linking the INF Treaty with conventional force reductions is an issue that must be explored further.

It is our duty to painstakingly examine the entire INF U.S.-Soviet negotiating record given the recent controversy over the broad versus narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Obviously this process is too important to be treated as a rubber stamp.

Soviet history points to several ominous and realistic questions demanding consideration during these hearings. Why are we entering into a treaty when it has been undeniably confirmed that the Soviets have repeatedly and even recently violated the ABM Treaty. Will the monitoring of just one Soviet missile plant be enough to ensure compliance? How do we explain a gross discrepancy in our own estimates in the number of SS-23's versus the figures provided by the Soviets?

What does this say about our ability to spot treaty violations in the future. We must, Mr. Chairman, explore in detail, U.S. arms control policy, a policy in which arms talks have been allowed to become the dominant element in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Instead of being a means to an end, arms control now seems to be the engine driving the train. Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev says that the goal of the Vienna talks is to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is criss-crossing Europe now drumming up support for comprehensive third zero option.

Meanwhile, President Reagan is desperately seeking a 50 percent cut in long range weapons and still talks of a nuclear Free World. The real danger is that nonnuclear forces alone, even if we achieve parity are not an effective deterrent. It is the nuclear component, Mr. Chairman, and the fear that it presents that is the stabilizer. It will be our duty in the weeks ahead on this committee to exhaustively review all aspects of the treaty to eliminate intermediate range and short range missiles. We must examine the full negotiating record and consider all ramifications to our national security before we come to any conclusions.

In the final analysis, the one question that must be answered to the satisfaction of this Senator is, will this agreement make our world more or less dangerous.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby. Senator Stevens.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Senator Warner for inviting me to be here to participate in these hearings. I have worked so long now with our colleague on your right, Senator Stennis, who will be the last Senator to ever serve as both a

member of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee.

The agreement we reached enables those of us involved in defense appropriations to audit your hearings, so that we will escape the necessity of redundancy in these hearings.

I appreciate your offer and that of Senator Warner, that I might participate in the hearings in the sense of asking questions and making statements. I do not intend to do that. I think in the course of the last 3½ years, the questions that members of the committee will ask have been asked by one or more of us on the Senate Arms Control Observer Group.

After the time that I have spent in the meetings with our ambassadors, with the representatives from the Department of Defense, the President's National Security Agency, with the Soviet ambassadors, with all those who are involved in this process, I am an open and declared, unreserved supporter of this treaty. I hope that we can ratify it, consent to the ratification as soon as possible so that we can go on to the next phase of this probing, in terms of whether it is possible to reduce the strategic weapons through a similar agreement.

I am prepared to answer questions, at any time, that any of you may have concerning the message that the Arms Control Observer Group delivered to the negotiators on behalf of the Senate as we met with them over the last 3½ years. But I want to simply say I am grateful for the opportunity to be here. I will be here as much as I can, consistent with my other committee assignments.

I think that you and Senator Warner, exercising your responsibilities here, have eliminated, potentially eliminated anyway, a great friction that existed between two committees in the past, and that was the friction between the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee. I thank you for that again, and again I ask that you not call on me. I will make no further statements or ask any further questions during this hearing.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens. I think all of us in the Senate owe you a debt of gratitude for the tremendous time and effort you have put forth as the cochairman of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, in monitoring on a continuing basis, both for INF, START, space and other arms control matters. And, for not only being an observer, but being one that comes up frequently with constructive suggestions both for the Senate and for the executive branch.

So we are honored to have you here.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I join you in paying tribute to Senator Stevens. Both the chairman and I have been with you on those trips to Geneva. I hope you are not too reserved because you have a corporate knowledge of the manner in which this treaty has been negotiated perhaps second to none in the U.S. Senate.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, we all have made opening statements. I think that indicates the importance of these hearings. I know it has taken a good deal of time, but I think it was necessary for our members to be able to express themselves in advance and to show their deep concern for this treaty and the whole process.

I will just ask you, before you begin, if you are speaking for the President of the United States and for the administration this morning?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, I am speaking for the President of the United States and for the administration.

Chairman NUNN. Do you consider yourself an authoritative witness before this committee?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I consider myself an authoritative witness before this committee, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I do not ask that frivolously, because there had been some hint that Secretary Laird was not an authoritative witness back when he testified on the ABM Treaty before this same committee, and we are working with the administration in trying to make sure that we have no misunderstanding on that subject.

We have not clarified all the aspects of that at this point. We are continuing to have a dialogue. At some point we will need the President making sure that he says himself which witnesses are speaking indeed for the administration with authority.

I might also want to make one other point. From time to time I know we have had a number of people who have already said they have questions about ambiguities. Senator Quayle had three or four pertinent points that he will be asking questions on. I share some of those concerns.

As far as ambiguities in the treaty, our witnesses will be providing, we hope, authoritative executive branch views on how the U.S. Government reads these key provisions. I know there is a lot of frustration from time to time with our system of government because so much of it is in the open and we have certain disadvantages vis-a-vis our adversary in that respect because they have a closed system, as we all know.

I think it should be noted as we begin, before we have the first bit of testimony, that these hearings are open and that most of them will be open. There will be some in closed session. In many cases, these hearings will be televised, as they are today. Now if the representatives of the Soviet Government want to attend, they are free to do so. We have no restrictions in our society about attendance of Soviet officials at our open hearings. And if they attend, as they did in the SALT I hearings, they will be welcomed.

I would also note that these hearings will be printed before the Senate floor debate begins. I want to make it clear that if the Soviet Government disagrees with the reading of the treaty being presented in these hearings by our executive branch witnesses, then the time for the Soviet Union to speak out is now, not after the Senate gives approval and not several years down the line.

If the Soviets remain silent on points of interpretation presented by the executive branch witnesses, then I believe that the U.S. Senate, as well as our Government, can reasonably believe and contend that that silence connotes assent to those interpretations. That is my own view, but I did want to express it before the committee begins.

At this point, Secretary Carlucci, finally we get to you, our key witness along with Admiral Crowe today. We welcome your opening testimony.

**STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK C. CARLUCCI, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE**

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. I am delighted to join you today in the kickoff of what I hope will be a productive year for both branches of our Government. We have provided the committee with the full text of my testimony. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my written testimony be inserted into the record and I will make an abbreviated oral statement.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, whatever you would like to do, but we would be delighted to have any part of your statement or all of it. I do not want you to feel pressed for time this morning. I would just announce that we are going to continue to about 1 o'clock. We will see how we stand at that stage. I am sure we are going to have more than one round of questioning.

We will have 6 minutes for each Senator and we will rotate on that basis. At 1 o'clock we will take a look at how we stand, and we will probably take a very short lunch break about that time and come back about 1:45, unless we look as if we can get through this morning by continuing. And I think that is unlikely.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think I can summarize adequately, Mr. Chairman, but at the outset I would like to join your colleagues in saluting you and Senator Warner and the committee for these hearings, which enable us to take a broad look at America's national security strategy.

As this committee recognizes, decisions about specific defense programs and policies should be evaluated in the context of our Nation's overall interests and objectives. In your strategy hearings this year, it is appropriate for your committee to focus on NATO, since the Senate's review of our recently-signed INF Treaty is to concentrate on how it supports the objectives of the Atlantic alliance. I hope my testimony today, along with that of Admiral Crowe, will illustrate the wisdom of U.S. and NATO strategy and demonstrate how the INF agreement supports both.

The INF Treaty underscores the inseparability of political and military factors for NATO security. In everything our alliance seeks to do, defense leaders must be closely attentive to the political landscape. Nurtured in this arena, the INF Treaty is a genuine success story, fully consistent with both the political and military objectives of the Atlantic alliance.

The INF Treaty is an enormously favorable outcome to what has been one of the most turbulent political chapters in NATO's history. The treaty will enhance NATO's security in several ways. First, it will reduce the Soviet military threat to Western Europe and Asia. Under its provisions, Moscow will eliminate INF missile systems capable of carrying over 1,600 nuclear warheads. Many of these systems have conventional and chemical warfare capabilities, which will also be eliminated.

For this reason, such reductions complement other NATO efforts to deal with the existing and very serious Soviet advantages in nonnuclear forces. The removal of a complete class of missile systems will reduce the Soviet Union's ability to strike critical targets

throughout Western Europe without recourse to its strategic systems.

In addition to relieving pressures on our own nuclear forces and related command and control facilities, Soviet INF reductions should improve NATO's ability to reinforce its conventional forces during wartime by reducing the Soviet threat to air bases, ports, depots, and other facilities essential to the reinforcement effort.

Of course, the treaty also requires the United States to destroy INF missile systems capable of delivering about 400 nuclear warheads. This will remove a part of our ability to hold at risk Warsaw Pact targets within European-based systems. Nevertheless, after the INF Treaty is implemented, NATO will still retain robust nuclear and conventional forces assigned to Europe, including ground-based nuclear systems as well as those carried by aircraft and submarines.

These forces will be capable of holding the full spectrum of Warsaw Pact targets at risk, although to do so over the long term they will have to be modernized, when necessary, as has always been the case. Moreover, British and French independent nuclear deterrent forces will not be affected by the treaty.

The key point is, the treaty, in addition to eliminating a category of weapons in which the Soviet Union has enjoyed a significant preponderance, will not impede NATO's ability to maintain and modernize a credible mix of nuclear and conventional forces. The United States will remain committed to the defense of NATO, prepared to respond to Soviet aggression with a full range of forces, including strategic nuclear weapons, if necessary.

The second major way in which the INF Treaty promises to bolster NATO security is by enhancing the credibility of NATO as a whole, by demonstrating to the Soviets that our nations have the political will to make and stand by the tough decisions necessary to ensure our security. NATO held together as we began deployment of our INF missiles and supported President Reagan's zero-zero option, even in the face of Moscow's protracted intransigence.

The INF Treaty also promotes NATO security by validating sound arms control practices. The INF outcome proves unilateral disarmament is wrong. Had INF opponents succeeded in blocking our deployments, the United States and its allies would still face those 1,600-plus Soviet nuclear warheads and not even have the compensation of our own INF systems. INF shows that political unity and resolve pay off.

The INF Treaty also establishes important precedents for arms control in general. It affirms the principle of asymmetrical reductions to achieve equal U.S. and Soviet levels, which is an important precedent for future negotiations in both the strategic nuclear and conventional fields. Moreover, the eliminations are global. They do not simply transfer the Soviet threat from one region to another. Asia as well as Europe will be more secure. Finally, the INF agreement does not rely on Soviet promises but, rather, on the most stringent verification regime in the history of arms control.

Notwithstanding these clear benefits of the INF Treaty, the Senate will hear from critics pointing out what they claim are flaws in the agreement. However genuine those flaws may seem, Senators should require INF opponents to explain how NATO

would be better off now and in the future if the United States failed to ratify this treaty.

Would rejection of this treaty contribute to NATO's political and military objectives? The answer most assuredly is no. The INF Treaty is a remarkable achievement for freedom's most important alliance, and it promises to advance both NATO's military security and its political cohesion. The world will see a vivid expression of this cohesion in the strong support of alliance leaders for the INF Treaty when President Reagan attends the NATO summit meeting early this March.

I want to stress also that the INF Treaty preserves intact NATO's strategy of flexible response as a credible framework for deterring aggression and intimidation. Effective flexible response has always required that NATO maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces adequate to the threat. The INF Treaty fully permits this objective.

Yes, NATO does need to modernize and strengthen its conventional and nuclear forces. These military challenges existed before the INF agreement, and we will have to cope with them after it. The INF Treaty does not exacerbate NATO's defense needs; it highlights the risk of neglecting them.

The INF Treaty provides no basis for significant reductions in the U.S. conventional presence in Europe. Our forces are the most tangible, most credible guarantee of the continuing coupling of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to the defense of our European allies. Holding our troop levels more or less constant is essential to maintaining and, if possible, improving the current conventional balance and to providing an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate real reductions.

We understand the serious congressional concern regarding burdensharing within the alliance. My view is this: Our allies in fact do more for NATO defense than is commonly recognized, but they can and should do even better. If we are to lower the risks associated with existing and projected conventional imbalances, our European and Canadian allies must find ways to help preserve and to build upon the gains of the past few years.

However, our allies are independent nations, and are not likely to respond to coercion from any quarter. Legislation designed to penalize U.S. allies unless certain conditions are met would be counterproductive.

Ultimately the greatest challenge will be for all NATO nations, including the United States, to sustain the political will to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure their security. Free peoples must recognize that there is no safe and easy way to avoid the burdens of maintaining adequate military strength. Arms control can help, as the INF Treaty shows, but only if we keep in mind that increased security remains the goal in all our negotiations.

Let me close by simply saying again, Mr. Chairman, that I look forward to working with this committee on the many critical defense issues currently facing our Nation. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carlucci follows:]

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FRANK C. CARLUCCI
 SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 HEARING ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

At the outset, let me salute the Senate Armed Services Committee for choosing again to begin its legislative year by taking a broad look at America's national security strategy. As this committee recognizes, decisions about specific defense programs and policies should be evaluated in the context of our nation's overall interests and objectives.

In your deliberations, this committee and the Congress will be able to draw on President Reagan's second annual National Security Strategy Report. I believe you will find this report comprehensive, relevant, and forward-looking. It ties together America's national interests, the threats facing them, and the strategy by which we are safeguarding those interests in cooperation with our allies. The report discusses how our strategy draws on diverse elements of U.S. national power, not just our military strength. It recognizes that America's security also rests on our economic wealth, technological edge, diplomatic skill, and moral example. In your strategy hearings this year, it is appropriate for your committee to focus on NATO, since the Senate's review of our recently signed INF Treaty should concentrate on how it supports the objectives of the Atlantic Alliance.

It is also important to note how the INF Treaty supports America's overall strategy. As the President's strategy report emphasizes, arms control should not be an end in itself, but rather only one of several means for us to enhance our security. Arms control must be fully consistent with other U.S. policies aimed at bolstering deterrence, reducing risks, strengthening our alliances, and decreasing Soviet military advantages. The INF Treaty reflects U.S. and NATO adherence to sound security principles, not a change in Soviet aims.

I hope my testimony today will illustrate the wisdom of U.S. and NATO strategy and show how the INF Treaty supports both. Further details on NATO's ability to preserve deterrence following implementation of the INF Treaty are in my report Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's, submitted today to Congress in compliance with an amendment to PL 100-180 sponsored by Senators Byrd and Quayle.

NATO and the INF Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty commits the United States and fifteen other nations to a common defense of our shared values. NATO is the primary vehicle by which the United States and other democracies counter the greatest threat to our freedom: the Soviet Union. So while America's security seems most often portrayed as a U.S.-Soviet matter, it is important to stress--as these hearings undoubtedly will--that our nation's future is safeguarded through collective security and cooperation with friendly nations around the world. Long gone are the days when U.S. security could be managed solely by what is best for our nation alone.

The INF Treaty underscores the inseparability of political and military factors for NATO security. In everything our

Alliance seeks to do, defense leaders must be closely attentive to the political landscape. Military policies cannot endure without acceptance by Alliance publics and their elected representatives. That is the way of democracies; and it is a strength, even though it means that defense leaders do not have the luxury of forging military policies in a political vacuum.

Within the Atlantic Alliance, cogent political considerations affect our military decisions and guarantee that diplomacy to reduce tensions and arms will remain a prime means of bolstering NATO security. Nurtured in this political arena, the INF Treaty stands as a remarkable achievement, fully consistent with both the political and military objectives of the Atlantic Alliance. The agreement unquestionably will strengthen our security and enable us to maintain it in the future. And, it is an enormously favorable outcome to what has been one of the most politically turbulent chapters in NATO's history.

The INF Treaty will enhance NATO security in several ways. First, it will reduce the Soviet military threat to Western Europe and Asia. Under its provisions, Moscow will eliminate forces capable of carrying over 1,600 nuclear warheads. Many of these systems have conventional and chemical warfare capabilities, which of course will also be eliminated. For this reason, such reductions complement other NATO efforts to deal with the existing and very serious Soviet advantages in non-nuclear forces. The removal of a complete class of missile systems will reduce the Soviet Union's ability to strike critical targets throughout Western Europe without recourse to its strategic weapons. In addition to relieving pressures on our own nuclear forces, and related command and control facilities, this should improve NATO's ability to reinforce its conventional forces during wartime by reducing the Soviet threat to airbases, ports, depots, and other facilities essential to that reinforcement effort.

Accompanying this reduction in the Soviet threat is the requirement that the U.S. destroy forces capable of delivering about 400 nuclear warheads. This will remove a part of our ability to hold at risk targets in Eastern Europe and the Western U.S.S.R. with European-based systems. Nevertheless, after the INF Treaty is implemented, NATO still will retain robust nuclear and conventional forces assigned to Europe, including ground-based nuclear systems as well as those carried by aircraft and submarines. These forces will be capable of holding the full spectrum of Warsaw Pact targets at risk, although to do so over the long-term they will have to be modernized when necessary, as has always been the case. Moreover, British and French independent nuclear deterrent forces will not be affected by the Treaty. The key point is that the Treaty, in addition to eliminating a category of weapons in which the Soviet Union has enjoyed a significant preponderance, will not impede NATO's ability to maintain and modernize a credible mix of nuclear and conventional forces. The United States will remain committed to the defense of NATO, prepared to respond to Soviet aggression with its full range of forces, including its strategic nuclear arsenal if necessary.

A second major way in which the INF Treaty promises to bolster NATO security is by enhancing the credibility of NATO as a whole by demonstrating to the Soviets that our nations have the political will to make--and stand by--the tough decisions necessary to ensure our security. NATO held together in beginning deployment of our INF missiles, and supported President Reagan's zero-zero option even in the face of Moscow's protracted intransigence.

The INF Treaty also promotes NATO security by validating sound arms control principles. The INF outcome proves the unilateral disarmers wrong. Had INF opponents succeeded in blocking our deployments, the U.S. and its allies would still face those 1,600 Soviet nuclear warheads, and not even have the compensation of our own INF systems. The lesson should be clear. Free nations must demonstrate the will to maintain a credible deterrent in the face of the build-up of Soviet arms, in order to provide Moscow with an incentive to negotiate reductions in those arms. INF shows that political unity and resolve pay off.

The INF Treaty also establishes important precedents for arms agreements in general. It affirms the principle of asymmetrical reductions to achieve equal U.S. and Soviet levels, which is an important precedent for future negotiations in both the strategic nuclear and conventional fields. Moreover, the eliminations are global; they do not simply transfer the Soviet threat from one region to another. Asia, as well as Europe, will be more secure. And, the INF Treaty does not rely on Soviet promises, but rather on the most stringent verification regime in the history of arms control.

Notwithstanding these clear benefits of the INF Treaty, the Senate will hear from critics pointing out what they claim are flaws in this agreement. However genuine those flaws may seem, Senators should require INF opponents to explain how NATO would be better off now--and in the future--if the United States failed to ratify this treaty. Would rejection of this Treaty contribute to NATO's political and military objectives? The answer most assuredly is no. The INF Treaty is a remarkable achievement for freedom's most important alliance, and it promises to advance both NATO's military security and its political cohesion. The world will see a vivid expression of this cohesion, and the strong support of Alliance leaders for the INF Treaty, when President Reagan attends a NATO summit meeting in early March.

NATO Strategy and Requirements to Ensure Deterrence

The INF Treaty preserves intact NATO's strategy of flexible response as a credible framework for deterring aggression and intimidation. To be effective, flexible response has always required that NATO maintain a mix of nuclear and conventional forces adequate to the threat. The INF Treaty fully permits this objective.

NATO's current military posture continues to deter because of this central fact: it is sufficiently robust to confront a potential aggressor with major uncertainties about the consequences of using or threatening to use nuclear or conventional forces in an attack against NATO. But this favorable judgment depends crucially upon NATO's continued ability to sustain improvements, both nuclear and conventional, as it has in the past.

With respect to nuclear forces, NATO must continue to fulfill existing requirements to modernize and increase the survivability of its nuclear forces. These requirements stem from NATO's 1983 Montebello decision to reduce the European nuclear stockpile by 1,400 warheads, while taking steps to ensure that the remaining nuclear weapons are responsive, survivable, and effective. Modernization programs continuing

to have high priority for NATO include: a follow-on to the LANCE surface-to-surface missile; development of a tactical stand-off air-to-surface missile (TASM); modernization of NATO's nuclear artillery, dual-capable aircraft, and nuclear bombs; and improved nuclear security and survivability. None of these plans and programs, which NATO agreed must be pursued independent of an INF agreement, are constrained by the INF Treaty; the agreement does not limit systems with ranges below 500 kilometers or dual-capable aircraft. Moreover, since they involve replacement of existing older systems, none of these programs would result in any numerical increase in our nuclear forces in Europe.

U.S. strategic forces remain the backbone of NATO's deterrent. Therefore continued modernization of these systems also is essential to the effectiveness of NATO strategy. We are hopeful that such modernization will soon be able to proceed within the limits of a strategic arms treaty, ideally achieving the 50 percent mutual reductions we have been seeking. Such deep and comprehensive reductions could limit Moscow's ability to offset the INF Treaty's elimination of SS20's with increases in its ICBM and SLBM forces. Of course under President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, we also are researching the feasibility of defenses against all types of missiles--defenses which could strengthen our deterrence of attack against our allies, as well as against us.

With respect to conventional forces, the need for substantial improvements was well established long before the Soviets returned to the INF negotiating table. NATO's current Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) effort is designed to remedy or ameliorate the most critical deficiencies in our Alliance's conventional force posture, for example, in areas relating to reinforcement, follow-on forces attack (FOFA), sustainability and air defense. Moreover, given the massive Soviet chemical arsenal, modernization of U.S. chemical weapons also is crucial to our ability to deter at any level of conflict. Additionally, NATO's conventional strength is vitally dependent on Alliance nations contributing more security assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Portugal; this is a priority needing strong Congressional support.

NATO defense ministers have reaffirmed the need to move ahead with the force improvements I have highlighted. Now we must have Congressional approval of measures that will ensure a robust deterrent for NATO in the years ahead. Even though defense is likely to be confronted with increasingly constrained budgets, I intend to ensure--and will so encourage my fellow defense ministers in NATO--that these nuclear and conventional programs are given special focus as they compete with other priorities. In this way can we ensure that our Alliance strategy remains viable and credible.

Let me also comment on arms control agreements as a way to remedy the current conventional imbalance in Europe. Certainly we can envision arms agreements that could complement--although by no means substitute for--our maintenance of an effective military posture. While Soviet intransigence has stalemated the MBFR talks, NATO has called for new negotiations to deal with the threat arising from Warsaw Pact advantages in Europe. These NATO/Warsaw Pact negotiations would encompass a broader geographic zone than MBFR, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Although East and West have not yet settled upon a mandate for such negotiations, we expect agreement on the goal of

strengthening security in Europe by establishing a more stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. A primary element of any such stability from NATO's perspective is to reduce or eliminate the Pact's capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

Still, assessments of the current disparities in the conventional balance indicate that proposals for major reductions in Pact offensive capabilities are the only cuts which by themselves can improve the situation. On the other hand, NATO can ill afford substantial reductions in its standing forces if it is to defend Alliance territory against a Warsaw Pact surprise attack. We therefore believe that any Warsaw Pact reductions should be large and highly asymmetrical. Small reductions, or less asymmetrical ones, will simply destabilize further the conventional force balance.

While our focus in conventional arms negotiations should encompass Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, any agreement should also reduce the threat in the Central Region. We should concentrate on offensive ground forces, primarily tanks and artillery, which represent the central threat to Western Europe.

Challenges Ahead for the North Atlantic Alliance

As I have discussed, NATO faces major challenges as it prepares to enter its fifth decade. Force adjustments are being considered continuously in order to ensure NATO security against the ever-growing Soviet threat. However, these challenges existed before the INF agreement, and we will have to continue to cope with them after it. The INF Treaty does not exacerbate NATO's defense needs; it highlights the risks of neglecting them.

NATO's most painful challenge will continue to be providing adequate resources for defense. And let us be clear on one point: the INF Treaty will not save us money. With or without an INF Treaty, we need to remedy NATO's long-standing conventional shortcomings. That means sufficient funds for defense. Of course what all our nations would prefer is to get more for our money. That certainly is what we have been striving to do in this country, and I look forward to working with the Committee to ensure that we support our defense needs as efficiently as possible.

Another challenge for our nations is to advance and exploit our technological edge. We must continue to rely on quality to offset the Warsaw Pact's greater numbers. Moreover, we need greater cooperation among NATO nations in all aspects of our defense programs--from research to production to increased interoperability. Congress can help immensely in these efforts, by supporting arms cooperation even though it often may be politically difficult. Equally important is Congress's ability to bring far greater multi-year stability to our defense programs.

In guiding our defense preparations, NATO leaders must remain creative and open-minded. We must ensure that our plans and tactics achieve the most deterrence for our investment. For example, we must identify and refine all possible low cost measures that enhance security, such as making better use of terrain and barrier planning.

We also must develop what we call competitive strategies, which seek to guide our acquisition process so as to align enduring Western strengths against persistent Soviet weaknesses, with

the goal of trying to influence Moscow to allocate its defense resources to purposes less threatening to us.

With all NATO must do to move forward, we cannot afford to backtrack. For example, the INF Treaty provides no basis for significant reductions in the U.S. conventional presence in Europe. Our forces are the most tangible, most credible guarantee of the continuing coupling of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to the defense of our European allies. Holding our troop levels more or less constant is essential to maintaining and, if possible, improving the current conventional balance, and to providing an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate real reductions.

We understand the serious Congressional concern regarding burdensharing within the Alliance. My view is this: our allies in fact do more for NATO defense than is commonly recognized, but they can and should do even better. If we are to lower the risks associated with existing and projected conventional imbalances, our European and Canadian allies must find ways to help preserve and to build upon the gains of the past few years. However, our allies are independent nations and are not likely to respond to coercion from any quarter. Legislation designed to penalize U.S. allies unless certain conditions are met would be counterproductive.

Ultimately, the greatest challenge will be for all NATO nations--including the U.S.--to sustain the political will to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure their security. In the coming months and years, the Kremlin will seek to engender an air of euphoria about East-West relations in order to undermine the resolve of NATO citizens to spend and sacrifice for defense. The Soviets likely will work to portray NATO modernization measures as inconsistent with the INF Treaty and counterproductive to future arms agreements, while at the same time they continue to improve their own offensive capabilities.

This is a standard Soviet tactic, which reflects one of Moscow's primary strategic goals: to convince Western European nations to distance themselves from the United States and to neglect their military preparations. The task for NATO leaders is to convince their publics that they must not rest their security on Soviet pledges. The Soviet Union respects strength and scorns and exploits weakness. If NATO citizens resist weapons modernization for fear of upsetting Moscow, they invite eventual Soviet dominance.

Free peoples must recognize that there is no safe and easy way to avoid the burdens of assuring our security through adequate military strength. Arms control can help--as the INF Treaty shows--but only if we keep in mind that increased security remains our goal in all negotiations. The West must not embrace arms agreements as a desirable end in themselves. A bad treaty is worse than no treaty. Political pressure on NATO leaders to achieve arms reductions for their own sake can promote agreements unfavorable to our interests. Moreover, the West's impatience for arms control can give the Soviets an incentive to stonewall while political pressure to make concessions mounts in the West. Such impatience can help the Soviets portray the United States as the real obstacle to peace and disarmament, as they attempt to seduce free peoples into entrusting their fate to their "friends" in Moscow.

The future of NATO and our democratic institutions will be determined by the judgments of our citizens about how best to stay secure. In democracies people are free to make bad choices as well as good. All of this emphasizes the importance of informed leadership to guide citizens toward prudence and realism about the world as it is, however unpleasant and burdensome that may be. So in the coming months, I look forward to working with this Committee and other Senators in determining how best to secure the future of America and its friends and allies around the world.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Crowe.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN, CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to participate in the second set of hearings which you have held on national security strategy. Certainly this year's focus on NATO and the INF Treaty is most timely. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a rather comprehensive statement for the record. With your permission, I will merely summarize the thrust and substance of that document.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, your entire statement will be part of the record and also the Secretary of Defense's entire statement will be part of the record. I read both statements in total and I found them very helpful.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, sir.

My statement is divided into four parts—a NATO overview, military objectives and strategies, the INF Treaty, and preparing for the future. The overview section briefly reviews NATO security interests and traces the coalition's current evolution and the posture it is in today.

Clearly, the alliance has evolved dramatically since World War II. In particular, the predominant position of the United States gradually changed as the European nations recovered economically, assumed a larger role in NATO, and reached out to the world in general. Today the European and American pillars are genuine partners with much in common—politically, economically, and, above all, integrated military policies within the NATO framework.

Insofar as the American pillar is concerned, economic support for the industrial allies no longer is necessary or desirable, yet our political and military participation in NATO still makes a crucial difference, and I stress the word "crucial." Certainly the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella is vital to NATO, especially for allies possessing no nuclear arsenals of their own.

Part and parcel of European expectations is a viable linkage between continental-based conventional forces, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic systems. Similarly, the allies are deeply interested in preserving the trans-Atlantic coupling. Our military presence of 300,000 troops in Europe and our maritime strength is a central part of this process.

Moreover, I would argue strongly that the U.S. role in shoring up International peace and security outside of the traditional treaty area contributes heavily to NATO's well-being, and the members willing to put their forces on the line in this fashion should receive credit in the realm of burdensharing.

NATO's general military objectives have remained constant and consistent from the outset. They are, to deter a Pact assault, to defend forward if attacked, and to restore the territorial integrity of NATO if necessary. The strategy for achieving these objectives is set forth in MC 14/3, a NATO document which was designed in 1968 to provide a more credible replacement for the earlier doctrine of massive retaliation.

Under the new flexible response, no one proposed to fold the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but much more emphasis was placed on direct defense by conventional forces and the selective and discriminate use of theater nuclear weapons. Such a strategy, to be successful, depended on constant and adequate investments across the spectrum of weaponry from conventional to strategic. It is a lesson that NATO has had difficulty absorbing.

On the other hand, the Kremlin continued its policy of steady improvements at all levels and over time confronted NATO not only with strategic parity but a degenerating balance in theater nuclear forces and increasing negative conventional trends in the conventional area.

As a consequence, the JCS have, for a number of years, been disturbed about the military balance in NATO. Although the United States has, since 1981, been effectively modernizing and upgrading its conventional forces in Europe, we still have some way to go before we can confront the future with confidence.

Of special concern to the Joint Chiefs is the low level of sustainability items and munitions supporting non-U.S. formations. This trend has in turn lowered the nuclear threshold and raised the risk of general escalation. Suffice it to say this state of affairs hardly accords with a strategy design to allow discrimination in the process of flexible response.

To relieve these problems, the United States and NATO have for some years been engaged in a serious arms reduction dialogue with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The result has been two SALT agreements, and, in the case of conventional weapons, 14 years of frustration—that is, the MBFR talks. More importantly, these efforts did not prevent the Kremlin from deploying intermediate-range missiles capable of striking every nation on and around the Eurasian continent.

Consequently, by the late 1970's NATO moved to the dual track decision, followed ultimately by INF negotiations, a global solution, and the treaty we address today.

This brings me to the treaty itself. Each party to the INF accord has agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate and shorter-range missiles and related support structures and equipment. That includes ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles within the range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Existing classes of missiles to be eliminated by the parties are specified by type in the treaty text.

Overall, nothing about this document makes Europe safe from another conventional war, nor does it eliminate the risk of a nuclear war. Yet this agreement does reverse a 40-year build-up during which Western Europe has become the most militarized region in the world, and eliminate completely several classes of very destructive, short-warning, nuclear weapons systems.

For the first time, the Soviets have agreed to asymmetric reductions favoring the United States by a ratio of 4-to-1. This asymmetrical reduction is politically significant, a very valuable precedent for future arms negotiations. Equally important is the military impact on both sides.

SACEUR surrenders the ability to hit some important targets with ground-launched missiles, in particular aim points deep inside the Warsaw Pact and in the Soviet Union itself. There is little

doubt that the Soviets felt strongly about capturing the Pershing missiles because of their rapid, deep strike capability, and that was an influential element in moving them toward a double zero approach.

On the other hand, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and the Asian theaters. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to stress that, since there is some tendency in the media today to concentrate on Europe and to ignore the Asian impact of this treaty, the Soviets will no longer have the capacity to hit with theater ballistic missiles Great Britain, Spain, France, Italy and a large part of Turkey, or to strike with these weapons many of our prepositioned major equipment sites and debarkation sea and air ports in Western Europe. As Secretary Carlucci stressed in his statement, it has improved our reinforcement line to Europe.

Incidentally, we have always been extremely concerned about the Soviets' ability to cover our shallow support area in Western Europe.

To threaten those targeted in the future, the Soviets will have to use their dual-capable aircraft or their strategic weapons and to upset their normal patterns of operations, I repeat, to upset their normal patterns of operations as practiced today.

Next, this agreement excludes all strategic and theater nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France while eliminating the intermediate and shorter range missile threat to these same systems.

Additionally, we have long been worried about the Soviets attacking NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter range delivery systems with CW capabilities, that is, the SS-12s and the SS-23s, will fall out of the Soviet order of battle.

Finally, a key factor is the global reach of this treaty. With the SS-20s, the Soviets have a capability to hold at risk nearly 500 targets in the Asia Pacific theater. The SS-20 can range virtually all of mainland Asia plus Japan, Taiwan, the northern Philippines and a portion of Alaska.

Everywhere I went, and if I could diverge from a moment, sir, everywhere I went as CINCPAC, the leaders of east Asia first of all queried me about the SS-20s and expressed their very deep concern about that threat to their safety.

The Soviets also have nearly 300 shorter range missiles in the Far East. Our Asian allies are greatly relieved that the INF Treaty will eliminate these threats.

With respect to verification of compliance, this agreement relies principally on national technical means for monitoring elimination of subject missile systems, related support facilities, and the production means. Also, the parties have agreed not to interfere with each other's national technical means. Verification is reinforced by the unprecedented right of on-site inspection set forth in the inspection protocol, such as baseline, closeout, elimination and short notice inspections, plus portal monitoring of the SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk where SS-20 missiles formerly were assembled.

Overall, the total web of all intelligence resources—and we will use all the resources at our disposal to verify—overall, the total web of all intelligence resources, plus improvements already in

train in our collection systems, provide high confidence that the U.S. Government can detect breaches of treaty provisions by the Soviet Union before such violations become militarily significant.

Thus, the JCS have unanimously concluded that on balance this treaty is militarily sufficient and also adequately verifiable. In turn, they believe that this accord is in the best interests of the United States and its allies and strongly recommend its ratification by the U.S. Senate.

At the same time, I believe it is important to understand what the INF Treaty does not do. As to arms control, it is only a first step if we are to reduce or redress the worrisome imbalances between East and West. The treaty has no impact on NATO's fundamental strategy. The United States will retain a full spectrum of capabilities to selectively execute NATO's strategy of flexible response.

Looking ahead, it is imperative for the alliance to take stock of its military posture and to examine its preparations for the long haul. NATO clearly needs to do more to keep up with the Soviet building programs and improvements in their theater nuclear and conventional postures.

This challenge has provoked a number of steps by the North Atlantic Council over the years. 1983 was declared the Year of Nuclear Force Modernization; 1984, Conventional Force Improvements; 1986, the Conceptual Military Framework, designed to give the alliance a fully integrated concept for defense; and 1987 saw force goals designed supporting the Conventional Defense Improvements Program.

In turn, I find some impressive work by the Conference of National Armaments Directors encouraged by the Nunn-Warner amendment. That is, enhanced anti-armor and anti-tank weapons, for example, the multiple launch rocket system, advanced precision guided missiles, and infrared Maverick; area and local air defense systems such as combined purchases of AWACS, an interoperable IFF system, and a family of surface-to-air missiles, for instance, Patriot, Roland and Rapier; the antitactical missile system now being pursued by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and the NATO frigate replacement program. Overall, programs of this type are strongly supportive of NATO's need to improve its force posture.

The traditional and lingering question remains, however: whether NATO Europe is collectively prepared to move from common R&D to the more expensive business of acquiring and deploying weapons systems required by the common defense.

As a leader of the alliance, the United States must likewise seriously address that question and the crucial issues confronting NATO, and there is no better time than now as we implement the INF Treaty. As I pointed out earlier, the JCS have been dissatisfied with the NATO force balance for several years. Admittedly, we have made considerable improvement in our posture since the late 1970s, and we know for a fact that these steps have reinforced uncertainties in the minds of the Kremlin planners.

The Soviets continue to run fast and to attempt to match our efforts. While the Chiefs strongly endorse the INF Treaty, you should

not conclude that they will be satisfied after the accord is implemented. It speaks only to a slice of their overall concerns.

What the Chiefs prefer, of course, is to develop an integrated concept for the future that strengthens all of NATO, that lays out a course for our representatives to pursue in the alliance, councils, that guides U.S. investment strategy, and that receives the strong support of the Congress.

We are working hard to bring together such a concept in the Pentagon now, as Secretary Carlucci pointed out in his statement. That is the central thrust of recent work by OSD on "Long-Term Competitive Strategies," a concept designed to get the most out of our acquisition process.

Secretary Carlucci's report to Congress on Support For NATO Strategy in the 1990s clearly notes that competitive strategies is not a substitute for NATO conventional defense improvements. The allies must move forward to correct critical deficiencies in infrastructure, munitions, C³, sustainability, and a number of other areas. We intend to continue to press our NATO friends to see the CDI through to completion, and that is the first step of our concept.

Still, the two efforts have one thing in common. Both call for the exploitation of new technologies to blunt the initial attack and counter the follow-on forces of the Pact. The "Competitive Strategy Effort" first addresses Soviet plans for overrunning NATO. I am talking about the initial air offensive, the rapid penetration of our forward defenses, and the central coordination of forces massed for the seizure of large chunks of allied territory. These concepts are the heart and soul of current Soviet military strategy. They also point to endemic weaknesses on the Soviet side and to new technologies which can be used to effectively exploit these weaknesses and disrupt the Soviet timetable of attack.

Overall, the proposed solution relies heavily on conventional, high accuracy standoff missiles and supporting battlefield and rear area surveillance capabilities. Many of the proposed missile systems can be found in present cooperative research programs of NATO. A number of the surveillance systems are well along in the U.S. development program, for example, intelligence-gathering cruise missiles and remotely-piloted vehicles.

Concurrently, the JCS are insistent on continuing the nuclear modernization efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and currently in progress. For the most part, the Chiefs have been focusing on dual-capable systems which are permitted by the treaty, for example, a tactical missile system which would be the follow-on to Lance, the multiple launch rocket system and artillery-fired atomic projectiles, plus a tactical air-to-surface missile to enhance the effectiveness of dual-capable aircraft and to provide greater survivability.

Again, many of these systems are built on common R&D efforts, examples of which were cited earlier in my statement. Depending upon warhead selection, these weapons can be used as theater nuclear forces or to strengthen conventional units, or both.

Likewise, the JCS are examining, in conjunction with our NATO counterparts, the disposition of our current forces which will survive the treaty to see if they make sense in the new circumstances.

Overall, we are trying to get as much deterrence and defense as possible for NATO out of technologies embedded in the coalition's ongoing programs, essentially, mature technologies which can be fielded over the next few years. Everyone must understand, however, that given a fragile military balance, the risks are related more directly than ever to time in the acquisition process. We cannot afford business as usual.

To put all of this into perspective, the North Atlantic alliance will be much better off with the INF Treaty than without it, but NATO must move forward to complete yesterday's work and to prepare for the future. If we collectively use our time wisely and productively, I am confident that we can achieve four objectives stressed in the President's report on National Security Strategy. Those are to narrow the gap in conventional capabilities, to enhance deterrence, to raise the nuclear threshold, and to reduce the risks of Soviet miscalculation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That completes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Crowe follows:]

STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to participate in your second set of hearings devoted to our national security strategy. Certainly, this year's focus on NATO defense and the INF Treaty is most timely.

My testimony is organized in four parts. First, I will present an overview of our experience with the Alliance. Next, NATO's military objectives and strategy will be reviewed. My statement then turns to the INF Treaty, including an assessment of its impact on NATO defense and the rationale for strong endorsement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, I will address the question of preparing the United States and its coalition partners for the future.

NATO OVERVIEW

To begin, allied security interests are set forth with remarkable clarity in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and in a 1974 review of these interests by the North Atlantic Council. Basically, the allies seek to:

- Safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people;
- Promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area;
- Unite their efforts for collective defense; and
- Preserve peace and stability in the world at large.

Over the years, however, NATO has often found itself in disagreement over how to marshal the resources necessary to support these policies. In the 1974 declaration, for example, the allies held that armed forces should be maintained and improved in efficiency. Yet, they also stressed the importance of reducing the burden of arms expenditures on their people. This ambivalence about resources has continued to the present day.

The Alliance has changed dramatically since the end of World War II. Initially, an enormously powerful United States moved swiftly to support a devastated and frightened Western Europe: economic aid under the Marshall Plan, favorable access to the U.S. market, integration of forces under the NATO umbrella, extended aid under the Mutual Security Act, and so on.

The remarkable success of this effort can be seen in the situation today: two nearly equal pillars in the Alliance: one European and another American. These pillars have much in common: each with over 200 million talented and energetic people, exceptional prowess at the high frontiers of technology and manufacturing, heavy dependence upon international trade to provide the necessary raw materials, and lines of commerce stretching to every corner of the world.

In other ways, the European pillar is much different than the American one: a bloody history of continental wars, more directly exposed to Soviet military power, little defense in depth against a conventional assault by the Warsaw Pact, and not much potential to trade space for time on the field of battle. Moreover, it is far more difficult for the 13 nations of Western Europe to coordinate defense policies than it is for a nation of 50 United States.

Still, geopolitical factors do not relegate NATO Europe to a position of permanent inferiority versus the Warsaw Pact or enormous dependence upon armed forces of the United States. To the contrary, Western Europe has a long history of producing great military leaders, highly professional troops, and first-rate military hardware. Moreover, within the European Economic Community, the European Space Agency, the Western European Union, and the Eurogroup, I find convincing evidence that where there is a will, our NATO allies can be remarkably effective in the business of integrating policies and resources.

Insofar as the American pillar is concerned, economic support for the industrial allies no longer is necessary or desirable. Yet, our political and military participation in NATO still makes a crucial difference.

Certainly, the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella is vital to NATO, especially for allies possessing no nuclear arsenals of their own. In my experience, they want us to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, shield them from nuclear blackmail and coercion, and engage the Soviets in a dialogue aimed toward a mutual and verifiable reduction in nuclear arms. In recent years, the "grass roots" sentiments favoring nuclear arms cutbacks as opposed to limitations have grown in Western Europe as well as the United States.

Part and parcel of European expectations is the linkage between continental based conventional forces, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic systems. In general, this requires a credible, visible mix of both short- and long-range systems suitable for holding at risk massed forces and militarily significant targets in the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union, and thus providing the deterrence that has kept the West free of war for almost four decades.

Similarly, the allies are deeply interested in preserving trans-Atlantic couplings. Our military presence in Europe of more than 300,000 troops is a central part of this process. Among

other things, this commitment tells both the Europeans and the Soviets that American troops would be among the first to fight. Equally significant is our maritime strength in the Atlantic, especially capabilities to contain or counter a major break-out of air and naval units of the Soviet Northern Fleet. This forward deployment also makes surprise attack against NATO far less likely.

Additionally, global economic activities and partnerships have led members of the North Atlantic Alliance to acquire a considerable stake in international peace and security. In a practical sense, this means that on occasion the Western nations must deal with the world's troublemakers, attempt to keep small crises small, and shore up trembling military balances which could turn to their disadvantage.

I would argue that the U.S. role in shoring up international peace and security contributes heavily to NATO's well-being and that members willing to put their forces on the line in the common interest must receive more credit in the realm of strategic burden sharing. From a military perspective, U.S. mobility units (air and naval) and light ground forces which can project power are not only a significant element of our contribution to the Alliance but perform a service which no other member can match.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

NATO's general military objectives have remained constant and consistent from the outset:

- Deter a Pact assault;
- Defend forward if attacked; and
- Restore the territorial integrity of NATO.

The strategy for achieving these objectives has, however, undergone some dramatic shifts since 1949. In the early days, NATO drifted structurally to a heavy dependence on the U.S. and especially the doctrine of massive retaliation. Washington possessed a nuclear monopoly, global delivery systems, and an affluence that permitted an across-the-board investment in weaponry. All of this formed a ready made counter to Soviet superiority in manpower and conventional weaponry at minimum cost to the allies.

Ultimately, time and circumstances eroded the underpinnings of this strategy. The Soviet Union first acquired atomic technologies and then during America's preoccupation with Vietnam proceeded to build up its nuclear arsenals not only to "parity" but in certain areas to "superiority." The passage of years led both superpowers into ballistic missile weaponry, cancelling out the U.S. advantage in air-breathing delivery systems. Suddenly, nuclear deterrence wasn't as compelling in warding off limited attacks as it had been in the 1950s.

Flexible Response

NATO revised its basic strategy in January 1968 with adoption of MC 14/3 which was designed to provide a more credible replacement for the deterrent threat of "massive retaliation" and to wean the Alliance away from an overdependence on nuclear retaliation that weakened the commitment to conventional defense. The new doctrine was known as "flexible response."

The general principles of MC 14/3, are well understood in the public domain. No one proposed to fold the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but much more emphasis was placed on direct defense by conventional forces and the selective and discriminant use of theater nuclear weapons before contemplating a general nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

Alliance policy did not prescribe the mix of conventional, theater nuclear, or strategic nuclear forces required for deterrence and defense. It did describe the conditions necessary to ensure an initial defense of NATO: regular consultations, adequate conventional and dual-capable forces, a high state of readiness, full use of available warning time to augment forward deployed forces, and sufficient logistics support and sustainability. In turn, it stressed that these factors will influence the time NATO can resist a Pact attack without resort to nuclear weapons.

Clearly, such a strategy to be successful depends on constant and adequate investments across the spectrum of weaponry from conventional to strategic. Otherwise, it becomes a high risk policy--as its predecessor was--because of its excessive reliance on nuclear ordnance should deterrence fail.

The Balance

As is always the case in military matters, the evolving balance can be influenced by either side. For its part, the Kremlin continued its policy of steady improvements and expansion at all levels and over time confronted NATO with not only strategic parity but a degenerating balance in theater nuclear forces, an increasingly negative conventional balance, and adverse trends in many of the major weapon categories.

The JCS have for a number of years been disturbed about the military balance. Their major concerns have been in the area of conventional weapons where NATO's defense capability needs great improvement. Although the U.S. has since 1981 been effectively modernizing and upgrading its conventional forces in Europe, Soviet spending and NATO's sometimes flagging performance have prevented a satisfactory resolution of the problem.

Of special concern to the JCS is the low level of sustainability items and munitions supporting NATO formations. This trend has, in turn, lowered the nuclear threshold and raised the risk of general escalation. This state of affairs hardly accords with a strategy designed to allow selectivity and

discrimination in the process of "flexible response." A number of others have expressed similar views as to whether NATO is relying too much on nuclear weapons and not doing enough in the conventional arena, e.g., General Rogers (former SACEUR) and Ambassador Abshire (former U.S. Ambassador to NATO). To date, the NATO nations have not seen fit to increase their spending levels sufficiently to reverse these curves.

Arms Control

Effective arms control agreements could, of course, relieve these problems. For some 14 years, MBFR has attempted to redress the conventional imbalance, but has had no success even in reaching agreement on the baseline from which future reductions should be measured. It is important to note that these talks focused on personnel rather than weapon systems.

Concurrently, the SALT agreements imposed some constraints on strategic weapons (i.e., rough parity maintained at high weapon inventories) but did not address other critical areas of the Soviet military build-up. To prove the point, the Soviets proceeded to deploy intermediate range missiles capable of striking every nation on and around the Eurasian Continent.

Shortly, the United States found countries in both Europe and Asia deeply concerned that the SALT process had not captured the SS-20s. By the late 1970s, many of our allies were urging Washington to proceed directly from SALT II to a treaty limiting intermediate range missiles. That, of course, was an integral part of the "dual track" decision reached by NATO in December 1979. These decisions ultimately resulted in INF negotiations, a "global solution," and the treaty we address today.

THE INF TREATY

This brings me to the Treaty itself. First, a few general observations are in order.

Each Party to the INF agreement (US and USSR) has agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate and shorter range missiles and related support structures and equipment. That includes ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles within the range of 500 to 5500 kilometers. Existing classes of missiles to be eliminated by the Parties are specified by type in the Treaty text, i.e., Pershing II, Pershing IA, BGM 109G (cruise missile), SS-20, SS-5, SS-4, SSC-X-4, SS-12, and SS-23.

Overall, nothing about this accord makes Europe "safe" for another conventional war. Nor does it eliminate the risk of a nuclear war. Yet, this agreement does:

- Reverse a 40 year build-up during which Europe has become the most militarized region in the world; and
- Eliminate completely several classes of very destructive nuclear weapons systems which offer neither East nor West much in the way of warning time.

Tactical Perspective

Obviously, Moscow would not have signed a Treaty conferring enormous military advantages on the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, there are substantial benefits for the US and NATO.

The Soviets agree to give up missiles capable of carrying over 1600 deployed warheads as opposed to about 400 for the U.S. This asymmetrical reduction is significant from both a military and political perspective; it is a very valuable precedent for future arms reductions negotiations. There is, of course, a great deal more to this agreement than asymmetrical numbers. Equally important is the military impact on both sides.

In this connection, SACEUR surrenders the ability to hit some important targets with ground-launched missiles, in particular aim points deep inside the Warsaw Pact and in the Soviet Union itself. There is little doubt that the Soviets felt strongly about capturing the Pershings because of their rapid deep-strike capability, and that was an influential element in moving them toward a double-zero approach.

On the other hand, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters. In Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to:

- Hit with theater ballistic missiles Great Britain, Spain, France, Italy, and a large part of Turkey; or
- Strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS) sites and debarkation sea and air ports in Western Europe.

Incidentally, we have always been extremely concerned about the Soviet's ability to cover our shallow support area in Europe. To threaten these targets in the future, the Soviets will have to use their dual-capable aircraft or their strategic weapons. Today, most of those aircraft are concentrated on a few main operating bases. They are not dispersed over the countryside like land-mobile missiles and consequently are vulnerable to counter-action.

Next, this agreement excludes all strategic and theater nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France while eliminating the intermediate and shorter range missile threat to these systems. As many of you know, this was a sticky issue on the Soviet side, but the United States steadfastly refused to consider British and French systems. We had no license to do so.

Additionally, we have long been worried about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter range delivery systems (SS-12s and SS-23s) will fall out of the Soviet order of battle as a result of this Treaty. Our field commanders have always considered the SS-23 a particularly worrisome threat to ports of entry and air fields.

Finally, a key factor is the global reach of this Treaty. With the SS-20s, the Soviets have a capability to hold at risk nearly 500 targets in the Asia-Pacific theater. The SS-20 can range virtually all of mainland Asia plus Japan, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and a portion of Alaska. The Soviets also have nearly 300 shorter range missiles (SS-12s and SS-23s) in the Far East. Our Asian allies are deeply concerned about this threat and greatly relieved that this Treaty will eliminate it. This Soviet concession was extremely difficult to negotiate and represents one of the more significant strengths of the agreement.

Verification

With respect to verification of compliance, this agreement relies on two basic methods. National Technical Means (NTM) will be the principal method of monitoring total elimination of intermediate and shorter range missile systems, related support facilities, and the means of producing such weapons. In this regard, the parties have agreed not to interfere with each other's NTMs and to take specific steps to enhance the other side's ability to monitor by NTM.

Another important means of verification is established by the unprecedented right of on-site inspections (OSI), set forth in the Inspection Protocol. Such rights include:

- Baseline inspections to help verify the initial exchange of data;
- Close-out inspections to verify that Treaty prohibited activities actually have ceased at missile support facilities;
- Elimination inspections to observe the destruction of missiles and launchers;
- Short-notice inspections of a specific number each year for the first thirteen years that the Treaty is in force; and
- Portal monitoring of the SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk, where SS-20 missiles formerly were assembled.

A Special Verification Commission will be used to resolve questions related to compliance and agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty's provisions. Routine or special communications between the parties will be routed through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

Later this week, Secretary Carlucci and I will be testifying on these provisions before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Suffice it to say, the total web of all intelligence sources, including our national technical means and on-site inspection procedures, provides high confidence that the United States Government can detect breaches of Treaty provisions by the Soviet Union before such violations become militarily

significant.

Thus, the JCS have unanimously concluded that on balance this Treaty is militarily sufficient and also adequately verifiable. In turn, they believe that this accord is in the best interests of the United States and its allies and strongly recommend its ratification by the U.S. Senate.

Further Implications for NATO

At the same time, it is important to understand what the INF Treaty does not do.

As to arms control, it is only a first step, if we are to redress the dangerous imbalance between East and West. While the role of arms control could be potentially significant in reducing the risk of war, we must understand that this process is a two-edged sword: it presents both challenges and opportunities.

The Soviets view arms control as an instrument for competitively achieving political and military objectives vis-a-vis the Free World. They clearly would like to divide NATO and to undermine its military capabilities. Restraining the SDI, eliminating NATO's theater nuclear response (an essential element of Alliance deterrent strategy), limiting America's ability to exploit its technological advantages in conventional weapon systems--all of these are high on the Kremlin's priority list. If these goals could be achieved without redressing the conventional balance the Soviets would have gained the unchallenged superiority they desire.

On the other hand, if the West can keep its arms reduction policy consistent with the NATO strategy of flexible response, we can maintain the security we seek at reasonable levels of investment--not to mention reducing the risk of nuclear devastation. To succeed in this endeavor, we must exploit key areas where we enjoy potential long-term technological advantages. Under these conditions, arms control could become an instrument for furthering NATO's long-term objectives.

The Treaty has no impact on NATO's fundamental strategy. While the Pershings and GLCMs will be eliminated by the agreement, the United States retains a full spectrum of capabilities to selectively execute NATO's strategy of "flexible response": short-range missiles, nuclear-capable artillery, dual-capable aircraft, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and strategic nuclear systems. As indicated earlier, both the theater and strategic nuclear systems of Great Britain and France remain outside the scope of this agreement.

It does not erase all of the imbalances which plague the Alliance today--especially the short-range nuclear, conventional and chemical warfare imbalances. Without further efforts by NATO, the adverse conventional balance will continue to force excessive dependency on nuclear use should deterrence fail. In this regard, the United States did make certain that the INF Treaty would leave the door open for NATO to exploit fully emergent technologies in

the modernization of strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

Looking ahead, it is imperative for the Alliance to take stock of its military posture and to reassess the way it is preparing for the long haul. As noted earlier, the strategic environment in both NATO and countries outside the Treaty area has changed a great deal since 1949 and is continuing to do so. What sort of future can we anticipate?

The West

On NATO's part, we can expect flat or declining national defense budgets, shrinking demographic trends that create manpower constraints (especially in the Federal Republic of Germany), and increased emphasis on further arms reduction negotiations. In a similar vein, all members of the Alliance face more pressure to merge efforts with significant free world players outside NATO (Japan, Brazil, Australia, et. al.), and the necessity to deal with Third World crises and problems.

In the near term, NATO clearly needs to do more to keep up with the Soviet building programs and improvements in their theater nuclear and conventional postures. As noted above, this widening gap has been of concern to members of NATO for some time. Thus, 1983 became the year of nuclear force modernization and 1984 the year of conventional force improvements.

Nonetheless, a number of factors on both sides of the Atlantic have been working against NATO's military posture: the public diplomacy of Gorbachev, diminished concern about a Pact attack on the West, euphoria on the arms control front, a tangled web of economic uncertainties, chronic federal budget deficits, and the allure of distant as opposed to current military technologies.

The Warsaw Pact

As for the Warsaw Pact, we must recognize that they likewise face serious challenges and do not necessarily look at themselves as we do. NATO's investments in conventional defense may look erratic to us but they have made a deep impression on Soviet leadership. While Moscow's conventional capabilities remain formidable there are significant elements of pessimism in Soviet circles about their ability to defeat NATO rapidly and at low risk. If our deterrent policy is to remain healthy, we must continue to nourish this air of uncertainty.

Moreover, there is growing apprehension in the Soviet military that rapid changes in technology are placing them at a disadvantage, particularly in the field of automatic data processing--an area crucial to the effective use of emergent technologies. This concern is, of course, linked to the overall Gorbachev effort to foster general economic reform and to place

his nation in a more competitive position. I genuinely believe he has come to the conclusion that his nation cannot remain a first-rate power with a second-rate economy.

The Kremlin has also demonstrated a rising concern about NATO maritime strength along their periphery; we see this attitude manifested in recent Soviet proposals to curtail naval activity, under the guise of "military detente" in northern European waters. The Soviets realize that Western maritime strength is a principal barrier for the global strategic objectives which are essential to their preferred strategy.

As in the West, the Soviets are heavily involved in the Far East, South Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. At the same time, the Kremlin continues to face major uncertainties concerning the reliability of Eastern European allies which would, in turn, constrain military operations against the West.

With these changes the Soviet threat has become more subtle and multi-faceted. Clearly, the Kremlin prefers muscle flexing, intimidation of smaller states, and the employment of surrogates to obtain its political ends. But as Afghanistan demonstrates, Soviet leaders are still not above the use of direct force when they believe their interests are served by it.

The key point here is to emphasize that in addressing the Alliance's future, we must factor in Soviet concerns, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities. In short, they have serious problems too, which NATO can and should exploit.

Progress in NATO Councils

Clearly, there is unease in the Alliance about the future and a great deal of thought has been given to the subject in Brussels. The Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee are working hard to prepare NATO for the future. The Conceptual Military Framework of 1986 reflects a solid effort by civilian and military professionals to examine the potential of emergent technologies and to produce a more forward-looking and fully integrated concept for NATO defense, especially one that is tied more specifically to budgets and resources.

In 1987, the Ministers gave this effort additional impetus by reaffirming endorsement of the Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) program which laid out nine critical deficiencies to be translated into force goals and corrected by the member nations. As others have noted, the CDI does have drawbacks: no plan of action or milestones to correct the cited deficiencies and no sense of priorities for what has turned out to be a very resource constrained environment.

Still, the CDI reflects a common awareness that technology is NATO's strongest card. Exploited collectively by the Alliance, recently developed and evolving technologies can substantially--even dramatically--improve capabilities to blunt an initial assault by the Warsaw Pact and attack follow-on forces. Equally important, such steps reinforce the uncertainty already

present in the Kremlin.

In turn, I find some very impressive work by the Conference of National Armaments Directors to pursue these technologies as a common research and development effort--and to broaden the base of procurement. Noteworthy projects encouraged by the Nunn-Warner Amendment and already in train include:

- Improved anti-armor and anti-tank weapons, e.g., the Multiple Launch Rocket System, Advanced Precision Guided Missiles, and Infrared MAVERICK;
- Area and local air defense systems such as combined purchases of AWACs, an interoperable IFF system, and a family of surface-to-air missiles (PATRIOT, ROLAND, and RAPIER);
- The Anti-Tactical Missile System now being pursued by the U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany; and
- The NATO frigate replacement program (NFR-90).

Overall, programs of this type are strongly supportive of NATO's need to enhance its force posture. The traditional and lingering question remains however: whether NATO Europe is collectively prepared to move from common R&D to the more expensive business of acquiring and deploying weapon systems required by the common defense. In essence, this is a critical moment in the Alliance. Never has there been greater need for bold and creative leadership within NATO councils.

U.S. Contributions

As a leader of the Alliance, the U.S. likewise must address the crucial issues confronting NATO, and there is no better time than now as we implement the INF Treaty.

As I pointed out earlier, the JCS have been dissatisfied with the NATO force balance for several years. Admittedly we have made considerable improvement in our posture since the late 1970's, and we know that these steps have reinforced uncertainties in the minds of Kremlin planners. But the Soviets continue to run fast and to match our efforts. While the Chiefs endorse the INF Treaty, you should not conclude that they will be satisfied after the Treaty is implemented--it speaks only to a slice of their concerns. In their view, allied sustainability and conventional imbalances especially undermine NATO's security. The Chiefs believe that these deficiencies must be corrected if deterrence is to remain credible as we move into the 1990's.

What the Chiefs prefer, of course, is to develop an integrated concept for the future that will strengthen all of NATO, that lays out a course for our representatives to pursue in Alliance councils, that guides U.S. investment strategy, and that receives the strong support of the Congress. Throughout, the U.S. defense effort and strategy for NATO must, of course, be part and parcel of our worldwide strategy. That is a tall order, but I assume Mr. Chairman that you intended for these hearings to

contribute to that goal.

Today, we are working hard to bring together such a concept in the Pentagon. Obviously we want to build upon productive work that has already been completed in NATO: the Conceptual Military Framework, Conventional Defense Improvements, and Common Research and Development programs. These efforts represent an excellent bridge to the future.

Our approach to NATO's conventional defense, of course, is conditioned by some sobering military realities. We will never engage the Soviets with the same number of tanks or aircraft or people. This conclusion is reinforced by current fiscal realities. Nor can we be as confident as we once were that our forces will prevail on the field of battle simply by exacting high exchange ratios in one-on-one engagements, i.e., tanks versus tanks. All of these factors drive us to think about how to use our enduring strengths to exploit endemic weaknesses of the Soviet Union and to concentrate on high leverage weapons systems. That is the central thrust of recent work by the Pentagon on "Long-Term Competitive Strategies," a policy designed to get the most out of our acquisition process.

Secretary Carlucci's report to Congress on Support for NATO Strategy in the 1990's clearly notes that Competitive Strategies is not a substitute for NATO Conventional Defense Improvements. The allies must move forward to correct critical deficiencies in infrastructure, munitions, C3, sustainability, and a host of other areas. We should press our NATO friends to see the CDI through to completion. Still, the two efforts have one thing in common. Both call for the exploitation of new technologies to blunt the initial attack and counter follow-on forces of the Pact.

The initial cases we have studied apply "Competitive Strategies" to the acquisition of systems related to the NATO central front. They address Soviet concepts for overrunning NATO--the initial air offensive, the rapid penetration of NATO forward defenses, and the central coordination of forces massed for the seizure of large chunks of NATO territory. These concepts are the heart of current Soviet military strategy in the contingency of a large scale conventional attack in central Europe. They also point to endemic or structural weaknesses on the Soviet side. We can infinitely complicate their problem by concentrating on counter-efforts in those specific areas of weakness. The study then considers how new technologies can be used to effectively exploit these weaknesses and disrupt or shatter the Soviet timetable of attack.

Overall, the proposed solution relies heavily on conventional stand-off missiles and supporting battlefield and rear area surveillance capabilities (great similarity to FOFA). Many of the missiles can be found in present cooperative research and development programs of NATO. A number of the surveillance systems are well along in the U.S. research and development program, e.g., intelligence gathering cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles. Obviously, all of these must be designed in range to comply with the INF Treaty.

Concurrently, the JCS are insistent on continuing the nuclear modernization efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and currently in progress. For the most part, the Chiefs have been focusing on dual-capable systems permitted by the Treaty:

- A tactical missile system (follow-on to LANCE), Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles; plus
- A tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) to enhance the effectiveness of dual-capable aircraft and provide greater survivability.

Again, you will find that these systems build upon common R&D efforts, examples of which were cited earlier in my statement. Depending upon warhead selection, these systems can be used as theater nuclear forces or to strengthen conventional forces, or both. In this connection, the Chiefs will be proposing a relaxation of legislative restrictions on the number of Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles.

Likewise the JCS are examining the disposition of our current forces which will survive the Treaty to see if they make sense in the new circumstances.

Overall, the Department of Defense is trying to get as much deterrence and defense as possible for NATO out of technologies embedded in the coalition's ongoing R&D effort--essentially mature technologies which can be fielded over the next few years. Everyone must understand, however, that given a fragile balance, military risks are related more directly than ever to time in the acquisition process: time to make the political decisions, examine trade-offs within no growth budgets, muster the financing, let the production contracts, and field the necessary systems. We cannot afford business as usual.

Beyond these efforts, designed to improve our capabilities in the near future, we must look further ahead and we must place our NATO related efforts into the context of worldwide threats and alliances and U.S. global interests. We need a longer term view because weapon systems we are now developing will have to serve our strategy at least into the first decade of the 21st century.

As you know, a Federal Advisory Committee, the independent bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, recently has completed its report addressing these broader long-term issues. I note that the Commission strongly endorses our coalition strategy and U.S. nuclear guarantees for the common defense, while stressing that reliance upon theater nuclear forces must be both discriminant and selective.

MOVING AHEAD WITH CONFIDENCE

To put all of this into perspective, we should be candid about the leadership challenges confronting the United States in NATO Councils.

Certainly, we cannot leverage our allies into doing more by threats of pulling out of Europe. That would be thoroughly counterproductive. At the same time, we are not positioned to take up the slack when and where the European allies decide to shed commitments or trim back on conventional force improvement programs. In some fashion, we must get the idea across that the benefits of collective security go hand-in-hand with the burdens of a common defense. In my view, that is not too much to ask on either side of the Atlantic.

Next, I believe that we deserve credit in NATO councils for dramatically improving our conventional force capabilities and readiness over the last eight years. We continue to do so with a defense budget amounting to about six percent of gross national product. Over the next few years, of course, we will be spending less than previously planned for national defense in a combined effort with other agencies to reduce the federal budget deficit. But I would argue very strenuously in NATO Councils that a healthy U.S. economy is vital to the Alliance as a whole.

Further, I am convinced that American leadership remains crucial to allied solidarity and resolve, particularly in dealings with the Soviet Union. In this regard, the allies have presented us with a very full platter: further the process of detente, engage the Soviets in asymmetrical arms reductions, exploit cultural and economic openings to the USSR, and do all of this without eroding public support for a strong deterrent and credible defense. If firm in our dealings with the Soviet Union--and with our allies in the field of burden sharing--I believe the United States can meet this challenge. If we ever vacillate or seem unsure of ourselves, experience tells me that the allies also will waiver.

Finally, I believe that it is extremely important for the U.S. and its NATO allies to prepare for the mid-1990s and beyond. If this time is allowed to slip away, the Alliance could end up with neither a credible deterrent nor a viable defense. Conversely, if this time is used wisely and productively, I am confident that we can achieve four objectives stressed in the President's Report on National Security Strategy: narrow the gap in conventional capabilities, enhance deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold, and reduce the risks of Soviet miscalculation.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Admiral Crowe. I will ask the clerk to keep the time now. We will have a 6-minute limit on every Senator's time, that way we can rotate around and give everyone an opportunity to ask questions.

Mr. Secretary, both you and Admiral Crowe mentioned the importance of NATO nuclear modernization, going forward after the Montebello decision with the modernization of those nuclear forces in NATO that are permitted after the treaty is ratified, if it is ratified.

What would be the implications for NATO deterrence if we do not modernize our nuclear systems?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would have to say, Mr. Chairman, that NATO's ability to deter would erode very considerably. If you just look at the Lance system, that short-range missile system was deployed in the early 1970s, and clearly is going to have to be modernized in the 1990s. These short-range systems are an integral part of our strategy of flexible response. The Soviet Union itself has some 1,400 short-range systems facing NATO. I think it is vitally important that we go ahead with nuclear modernization. Picking up on Senator Quayle's suggestion, I believe Congress should lift the ceiling it has imposed on the number of modern artillery-fired atomic projectiles, and should allow us to use ATACMS as a dual-capable follow-on to Lance. To underscore what I said before, our deterrent would be eroded substantially if we are not allowed to modernize these systems.

I think one of the members of the committee referred to European concerns. Certainly there are political sensitivities involved here, but let me point out that all the NATO countries signed up to the Montebello decision. NATO can never implement the Montebello decision if we, ourselves, put constraints on our ability to do so.

Chairman NUNN. Secretary Carlucci, article XIV, which Senator Quayle alluded to a few moments ago, and I also share the concern that he set forth there, states as follows, and I read from that article. This is the so-called noncircumvention clause. "The parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions."

Are you confident that article XIV does not prohibit NATO from implementing those portions of the Montebello decision which do not involve systems explicitly covered under the INF Treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are totally confident in that regard, Mr. Chairman. All this statement does is reflect the duty of each party under customary international law to comply with the treaty. We can comply with the treaty and continue to modernize those systems that are not encompassed under the treaty.

Chairman NUNN. On January 19, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze warned in Bonn that NATO proposals for new nuclear deployments would "scuttle" all recent progress in disarmament, and quoting him again, "cannot be allowed."

How did you read that statement by the Foreign Minister, particularly in light of article XIV?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I read that statement by the Foreign Minister as being in conflict with the negotiating history of this agreement. I think it is clear that nothing in the treaty would prevent the modernization of those systems with ranges under 500 kilometers or over 5,500 kilometers. Those non-INF systems are not covered by the treaty.

So I think this is, if I may say so, a propaganda effort directed at some factions within certain countries that may be less than enthusiastic about NATO modernization programs. But I fully anticipate that our allies will support continued implementation of the Montebello decision.

Chairman NUNN. So you are telling us this morning that you are certain the Soviets understand that article XIV does not prevent

NATO from implementing needed nuclear modernization for systems not covered under the INF Treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I am certain that that has been made clear to them, and on the record today, I am delighted to make it clear again.

Admiral CROWE. Mr. Chairman, we see a lot of evidence of them continuing to modernize and to test at shorter ranges, et cetera, et cetera. So I think they have a similar interpretation really.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, in your statement you said that the INF Treaty "does not exacerbate NATO's defense needs; it highlights the risks of neglecting them."

Since NATO relies on the early use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack, and the INF Treaty eliminates two whole categories of delivery systems which would be useful for selective and highly accurate nuclear escalatory strikes, does that make NATO's conventional defenses, which I think everyone would agree today, are inadequate, even more inadequate or unacceptable?

In short, does the INF Treaty exacerbate NATO's conventional deficiencies?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, Mr. Chairman. As Admiral Crowe has testified, I do not think it has anything to do with NATO's conventional deficiencies. We see the treaty as being in our advantage. NATO's conventional deficiencies existed before the treaty. They will exist after the treaty. In the Conventional Defense Initiative undertaken in 1985, the NATO defense ministers set out to address these deficiencies. We do agree that the treaty highlights the importance of getting on with the already existing program.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral Crowe.

Admiral CROWE. I agree with that completely, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, in terms of the INF alone and the military advantages, merits and demerits, I think you have to consider both. I think it is very much in our favor. And I am talking about not only a symmetry in destruction but also in the capability to hit rear areas, to free our support countries for the FEBA, and to free up embarkation and disembarkation ports and airports as well as POMCUS sites, and as I mentioned in my statement, the chemical weapons systems which we will be putting out of the inventory.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral, please explain the acronyms FEBA and POMCUS so that people who are not familiar with those terms can follow a little more meaningfully.

Admiral CROWE. Our POMCUS sites are our prepositioned equipment in Europe, many of which will now come out of range of those theater ballistic missiles included in the treaty, and which have a great deal to do with the speed with which we can reinforce Europe.

The FEBA is the forward edge of the battle area, and one of the disadvantages, one of the geographic disadvantages that we suffer from, which was mentioned in Senator Levin's report this week, is that our support area behind that FEBA is much thinner than the Soviet Union's, and that area has always been of considerable concern to us, the Soviet ability to smother, to blanket it with nuclear and chemical weapons. This improves our posture in that regard.

It does not solve all our problems, please understand, but it improves our posture and makes the Soviets, if they are going to continue to hit those targets, make some very difficult choices. There are ways for them to do it, but they will not be as quick and rapid and as accurate as these INF systems.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, you have been a student of the Soviet military system throughout your career, and in the context of your preparations for today and the work that you did prior thereto in advising the President, you consulted with senior members of the Soviet military. As a matter of fact, you and I together had lunch with one not long ago, and we met your counterpart, the Chairman of the Soviet General Staff.

Now, considering that those same military leaders are the ones that are waging war in Afghanistan and waging war through proxies in other parts of the world, including Nicaragua, why is it that your counterparts in the Soviet military want this treaty?

Admiral CROWE. Two prefatory statements, Senator. I do not want to overdo the amount of contact I had with Marshal Akhromeyev and any other counterparts, because it was brief. We were talking through interpreters, and it was not an extensive or a deep exchange.

Second, the real answer is I do not know. I have speculated on the question, of course, a great deal, and I will give you the benefit of my thinking, but I am not so confident it is right or wrong.

I think they have discovered that, first of all, their military strength is very closely connected to their industrial and technological strength and that they are sitting on a second rate economy, and they do not want to go into the next century with a second rate economy. If they are going to compete and if they are going to have a strong military, it has got to be backed up by a first rate industrial establishment. And to do that they have got to support Mr. Gorbachev, and they have got to generate some funds and resources for him to do it, and they are willing to look for other alternatives so they can do that.

They are very concerned—and I do not think there is any question about it, about their ability in some of these high tech areas such as computers and data automation, and the ability to miniaturize, and they do not have it, and they are desperately trying to get it, and they would like to concentrate on those things instead of what they have traditionally done in the past, build more tanks, more weapons, more nuclear weapons.

Senator WARNER. In other words, as Mr. Gorbachev has said, this will enable him to redirect resources into a civilian economy, and that will have indirect benefits on the military in the future.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I think the military is attempting to adopt a long range as opposed to a short range view. They are not trying to deemphasize or do away with their military. They are looking out for it, and they want a first class organization. But to do it they have got to make some painful choices.

Senator WARNER. In your deliberations in the JCS, were there those among your colleagues who dissented in any way from this treaty, and the position that you have taken?

Admiral CROWE. The final bottom line that we support the treaty? No, sir, we are in unanimity. I think also I should mention that the military leaders in NATO are in unanimity on this.

Senator WARNER. When you spoke with the President and advised him that it was your recommendation and that of the other members of the JCS that you support this treaty, was that conditioned on any pledges from the President in terms of future budgetary programs for the Department of Defense?

Admiral CROWE. We spoke to the President in much the same tone as my statement takes. We have told the President, at least since I have been connected with JCS, we have told him for that whole period that we are concerned about developments in NATO. We think the risks are too high and that this country as well as the other NATO countries should do more.

Senator WARNER. So it is conditioned on serious modernization both of the remaining strategic forces here in the United States and the conventional forces?

Admiral CROWE. I want to clarify that. It is not conditioned on that. We think on balance—and I am not pretending that everything is a plus in the INF Treaty—we think on balance, though, that the pluses outweigh the minuses. The improvements that we are advocating and we strongly suggest, are not conditioned on the INF Treaty. We are disturbed about the balance today, and when the INF Treaty is completed, we are still going to be disturbed about it. They are separate and distinct.

Senator WARNER. So, in other words, the support the JCS has given this treaty contained no conditions?

Admiral CROWE. No conditions.

Senator WARNER. Now, Mr. Secretary—

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator, I just want to comment on your first question because I think it is a little misleading to consider the Soviet military view disembodied from the Soviet political view. Obviously the Soviets have a political motive in trying to persuade the West to accept arms control agreements as ends in themselves. Because they hope that arms control will lead to the West relaxing its national defenses, that makes it all the more important that we look at these treaties in terms of our own national security.

So we have to weigh the treaty on its merits in that context.

Senator WARNER. I come exactly to that point now.

Those of us that go back to our respective States and elsewhere to explain this treaty and the advantage of it, we talk in terms we are going to destroy two classes of weapons, save warheads and some of the guidance and so forth.

But basically the concept in the American public, you are going to destroy this category of weapons. And that is billions of dollars that they have contributed through their taxes, gone.

Then the START Treaty, if we achieve the goal of a 50-percent reduction, again, destruction of a vast array of weapons, and those tax dollars gone.

Now, it is fair to say that the public would ask us a question. Given that you are going to destroy these systems, would that not

mean less money? You must be making a calculation that if you are going to destroy weapons, it would require less money for future budgets.

Now, those of us around this table and others that are involved daily in the strategic thinking of this country, the national defense, know full well that that is not the case.

How do you explain, then, to the American public, in light of the destruction of major weapons systems, assuming START goes through following INF, that we must continue the modernization and the expenditures of the maximum amount of money that our budgetary system will allow on national defense?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, as this committee is well aware, you cannot look at the defense budget in slices. You cannot take this piece of the defense budget and compare it to that piece of the Soviet threat.

You have to compare the overall defense budget to the overall threat. And is our budget sufficient to deter? And what are the risks entailed in that deterrence?

In my own judgment, with the decreases in the defense budget over the past 3, and now it will be 4 years, those risks are getting quite high. In NATO in particular, the Chairman has already indicated that the JCS is uncomfortable with the risks.

So the answer to the question is, we are pleased that we and the Soviets are destroying these weapons. It is better to eliminate them through arms control than to fire them.

On the other hand, we have to look at the entire spectrum of the threat and the entire spectrum of our deterrent capability.

Senator WARNER. Well, the bottom line is it promises no potential reduction for the U.S. defense budget.

Secretary CARLUCCI. On the contrary, it will probably add somewhat to the U.S. defense budget.

Senator WARNER. It will add. Let me just finish this next question. I think my time is about up.

What would be the implication on the cohesion in that very valuable alliance, NATO, in the event the Senate were to add amendments requiring further negotiations?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, of course it would depend on the nature of the amendment. But almost any amendment that forces us to go back and renegotiate with the Soviets will cause great unease within the alliance.

Bear in mind what the December 1987 communique of the NATO defense Planning Committee said, that the Treaty is an alliance achievement, and that we very much view it as an alliance treaty. So, any requirement to renegotiate it, as I say, would cause considerable unease in the alliance.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, I just wanted to add that when you are looking down the road, not just at a START Treaty but ultimately conventional reductions, then you ultimately are looking at money saving. But we are not doing that just in START.

Second, I think we should keep in mind throughout, on our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, that we hope to do that in an effective and verifiable fashion. But the very prospect of reducing the chances of nuclear devastation has got a lot of merit, whether it saves money or not.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Admiral, you are now the top military officer in the Government. You have wrestled with this subject and played a prominent part, a controlling part, in some ways, in my opinion. And we thank you for that.

As I understand now, you see where the interest is. You have this power and share it to a degree with the other members.

But all of you have supported the idea here that these concessions were relatively safe, and that they could be handled to the advantage of our country. Is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. I believe that is essentially correct, Senator.

We have been consulted throughout this process from the outset, and the military side, I believe, has been consulted widely. And much of our input has been taken, and our major concerns have been listened to and been provided for in the final treaty.

And yes, I think you have described it accurately, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. I know of your work on it, and your influence on it, and it is a key to this problem, as I see it. And it will become more and more the key of the people. The way they are going to look at this thing, I think.

So if you have anything now to add to what you have already said on this and related points, I would just be glad if you would. But you have already answered the question.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir. Absolutely. I have nothing to add, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. I want to be sure that I have understood correctly so far the answer you give to this question that the considerations and agreements and all were not based on any kind of a promise of any kind with reference that you get more military money or more funds for the military. That is correct, is it not?

Admiral CROWE. Not in our considerations in the INF Treaty. No, sir. It was on the balance of the merits and demerits on the treaty per se.

Senator STENNIS. Are you satisfied with that, and that is where you stand?

Admiral CROWE. I am satisfied with the treaty. I make clear, I think, in my statement and some previous questions that I have got lots of concerns and worries about the balance in NATO, Senator, separate and distinct from the INF Treaty.

Senator STENNIS. I understand. But those are outside, so to speak, of this immediate point that we have been discussing.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir. But they are very serious in my view.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I think you have made an excellent statement and you are a fine witness. It is a good point to stop. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, in the post-SALT I and ABM period, do you feel that the idea of detente had anything to do with the Soviet calculations about our resolve during the Arab-Israeli war in the fall of 1973?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, that is a hard question to answer, Senator Thurmond. I am not an expert on the Soviet attitudes during that conflict.

Let me only say that it is quite clear that in the 1970's the Soviets tried to foster an atmosphere of detente in order to induce us to let up on our defense effort.

They were indeed remarkably successful, and I have no question in my own mind that they would like once again to create that kind of an atmosphere through their emphasis on arms control.

It is up to us to be certain that they do not do that, and that we measure these agreements on their own merit in terms of U.S. national security, and not in terms of some process that the Soviets are pushing.

Senator THURMOND. Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a very important question.

In your statement you point to the fact that our INF deployment helped us gain this treaty. I certainly agree with you. But if that is true, what will it take on our part, and NATO's part, to bring about a reduction in conventional forces?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think your point is very well taken, if I understand it correctly, Senator Thurmond, that we should not negotiate from a position of weakness, that we do need to build our conventional strength if we are going to have the leverage to negotiate successfully in the conventional area.

I think we do have considerable strengths as a result of the combined efforts of the Congress and the administration during the first Reagan administration. I am concerned, however, that this effort has begun to erode as a result of budget cuts during the past 3 years.

And I think we have to look at the budget in the context of maintaining the leverage needed to negotiate successfully in the conventional area. In other words, I think we need to do more.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, one of NATO's goals is to provide minimum essential facilities at our reinforcing air bases in Europe.

Minimum essential facilities provide for storage of 7 days of ammunition and fuel. We will not reach this goal for some years to come. Do you feel that the 7-day minimum is adequate?

Secretary CARLUCCI. One of the NATO initiatives is to try and build up sustainability. That once again requires budget tradeoffs.

As for whether the 7 days is adequate, let me defer to Admiral Crowe on that question.

Admiral CROWE. Obviously, all professional military people would like it to be longer, Senator.

But given the circumstances and what we have in mind for reinforcement, et cetera, that goal would be a quantum step forward, and we need it desperately. We are not there yet.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as our technologies improve, we can expect some significant force multiplication capabilities to emerge.

How do you see these technologies impacting on the future size of our military forces, given present budget constraints?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, we are moving as rapidly as we can in the area of new technologies. Indeed, the R&D budget has been one of the fastest growing parts of the defense budget.

The competitive strategies which I think Senator Quayle referred to, Senator Nunn also referred to it, is an effort to bring our tech-

nological capability to bear to match our enduring strengths against Soviet enduring weaknesses.

And clearly one of our strengths is in the technological area, data processing, signals processing, that kind of thing. Once again, we do not have the resources that we believe we need to fund all these programs adequately, and we are going to have to make some tough choices.

One of the things that we plan to do in the revised 1989 budget is to try and protect these programs and to protect readiness and sustainability by bringing down force structure. But that is going to create a number of political problems.

Admiral CROWE. Could I add something to that, Senator?

Senator THURMOND. Yes, sir.

Admiral CROWE. I agree with everything the Secretary has said. And of course, facing force structure cuts and declining budgets, we probably cannot match them size-wise.

But with regard to these technologies we are looking at, certainly the main purpose of trying to concentrate on those is, number one, to take advantage of Soviet weaknesses and to keep their level of uncertainty high, even though we do not match them gun for gun, weapon for weapon.

The heart of deterrence is their uncertainty. And if these technologies can help us exploit their vulnerabilities, we feel that we can keep the deterrence up, the risk level down, by keeping their level of uncertainty as to what is going to happen when they start things, if we can keep that level high.

And these technologies give us some promise of doing that.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, I had a few questions to propound to you, but I understand my time is up. Thank you very much.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. We are going to hear a great deal about the fact that there are no nuclear missiles being destroyed under this treaty.

I was quite surprised to hear one of my colleagues saying on the air on CNN that he just found out that there were no nuclear missiles being destroyed.

I was surprised because I thought that was generally known by the people.

I am raising this so that you gentlemen can clarify it for us, because I am sure that that is one of the things that the opponents of this treaty or the naysayers are going to raise. I am not approaching this from a negative standpoint. I am approaching this from a positive standpoint.

That does not mean that I am going to swallow everything that is said. But from a positive standpoint, can you explain, Mr. Secretary, why it is a good idea to eliminate only the delivery vehicles of nuclear missiles?

The nuclear missiles basically would not be any good if you did not have some way to get them to where they wanted to go.

And a follow-on question, which side insisted that no nuclear missiles be destroyed, only the delivery systems?

Secretary CARLUCCI. If I may, Senator Exon, clarify the terminology. Missiles, along with their associated launchers and key sup-

port structures plus equipment, will be destroyed. I think what you are referring to is what is commonly called the warhead.

The treaty requires that the "Front Section" of the INF missile, minus the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, be destroyed. Thus, what is not being destroyed is what we would term the "physics package,"—the nuclear material, the surrounding high explosive, and the timer—and the guidance elements.

This basically was done at our behest. At one point the Soviets talked about destroying them, but once we compared notes on what is normally done, we quickly came to an agreement at the September Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting on what makes sense.

Verifying the destruction of the physics package, fissionable material, would be an absolute nightmare. I see no way that you could verify its destruction. I see no way that you could control its production.

Furthermore, we can use this physics package on some of our follow-on systems. It is fungible. If you take a look at the difficulties that we have had in this country of producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons and compare it with the ease with which the Soviets can produce similar material, it is clearly in our interest to be able to retain the physics package.

Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, let us repeat that so everyone understands that.

We do have a critical shortage of some of the critical materials for our nuclear systems.

So what you are saying is that that is not a legitimate objection to anyone who indicates that the Soviets are trying to put it over on us.

Secretary CARLUCCI. On the contrary.

Senator EXON. To the contrary, this is something that benefits us?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely. It is highly desirable from our point of view.

Senator EXON. Well, I think that is awfully important, because we are going to hear about this over and over again.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think Admiral Crowe wants to agree.

Admiral CROWE. I just want to add one thing, Senator. It is not just a matter of the nuclear material. It is the makeup of the physics package.

Both sides have worked very hard, and have a lot of very highly classified technology there that they are not interested in sharing. But you cannot verify this destruction without getting in there and seeing it and watching it and so forth.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Exon, let me just make an announcement.

There is a vote now on in the Senate. Senator Quayle is to be recognized, I believe Senator Quayle or Senator Humphrey will be recognized next in order not to interrupt any longer than necessary.

I am going to go vote and come right back. If you continue your questioning, please do not deduct the time on Senator Exon for this interruption. Then either recognize Senator Humphrey or Senator Quayle next.

Senator EXON. Thank you. I will stay till you get back. Had you finished, Admiral?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator EXON. There has been a recent news story about verification. I do not know how much you can talk about in open session such as this, but my concern has to do with the alleged interference by the Soviets of some of our satellites.

If they would continue that practice, would that significantly hamper our ability to check on their compliance with the terms of the INF Treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Any effort that degrades our national technical means would be obviously harmful. Beyond that, I do not think we should discuss this in open session, Senator Exon. I think that is better dealt with when the CIA testifies before the Intelligence Committee.

Senator EXON. I understand. Let me move on. There are movements around the world to declare various regions nuclear-free zones. This movement has been strong in Europe. I have personally encountered its strength, even in the South Pacific.

I believe that given the reality of the world that we live in, such sentiment is short-sighted, selfish, and dangerous to the overall security of the free world.

To what extent will the INF Treaty fuel the antinuclear sentiment in Europe, in your opinion, Mr. Secretary? And will NATO face a renewed stronger challenge in this area in the immediate future as a result of the INF Treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I quite agree with you, Senator Exon, that this is a very slippery slope. And once you start talking about nuclear-free zones, there is no end to it. So we have tried to resist that tendency.

There are clearly forces in Europe who would opt for the triple zero, as opposed to the double zero, leading to the denuclearization of Europe. Those forces existed before the INF Treaty. They will continue their effort in the post-INF atmosphere.

There are a great many Europeans, including the NATO defense ministers, the North Atlantic Council, who recognize the dangers in this. This is why the North Atlantic Council, in its June 1987 meeting at Reykjavik, decided on a sequence for arms control.

And in that sequence, any negotiations on systems with ranges below 500 kilometers would come only after we have redressed the conventional imbalance, addressed the destabilizing strategic systems and taken a look at the chemical warfare question.

So I think it is a problem. But I think that the governments are resolved to meet it.

Senator EXON [presiding]. I would simply say in concluding that it is going to take more political leadership, I think, in the entire free world, to overcome this matter.

I do not know where it originated. But I found it widespread in my recent visit to the South Pacific. And everybody seems to think that if they can declare themselves a nuclear-free zone that that just takes care of everything, and they are not going to have to worry.

That seems to be like isolationism in the extreme, and either a total lack of the geopolitical structure of the world, or they simply do not care. Senator HUMPHREY.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad these hearings are being televised, because it provides an opportunity for the American people to learn more about these treaties.

I am keeping an open mind myself. I have a number of concerns, but I certainly want to wait until this learning process for us as well as the viewers has run its course.

I was astounded really among many others to find out that the Vice President has appeared confused about a very important point in this treaty, or at least appeared to be confused in his remarks at the event at Dartmouth, 10 or 12 days ago in which he insisted that this treaty will eliminate war heads. Or as he put it in another way, eliminate those things that blow people up.

Well, this treaty does no such thing. It does not even bear upon warheads in any way. I want to cite from the treaty itself in this regard. First in that protocol dealing with the elimination of missile systems, section two, paragraph three says very briefly and simply and clearly, "Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed."

And Mr. Secretary, once they are removed, is there anything in the treaty protocol, is there anything that is part of this official package that requires of either party any further measure with respect to warheads once they have been removed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, the destruction procedures vary a little from missile to missile; where necessary the casings, or reentry vehicles shells, are crushed. But the essential thing that you are talking about is the physics package and the guidance elements. As I indicated earlier in response to Senator Exon's question, given the problems that we have in manufacturing special nuclear material, it is clearly in our interest to preserve this physics package.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is not my question. My question is is there anything in the treaty or associated documents that requires any step on the part of either party with respect to warheads?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would like to submit something for the record on that. I think on some of the missile systems it is specified that the casing—the reentry vehicle shell—around the warhead will be crushed.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, the casing. But the warhead itself—

Secretary CARLUCCI. Otherwise, the answer to your question is no.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is not a question of otherwise. Let's try to clarify the point.

With respect to the warhead, is there or is there not any action required by either party?

Secretary CARLUCCI. With respect to the nuclear warhead device the answer is no.

Senator HUMPHREY. Again, in the protocol, quoting from the protocol on elimination, which is an official part of the treaty, with respect to the Soviet SS-20 missile which is the most capable of those missiles to be destroyed, capable in that it is modern, mobile

and therefore difficult to detect and to destroy, triple warhead and highly accurate, it says that with respect to the SS-20, paragraph C, and this is what the Soviets are required to do for their part in eliminating this particular missile, section C, "the front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices and instrumentation compartment shall be crushed or flattened."

Front section, including the reentry vehicles, which I take to mean or take you to have meant when you used the word casings, reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices.

I have gone through this treaty, it is not terribly interesting reading, but I have taken the hours to go through it backwards and forwards and there is nothing in there about what either party has to do with warheads. Now that might be good or bad, but I want people to understand that this is not a treaty that eliminates the things that George Bush says, blow people up, it isn't.

We need to be honest and accurate and careful in what we say to the American people about what this treaty does.

Admiral Crowe, from the point of view of the Chiefs, professional point of view, are there any inconsistencies in the data base supplied by the Soviets?

Admiral CROWE. From our perspective?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes.

Admiral CROWE. We were concerned about some of the Soviet reluctance to exchange data. We have some problems on timeframes et cetera. The data that we now have is generally within the ranges which we would expect, with one exception, and that is on the SS-20 nondeployed missiles.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am looking at a sheet prepared by the Congressional Research Service whose source is the memorandum of understanding for the INF Treaty. These are the figures on numbers of missiles and launchers required by each side, that each side is required to destroy. And with regard to the SS-20, CRS has come up with 405 deployed launchers, 405 deployed SS-20 launchers and 118 nondeployed SS-20 launchers. That is a total of 523 launchers.

With regard to the SS-20 missiles the figures are—I think I misstated. It is 405 launchers deployed and 118 launchers not deployed for a total of 523.

The data package cites 650, a total of 650 deployed and nondeployed missiles. And that is a ratio of not quite 1.3 missiles per launcher.

Do you agree with all that so far as your understanding?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, those figures are right.

Senator HUMPHREY. I find it remarkable that a missile system that was deliberately designed to be reloadable, a launcher to be reloadable, which is the mainstay in this class of Soviet weapon would have slightly less than 0.3 additional missiles for each launcher.

I find it hard to believe that if there are 523 launchers that there are 650 missiles for a missile system that was deliberately designed to be reloadable. Does that bother you?

Admiral CROWE. Well I am not so sure of the accuracy of our information, how deliberately designed to be reloadable it is. We think that it is Soviet practice, and our history will accord with

that, our information as to exactly what the Soviets have in mind and so forth is not quite as clear as you are making it.

On the other hand, that figure that you are pointing out is the one that I mentioned that we have some concerns about.

Senator HUMPHREY. My time is fast expiring. In fact it has already expired. And I want to pursue that further.

Admiral CROWE. We have an estimate from one agency that disagrees with the Soviets.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Let me also say that there are uncertainties in intelligence estimates and there is one estimate that is higher than the Soviet MOU, some other agencies are within the ballpark.

Senator HUMPHREY. How do you know what the ballpark is?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Soviet figures are approximately right. The point is that we have no solid grounds for believing that the MOU is inaccurate at this point. And we will conduct a baseline inspection and over a period of time we fully anticipate that we can clarify the Soviet numbers.

Senator HUMPHREY. Admiral, does the Soviet number agree with the Defense Intelligence Agency estimate? Does the Soviet data package on the SS-20's agree with the Defense Intelligence Agency estimate?

Admiral CROWE. That is the estimate that disagrees, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you Senator Humphrey. Senator Levin, I know you have just come in. Senator Gramm is here, it is your call. Would you like to go to Senator Gramm and then back to you?

Senator LEVIN. I am fine. Have you voted?

Senator GRAMM. I voted.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As both of you know, I have been concerned about the bean count approach to assessing the conventional balance, believing as I do that it can be misleading and distorting. As one expert from the International Institute for Strategic Studies put it yesterday in the paper, there are 999 ways in which pure bean counting does not give a sensible answer.

I am wondering if both of you would give us you assessment of the current balance of conventional forces in Europe. Mr. Secretary, why don't you start.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well first of all, let me say, Senator Levin, that we think your study makes a major contribution and we are very pleased with it. We generally agree with your 13 categories. We might take issue with some of them based on the hypothesis, for example in terms of quality, that is based on certain budget assumptions, on systems that are yet to come. Also maybe you count it as nuclear, but we do not see anything about chemical warfare in there. And that is a very important consideration. But in general, we welcome the 13 categories and we are not far away in terms of looking at them.

You say in your statement that it does not pretend to be a net assessment, yet you say well, there is approximate stability that is in fact bordering on a net assessment. I find it very hard to give you a net assessment based on a pure conventional balance, par-

ticularly because NATO is designed to have a flexible response, where we have the triad.

If you look at conventional forces, some of those areas as you point out in your own report—for example—sustainability—it does not do you any good to be way ahead in readiness if you run out of ammunition all of a sudden in the face of a Soviet offensive. So some areas are more critical than others.

How you give weight to those is very difficult without having some kind of a dynamic net assessment. So recognizing that bean counting is not the way to go, if you identify any bean counters in the Pentagon we would be glad to weed them out. We still think that there are conventional asymmetries that need to be addressed by the NATO Conventional Defense Initiative and you point to a number of them yourself.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe overall that the Soviets have a marked superiority in Europe conventionally?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not think that is the proper way to put it. I think we have a deterrent that has worked. And the question is, what degree of risk do you attach to that deterrent, particularly as you look at the conventional area? Both Admiral Crowe and I have indicated that we are a little uncomfortable with the high degree of risk that we currently see, which underscores the importance of going ahead with the Montebello decision, CDI decisions, armaments cooperation and cooperative R&D the whole range.

I think a one word answer to your question is very misleading and I prefer not to make it.

Senator LEVIN. One more question and then I hope I have a couple of minutes for you Admiral, as well.

Still on this question of the conventional balance, what is your opinion of the desirability or wisdom of linking either an INF agreement or a future START agreement to either conventional arms control or to conventional force improvements. And when I say linking it, I mean during this ratification process, do you believe that it is wise, needed, appropriate for us to link either this treaty or future START agreements, which we have not seen of course, to either some conventional arms balance status or to some progress in conventional arms control?

Secretary CARLUCCI. One is conditional on the other, as opposed to being hortatory. And then I think that is pretty close. That is a killer amendment. We fully agree that it is important to get on with conventional negotiations and we are making an intensive effort to do so. Those are extraordinarily complex, they are alliance to alliance negotiations as opposed to the INF negotiations.

I think that linkage would create uncertainties in NATO on our ability to deal in good faith with the Soviet Union. So I would regard such an amendment as extremely undesirable.

On the other hand, let me emphasize that we agree we ought to get on with the conventional arms, the so-called stability talks.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Admiral, do you have any comment on those questions? I can repeat them, but I think you probably do not need to have them repeated.

Admiral CROWE. In regard to the balance?

Senator LEVIN. First on the balance. How would you assess the conventional balance? Do you believe that the Soviets have a marked superiority overall in conventional forces?

Admiral CROWE. Well I would say one or two things, Senator, about your effort which reflects what Secretary Carlucci said. I think it is a very fine effort. He talked about the weighting between categories, and I think that is extremely important, and I do not see that. At the risk of being weeded out of the Pentagon, I think the danger in your study is to suggest that there is no merit in bean counting. And that would be equally dangerous as to say that bean counting alone is a dangerous practice.

Senator LEVIN. If I could interrupt you there. We did make it very clear that we do think the bean count is a relevant component. We will try to highlight that in version two because the report is a best seller already. So we will do it in the second edition.

Admiral CROWE. You just saved me in the Pentagon, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. I think that one of the reasons in the bean counting column that the Soviets put such great emphasis on superior numbers is that it allows them to compensate for weaknesses in other areas. A commander can get away with a great deal if he has more ammunition than he would normally need, if he has more guns, more tanks, more soldiers; he can afford to make mistakes or errors or take risks that he cannot when his equipment is just marginal.

Admiral CROWE. I would like to point out that we have done a great deal to improve our own situation over the past few years, and I think what is extremely important in this is to raise the level of uncertainty of the Soviets. It is not a matter of matching, et cetera, et cetera, if on balance you have made improvements, if you have structured yourself, if you have the kind of equipment, the posture, the training, the quality that he is not sure what is going to happen when it starts, that is the way we have kept our deterrence up in NATO, I think, and we want to continue in that manner.

One comment that I would like to make, if I recall in some of the rhetoric in the beginning you say it looks to me like we have a decent prospect or something of winning.

Senator LEVIN. No, I do not think that was——

Admiral CROWE. I may have misconstrued. But the point I want to make is that I am not sure winning or losing is the test when you consider that they won World War II but it was at the cost of 20 million people, 4 years of trauma, et cetera, et cetera.

We want a position or posture so that we can carry out our aims and do it with confidence. And we can deter and not go through that kind of trauma. I am not so sure that we have that in Europe.

Senator LEVIN. I think we would be in agreement on that.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin I do not want to interrupt, but I think your time has expired. In the absence of Senator Quayle Senator Gramm is next.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go back to the issue that I think you all have come close to nailing down, but I want to be sure here in our first

hearing on this subject relating to NATO that we have a clear answer to it.

Obviously a lot has been said by critics of the treaty about the impact of the treaty on our ability to defend Europe. As I said earlier, we often end up in a straw man type of debate, much of the focus acts as if this treaty denuclearizes Europe and I would like to begin with a sort of straight forward question to both of you. Let me just frame it very precisely to try to get a clear answer.

Let's say you knew that tomorrow afternoon there was going to be a war in Europe. If you could choose whether to have this INF Treaty fully implemented today or not, given that knowledge, would you want it, or would you not want it.

In other words, will we gain militarily from this treaty, lose, or is about a neutral movement?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The answer from my point of view is yes, we would want it. We would gain militarily.

Admiral CROWE. The Chiefs have concluded that. We would agree with that, yes.

Senator GRAMM. So your basic argument then would be that because of our greater capacity in electronic jamming, because of our greater Stealth capacity, we would have the ability to imperil Soviet and Warsaw Pact targets in Central Europe, they would not have as great a capacity using what would be left after the treaty to imperil our targets?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I am not sure that I would put it exactly that way, because you are referring to programs that are ongoing independent of the treaty. We need those programs in any event. The treaty, in eliminating systems—as was pointed out by Senator Humphrey, I believe—that are highly sophisticated mobile systems that can strike ports and depots in Europe, brings us substantial advantages.

At the same time, we do need to get on with our modernization programs. Moreover, there may well be some adjustments that will need to be taken as a result of the treaty, but I use the word adjustments advisedly.

For example, dual capable aircraft become more important, therefore air defense might become more important. Obviously there is some retargeting that has to go on on both sides. But once again, to come back to the fundamental point on balance, this treaty is a net plus militarily for us.

Senator GRAMM. Well let me ask Secretary Carlucci the second question that I think is relevant, and that is I think most people feel that this is the best treaty in the post war era, in terms of verification. But you ultimately come back to the question, what do you do if you verify that the Russians are cheating? Given our experience with other treaties we have signed with the Soviets in the post war era, given their lack of compliance in some fundamental ways, but in many ways small changes that we might or might not have agreed to in advance as part of the treaty, do you think we need some clear understanding, either by Senate action or by statement of policy by the administration that if the Soviets violate the terms of the agreement that we are going to take specific actions?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think we need a clear understanding between the Congress and the executive branch that the United

States should take action if the Soviets violate the terms of the treaty.

Now I think it is important here to take a look at possible violations. The violations should be militarily significant. Our job is not to spank the Soviet Union if they are bad boys. Our job is to maintain deterrence. If Soviet violations are such as to affect adversely our capability to deter, then we would need to take appropriate action to enhance our defense posture.

Now how we want to enhance it might depend on the nature of the violation, the particular systems that we might have at that point in time, and on our assessment of the most appropriate and cost effective way to improve our deterrence. It is very hard to say in advance what we would do. You and I can speculate on some of those systems, and in a classified document I guess I could give you a range; but if the administration and the Congress could agree, then indeed, we would provide the resources necessary to maintain our deterrent capability in light of a militarily significant Soviet violation. I think that this would strengthen our hand very considerably in the Special Verification Commission.

Senator GRAMM. Well, Mr. Secretary, the only thing that I would add to that, I do not know if it is our duty to spank the Soviet Union for little violations, but we are all aware that little violations become big violations if there is no cost involved.

I guess the one remaining area of concern I have about the treaty is not our ability to verify whether or not they are complying, but our absence of a clearly set policy as to what we are going to do, if in fact we do verify that the Soviets are cheating on the treaty in some way that is either significant or could become significant as part of a pattern.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Gramm and Mr. Chairman, I would be delighted to work with the committee on that question, because the administration cannot answer that question by itself. It has to be a cooperative effort between the administration and the Congress, because clearly it entails resources.

When we did something like this with regard to SALT II, we had problems on the Hill. So I accept your thesis. We need to have an understanding in advance.

Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I just would like to say that I think we do need to work it out. I think the American people are concerned about it, and I think we can certainly broaden not only the base of support for the treaty, but the degree of confidence people have in the process, if in fact we can work that out, and I am willing to try.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gramm.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to elaborate on the concern I set forth in my opening remarks, and that is that the purpose of the INF Treaty is not to denuclearize Europe, but to eliminate the two categories of nuclear weapons defined by their range, and in so doing reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This treaty will represent an important step in the process of bringing a halt to the nuclear arms race in Europe. And we should

not act now as a result of that treaty to reignite that race at a different level.

I understand the need over time to modernize our weapons systems. I have been one of the strongest and most consistent supporters of modernizing our conventional forces in Europe and throughout the world.

My concern is, what our intentions are today with respect to the modernization of our nuclear forces in Europe? I do not believe that it makes sense for us, as part of our response to INF, to take steps to increase the range of those nuclear weapons not covered by the INF Treaty. I am not alleging any bad faith here.

I am just questioning the political and military wisdom, for example, of doubling or tripling the range of our Lance missiles at this time, taking that system right up to the edge of the INF boundary. Such a development I believe will light fires throughout Europe and will generate protests, exacerbate the Germans' concern about all tactical nuclear weapons, and we will lose whatever political gains we have made in Europe by concluding INF.

We have a viable nuclear deterrent in Europe today. Modernizing that deterrent seems to me to be a much longer term concern.

Which leads me to my question, what are our intentions with respect to the Lance missile follow-on? What improvements do we really expect to make?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. I appreciate your statement that you are supportive of modernization, because the failure to modernize is in fact de facto denuclearization of Europe.

We have not yet determined a system for the follow-on to Lance. As you know, it was agreed there would be a follow-on system at Montebello, and our technical people are currently looking at several systems, one of which is ATACMS. However, the congressional prohibition on using ATACMS in the nuclear role is an impediment to us.

There is at least one European system that we are considering. We recognize that this is a politically sensitive issue and intend to consult fully with our allies. No final decision has been made on what the range ought to be. It may well be desirable to have some increase in range. It may be that that is not politically desirable, but this decision will be made in full consultation with our allies.

Senator KENNEDY. But do I understand therefore that there is a predisposition to move up to the lower limits of the range limited by the INF Treaty.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would not foreclose the option of increased range for the follow-on to Lance. I see no particular rationale to keep it at the present range, which is well short of the 500 kilometer limit. And until we decide on the system, it would be premature for me to make a categorical statement at this point.

Senator KENNEDY. And that you will work out in terms of the consultation also with the committee?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Admiral CROWE. NATO is addressing it right now, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me move quickly into another area that I mentioned. Both of you in your statements note the importance of this agreement in eliminating Soviet capabilities to strike the

depots, the various prepositioned materials and other bases with their SS-20s.

And as I mentioned just in my brief opening statement about what you think of the possible likelihood of the Soviet Union retargeting their SS-24's and SS-25's. Let us say they may already have targets for their SS-24's or their SS-25's.

In our last authorization bill we did have, under the leadership of Senators Bumpers, Leahy, Chafee, and Heinz, provisions that established a policy of interim restraint to provide at least some limits on strategic offensive forces as the START negotiations are going on. Hopefully we would not see a situation where the Soviets could move ahead tomorrow and build either more SS-24's or SS-25's to make these same targets vulnerable and therefore undermining what you have described as a significant advantage, both from a military point of view as well as a political point of view.

The first question I would ask you is whether you perceive that that may be an option for the Soviets to move ahead in retargeting SS-24's and SS-25's and picking up some of these areas which you think have additional security with the elimination of the SS-20's? In considering the Soviet capability to build additional SS-24's and SS-25's, would you be more willing to support the interim restraint which had been supported by the Congress, which we have not heard from the administration on, as a way of really maximizing both the military and the political outcomes of the INF agreement in terms of those?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think it is certainly possible that the Soviets might retarget some SS-25's, although that is not very cost effective for them because the SS-25 is a single warhead missile which they would be substituting for triple warhead missiles.

That can be dealt with in the START agreement, assuming we get one. In any event, Soviet use of ICBMs for INF missions would represent a decrement to their strategic capability.

I myself have not studied the interim restraint proposal that you referred to, but I would have no grounds for believing that any unilateral restraint on our part would be matched by the Soviets in terms of their not targeting or retargeting the SS-25's on these aim points.

Senator KENNEDY. I just have a follow-up on that. Here we are really talking about building additional SS-24's and SS-25's, if they agreed not to exceed the sub-limits.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If they do that, then I do not know why they signed the treaty.

Senator KENNEDY. The time has expired. The question is with regard to SALT, if they are abiding by the limits and they have made statements, Shevardnadze has here when he was here during the Gorbachev meetings, that they are going to comply with those, would the administration be willing to give consideration to the interim restraint policy in which we would be willing to abide by certain sub-limits?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would have to study that, Senator Kennedy.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, they take down older systems in order to build new ones and stay within the limits.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus along the lines of Senator Thurmond's questions on what we can in fact do now and what we should be doing now on a military basis.

I want to make sure that everybody understands that some of the things I have been talking about and others in relationship to the competitive strategy task force study, the post-INF study that has been forthcoming, is not something that we all of a sudden just invented.

It is something that has been ongoing within the Department of Defense. But my curiosity and my question is, how can we now take this opportunity, where we now have this new arms control agreement where we are going to become more reliant upon conventional deterrence, not entirely reliant but more reliant upon conventional forces for deterrence, how can we take this opportunity to coordinate our efforts within the Department of Defense and to work in cooperation with our allies to get them to do more in the conventional area. We want to focus more in the conventional area, setting aside for the time being the conventional arms control process, even though I believe that we are going to continue with the conventional arms control process, as we should.

But in the meantime, there are a lot of things that we can be doing, and I just wonder if I might get both of you to respond to this idea of highlighting, not creating but highlighting, a NATO defense initiative or a theater defense initiative that would do, in my judgment, a couple of things.

One, I do believe we have got to go ahead with the implementation of and the commitment to the Montebello decision; and two, it seems to me that if we would extract from the competition strategies task force some very important programs, like long-range conventional cruise missiles, smarter munitions, and improved our air defenses in Europe, on a basis where we have that competitive advantage with the Soviet Union, that this would give us the impetus to work not only with ourselves, but then go to our allies and say, here is what needs to be done.

Can you give me a feeling of how we might be able to proceed with this kind of initiative, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think the suggestion, Senator Quayle, is an excellent one. This is an appropriate time to highlight a lot of the ongoing initiatives. What you are talking about is essentially a packaging problem, a consultation problem, and a heightened public awareness problem.

I do not have any instant flashes of wisdom. We are going to accelerate our efforts with the NATO allies. We do have the NPG meeting in Denmark coming up, where a lot of attention will be given to this. It will certainly be an important subject of the NATO summit currently scheduled for early March.

We would be very pleased to break these out as part of the budget package—which I think is now coming up on February 18—so the Congress can have a bit of a mission-oriented budget, if you will, taking a look at the NATO programs.

So I think your suggestion is a very good one, and we would be glad to work with you on ways that we can best accomplish it.

Senator QUAYLE. I think it would be very helpful, within the next few weeks, if we can get into some of these programs that are already ongoing, that fall in this category of competitive strategies, and protect them in a very tough budget that unfortunately you are going to have to submit.

You are going to have to make some very, very tough choices. You unfortunately have a tremendous challenge ahead of you and one that I do not particularly envy, but one that you will do and you will do it in a very professional, straightforward manner, in which you think are the best interests of this country.

But I would hope we could coordinate and get some higher visibility or more visibility in this area, if in that budget submission highlighted some of the newer programs that are going to be protected now and for the next 5 years as we look to this NATO or theater defense initiative and how we are going to proceed.

Secretary CARLUCCI. My view—and it is quite clear, Senator Quayle—which I have made known throughout the Department, is that we are going to protect these kinds of programs, even if it means taking down more force structure.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, could I just say one thing? I think one of the challenges here is to limit our appetite. We have got to figure out what system gives the highest leverage and then go with a few systems that will keep the level of uncertainty up so we can invest in the numbers that are economical and get those systems in the field and do it rapidly.

But that is a difficult problem in our Government. There are so many ideas, and it is so pluralistic, to get people to agree, instead of the whole bag, on a few things with high leverage is sometimes very difficult.

Senator QUAYLE. I know it is difficult, and unfortunately we do not have a lot of time because of the compressed environment that we are in. The discussion of this treaty, the budget submission, and the President going to Brussels on March 2.

There is going to be a lot of focus on this. But those highly leveraged systems that will give us a good return, I hope that we can identify them as early on and begin to talk about protecting them.

Secretary CARLUCCI. They are by and large identified in the Byrd-Quayle report which we are sending up to you today.

Senator QUAYLE. I would like to turn to the Chairman's question on article XIV, which is the so-called noncircumvention clause. In response to the Chairman, I detected that the meaning of this article was more or less a political statement, and one that did not in fact preclude us from deploying other things that are not already precluded in this treaty.

Let me just ask this. What is the meaning? What is the meaning of article XIV? My knowledge and understanding of international law is very small. But it is my understanding that each article in a treaty in international law has some meaning, and my question is, let us try to figure out what article XIV means.

Unfortunately, I see I just got a time notice, so I guess you can answer that and maybe this afternoon I can follow it up more specifically, because what I am afraid of—and I said this in my opening statement—this has the potential, if we are not careful, of having the same kind of political repercussions down the road as

the Agreed Statement D did for the ABM Treaty, and I do not want to repeat that.

I just do not know what this article means, why it is there, and what we are going to prohibit, other than what is already prohibited in this treaty. That is a general question, and then this afternoon I will try to follow up with questions on specific weapons systems.

Maybe generally, Mr. Secretary—

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, your time has expired. But, Mr. Secretary, why don't you give us an answer on that, then we will go on to the next question.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It is an important subject. Let me read the answer, because it is an agreed upon answer between the State Department and the Defense Department:

This provision reflects the duty of each party under customary international law to comply with the treaty. The provision does not impose any additional obligation on the parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the policy. Article XIV will not affect existing patterns of cooperation with our allies, nor will this provision preclude cooperation with our allies in modernization.

Senator QUAYLE. I will have to get to that this afternoon.

But what does this article mean? It is just sort of hanging there. But I will pursue that.

Chairman NUNN. We will come back on it in more detail. Let me move on now, Senator Quayle. I think that is enormously important, particularly in light of some statements being made right now by the Soviet foreign secretary on this subject.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and also Admiral Crowe, I would like to address this to both of you. Given the stated concern over the conventional imbalance that the NATO forces in Europe face against the Warsaw Pact nations, why did we not as a nation attempt to establish linkage within the INF Treaty concerning this imbalance?

I know this has been talked about. I believe Senator Gramm asked a similar question earlier. It looks to me like, from an outsider up here in the Senate, not doing the negotiations, that that should have been linked, because that has a lot of us concerned.

Now we are searching for a way to strengthen the conventional weapons system of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. How are we going to make some strides in that direction? Negotiations have been going on, by your own testimony, some 14 years and no progress to amount to anything.

I would like to hear your comments on that.

Secretary CARLUCCI. To answer that question, Senator Shelby, you really have to go back to the origins of the dual-track decision, which arose as a result of concern about the increasing Soviet theater nuclear threat. The allies got together and agreed that we would undertake these INF deployments, and at the same time would try and negotiate the reduction of the Soviet nuclear threat.

At no time during this process, which started in 1979, did the allies ever agree to link INF to the so-called conventional imbalance, although at the same time we continued to press the Soviets, unsuccessfully albeit, in MBFR.

The important fact is that the treaty stands on its own merits. You heard the view of the Joint Chiefs that it is militarily in our interest. If that is the case, then we should go ahead and ratify it.

At the same time, we need to move ahead vigorously in the conventional area. But to link the two is almost like linking apples and oranges, because in the conventional area, in the stability talks, we are talking about dealing with 23 nations, getting all of them to take a common position, whereas this is a treaty negotiated directly between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, before Admiral Crowe answers, you say the treaty stands on its own merits. That is your position in the administration and we should go ahead and ratify it.

Then you go on, and this has a lot of us concerned, but we have got to do something about strengthening the imbalance in the Warsaw Pact versus NATO forces. Why could not—and I am going back to my original question.

Why could you not have had a dual-track here and link it?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Because it was directed at a specific threat. In fact, you could link almost anything.

Senator SHELBY. Were you in too big a hurry? Were you too anxious?

Secretary CARLUCCI. From 1979 to 1988 or 1987 does not imply that we are in too big a hurry. This decision has been in the works for quite a period of time. There are all kinds of things that one could think of that one could link to the treaty.

The Soviets, as you know, at one point were linking INF to an effort to kill SDI. So our argument was against linkage. We said, let us have this treaty stand on its own merits, and we think that is the way it ought to be looked at.

Senator SHELBY. When we are talking about regional forces, we are talking about Europe or the European area basically—it might move over to other areas, but talking about there—then if this treaty is ratified, either de jure or de facto, and goes into effect, what assurances do we have that we are going to make any progress in the conventional reductions of the weapons?

We do not have any, do we?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have the assurance of the professed willingness of the Soviets to engage in these discussions, their willingness, as expressly stated by General Secretary Gorbachev, to look at asymmetrical reductions established as a precedent in this treaty.

But more significantly, we have the cohesion of the alliance, which has been demonstrated in bringing this treaty to fruition. If we are going to negotiate a conventional reduction, we need to maintain a strong defense, and that carries budget implications.

Senator SHELBY. What can we give up now that would induce the Soviet Union to reduce their large superiority in conventional weapons? What is our ace card we can give them?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, we are currently talking or trying to get a date for the stability talks, which is directed at the greatest offensive threat of the Soviet Union—tanks and artillery.

If we can get negotiations leading to asymmetrical reductions in that area, that will be militarily to our advantage. Until we actually engage the Soviets, we do not know what their position will be.

We have had some inkling that they intend to go after our aircraft, but that is all part of the negotiating game.

It is give and take, and we certainly would not enter into any kind of conventional agreement that is militarily disadvantageous to us.

Senator SHELBY. Admiral Crowe.

Admiral CROWE. I have very little to add, Senator. If you are saying that we should not take a small step forward until we have got everything solved, that sounds to me intellectually good, but practically not a worthwhile suggestion.

Senator SHELBY. What about reductions? You call reductions in conventional weapons an important step?

Admiral CROWE. My goodness, yes. But we have tried for years in MBFR and it has eluded us, longer than we have in the INF negotiations.

Senator SHELBY. Well, after the INF Treaty goes into effect and everything is carried out on both sides, will that not leave, if nothing happens in the conventional area, will that not leave a tremendous advantage to the Warsaw Pact?

Admiral CROWE. Well, it will leave the advantage they have today. This treaty does nothing about the conventional balance and does not pretend to.

Senator SHELBY. That is my concern.

Admiral CROWE. I understand that. We all have that concern. But I think it should be emphasized what the Secretary said: this will be an alliance problem—well, it will be more than that. There will be many countries involved in Europe besides the alliance.

That is a very complicated problem, and it will be a long time.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

CHAIRMAN NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby.

Senator McCain, I know you have been here a long time. We have not finished the first round yet, but after Senator McCain we will not have any other questions this morning. We will then take a 45-minute break and come back at 5 minutes after 2.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here, and I think they have provided us with a lot of important information.

First of all, I would like to comment that as a follow-up to Senator Gramm's statement about the case of Soviet violation of the treaty, I agree with Secretary Carlucci's statement that action would have to be taken in partnership with the Congress. But I also feel that it is very, very dangerous to assume a position that the only reaction we would have to any Soviet violation would be a response in the form of a military expenditure or build-up in order to compensate for that violation. I believe there are many of us who would seek other punitive measures or actions that would have to be taken on the part of the United States in the case of significant Soviet violations of the treaty.

Admiral Crowe, you stated in response to previous questions that there will be a short term requirement for the United States and our allies to spend more in the absence of or failure to realize both a START Treaty and conventional force reductions. I agree with that. I think that it is a very important point that may be escaping many Americans, and I believe that it is also important for the

members of this committee to have a clear understanding where you and Secretary Carlucci believe the shortfalls exist and additional expenditures may be required. We need to know this on both the part of the United States, and on the part of our NATO allies.

I do not want a percentage basis estimate of increases in spending required by the United States and NATO, but rather the specific areas in our land, air, and naval forces where you believe that expenditures need to be made. I would like you to provide that for the record since it would be rather difficult for you to do at this time.

I would like to now move the risks in the so-called triple zero option or third zero option. As some predicted, the Soviet Union is already seeking to further its often-held goal, long-held goal of decoupling Western Europe from the United States. We have seen Mr. Shevardnadze has recently stated that he thinks that short-range nuclear weapons should be next on the agenda, and what is of great concern to many of us is that Mr. Genscher and others in the Federal Republic of Germany have subscribed on this.

I would like to know how serious a threat you feel that is, and what is your position as to when we should pursue the so-called triple zero option or third zero option.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think it is important to bear in mind here that the NATO foreign ministers, at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Reykjavik in June 1987, addressed this issue in some specificity and agreed upon a formula, a framework, if you will, for the arms control process in which we went from INF to START to chemical to conventional, and only after the conventional imbalances were redressed did we contemplate addressing the below-500 kilometers issue.

I had occasion to meet with Foreign Minister Genscher the other day, and he reaffirmed that the Reykjavik formula is the formula that will be guiding NATO in these negotiations. We have no intention of moving to below 500 kilometers. What Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is obviously doing is attempting to play the old game of creating political tensions within NATO, attempting to split NATO off from the United States, as you put it, and we should certainly not let him get away with it.

Senator McCAIN. Is it your view that we not only have to maintain our existing short range nuclear weapons but proceed as rapidly as possible with modernization of those weapons?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely. We all agreed on that at Montebello. I see no reason whatsoever to change the Montebello decision, and this will be addressed at the upcoming NPG in Denmark.

Senator McCAIN. Do you not believe that this imposes some political burdens on the Federal Republic of Germany?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, great political burden is imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany by virtue of its own geography, but so far, Chancellor Kohl has been more than equal to the task, and I have full confidence that the Germans will proceed with the Montebello and the CDI decisions.

Obviously this is a sensitive subject, and it has to be dealt with in a tactful way, and we will do it in full cooperation with our German colleagues. I do not mean to imply that we are going to use a bulldozer technique, but I have seen no signs whatsoever, no

official statement out of Germany that they are backing away in any way from the Montebello decision.

Senator McCAIN. Well, I hope that remains the case.

Admiral Crowe, you noted that as a result of NATO's 1983 Montebello decision, the alliance has reduced its stockpile by 1,400 weapons. In last year's military posture statement, in addition to Soviet military power, there is a description of a massive Soviet buildup in nuclear capable strike aircraft, that has given them a 3 to 1 advantage over NATO, and of a 50 percent build-up in short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery between 1980 and 1986.

The posture statement summarized that trend in each of those categories over the last 5 years and during the current year.

What is your opinion of the importance of those threats after the INF reductions are completed?

Admiral CROWE. I think we have to take them very definitely into our calculations. The review we have got in mind with modernization is aimed toward that. It is also, as I said in my statement, that we are going to look at our dispositions under the new circumstances to see if they are appropriate or not, and there are a number of things that we can do, whatever those circumstances dictate, to rearrange the furniture, reorient ourselves to meet it.

I can elaborate on that, but I would prefer to do it in closed session.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

We will take a recess now for 45 minutes and reconvene at 2:05 in this room.

[Questions supplied for the hearing record follow:]

[Answers to all of the following questions were not submitted in time for printing, but upon receipt will be retained in committee transcripts files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FRANK CARLUCCI AND ADMIRAL CROWE

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Crowe, I would like to insert a detailed set of questions for the record in response to your testimony that can only be dealt with in the form of an equally written detailed response. While I do have some other questions, I believe that we need the kind of net assessment analysis, risk analysis, and budget impact statements for the record that will give this committee and the American people the facts they really need to understand the INF Treaty.

1. Could you provide a detailed explanation—by individual type of missile system—of the differences between the estimates of Soviet missile and launcher strength in the data annex to the INF treaty and the Department's estimates in its posture statements, reports, and briefings?

2. Could you provide a detailed explanation of the Department's estimate of the changes in total Soviet warhead strength that will result from the INF treaty by individual type of Soviet missile system and of how the warheads and guidance platforms that will be removed from the INF and SRINF missiles that are being destroyed will be used?

3. Could you provide a projection of total Soviet warhead strength over the next five years, with and without the INF Treaty including the new warheads the Soviet Union is producing, taking the continuing high volume of production at its weapons material plants into account?

4. What confidence does the Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency have in their ability to detect any overall change in the Soviet nuclear force posture of a kind that might materially affect the theater nuclear balance?

5. What warning time are we likely to have of typical changes in the U.S.S.R.'s force posture?

6. Could you provide a more detailed analysis of how we could react to such changes by deploying new theater nuclear systems, redeploying theater nuclear systems or taking other measures to protect ourselves and our allies? There is ultimately only one way to enforce an arms control agreement and that is by both being able to detect any increase in the threat and being able to react to that change.

7. Are you fully confident our intelligence programs are adequate and are adequately funded to perform both their existing and programmed tasks, and the additional workload of monitoring all the changes that will take place in Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic and theater nuclear forces as the result of an INF and START Treaty?

THE THEATER NUCLEAR MILITARY BALANCE

The Department has shown on many occasions that it can produce unclassified estimates of the military balance. I have counted some 30 different statistical and graphic measures of the nuclear balance in recent reports and posture statements and roughly 50 measures of the conventional balance. There is a particularly good measure of the INF balance on page 47 of the Joint Chief's fiscal year 1988 Military Posture statement, although I must again note that that it does not track with the data in the data annex to the INF Treaty.

8. Could you apply these techniques of analysis in depth to provide this committee with the current and projected theater nuclear balance, with and without an INF Treaty? I would like to see this balance projected forward for at least the same time period as in past projections—in this case that would be to the year 2000.

9. Could you provide a similarly detailed analysis of how the nuclear balance, with and without the INF reductions, affects four critical issues:

Soviet and Warsaw Pact incentives and capability to launch a nuclear first strike against NATO?

Soviet and Warsaw Pact incentives and capability to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons?

Soviet and Warsaw Pact capability to decouple the nuclear capabilities of the United States from the defense of Europe?

Soviet ability to substitute strategic systems and bombers like the Backfire for INF forces without seriously impacting on Soviet strategic capabilities against the United States?

10. Could you provide a detailed net assessment of the impact of rushing into the kind of "triple zero" option to reduce shorter range theater nuclear arms that has just been proposed by the U.S.S.R.?

11. Could you provide a detailed assessment of the current and projected risk posed by each Soviet theater system not covered in the INF Treaty? For example, the latest Military Posture statement by the Joint Chiefs shows that the Warsaw Pact now has a roughly 3 to 1 advantage in INF strike aircraft, has made a 50 percent increase in its land-based short range nuclear delivery systems since 1980, and now has a major lead over NATO. (pp. 48-49) The latest edition of Soviet Military Power shows that the Warsaw Pact now has over 10,000 artillery weapons that can deliver nuclear rounds, more than 500 Scud launchers targeted against NATO, and more than 500 FROG and SS-21 launchers targeted against NATO. (pp. 41-42).

12. Could you provide a similar assessment of the risks inherent in a net assessment of the current balance of theater air breathing systems with and without the INF Treaty?

THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE

I am equally concerned with our ability to get the Department views on the conventional balance. I know that the Department is issuing a report on Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990s today, but I gather this has been severely edited down from the original drafts, and I want to make sure that we have a full and comprehensive picture of the Department's view of the conventional balance in the NATO Central Region.

13. Could you review the earlier drafts of that report, and provide us with a comprehensive picture of the conventional balance?

14. Could you provide us with a chronological summary of the results of the war games the Department has run for the NATO Central Region over the last 4 years, to include a statement of how long NATO conventional forces could hold and the main strengths and weaknesses of NATO forces?

15. Could you provide a comprehensive analysis of the Department's estimate of the impact of the comparative rates of United States and Soviet, and NATO and Warsaw Pact production and deployment of land, air, and naval equipment in the Central Region balance showing annual deployments by major category of equipment over the last 10 years and projected deployments for the next 5 years?

THE CONVENTIONAL OPTION

16. Could you provide us with the Department's estimate of what we would have to do to the current 5 year defense program (FYDP) to provide a fully adequate U.S. contribution to creating a robust conventional option in the Central Region of NATO?

17. Could you provide an equally detailed statement of the specific force improvements each of our allies in Europe would have to make in the army, air force, and navy to create the robust conventional option you mention in your testimony?

Let me be very precise here, I am not asking you for yet another report or generic shopping list. We need a specific picture of what would have to be done to each line item in the fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1990 budgets and the rest of the current 5 year defense program. We need the kind of detail that can only come in the form of a draft supplemental budget request for the United States and an equally specific list of the major improvements the Department feels each NATO Central Region country would have to make.

18. Could you provide me with a comparative estimate of what the United States and U.S.S.R., and NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a whole, are spending on their forces for the Central Region and in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals, and of the annual trends in real defense expenditure over each of the last 10 years?

[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:05 p.m., this same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:10 p.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Caucus Room, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Quayle, Gramm, Symms, and McCain.

Also present: Senator Stevens.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Gerald K. Bankus, Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Frederick F.Y. Pang, professional staff members; and Lucia M. Chavez, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn; Robert K. Griffith, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

The next Senator to be recognized is Senator Wirth.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was not here for the completion of the morning. I had to chair the floor of the Senate, but I am delighted that we are expanding to this afternoon.

I wanted to, if I might, first of all, pick up, Admiral Crowe, on your statement. You stressed in your testimony, and let me see if this is an accurate paraphrase, that the INF Treaty would force the USSR to upset their normal pattern of doing business, and then you repeated. I repeat, upset their normal pattern of doing business.

Could you explain a little bit more what you mean by that?

Admiral CROWE. What I was talking about, Senator, was that they have some target coverage that these SS-20s and the associated missiles have been identified with in the way they intend to use them. Now, when those are missing, they are going to have to look through their alternatives, and the choices they have are going to be either in the SNF range, or they are going to have to go to dual-capable aircraft or to strategic systems. Any one of those choices will help them compensate for what they have lost, but they will not be what the normal pattern has been and not what they want to do. For example, in dual-capable aircraft, they do not train up to this point for that.

Senator WIRTH. The thrust of my question goes not only to the definition of what you meant by that, but to see if we could take the next step and talk a little bit about what we have learned coming out of the Stockholm agreement signed in 1986 in which we have had a good deal of experience in monitoring and inspecting what the Soviets have done, and they us, and whether there might be room for us, following to INF, to expand on Stockholm, if you all have been looking for opportunities to expand on Stockholm. How, for example, would you find out if the Soviets were upset and what they were doing to replace what might be there. That might be part of what such an agreement might be.

Chairman CROWE. First of all, those inspections have been very successful, and we would like to see that expanded, and I made that clear to Marshall Akhromeyev.

Two, they have not matured to the point yet where they are going to address the kind of question we are talking about here, but I would ultimately think that they would, if we are successful in getting more and more.

Senator WIRTH. We certainly might mature those to get to the point, perhaps, of exchanges and discussions on strategy, might we not?

Admiral CROWE. And doctrine and tactics.

Senator WIRTH. And if we got to discussions of strategy, doctrine and tactics, presumably that might help to lower the level of concern on both sides that each was thinking that the other was organized in an offensive fashion.

Admiral CROWE. We would hope so, and those are the two words they use, doctrine and tactics. But they would like to have discussions on those and meetings to promote discussion of those subjects.

Senator WIRTH. Mr. Secretary, on that front, one of the items that struck me on my trip was in talking with our military leadership, a very, very impressive group of people, as you know, and it is something that I would wish all Americans would have the opportunity that I just had of talking to these extraordinarily impressive and capable individuals.

I asked each one of them about the potential of building on Stockholm, and very specifically, about the possibilities of their meeting with their counterparts in the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet forces. Uniformly the reaction came back that they would like to do so. General Galvin made it very clear that he would like to meet with his counterpart, and to paraphrase him, "find out what worries him and tell him what I am worried about." General Otis said in no uncertain terms that he would like to meet every 2 months with his counterpart, and he said, "if for nothing else, if he did not show up during one of those 2-month periods of time, I might wonder that something might be amiss."

This came out over and over and over again. One of the problems, apparently, is that they are constrained by order of the administration from meeting with their counterparts, that they have been told they cannot do so, and I was wondering if there was such a policy in the office of the Secretary that precludes any kind of a meeting like this, and if not, what kind of a process might be set up to encourage a greater exchange of information, acquaintance and so on.

Secretary CARLUCCI. There is a Government-wide policy on social contacts with the Soviets, and I have asked that that be reviewed. There are some constraints on General Galvin that come as a result of NATO policy.

I think it is appropriate to take a look at this, and indeed, at the summit, Secretary General Gorbachev suggested that I and my counterpart meet for the purpose of setting up a series of military-to-military contacts, and I have agreed to that and have sent my Soviet counterpart in broad terms an agenda which would include military-to-military contacts, how we might go about them. It would include discussing avoiding dangerous activities such as happened in our military liaison mission; arms control discussions; and doctrine and tactics.

The Soviets have welcomed this, and they are presently considering a response. So once that happens, then I anticipate that Admiral Crowe will meet with Marshal Akhromeyev and will begin to establish a series of military-to-military contacts. We do think that these are important.

Senator WIRTH. What kind of a time frame do you see on that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I had told the Soviets I am ready to meet at any time. I suggested February. They said that they would get back to me with an appropriate response.

Senator WIRTH. I think that is a very important initiative and would just tell you that there is a very widespread understanding among at least the military leadership that I talked to that they were precluded from doing so, and they think that that would be very, very productive, and that was to a general, admiral, every one of them that I talked to about it thought it was a good idea.

Pursuing that I think would be very productive.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. I might say that I know both Senator Warner and I agree with that. After touring parts of Western Europe and Eastern Europe last year, we felt very strongly that it would be of benefit for the Warsaw Pact military officials to get together with

their NATO counterparts, and that we have everything to gain from those meetings. There is virtually no down side to them that I see. Understanding tactics, doctrine, and training can lead to confidence-building measures, which would greatly increase warning time, ease tensions and provide for increased stability.

Senator Wirth, I completely concur with your observation. Secretary Carlucci.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I concur with that, too.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, and Admiral. I appreciate your testimony here this morning.

I just was in Western Europe last week and talked to some of our military leadership there. I would share in what Senator Wirth said. I think that we can be very well pleased and very proud of the quality of leadership we have in all the services, not only in Europe but around the world. I am certainly very proud of that.

One question that comes to mind, though is, when you observe things in Europe after INF, what role, if any, do you think that the chemical weapons will have in Soviet military planning? What is your estimate on that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think chemical weapons currently have and will continue to have a very substantial role in Soviet military planning. They have by far the largest chemical capability of any country in the world, and I am glad to see that they have finally admitted it. That is a very important force multiplier for them. So we need to get on with our own deterrent.

Senator SYMMS. It appears to me that that is a stumbling block to the NATO Alliance, to all our forces, just how well they will be able to operate under siege with chemical weapons.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Agreed. We are very concerned, very concerned about that threat, and we are pleased that the Congress has finally allowed us to get on with the binary program.

Senator SYMMS. Now, with respect to the removal of the Pershing IIs and the cruise missiles from Europe, and in light of Spain saying that we have to close a military base, 72 F-16 fighters that are dual-capable. Is that not quite a sacrifice for us to be expected to make?

Secretary CARLUCCI. They are two different subjects, of course. In the one case, we have negotiated with the Soviets a more than offsetting reduction of their capability, an asymmetrical reduction, if you will.

In the case of the Spanish, this, in my judgment, is an unfortunate occurrence, but we are acceding to Spanish sovereign demands. Spain is after all, a sovereign country. So if they insist on our departure, we really have no alternative.

We are currently looking for other basing for the 401st, and there is some possibility that we could find some alternate basing for it, and if so, I would make every effort to keep it in Europe.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, one question that kept coming up with the European leaders that I talked to, and it is very apparent, you can see that the ideal war between capitalism versus communism, the capitalists are clearly winning the war. Every place in the world

where we are standing up for a sound principle, we seem to have a foreign policy that is winning, whether it is in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in the Persian gulf, and so forth.

But after this INF treaty there will be a great deal of concern about whether or not there will be a commitment, not only on the part of the political leadership in this country but in Europe to actually fund the necessary defense network. In other words, now we are having this big love-in with the Soviets, so why do we need all this money for defense.

What is your strategy for that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think it is very important that with the help of this committee we somehow find a way to restore the defense consensus in this country. I think we have reached the point in defense decreases where the level of risk is too high. I have indicated this morning that I will try and fund, to the best of my ability, the programs that contribute directly to the NATO deterrent, even if that is done at the expense of force structure, and if we have to have a smaller military force. But each time you do that, you heighten the risk.

Of course, it is also fair for us to say to our European friends that they need to pick up more of the burden. They do more than is generally recognized, but we need to continue to emphasize that this is a collective alliance, and we all have to do more.

Senator SYMMS. See, I have the sense that NATO is probably stronger right now than it has been in 40 years. Right now, under the current situation; whether or not the INF treaty per se will make it weaker or stronger, I think is a nebulous question. You could probably make an argument on either side.

But I do think, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, that the problem is going to be what happens after this treaty and whether we do make that commitment to fund the necessary defenses. I think our commanders in Europe feel very good about the forces now, but I think they sense that we in the Congress are starting down that long slippery slope that we went down in the 1970's, and are starting over again, and things may not be so good 5 years from now.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Symms, I agree with you. What we are seeing in Europe are the results of the defense funding efforts that we made in the early 1980's. I hope that what we will see in the 1990s will not be the result of the decreases that we are experiencing today, although, when we went through the 20 percent decrease in the 1970's, we did so very much at the expense of readiness and sustainability. Remember General Meyer's phrase, the "hollow army". In the face of the budget decreases that we are facing now, the current Pentagon is making every effort to avoid that situation, which is why I mentioned taking down force structure, if necessary. I feel very strongly that it is unfair to our men in places such as Europe to make the budget cuts at the expense of spare parts, ammunition, readiness and sustainability.

Senator SYMMS. I think my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Symms. Next we have Senator Dixon.

Senator DIXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, some of the things I am going to ask you might be somewhat repetitious.

But I would appreciate it if you would indulge me, because they constitute my major concerns. And I would like to have your point of view, even if you have indicated it in my absence some other time today.

You heard my statement earlier about my concerns about our conventional capability and our chemical capability, when we do away with the nuclear deterrence that we now have in Europe. I presume you share those concerns. Do you not?

Secretary CARLUCCI. When we do away with a certain group of nuclear weapons, yes, I share the concern.

Senator DIXON. Now, you were talking to my friend, Senator Symms, about the chemical question a minute ago.

I wonder whether you do not share the concern of some of us that there is a lack of popular support for some of these programs in this country. I recall twice voting for binary chemicals when it was a tie vote, and the Vice President had to break the tie.

In the event that we do not have a successful arms control agreement with the Soviets on conventional weaponry and chemical weaponry, how can we be assured that we will be able to develop the kind of necessary defense structure that we need to have in connection with, for instance, the chemical deterrence in the future?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, the only assurance is for the Congress and this committee, in particular, to work together with the administration to try and get the resources that are needed to go ahead with these programs.

If ever there was a lesson that could be drawn from INF, it is that one must negotiate from a position of strength.

Senator DIXON. I would agree with that. But when we have the INF Treaty, and I assume that we will have it ultimately, I hope to be able to support it, would you concede that the imbalance between us and the Soviet and the Warsaw Pact nations in connection with chemicals is something of grave concern?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. It has nothing to do with INF. But as a matter unto itself, it is one of grave concern to us.

Senator DIXON. Well, I think it does have something to do with INF in the sense that some of our deterrent capability is being minimized or adversely affected, so that we have to look at these alternatives. Do we not? Whether we are going to be able through conventional equality and chemical equality to meet the test in Europe?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have to look at our overall deterrent posture. We have to look at the NATO triad to make sure we have adequate deterrence in Europe.

We do not need to compensate in any way. In fact, we do not even use that phrase in connection with the INF Treaty because, militarily, we believe the INF Treaty works to our advantage.

Now, to the degree that we do not have an adequate chemical deterrent, and we do not, it would lower the nuclear threshold.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Secretary, could I interrupt to ask a question, as a follow-up to the statement you just made?

If we adopt the INF Treaty and nothing else follows, are you not then concerned about our position vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact na-

tions with respect to conventional and chemical capability in Europe?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Dixon, I did not say nothing else follows.

Senator DIXON. But that is my question.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We need to get on vigorously with existing NATO programs of modernization in the conventional defense area, the 1985 CDI.

We need to get on with the Montebello decision. We need to get on with the cooperative R&D program. We need to get on with the Nunn-Warner amendment on arms cooperation. All of these things are programs that strengthen NATO. We need to move more vigorously in these areas.

We do not need to do this because of the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty may highlight the NATO's problems, and in this sense I am delighted it does, because it emphasizes the importance of getting on with existing programs.

Senator DIXON. I think that I would have to say that I am not alone, and I have not heard all the questioning today, but I suspect that I am not alone in the Senate of the United States, I am sure I am not alone in the country, in believing that while the INF Treaty is important, the INF Treaty, absent ultimate arms control agreements in conventional weaponry, chemical, and START, would be a very difficult situation for this country.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not agree with that statement. I think the INF Treaty, standing alone is militarily advantageous, and the Chairman has testified that that is the view of the JCS.

Senator DIXON. But you have stated that you believe our imbalance is serious so far as chemical capability vis-a-vis the Soviets. Have you not?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I agree with all of that.

Senator DIXON. Then what is your view of our conventional capability vis-a-vis the Soviets in Europe?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think we need to strengthen our conventional capability.

Senator DIXON. So do I.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think we need to get on with a more viable chemical deterrent. In fact, I think we need to go ahead with modernization vigorously, including modernization of our strategic forces which are also part of the NATO deterrent.

I think there are a lot of things that need to be done. But this does not denigrate from the merits of the INF Treaty itself.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, could I add something?

Senator DIXON. I would be delighted to have your answer as well, Admiral.

Admiral CROWE. First of all, I consider the chemical imbalance today a very grave deficiency in our posture. And I am sure if you visit Western Europe our commanders there will make that absolutely clear.

And I do not consider the theater nuclear weapons an appropriate deterrent to chemical warfare. That is not the way to deter chemical warfare. The way to deter it is to have a suitable chemical capability of your own. Now, I understand that is arguable.

Senator DIXON. I do not have any quarrel with what you are saying, and I see that my time is up. I am concerned about whether we can ever accomplish what you are suggesting.

Frankly, through simple political pragmatism, I wonder whether it can be done. I know the pressure put on me. Had my vote been switched, you would not have had the chemical capability we now have.

I remind you again, on a tie vote, the Vice President twice broke the tie. These folks in this committee have heard the discussions behind closed doors in our committee. And some of these things are going to be difficult to do. That is what concerns me.

Admiral CROWE. And I have real difficulty understanding it. The only thing that we have, a really tangible example of deterrence is in chemical systems.

We actually fought a war where chemical weapons deterred the use by the other side of chemical weapons. We have empirical experience to that effect. And yet our country is ignoring it in a certain sense.

And as far as the moral question is concerned, the soldiers out there in the field think that if they are going to be subjected to gas weapons and chemical weapons, it is moral for them to have a counter. And I do not understand the moral argument against it. I just simply do not.

Senator DIXON. I am sorry. My time has expired. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. I certainly share that concern. It ought to be said, though, that in the fiscal year 1988/89 DOD Authorization Act we authorized the production of chemical weapons.

Production is underway. Our problem is, how are we going to deploy those weapons? Are we going to build and deploy them in Europe? Our allies have a real challenge, whether to deter chemical war with a chemical deterrent, or to continue to rely on responding with nuclear weapons to a chemical attack.

I would agree with you, Admiral Crowe, that is a very unsatisfactory policy. I am afraid that is our policy. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If the INF Treaty is approved tomorrow, what would be the status of our ability to go monitor?

Who is in charge of setting up the inspection teams? How many people are going to be involved? What is the expense of that likely to be? Are the Soviets picking up their expenses? We are picking up ours.

Where do we stand with development of all the things that are going to be necessary to do this? Is there going to be a time lag here that if we approve the Treaty we still would need time to develop our process?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Glenn, we are beginning to move already to set up a defense agency, the On-Site Inspection Agency [OSIA] in the Department of Defense, located for organizational purposes under the Under Secretary for Acquisition, but receiving guidance from the chairman and the Under Secretary for Policy. A director for that agency has been selected.

Approximate cost this year——

Senator GLENN. Has that person been announced?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not believe the name has been announced but we would be glad to supply it.
[The information follows:]

ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY

Brigadier General Roland LaJoie (USA) has been selected to head the On-Site Inspection Agency.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not know if it has gone entirely through the process. But we will be glad to tell you who he is. He is very well qualified.

The approximate costs for implementation of the treaty in the 1988 budget would be in the \$180 to \$200 million range. That would also include some of the costs of missile destruction. We are looking at ways of funding treaty implementation. Current thinking is that it would probably be funded through offsets in the Defense budget.

Senator GLENN. You have a total bill for carrying out, you say it would be \$180 million for this kind of monitoring and so on.

Do you have a total bill for what it is going to cost to carry out everything we know that is going to be required now on INF?

Secretary CARLUCCI. In 1988, our ballpark figure is \$180-\$200 million. I cannot really tell you what it is in the outyears at this point.

Senator GLENN. How about the equipment that is going to be necessary to monitor when it comes in and out of the plant?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The equipment that we need would be included in that figure. That would include people and equipment.

You asked about transportation. The treaty provides that in-country transportation would be supplied by the host country. Transportation to the inspected country would be paid by the inspecting country.

Senator GLENN. I do not believe it is any secret we have been involved for a long time, for 18 months or so, in developing some of the equipment that is going to be necessary, and the stations, what they will look like.

I visited our test monitoring facility at Sandia, and it was very good. But I was questioning the amount of money we are going to have to provide in the budget. We have to face that here.

And it would seem to me that \$200 million to carry out everything that I could see that had to be done would be pretty much of a bargain. Are you sure you can do it for \$200 million?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I am talking about the 1988 figure. Obviously, there would be ongoing costs, recurring costs in 1989. We will address those in the 1989 budget.

Senator GLENN. This would include the destruction of our weapons here and the costs of all the things that must be done?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir, it would. I cannot guarantee that it will not mount in the outyears as we get going. But what we are talking about is the initial startup costs.

Senator GLENN. Do the Soviets pay their own way on what they want to put up as monitoring devices here, and we pay our way there?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is the understanding. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. In a different area, I would like to carry on a little more discussion on the direction we are heading with the START talks, and using INF as the basis. Have you both signed off on this as our approach? Taking the warheads out, the nuclear explosive devices out, and stockpiling them?

I know there are some advantages to that right now for some other reasons relating to our supply of material and so on. But what about this as a basis for long-term arms control?

I have some serious reservations. I would appreciate your observations on this. Let us say we are setting up a pattern here of INF and START to 50 percent, and hopefully on below that sometime.

Are we going to have to modify our basis for negotiation along here somewhere?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have been looking at warheads in both START and INF as a unit of account.

But when we are actually talking about destroying the delivery systems, the launchers, and the missiles themselves, we have not actually gotten into this level of detail in the START talks.

But from my own perspective, I do not think that what we are doing in INF, in preserving the physics package and the guidance system, necessarily serves as a binding precedent under START.

Senator GLENN. Have the Joint Chiefs signed off on going to 50 percent? Taking the warheads out and saving them?

Admiral CROWE. Destruction and what you are talking about, we have not gotten to that level yet, Senator. We have not signed off on the warhead destruction.

Secretary CARLUCCI. They have agreed on the 50-percent reduction. But the question of how you handle the warheads under START is one that has not yet been addressed.

Senator GLENN. Well, it would seem to me like we are pretty late in the pattern here.

You have Ron Lehman sitting behind you who has been negotiating some of these things, and doing a good job. But we are talking about perhaps by late spring having some sort of an agreement, if I read the papers correctly.

When do we get down to signing off on this? It seems to me we are getting late in the day.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Glenn, we still have not yet fully finished on the counting rules. We have some very serious issues to deal with in terms of cruise missiles and mobile missiles, to say nothing of the problems with the ABM Treaty. So we are really not at the end game on this.

Senator GLENN. I agree that there is an awful lot to be done. Would you estimate we could have all these things done and taken care of for a summer summit?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The word is we are going to try. But that is not a hard and fast deadline.

The President has made it clear that if we do not have a good agreement by the time the summit comes, we will not sign an agreement.

Senator GLENN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn. That completes round one with all of the Senators who are now present. A couple

are not here at the moment. We will start round two under the same ground rules.

Admiral Crowe, I would like some definitions of terms that we use all the time. There is going to be so much public debate, so much necessity for public understanding, that I would like to clarify or define some terms.

You mentioned in your very thorough and excellent opening statement the current NATO strategy as being one of flexible response. Would you define flexible response?

Admiral CROWE. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, flexible response is the ability to respond across the entire spectrum, from conventional to theater nuclear, to strategic weapons, and to have that capability.

Chairman NUNN. And the idea would be to have a strong enough conventional defense to not have to turn to nuclear weapons at the very earliest stages, if possible. Is that right?

Admiral CROWE. To keep the threshold as high as we can manage. Hopefully never to resort to it.

Chairman NUNN. What was NATO's strategy before the doctrine of flexible response?

Admiral CROWE. Fundamentally, it was massive retaliation.

Chairman NUNN. What does that mean?

Admiral CROWE. That means, if we are attacked, the enemy would draw upon his head a very, very heavy nuclear response.

Chairman NUNN. Would you tell us the difference between the NATO strategy of flexible response, which we have been following since the 1960's, and the doctrine of massive retaliation?

Admiral CROWE. The basic difference was the introduction of theater nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft that were designed and meant to operate within the theater and not as a strategic response. In other words, not an exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States, et cetera, et cetera.

Chairman NUNN. What about the difference in nonnuclear conventional weapons in the flexible response doctrine or in the strategy compared to massive retaliation?

Admiral CROWE. It was to rely more heavily on conventional weapons.

Chairman NUNN. In the late 1960s, when we moved as an alliance from massive retaliation, meaning when the enemy comes across the border with tanks, we respond with strategic nuclear weapons; to a strategy of flexible response as a declared NATO strategy. Under a flexible response doctrine we try to do better with conventional weapons, and we turn to tactical theater weapons and use strategic weapons as the last resort. Is that fair?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir. The theater nuclear weapons, of course, if you had to resort to those, were to both disrupt the attack and to signal to the enemy that he was risking further escalation if he did not—

Chairman NUNN. Would you also tell us the difference between a first-strike policy, a no-first strike policy and a no-first use policy?

Admiral CROWE. Well, a no-first strike policy is just that. That we would never use nuclear weapons to strike out of the blue. It would always be in response to some kind of threat, et cetera, et cetera.

Chairman NUNN. But NATO has what we call a first-use policy. Is that right?

Admiral CROWE. We have never subscribed, we have never pledged ourselves to not strike first.

Chairman NUNN. With nuclear weapons?

Admiral CROWE. That is correct. The implication being theater nuclear weapons.

Chairman NUNN. You are saying the first-use policy would be in response to a Warsaw Pact attack?

Admiral CROWE. We reserve the right to ourselves to use nuclear weapons, if we feel that we are in grave jeopardy.

Chairman NUNN. Even if the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have not used them?

Admiral CROWE. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. So, within NATO's framework or strategy, we would say we reserve the right, or reserve as a policy matter, the option of using nuclear weapons in response to a nonnuclear attack?

Admiral CROWE. That is correct. And to make the decision at the time based on the circumstances.

Chairman NUNN. You mentioned in your statement a high-risk policy. Could you tell us what you mean by a NATO high-risk policy?

Admiral CROWE. What I mean by the high-risk policy is that your conventional capability, relatively speaking, is so low that you might have to resort to theater weapons early, either in terms of time or in terms of violence; much earlier than you would like.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral Crowe, General Rogers has said several times over the years in an unclassified forum, including before this committee, that in event of a massive Soviet conventional attack against NATO, NATO would have to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in a matter of "days, not weeks or months."

Do you agree with that assessment?

Admiral CROWE. I do not agree with the timeframes that I have heard in those assessments, for a number of reasons.

The games that I see, the analysis that we do and my own instincts tell me that in intellectual analysis you compress timeframes and the situation does not go quite that way in real life.

Chairman NUNN. Does that mean you are more optimistic than General Rogers about being able to delay longer?

Admiral CROWE. I believe I am, sir. It depends a great deal on warning time now, et cetera, et cetera.

As a matter of fact, it is an infinite problem. It depends on a very detailed scenario as to what and when it is possible, of course, and our games and our analysis shows us, that by giving ground you can buy time.

Whether you do that, whether the politics of NATO permits that, et cetera, is a very fluid problem.

Chairman NUNN. That also gets into NATO's forward defense strategy, meaning NATO's policy is not to give ground for time. Is that not right?

Admiral CROWE. That is correct. In war time, though, commanders have a way of being controlled by circumstances, not peacetime policies though.

Chairman NUNN. I would agree with that. Admiral Crowe, on page 5 of your prepared statement you say there has been a trend in NATO toward low-level sustainability.

By sustainability, you mean enough supplies to be able to fight?

Admiral CROWE. To prolong or protract the fighting, yes.

Chairman NUNN. You go ahead to say which has in turn, "lowered the nuclear threshold and raised the risk of general escalation." Could you explain that?

Admiral CROWE. Well, what I mean by that, Mr. Chairman, is that you cannot maintain a viable defense as long as you could with sustainability, with munitions, et cetera, et cetera.

And you would have to, under the policy that you described that General Rogers talked about, you would have to resort to nuclear weapons quicker.

Chairman NUNN. When you say lower the nuclear threshold, that generally sounds pretty good, but it is really just the opposite.

When you lower the nuclear threshold you are really making it more likely that you will use nuclear weapons sooner. Is that right?

Admiral CROWE. You will be involved in some kind of nuclear conflict quicker or sooner.

Chairman NUNN. So, the purpose of conventional defense, and strengthening conventional defense, is to raise the nuclear threshold. Otherwise meaning, not to use nuclear weapons as early would be the case. Is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. That is the way I look at it. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying then that we have basically seen the nuclear threshold get lower over the last several years in Europe?

Admiral CROWE. I do not think we have over the last several years. I think that the improvements that we have made in the last 7 to 8 years have raised the nuclear threshold.

Now, it is a matter of controversy as to whether you are talking days or weeks or months. It is not a science, it is an art. But it is my opinion that we have raised the nuclear threshold, albeit probably in small amounts.

Chairman NUNN. On page 5, I read your statement just the opposite. You say "of special concern to the JCS is the low level of sustainability, items, ammunitions, supporting NATO formations. This trend has, in turn, lowered the nuclear threshold and raised the risk of general escalation."

Admiral CROWE. Well, I am really talking here in small increments, and we have always been disturbed about that. I think that the sustainability that I am talking about are non-NATO formations. We have improved our sustainability in the U.S. sector of NATO, and some of the NATO countries have improved their sustainability. But not all.

Chairman NUNN. I understand we have a longer length of supplies than most NATO countries by far. Looking at the NATO alliance as a whole, has the NATO alliance over the last several years, whatever time you pick, been lowering the nuclear threshold, or, has it been raising the nuclear threshold?

Admiral CROWE. That is a difficult question, Mr. Chairman. It certainly has not been raising it enough to satisfy the Joint Chiefs.

Chairman NUNN. I am trying to pin down exactly what you meant on page 5 of your statement, where you say "this trend has, in turn, lowered the nuclear threshold and raised the risk of general escalation." What is the timeframe.

Admiral CROWE. I think since we have been in 14/3, that has been true.

Chairman NUNN. That is going back to what year?

Admiral CROWE. I think to 1967.

Chairman NUNN. From 1967 forward, the general trend has been toward lowering the nuclear threshold?

Admiral CROWE. We have certainly, in the absolute sense, made some real improvements in our capability. I do not know about the threshold, but in our capability, in the last 7 or 8 years. Unfortunately, the Soviets have also made some rather dramatic improvements. So, in a relative sense, I am not so sure that we are better off.

Chairman NUNN. We had a massive retaliation doctrine before 1968, and since then we have had flexible response. Since we moved from massive retaliation to flexible response, we have lowered the nuclear threshold, and have been, over that period of time, constantly lowering the nuclear threshold. I sounds like we have never moved to flexible response.

Admiral CROWE. I understand your concern. And I likewise am concerned. I do not think it has ever been high enough. But it is scenario-driven. There is no question about that. I mean, to make this generalization is very difficult. We have got to know the time, the warning time, how long we have been reinforcing, where we are, what political action NATO takes and what date it takes it before D-Day, et cetera.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired. I will come back to this question. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, under the provisions of the treaty, there are specific periods when two classes of weapons begin to come out of inventories and are no longer available to the military commanders. I want to overlay on that the budget scenario. With a specific question to you, Mr. Secretary, I assume as you are now working on your 1989 budget and the out years you are assuming treaty ratification. I do not say this with any lack of deference to the President's respect for the Senate. My question is, What changes have you made in the 1989 budget, and say the 1990 and 1991 budgets, to reflect the corrections needed, assuming this treaty is going to be ratified?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would be glad to provide the figures for the record. We have certain investment costs.

BUDGETS REFLECTING ADOPTION OF INF TREATY

Senator WARNER. Has the Department of Defense begun to make adjustments for fiscal years 1989, 1990 and 1991 budgets reflecting adoption of the INF Treaty? I refer to costs resulting directly from the treaty and also those resulting from planned conventional and nuclear adjustments in light of the treaty.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Department of Defense is currently making an assessment of the resources required to implement the particular requirements of the treaty. The requirements for fiscal year 1989 are approximately \$150 million and are reflected in the Department's fiscal year 1989 budget request. The remaining outyear costs will be incorporated in subsequent budget submissions.

We are currently studying possible conventional and nuclear force adjustments in light of the INF Treaty. At the same time, those programs which were identified as necessary prior to and independent of the INF agreement, and which can benefit from immediate funding, will be included in the fiscal year 1989 budget.

Senator WARNER. I mean more specifically in the area of conventional weaponry, the modernization of the strategic forces. Given statements made by the Chairman, we are going to have to take certain actions if this treaty goes into effect in terms of our planning and investment in future military hardware. The question is, Have you begun to make the adjustments in 1989 and 1990 budgets reflecting the adoption of this treaty and ratification?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, once again, the modifications that result from the adoption of this treaty would be scaling down, or eliminating, the O&M costs from the Pershing II and GLCM systems, the costs of destruction, the costs of the OSIA. The other programs that you referred to are ongoing programs, whether they come under CDI or Montebello, and we are currently in the process of funding them. They are identified in the Byrd/Quayle Report.

Senator WARNER. The short answer would be this treaty has no major impact on the 1989 and 1990 budgets because we have already begun to take action?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. What do you see with respect to the NATO budgets? Are they reflecting the adoption of this treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The same thing would apply to them. Most of the bases have already been set up. There is a question of what would be done with the individual bases. Those are being discussed on a country-by-country basis. But in terms of their own national budgets, once again, they fit into the conventional defense initiative. The modernization—

Senator WARNER. I think you have answered both of my questions. No dramatic changes in the U.S. budgetary planning and likewise no dramatic changes in the NATO budget planning?

Secretary CARLUCCI. There will be changes, but not dramatic.

Senator WARNER. Let's return to article XIV. It was brought up by several Senators, notably Senator Quayle. We concluded the earlier colloquy on what it might mean. During the brief period of recess, my research shows that the Soviets proposed a very detailed provision, and fortunately our negotiators were able to set that aside. The United States did not have its position accepted, namely a very short provision comparable to what we have had in other agreements. We ended up instead, with what we have in this treaty. Primarily, the two words "or undertaking" are the new part, as contrasted with earlier treaties. My specific question to you is, in your judgment, is article XIV a noncircumvention provision, or is it a noninconsistency provision?

Secretary CARLUCCI. As a nonlawyer, I hesitate to answer that kind of question. I would fall back on the statement that I read earlier. It really means that we will implement the treaty in good faith, and it is quite specific, and do nothing which would conflict with its provisions.

Senator WARNER. Let me ask you a specific question. Do you interpret it as being in any way restrictive on what we are trying to

do to, say, in helping the British with their Trident program, the Trident modernization program?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Warner, I do not, principally because this is not a system that is covered by the treaty. One of our objectives in the treaty was to make certain that it not cover the British and French deterrents. Let me say that one can dream up a whole series of hypotheticals in this area, and if we are going to do that, I prefer to answer those questions for the record.

Senator WARNER. I think we will get the negotiating record up and I will ask, Mr. Chairman, at this point to insert in the record the specific provisions submitted by the Soviets and the United States.

[The information was not received in time to be printed, but upon receipt will be retained in committee transcripts files.]

Senator WARNER. Admiral Crowe, you mentioned in your earlier testimony the question of violations. Can you amplify on your characterization to the committee of what you would consider to be militarily significant violations of the INF Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. I am not so sure it is possible to draw a line and say that above or below is a militarily significant violation, Senator. I think it depends on the circumstances such as what kind of violation you are talking about, what degree of confidence you have, et cetera, et cetera. But, of course, above all, what it does to your own posture, and particularly in your ability to deter. If in fact your ability to deter is being threatened by that violation, that is pretty significant. You should be taking it seriously, and you should be reacting.

Senator WARNER. I wonder if you might study your earlier response to this question, and amplify for the record and give us some framework to guide us as we look at this question of violations.

Admiral CROWE. Of course.

[The information follows:]

Admiral CROWE. Judgments on the military significance of Soviet cheating must be made on a case-by-case basis. We should not be explicit in defining in advance what we consider to be, in the abstract, militarily significant. We would regard any cheating with the greatest concern. In determining the military significance of any given case of cheating, we would take into account the following kinds of factors:

The quantitative level of cheating and the overall threat it posed to U.S. and NATO defenses.

The kind or kinds of weapons involved and their specific capabilities for target coverage, survivability, etc.

Our assessment of the state of readiness and training of a cheating force.

The extent to which other forces available to the Soviets render a cheating force largely redundant or conversely comprised a significant additional military capability.

The extent to which the U.S. and its allies possessed existing military forces or surge capabilities which could permit an effective counter to a Soviet cheating force.

The overall political and military situation surrounding the discovery of Soviet cheating, e.g., whether that situation was one of relative stability, one of tension, etc.

The assessment of military significance of any Soviet cheating would be a fundamental part of our response to Soviet non-compliance. We would govern our actions by insuring an appropriate response directed toward protecting our national security interests.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Carlucci, you indicate in your testimony that removal of a complete class of missile systems will

reduce Soviet ability to strike targets in Western Europe without resorting to strategic weapons. Do you believe that the Soviets would view the use of strategic weapons in Europe any differently than they would view the use of their INF weapons today?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, I do not. But as Admiral Crowe pointed out, it disrupts their current pattern for them to have to target their strategic systems on European aim points that are presently covered by the SS-20, so there is a net decrement in their capability here.

Senator WARNER. But they could retarget?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir they could retarget.

Senator WARNER. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe, you and I were talking when I ran out of time this morning. I wonder if we can pick up from there relative to the conventional balance and how you perceive it in Europe. Do you believe that the Soviets have a marked superiority overall in conventional forces?

Admiral CROWE. I am not so sure they have a marked superiority. I am not quite sure what that means, Senator, but I certainly think, as you pointed out in your own studies, that there are a number of important categories in which they have a superiority, and how those play out in an actual scenario is a different problem. It is certainly too close to call. It is not the kind of balance that I am comfortable with.

Senator LEVIN. I asked Secretary Carlucci, and I would like to get your comment on it as well, about the linkage of either an INF or a future START agreement to either conventional arms control, or to conventional force improvements. I am wondering whether or not you believe it is in the interests of the United States to link the ratification or implementation of the INF Treaty to the conclusion of a conventional arms control agreement, or to conventional force improvements.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Is that addressed to me?

Senator LEVIN. No. I said I had asked you that this morning and you did answer it. I understand there was some additional comment on it in response to some of my colleagues' questions, but I do not know that the Admiral has had a chance to comment. If he has, forgive me. But, if you have not had a chance to comment on that question, do you believe that we should link?

Admiral CROWE. I am not sure that I understand the linkage, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe that we should link the ratification of the INF Treaty to either the conclusion of a conventional arms agreement or to conventional force improvements by NATO?

Admiral CROWE. No, I do not, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe that we should, in advance of seeing a START agreement, state that we would link the ratification or the implementation of a START agreement to conventional arms control or to conventional force improvements?

Admiral CROWE. No, I do not. I think a START treaty should be treated on its own merits.

Senator LEVIN. Admiral, I believe you commented earlier this morning that there have been some considerable improvements in

the conventional posture since the 1970's. I believe that was your testimony. I am wondering if you could tell us, give us a couple of examples, where we are better off relative to the Warsaw Pact than we were, say, in 1980, relative to conventional forces. Could you give us some examples where we are specifically better off?

Admiral CROWE. You are saying we. I assume you are referring to the United States?

Senator LEVIN. NATO. NATO versus Warsaw Pact. If you could give us some category of either readiness or sustainability or weapons count, give us a few categories where you think we are relatively better off vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact than we were in 1980.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I think our personnel situation has improved a great deal. Our sustainability in an absolute sense has improved considerably. Our ability to fight with combined arms has unquestionably improved. Our training and also our ability to function at night, which I consider one of the tremendous advantages that we enjoy. Those are hard to come by, and we have done it because of our change in systems and our concentration on it and our training. Certainly in the aircraft field, the modern aircraft which we are fielding, the F-16's and the F-15's, and now the F-15E to come in, our sheltering in NATO, which we have now done, and our longer-range missiles. All of those areas we have done. And we have made, incidentally, in the reinforcement arena, considerable strides in airlift and sealift.

Senator LEVIN. So, that at least in a number of instances, those are not traditional bean count categories, those are quality items.

Admiral CROWE. Absolutely.

Senator LEVIN. So, they are important and our effort to improve those you believe were well-placed and desirable?

Admiral CROWE. Completely. We attempt very hard to get away from the bean count. We do not always succeed. It is particularly difficult in gaming to put a quantifiable figure on these things so you can grind them into games.

Senator LEVIN. So I can give you some assurance on the other end of that let me just read from our estimate relative to that one category, the quantitative or the bean count. My conclusion is that the Warsaw Pact possesses a clear quantitative advantage in most categories of conventional military equipment. Numbers are very important in war. All other items being equal, numbers prevail. It is important to see if other items are equal. So we do have the assurance in this report, which you believe is important from your testimony today, that in fact the bean count is a relevant consideration. It is just not the only consideration. I shot over my time this morning, Mr. Chairman, so let me undershoot it a bit this afternoon. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. Senator Thurmond is next.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe, I would like for both of you to answer this one question. There were some concerns expressed about the adverse effects of time pressures on the completion of his treaty. Were any compromises made during the closing days of the negotiations that adversely impact our monitoring capabilities or our military capabilities?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Were there concessions made that adversely impact? As is true in any situation where you are negotiating, there is some give and take by both sides. However, we preserved, throughout the entire negotiation, our fundamental principles, our bottom line. That is to say, effective verification capability, global zero, exclusion of air and sea systems, exclusion of the British and French Nuclear deterrents, all of those were preserved. But certainly there were some compromises in the closing days. I would not deny that.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, would you care to answer? You said that there was a good deal of talk there about hurry up and get this treaty ready, and the Soviets would not agree to some of these things, and we gave them to them, in simple words.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is not quite the case.

Senator THURMOND. That is what I want you to explain. That is the information that came out in some of the papers.

Secretary CARLUCCI. One example. The Soviets wanted something like 18 hours after notification before the inspectors would be taken to the inspection site. We wanted something like six hours. We settled on 9 hours. Is that a concession? Nine hours seems to us to be a sufficient amount of time. It is that kind of thing that took place in the final stages of the negotiation. Yes, we might have preferred a shorter period of time, but 9 hours will do. So, that is a concession, but it is not one that undercuts our ability to verify the treaty. One can cite a whole series of things like that.

Admiral CROWE. I do not see any of those steps that were taken in the later stages that would affect the fundamental military calculus.

Senator THURMOND. You do not think we acquiesced just to get the treaty finished up at the last minute on things, that if we had had more time, we might have held out and gotten a better deal?

Admiral CROWE. I am not sure I am really competent to answer that, but I do not think I see anything important, fundamental or significant that happened.

Secretary CARLUCCI. One could always argue, Senator Thurmond, that had you gone on a little longer you might have gotten this or might have gotten that. Those are all hypotheticals, and we cannot demonstrate a negative. I think it is important to look at the treaty in its total context.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, what you are saying, as I understand it, is we did not sacrifice anything of importance because of a last minute rush up?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Once again, the word "importance" is a qualitative word. There were things that we compromised on in the interest of getting a treaty that, overall, was militarily in our advantage. We did not compromise any of our fundamental goals in the closing days. But I will not sit here and tell you that there were not things that we compromised on.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, we did not compromise on anything that would be detrimental to our best interests. Is that the case?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We did not compromise on anything that would produce a treaty that was not in our overall best interests. I prefer to put it that way.

Admiral CROWE. But it is not a one-sided treaty, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, is there any concern among the JCS about Soviet access to U.S. facilities declared in the INF Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. No. That was a topic, as you might imagine, of considerable discussion in JCS, Senator, as we went through this, and particularly as we approached the end game and the JCS position moved as they became more sophisticated on it, et cetera. But, no, they are satisfied with the treaty as such in that regard.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, are you satisfied with the resource and effort we are devoting to our conventional weapons systems, specifically infantry antitank weapons?

Admiral CROWE. As I think I made clear in my statement, Senator, no we are not. I would like to see considerably more investment in our conventional weapons systems.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, is the JCS confident that the INF Treaty has no significant ambiguities and no loopholes that would be detrimental to U.S. national security interests?

Admiral CROWE. We believe that it is in our best interests, Senator. Please bear in mind now, we are going to go through a rather elaborate inspection process here. We are talking about baseline inspection, elimination inspections, et cetera, et cetera, which I believe, if we are allowed to carry those out as envisioned, will protect us against these things. But that is all part of the treaty, and I cannot say at this time that we will be able to resolve some of these ambiguities until we have had that opportunity or that that will go as planned until we have done it.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up. Let me just ask one question. Admiral Crowe, do you view the INF Treaty as part of this Soviet strategy that plays to Soviet strengths in conventional weapons, and what changes should we anticipate in Soviet military strategy in the short and long term?

Admiral CROWE. I am not sure I understood the first part of the question, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Do you view the INF Treaty as part of a Soviet strategy that plays to Soviet strengths in conventional weapons?

Admiral CROWE. I think it is part of the Soviet strategy in the sense that they likewise share some desire to get down the number of nuclear weapons and to divert their resources to other things that they feel, facing the future, are more important to them. When you say play to the strengths, again, it is scenario-driven. What timeframe are you talking about? I am not so certain it does play to their strengths in the short term, but I am sure that in the long term, they hope that it will. But I think like us they face a lot of uncertainties about the future, and they are playing it the best they know how. But I do not think that it plays to their strengths anymore than it does to ours.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that we will have the opportunity to examine in some detail the verification provisions with the Intelligence Community, but I would like

to inquire of our witnesses about some of the process that was included in the treaty and gain their insights about whether it can be successful.

As both of you know, there have been a good many allegations that the Soviet Union has not complied with the terms of past arms control agreements, and one of the attacks that is likely to be made on the treaty is that we should not enter into any new agreements with the Soviet Union until they comply with the terms of earlier agreements.

In any agreement, there will be disagreements among the parties about whether there is full compliance with the terms of the agreement. This is an inevitable feature of any agreement. It is important that there be mutually agreeable mechanisms to resolve these disputes. There must also be a good faith attempt by the parties to use that mechanism. The ABM Treaty created the Standing Consultative Commission, the SCC, as the mechanism to resolve disputes about compliance with the terms of that and subsequent agreements.

That vehicle was used a number of different times, 1974, 1976, 1978, to consider different areas, to review some of the provisions of the ABM Treaty. But it has been generally disregarded in recent times in looking at some of the areas of violations of the ABM Treaty.

The INF Treaty creates the Special Verification Committee, the SVC, to resolve questions relating to compliance.

Why is a totally new commission necessary to deal with questions of compliance, why can't the two parties use the already existing SCC?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We think it is a different kind of treaty, and we agreed with the Soviets that a standing body, such as the SCC was not necessary to review compliance. We agreed that it would be best to have a body that met on demand. Many of the tasks given to the SCC under the ABM Treaty, such as the development of procedures for the elimination of treaty limited systems, have already been accomplished in the INF Treaty. So we did not view it as necessary to set up a similar type of body. And we did not consider it particularly desirable to put this kind of a treaty into a forum that reviews the ABM Treaty when we spent considerable effort in getting the Soviets to delink the INF Treaty from the ABM problem.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand it, the SVC's purpose is to resolve questions related to compliance and to consider additional measures during the life of the treaty which may be adopted to improve the effectiveness of the treaty.

Are you able to give us any assurances that this might be a more constructive mechanism to achieve those goals than we have seen in terms of the SCC in recent times?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not think the SCC has been quite as moribund as you describe it. We have raised a number of issues in the SCC. But leaving that aside, I was present during the discussions with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on setting this up, and it was the clear intent of both sides that this would be a viable vehicle that would be used extensively.

Senator KENNEDY. Moving on to conventional arms questions. I note many of our colleagues have inquired of you about the conventional balance. We may be facing some proposals, reservations perhaps, framed in such a way as to prohibit implementation of the INF withdrawals until there is progress in the conventional area.

We have seen a variety of different proposals, both that have come from the Warsaw Pact countries and from Gorbachev himself—the Jaruzelski plan announced in April 1987, Gorbachev's speech in Prague in May of last year, the communication from the Warsaw Pact countries last November. To my knowledge there has been a paucity of response from NATO on those particular proposals.

I think we are mindful that as a result of the General Secretary's visit here and the discussion which took place during those several days, including Admiral Crowe's meeting with the Soviet general staff during the summit, that there would appear to be some Soviet interest in military-to-military contacts for the purpose of exchanging information about troop and weapon deployments and for the purposes of establishing common data basis for the future discussions.

Do you support the idea of establishing a common data base on the military situation in Europe by both alliances? What might you be able to tell us, Admiral Crowe or Secretary Carlucci, about what the follow up might be from such meetings?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Let me go back, first of all the statements that you have made about the various Soviet proposals. None of the proposals you mentioned were ever tabled as a serious negotiating position. They were used for propaganda effects.

Indeed, as you are well aware, in 14 years of MBFR we failed to get the Soviets to argue on any kind of baseline data. At the summit, General Secretary Gorbachev, in my presence, proposed that we get on with conventional negotiations. It was pointed out to him that we had not been able to get the necessary data from the Soviets, and he then said well, let Carlucci and Yazov get together and they can compare notes and decide what asymmetries exist and they can tell us if these imbalances exist.

As I indicated, I do not think you were here in response to another question. I have agreed to meet with Yazov and if we want to compare notes on data bases that is fine. You have to bear in mind that conventional negotiations are dealt with in a multilateral forum. We are talking about very complex negotiations now shifting from MBFR to a 23-country forum on our side where we have to develop a mandate.

These are long and complex efforts that have been tied to CSCE, and to introduce this kind of negotiation as some kind of a condition on ratification of the INF Treaty would, in effect, be a killer amendment in my judgment.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Kennedy, I think we better call it at that time. Do you need to follow up briefly?

Senator KENNEDY. Just on the other point. I appreciate that response which I think is very helpful.

Can you tell us in the wake of the summit, is there follow up on the basis of the proposals of direct military to military meetings?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I have made a proposal to the Soviets on a meeting with Marshal Yazov and I am awaiting their response.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe, when you and I spoke earlier, one of the matters we discussed was the fact that the treaty does not cover warheads. Each party is free to do as it wishes with its warheads.

One question that comes to mind immediately of course is in the view of the Joint Chiefs, can any of the warheads which the Soviets will remove from weapons covered by the INF Treaty be used on other weapons not covered by the INF Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. The answer to that question is yes?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Can I elaborate on that?

Senator HUMPHREY. Well the chairman runs a tight ship as you know, and I know you want to put the best face on it, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral CROWE. Incidentally, we have the same privilege.

Senator HUMPHREY. Our job is to try to satisfy ourselves, not to sell this thing.

Admiral CROWE. But with the warheads, we would have the same.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand that. But I trust us and I do not trust them.

Admiral CROWE. Well I do not know if this is a matter of trust.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well trust me. What warheads can be used on what weapons?

Admiral CROWE. Well you can use the guidance package or the physics package or the material for other weapons.

Senator HUMPHREY. With what degree of difficulty? Can these be bolted on existing or anticipated weapons, or does it require remolding?

Admiral CROWE. You would have to rework it, and they will too.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am talking about them, not us.

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. So there is nothing that can just be bolted on another weapon?

Admiral CROWE. As far as I know, no.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is an important point. The Department of Defense has carefully examined that point, I hope.

Admiral CROWE. Yes. But there are a lot of things that we do not know about their systems, as they do not know about ours.

Senator HUMPHREY. Of course, you cannot know with certainty. So they are free in any event, and you say with remolding then, the answer is obvious, with remolding, any fissionable material can be used on any weapon that is not covered by the treaty.

OK. Admiral, I want to pursue a little bit further the SS-20 data package discrepancy. For a number of years in the Department of Defense's Soviet military power book, including in the 1987 edition, you folks have been saying that the Soviets have deployed 441 SS-20 launchers. And that is even after converting some of the SS-20

units to SS-25. You were saying as recently as the 1987 edition that there are 441 SS-20 launchers.

Where does that estimate come from?

Admiral CROWE. The 441?

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you know what I am referring to here?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. That came out of our intelligence community.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now the Soviets in their data package tell us they have 459 deployed SS-20 launchers, correct?

Admiral CROWE. I have 405, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is missiles, is it not, 405 missiles?

Admiral CROWE. No, deployed launchers and deployed missiles.

Senator HUMPHREY. Both the same number?

Admiral CROWE. Deployed missiles, right. It would be the warheads that would be different. And that was in accord with what we thought it was.

Senator HUMPHREY. The deployed missiles and launchers have the same number, is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, all right. So let's say that they have 405. We thought they had 441, they say they have 405. What has been the rule of thumb estimate on the number of missiles, what has been the rule of thumb on the number of reloads per launcher in our intelligence estimate?

Admiral CROWE. It depends on, one to two, somewhere in there, depending on the agency.

Senator HUMPHREY. That has been our estimate. What has been the DIA estimate on the number of missiles for reload per launcher? —————

Admiral CROWE. Two reloads.

Senator HUMPHREY. DIA?

Admiral CROWE. One reload, that is DIA.

Senator HUMPHREY. DIA has been estimating one reload. That would imply 810 missiles, right, if that estimate were correct and the Soviets say they have, that would imply 810 missiles and the Soviets say they have 523.

Admiral CROWE. That is about right. It comes out with a difference of somewhere between 165 and 300.

Senator HUMPHREY. Somewhere between 165 and 300. We have always felt they had——

Admiral CROWE. DIA, that's one agency.

Senator HUMPHREY. We have always felt they had somewhere between 165 and 300 more missiles than they claim they have?

Admiral CROWE. You say always felt. That figure was what they felt, and it came out to be that.

Senator HUMPHREY. And that is the problem that you have with the SS-20 data package?

Admiral CROWE. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well that is a pretty big problem. Was that just brushed under the rug, or how was that dealt with?

Admiral CROWE. We are dealing with it now, Senator. We have to deal with it.

Senator HUMPHREY. How are we dealing with it?

Admiral CROWE. Well, we have a number of procedures here that we are going to go through and incidentally, two agencies do not agree with that figure. They agree that the figure that is being given to us by the Soviets is within the range.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator, I know you may not want to hear from me, but I have spent a number of years in the intelligence community—

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, my time is up, even now. There are lots of things that I would like to discuss with you both. But I am going to have to stop now, I am sorry.

Chairman NUNN. I would say that Secretary Carlucci has been trying hard to answer this question. We will permit that.

Senator HUMPHREY. On the committee's time?

Chairman NUNN. Sure. We will permit it on the committee's time.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think we have to be clear here that intelligence is not an exact science, that there are uncertainties in any intelligence estimate and situations change, our capabilities change. And in my years in the national security business I have never seen the intelligence agencies uniformly agree on a set conclusion. There are always differences. The question is whether the differences are sufficiently serious for us to say this is a major violation.

The answer to that question is "No." It is something that we are going to have to resolve in the baseline inspection. It is something that will be resolved over a period of time. If they have these missiles, they cannot keep them hidden, certainly in a useful fashion.

Senator HUMPHREY. They have so far. We have never seen an SS-20. We have seen garages, but we have not seen the missiles. So they are very good at hiding them.

Secretary CARLUCCI. They may be able to hid some, but over a period of time, if they cannot test them they lose their military utility.

Senator HUMPHREY. But that does not tell you how many they have.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Almost every major conflict has reflected an economic problem or concern, either perceived or real. And we are much more likely to have military hot spots I think around some of these economic hot spots. We tend to concentrate on Europe and NATO as a result of that, but we look back in history and Hitler had his "lebensraum" proposals that led to World War II and the Japanese had the greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere.

They were all economic in focus. The place where we have a greater economic interest right now than almost anywhere in the world is that 70 percent of the world's oil reserves are in the Persian Gulf. And the Persian Gulf comes closer to being an economic hot spot than any place I know.

All of our efforts there now are seaborne. I do not know what we are planning with regard to increasing our land capability there. I guess the first question is what changes are in the 1989 budget to reflect the Persian Gulf concerns, if not why now, because it seems to me that there should be if there are not.

Fred Ikle and Wohlstetter's study that I am sure you are familiar with, their number one recommendation said we should emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated our alliance policy and force planning—the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all out Soviet nuclear attack.

By concentrating on these extreme cases, our planners tend to neglect attacks that call for discriminating military responses and the risk that in these situations some allies might opt out.

Pursuant to that, Bill Perry who was formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense, an individual most people on this committee greatly respect, said in November that the dominant NATO land forces, and any land battle in Europe must come from the continental European powers. In a land war the U.S. role is an assisting role. Its primary role is to become the dominant force in air power in Europe.

That changes the relationship a little bit on what our defense posture should be and what our budgeting should be if we buy all that.

That is a long and involved statement, but perhaps you each could address that with particular emphasis on what we are doing in the gulf and how our budgetary changes should reflect that position in the gulf where we have seaborne power, but very little else.

Secretary CARLUCCI. First of all, with regard to the European fighting land forces, they provide about 90 percent of the land forces. That is the case in Europe. We do not attempt to break out our budget region by region. But there are a number of things that we are doing in the budget to enhance force mobility and to deal with low intensity conflict.

In fact that has been a central purpose of our budget effort over the course of the years as we have rebuilt our Navy. One of the things that is hurting us, quite frankly, has been the very drastic cut that the Congress imposed on O&M in 1988. We are having to cut back on training, on flying hours, in order to continue the gulf operation.

The major change that would be in the budget, that would have the kind of applicability you are referring to, Senator Glenn, and it is really a world wide applicability, is the creation of so-called Program II under the low intensity conflict status that the Congress has passed.

We have set up the command that the Congress directed, and we are funding the programs in the Special Operations Forces and all that go along with it, the kind of special helicopters and equipment, the SEALs, and all that is needed to deal with low intensity conflicts around the world.

Senator GLENN. Do you see any changes in the budget as you see it right now that would reflect specifically the Persian Gulf situation where some 70 percent of the world's oil reserves are located. That fact is not going to change in the immediate future.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The principal change is a heavier O&M as we conduct the operations out there. It is not the \$1 million a day that I see bandied about in the press. It is somewhere on the order of \$15 to \$20 million a month. And there are some smaller things

that our people are doing to innovate over there, but they would not normally be reflected in the budget per se.

Senator GLENN. In another area, we worked on the total force concept which puts a great deal of reliance on the Guard and Reserve. Shy Meyer, before he retired, expressed some doubts about whether we had gone too far with parts of that. And on the Manpower Subcommittee that I chair, we have gotten into some of this with regard to combat support and combat service support areas and particularly in the medical area.

Are you rethinking any of the total force concepts or have any studies underway that would show any realignments there that we should be aware of?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are not, Senator Glenn, rethinking the total force concept, although this concern that you raise is a concern that was raised with me by a number of the CINC's when we had our budget meeting not too long ago. Combat support, combat service support, those are areas that we have to pay increasing attention to. They are not sufficiently funded to meet the needs of our CINC's, but I don't think any fundamental structural change is called for.

Admiral CROWE. I would agree with that, Senator. On the other hand, we must understand we are going to face a declining appropriations curve now and we are going to be cutting some things. We may be cutting some force structure.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are cutting force structure.

Admiral CROWE. So these areas that you would like to see, the kinds of equipment, for example, we need in the gulf will still be in the budget, but there will not be as much of it.

Senator GLENN. Do you see any change in our relationship in NATO so that we take on a predominant air role and let them take more of the other burdens there?

Do you see any major changes?

Secretary CARLUCCI. There is plenty of room for everybody to do more. I do not know that there is that kind of tradeoff. We have to make a more intensive effort with the help of everybody here, to get our allies to do more.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Next is Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I beg your indulgence, Mr. Secretary, to turn once more to article XIV. Let me just select a key provision of what you read to me just before we broke at lunch or during my question. And you said this provision, meaning article XIV, refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future, and existing agreements are therefore unaffected.

Now, the critical question is, What are we referring to of assumptions of obligations in the future?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not believe, Senator Quayle, I used the phrase "in the future."

Senator QUAYLE. You were reading from this analysis, which I presume is the administration's position of what the interpretation of article XIV is.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It is apparently not what I read, but it is in an administration paper, so I accept it.

Senator QUAYLE. I was misinformed, because I asked for a copy of what you read to me and I was handed this. Well, let me just ask. This is an analysis by the administration, I presume. I see nothing of heads.

And it says "This provision," meaning article XIV, "refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future."

Now, my question I think probably goes along the lines of what Senator Warner was talking about, only in a little bit different manner. He mentioned the Trident program with Britain, and I believe your answer was that you did not think so.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The answer to that is it is not a program that is even considered by the agreement.

Senator QUAYLE. Let me take one that could possibly be in the future. What if Great Britain decides to deploy a conventional, non-nuclear ground-based cruise missile with a range of 4,500 kilometers, and they come to us and ask us for help, for a guidance system.

Can we do that or would that be in this non-circumvention or conflict cause of this treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Quayle, I have to take that for the record. I am not going to sit here and make a lawyer's judgment on a treaty interpretation. I think that would be a very high risk.

That is a complicated question. I am not being flippant.

[The information follows:]

ARTICLE XIV

Secretary CARLUCCI. The treaty prohibits us from producing or transferring a missile, missile stage or launcher for a Treaty-limited GLCM or GLBM. It does not prohibit the production or transfer of lesser components (including guidance elements), technology or blueprints, and the United States rejected Soviet proposals for such prohibitions.

In any event, issues such as these would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

Senator QUAYLE. And I fully respect and understand your position. But can you please help me to suggest a procedure that we can use to get to these kinds of questions?

Because I am telling you, this article is going to come back some day in the future and haunt us if we do not do our job in really nailing down specifically what we mean. I am not saying it in a confrontational manner. I need your help.

I would ask the indulgence of the Chairman to try to figure out a procedure on how we can get these specific questions answered. I guess the best way for me would be to try to sit down and think of hypothetical situations, and then ask you to provide it for the record.

I guess that would be a way to proceed. But it is something that is a major concern to me, and I am sure it is to you, too.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I can think of any number of hypotheticals off the top of my head, and I do not think that is the way to go about defining this. I understand your concerns.

I guess at your urging, I would be glad to ask the lawyers to reconvene and see if they cannot set out some guidelines. But when you get into the area of cooperative programs and what the allies might do or U.S. contractors might do or what R&D might be made available to country X, which might build a system that is encom-

passed in this range, you are getting into very complex legal issues.

And I would prefer not to make judgments right here.

Senator QUAYLE. I certainly understand that and respect that position.

In just examining—and let us take as a given, there are some uncertainties about how article XIV is to be interpreted, and we need to work that out. Another troublesome aspect along these lines that might also need to be worked out, I refer to article VII of the treaty, and I just read the first section of it—if a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type—and we keep referring to “of that type” in section 1 and section 2, but there is no definition of that type.

If you remember, particularly in SALT II and also in SALT I, but particularly in SALT II, we had a major argument over whether the SS-25 was a new type. There is no definition of what “of that type” might be. I guess my question would be, how much change could there be to that ballistic missile or cruise missile so it would not be of that type, because there is no definition of that.

It sort of relates back to this article XIV question on the non-circumvention, that we really do not have, at least in my reading of the treaty, a clue of what “of that type” means.

I wonder if Admiral Crowe or Secretary Carlucci could help me with the definition, or how much change they could do to the ballistic missile before it would not be of that type.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would prefer to submit something for the record on that one, too, how much of a change would be necessary to change a type of ballistic missile or cruise missile. If you are getting at the question of ALCM's or SLCM's, it is quite clear that what is done and has been done in INF is not a precedent for START, and I guess it is a different issue.

[The information follows:]

CHANGE IN BALLISTIC MISSILE

Senator QUAYLE. How much change is required to a ballistic missile before it would be considered a new type, or not “of that type” as used in article VII?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Since all ground-launched, intermediate range missile systems are to be eliminated under the terms of the INF Treaty and the future production of such systems is banned, the treaty does not specifically address the difference between new and existing types of INF missile systems.

A determination of whether a given individual missile is of the same type as a missile covered by the treaty will necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis. The technical characteristics of the missile will be compared with the technical characteristics and photographs of existing types set forth in the MOU on data. For a missile to be considered not of an existing type of missile covered by the treaty, it will have to differ from those technical characteristics and photographs.

Senator QUAYLE. ALCM's and SLCM's are a different definition. My main concern here is that we say we are prohibiting these things of that type. OK, “of that type.”

What if they paint it differently? What if they put a different wing on it? How much difference does there have to be before it becomes a new type of ballistic missile or a new type of cruise missile that would not be covered by what we are referring to here in article VII?

The reason I have difficulty understanding is because there is no definition of what "of that type" would be. It is not 5-percent change or 10-percent change, like they did in other agreements. There is just a void.

Admiral CROWE. I think in a sense, Senator, it bans all ground-launched weapons that will be within the range limits of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, that will be ballistic or cruise, that will be ground-launched and that are weapon deliveries. We are talking about all those missiles.

Senator QUAYLE. And if they change the characteristic so it is not of that type?

Admiral CROWE. But if it is within those parameters, it is banned.

Senator QUAYLE. Those range limits, yes. But it has to be of that type. But what if it is armed instead of unarmed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. If it is not a weapons delivery system, then—

Senator QUAYLE. It is not of that type.

What other characteristics fall in not "of that type"?

Secretary CARLUCCI. If it is within the INF range band, ground-launched, and a weapons delivery system—it is banned.

Senator QUAYLE. What if they change the characteristics of, say, paint it differently? Is that changing it?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, it is still a weapons delivery system.

Senator QUAYLE. It is of that type. How much change, Five-percent change? See, that is what I am saying. We do not have a definition.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If it is a weapons delivery system and if it is within the INF range band and it is ground-launched, ballistic or cruise missile, then it is banned.

Senator QUAYLE. How about the confidence of whether it is a weapons delivery system? How do we tell if it is armed or not?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think that is the issue you are raising.

Senator QUAYLE. That is a verification issue that we are going to get into, and it also goes to "of that type" as well.

Secretary CARLUCCI. What this says is that existing systems are considered weapons delivery systems. The question you are raising is, suppose you have some new system; how do you determine if it is a weapons delivery system?

And, there are some empirical grounds for determining that. I mean, if it is ground-launched and carries a device that explodes, it is a weapons delivery system. If it is a reconnaissance drone, it is not a weapons delivery system.

Senator QUAYLE. OK. My time is up.

Admiral CROWE. You would have to determine each one of the parameters, if it is within the range, if it is a weapons delivery system.

Senator QUAYLE. But how do you determine if it is a weapons delivery system? Can you do that?

Admiral CROWE. That is what the Secretary is saying. What you are prohibiting here is a ballistic missile or a cruise missile of that type. That is what it says in section 1 and section 2.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If I read that correctly—and I defer to the lawyers—existing missiles are considered to be weapons delivery

systems. And every ground-launched system that is a weapons delivery system and falls within the INF range band is banned.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, we are going to have to come back. I think your time is up.

Senator QUAYLE. Let the record show that we can pursue this for the record with statements for the record to try to clear it up, but it relates back to this whole article XIV and some of these ambiguities that I think need to be cleared up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today's hearing is, as you pointed out, a continuation of our examination of U.S. national security strategy. To put my question in context, that includes not only the building of more weapons, but also attempts to come to agreements with the Soviet Union on diminution of this particular class of weapons and what we were talking about a little bit earlier, other measures on which the United States and the Soviet Union, as part of their mutual national security strategy, come to understand the other better, and perhaps through that sort of sets of understandings might be able to lower tensions.

The Stockholm agreement which I referred to earlier, signed in 1986, has a number of very interesting provisions permitting the direct inspection and observation of military categories. Participating states are required to provide one another with an annual calendar of military activities involving more than 40,000 troops and are prohibited from conducting activities involving more than 75,000 troops without prior notification.

Participating members are required to invite observers to exercises involving more than 17,000 troops. In addition, participating states are permitted to make challenge inspections of another participating state's territory where compliance with the terms of agreement is in doubt.

On my recent trip the Europeans appeared to me to be a lot more aware and a lot more conversant with the provisions of Stockholm, at least so far, than we are. I think we are getting up to speed very rapidly on how productive the observations and inspections that we have made of the Soviets have been.

And there is very broad consensus among the officers with whom I spoke that this is very beneficial for us. The thrust of that question, Admiral—maybe this comes to you and the Chiefs more than to you, Secretary Carlucci, is what kind of a working group do you have together to, first, examine what we have gotten out of Stockholm so far; and second, start to determine what next steps we ought to be suggesting in an environment in which all sides seem to be looking for other alternatives to get to know each other better, and perhaps to lower the levels of tension?

Admiral CROWE. I have a section in the JCS staff which follows that constantly, both in terms of lessons learned and what we should be doing next in terms of what we should be examining and what we want to get out of the examination. And we work very closely with the SACEUR's staff in that regard, constantly as a matter of fact.

The European inspections have all been conducted, one way or another, by SACEUR.

Senator WIRTH. Maybe it might be possible for me to meet with him. I will get hold of your office and talk with him and we might share our experiences and perspectives that we have had. It would be very valuable to me. I would appreciate that.

Admiral CROWE. We would be happy to do that.

Senator WIRTH. Let me move to another area that has been touched upon here, and that is the modernization of our tactical nuclear weaponry.

A number of analysts have told me that the modernization program in effect means a reduction of the number of tactical nuclear warheads that are on the ground in Europe, that that is what the result will be.

The reasons I raise that, Mr. Secretary, it seems to me there is a lot of resistance to the idea of modernizing tactical nuclear weaponry, and we have to be very careful in understanding what it is that we are talking about. And if in fact we are talking about, as some have suggested, that ultimately we end up with a diminution in the number of tactical warheads, then that is an argument that would help the case for modernization.

Secretary CARLUCCI. There are those who make that argument, and there are those, in Germany in particular who are making that argument. That is something we would have to consider as we discuss the programs for modernization. Right now we would urge, as I said earlier, the committee to take off the 925 ceiling on modernization artillery-fired atomic projectiles, because we think we ought to continue with that program.

The argument that you cite is made principally with regard to the follow-on to Lance, and there we really have not selected the system yet. It is certainly possible to, say, increase the range and general capabilities of the system and have fewer warheads.

On the other hand, I do not know that that is a desirable way to go.

The answer to your question is, no decision has been made as yet.

Senator WIRTH. But it might well be that the modernization of our tactical nuclear weapons would mean an increase in the number of warheads, is that what you are saying?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It could. What you are suggesting is that it is politically desirable to have a reduction.

Senator WIRTH. I am suggesting to you that if in fact modernization means that there will be fewer, it seems to me you have got a better political case to make for modernization than if you were saying, as you said earlier, we do not want to compensate for INF, but on the other hand we are building more tactical nuclear weapons and it would appear that there is in fact a contradiction and in fact, we are building more and are compensating for INF. Do you see what I mean?

Secretary CARLUCCI. A couple of things to bear in mind here. The first is that our nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe is at its lowest point in 20 years. Pursuant to Montebello, we took out 1,400 nuclear weapons.

The second is that the Soviets have very considerable SNF capability. In fact, that is what is of concern to the Germans. So we

need to modernize our existing systems to deal with that capability and to maintain an adequate deterrence.

What I am suggesting is that we need to keep our options open in this area. At Montebello, NATO made the decision to go ahead and modernize. The question of what specific systems, what range, and how many we ought to have are still open questions.

Senator WIRTH. You understand, I am trying to understand how the politics of this argument might come down, as well as the substance of it. And it seems to me there are some very complicated political and perceptual problems that exist with an increase in the number of tactical nuclear weapons at a time when we are doing INF, and I think we have to be clear on what those numbers might be.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are really not talking about an increase in that sense. I think the proper term to use is modernization.

Senator WIRTH. But I think we have to be very, very careful in that terminology, and I would suspect that that debate is going to be very important, particularly in Germany. And I look forward to working on seeing if we can hone down those numbers and definitions perhaps a little more carefully.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go back to a point I raised earlier about my concern as it related to Soviet noncompliance and our recourse if in fact we use the very excellent verification procedures of this treaty and we find that the Soviets are not complying.

Mr. Secretary, you talked about the need to have an understanding that there is a policy. But I would like to go back and relate this problem to SALT II. President Carter said on April 30, 1979: "If we ever detect any violation of the SALT agreement, that would be a basis on which to reject the treaty in its entirety. There would be a possible termination of the good relationship between our country and the Soviet Union on which detente is based, and it might very well escalate into a nuclear confrontation."

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a hearing on SALT II in 1979 said: "Any Soviet attempt to deny or impede our ability to monitor SALT-related parameters would be regarded by the United States as a most grave violation of the treaty."

Now, I remind you that, number one, we never ratified that treaty; number two, the date of compliance has passed, or the date of effectiveness is passed if we had ratified it. And yet, the U.S. Congress last year in both Houses passed provisions mandating that we abide by the SALT II Treaty.

No one denies that the Soviets have encrypted telemetry, a clear violation of the treaty. No one denies that they have deployed a new type missile, the SS-25. And yet, with clear evidence that they have not lived up to the agreement, we still find ourselves in a position where the Congress attempts to pass laws that mandate we comply.

Now, my question is, What can we do in this agreement to assure that we are not going to find ourselves in exactly the same position

if the excellent procedures to verify that the Soviets are cheating, find they are cheating? What are we going to do about it?

Is there any way that we can have a provision in advance that says, verification terminates the treaty, verification of noncompliance sets into motion a series of responses or offsets?

How can we prevent the reoccurrence of a problem that clearly exists with a treaty we didn't even ratify?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is a very good question, and you are asking me how to manage the Congress, and I am hardly an expert on that. I think both of your thoughts are good.

If we could have a sense of the Congress resolution or whatever it might be that says we are all agreed in advance that, should there be a masterful violation of this treaty, we would take the following actions, whether it is to withdraw from the treaty or some other step. As I said earlier, it seems to me it has to be a violation that is militarily significant.

Senator GRAMM. Let me stop you right there, Mr. Secretary. Would you consider encrypting telemetry on SALT II significant?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator GRAMM. Would you consider the SS-25 significant?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator GRAMM. Well, I guess that is why I keep coming back to this point.

Secretary CARLUCCI. To go back to Senator Humphrey, if it turns out that they have 10 or 12 more SS-20's that are hidden in the bush someplace and they cannot test them anyway, I would have to say, well, I am not sure that is militarily significant.

But the kinds of violations that you cited, in my personal judgment—I can give you my personal judgment now—would be militarily significant. If we could agree that we would terminate the treaty and the Defense Department would be charged with coming to the Congress with a request for programs that would restore our deterrent capability in light of this, speaking personally, I would be very pleased at that.

Obviously, I would have to consult the President and the Secretary of State before you did that. But I think your suggestion is a very good one.

Senator GRAMM. Let me ask Admiral Crowe if he wants to comment on this problem.

Admiral CROWE. I think you are in a very important area, Senator. But I do not know how you get that by the Congress. You are above my pay grade right here.

Chairman NUNN. Let me interject. If the Senator would yield, without it being on his time.

This was exactly the same policy this administration followed for the first 6 years of following SALT II, even though it had not been ratified. And I assume all the violations you talked about had already occurred, and the administration changed its view in January of last year.

Until then, I mean, to say it is all Congress is just absolutely wrong. It was the administration's policy to abide by the interim restraints for 5 years. So whatever the problem is, it applies to both branches of government.

Secretary CARLUCCI. This raises another issue. You have to give them a chance to correct a violation. The minute you discover it you do not slap on the sanctions. You go through a process.

Senator GRAMM. If I could just conclude, it is not my purpose to say that the Congress is the source of the problem here, even though the vote occurred last year and it is pretty startling.

My point is, we are getting ready to ratify another treaty, and we are all very excited that it has the best verification procedures that we have ever had in a treaty. And that is a strong selling point to me.

My problem is, what good are they if we do not have an established procedure to respond to Soviet violations? And I think it is a very real problem.

We have established in our last treaty that was never verified that Congress, after the fact, and perhaps the administration and maybe both, are not willing to live up to commitments that were made by the then-President and the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And if we are going to go into this, maybe we ought to have an established policy through some legislative action so that if there is a clear verification of noncompliance, then automatically an action takes place.

And then if the Congress and the President want to come back and say, well, you know, even if they are cheating it is still a good idea, they would have that option. But at least the burden would be on them.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would be glad to work with you on that.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Gramm, I did not want to take any of your time. Have you finished your time? Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sure the witnesses are getting a bit fatigued.

But I think we are obviously making good use of their time, and what they have to say is very important in our deliberations.

In the course of the questions, at one point, Admiral Crowe, you stated in terms of budgetary considerations, we need to spend more money. Is that correct? In order to help correct the conventional imbalance in NATO? Is that a correct statement?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. In my judgment, yes. I also believe we are not going to do that, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. You believe we are not going to do that?

Admiral CROWE. At least from what I read in the tea leaves, I do not think that this country is.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary, do you agree with Admiral Crowe that we need to spend more money to correct the conventional imbalance as a result of the INF Treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Not as a result of the INF Treaty. I think we have to spend more money to deal with the conventional imbalance, because it is there.

The INF Treaty does not affect it one way or the other. But yes, we need more resources to deal with the conventional imbalance. We need to go ahead with our strategic modernization program, and a whole host of other things.

But we are operating in a severely resource-constrained environment at this point. I will do my level best to direct our budget at maintaining some kind of conventional capability.

Indeed, in answering the kind of competitive strategies program that Senator Quayle referred to, but we have got to recognize that something is going to have to give somewhere.

Senator McCAIN. So you will not be requesting increases in the defense budget earmarked for correcting the present imbalances?

Secretary CARLUCCI. As I understand it, we are bound by the four corners of the budget summit, which does not mandate any increase in the defense budget. In fact, it mandates a real decrease in the defense budget.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Admiral Crowe, would your support for this treaty and that of the other members of the Joint Chiefs be altered if it were totally clear that there would be no modernization of the short-range nuclear forces in Western Europe, either mandated by the Congress, as we just discussed in the matter of SALT?

Or as a matter of similar arms reduction policies adopted by the West German Government?

Admiral CROWE. I do not think our view of the treaty would be altered. We would be very disappointed, though, if we do not go through with some of these steps, which we are strongly recommending vis-a-vis NATO.

We are not satisfied with the risk today. And if the INF Treaty is implemented or not implemented, we are not going to be satisfied with the risks. That is what I say in my statement.

Senator McCAIN. It is clear already from what some of the other members have stated that there will be opposition to any modernization of the short-range nuclear capability.

Admiral CROWE. I understand there will be some opposition. But the Secretary and I do not see that in the official circles in NATO.

The DPC in its last meeting came up and approved the High Level Group report, which is very parallel to what we have been talking about here today. That report, as I understand it, is going to be refined and delivered to the NPG in the spring.

There is strong support from all the governments there. I am sure that in each of these countries there may be some elements that oppose it. But I am not persuaded that these governments are not going to adopt it.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If I may just comment, to follow-on to Senator Wirth's question too, modernization is very important. But we do intend to keep it to the minimum level needed to maintain adequate deterrence. Nobody is talking about a vastly expended program.

Senator McCAIN. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. But I believe that you have proposed or are supporting improved LANCE and a tactical standoff air-to-surface missile. Is that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. Could you describe in detail what plans exist to fully develop such systems and what numbers are involved and when they will be available?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are currently looking at systems for the follow-on to LANCE. ATACMS being one.

Yet we have a congressional prohibition on that system in a nuclear context. So I would urge that that prohibition be lifted. There is also a French system that our people are looking at, HADES.

In terms of the TASM, the tactical air-to-surface missile, there are several systems that are being looked at, SRAM II being one.

We have not reached any conclusions, at this point, on what system is best. And, until we reach a conclusion on what system might best meet our needs, we have not put money in the budget. But as soon as we do reach that conclusion, we will fund these systems.

Senator McCAIN. Once again, I would like to return to the issue I raised earlier, and I am seeking an unclassified answer.

You have said that the U.S.S.R. is rapidly modernizing its short-range nuclear capabilities. Last year's Military Posture statement and edition of Soviet Military Power show in detail, and unclassified charts, that the Soviet Union has a 3-to-1 advantage in INF aircraft that is rapidly increasing.

Further, they showed that, in direct contrast to NATO's Montebello decision, the Warsaw Pact made a 50 percent increase in short-range nuclear delivery systems between 1980 and 1986. It has built up over 10,000 nuclear-capable artillery weapons, and targets more than 500 SCUDs and 500 FROGs and SS-21s against NATO.

Do these trends cause you deep and significant concern?

Secretary CARLUCCI. They do indeed cause us deep and significant concern. But that does not detract from the military merits of the INF Treaty, which we think on balance is to our advantage.

We need to do more. That has been the burden of Admiral Crowe's and my testimony all day. I completely agree with that thesis. We are not in a new detente. The Soviet weapons systems continue to pour out of their factories, despite the Soviet arms control rhetoric.

We need to recognize this is the case, and we should not be seduced by that rhetoric.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to have further questions submitted for the record.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator McCain. We are through now with all the people on the second round. And I will begin with a third round of those who want to ask further questions. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Admiral Crowe, one last time on the SS-20 data package, with which you exhibit some discomfort.

Do you think that the Soviet data package, the data package given us by the Soviets on the SS-20, is accurate?

Admiral CROWE. I do not believe that we have the evidence or the conviction to say that it is inaccurate at this point.

Senator HUMPHREY. You do not have the evidence to say that it is inaccurate. I can understand that statement.

What do you mean when you say you do not have the conviction to say?

Admiral CROWE. I do not believe that the evidence supports it in what we have.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has given us another estimate that is based on its best judgment and a lot of assumptions over a period of years. We are taking it very seriously, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have you made a recommendation that the data package on the SS-20 be accepted as is? Or what recommendation have you made with respect to that matter?

Admiral CROWE. We believe the Soviet data provided in the MOU is generally consistent with our intelligence estimates.

There are two agencies out of the three that believe it is within the range.

Senator HUMPHREY. Why do you seem to be uncomfortable with that?

Admiral CROWE. Because there is one that says it is not. You know, I was brought up in a profession that looks at worst-case scenario.

Senator HUMPHREY. The agency that does not agree is the Defense Intelligence Agency?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, DIA.

Senator HUMPHREY. When was that package given to us?

Admiral CROWE. Specifically?

Senator HUMPHREY. Was that one of the last minute items that was provided just prior to December 8?

Admiral CROWE. The second of December.

Senator HUMPHREY. The entire package. And what about the photograph? Do you believe that we have a photograph of the SS-20?

Admiral CROWE. I think we do now, yes. And I said there was some reluctance in some of the data exchanges that we were not happy with. I think that has been sorted out.

Senator HUMPHREY. The Republican staff of the Foreign Relations Committee has produced a memorandum here, I do not know if you have gotten a copy of this yet.

The first section is written by General Bernard Rogers, and he makes a point which seems to be consistent with history, that the Pershing II was not deployed solely to counter the SS-20, although in the public relations struggle, and it was intense as you will recall, to sell the European public, the NATO public on the deployment of the Pershing IIs and the GLCMs, in the public relations battle it was largely sold as deployment of Pershing II as a means of countering the SS-20.

He makes the point that that is not the whole story. That the GLCMs and Pershing IIs were deployed as well to try to close a growing gap in NATO's deterrence. Is that consistent with your recollection, Mr. Secretary? It was not exclusively to address the SS-20.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think I said that earlier, that it was not exclusively the SS-20. It was growing concern about Soviet theater nuclear capabilities.

But when the SS-20, which is a highly-capable mobile system as you pointed out, came on line, that heightened the concern.

Senator HUMPHREY. He goes on to say later, and I would like to get your response to this, this will be my last effort here. He says, and I quote, "Another rationale often heard to justify double-zero INF is the Soviets were giving up over 1,550 warheads and the United States and West Germany only about 430. Surely that is a good deal for NATO."

Again, Rogers says, numbers only count if NATO has to fight. But for NATO, the name of the game is deterrence. The prevention of fighting. So long as nations can retain their freedom.

The fact is the Soviets would be giving up only about 3 percent of their current nuclear warheads. Almost all of the remaining 97 percent, thousands of warheads, can strike Western Europe if the Soviets wish. And 14 of the 16 NATO nations are in the Western European area.

And what is NATO giving up? The one theater weapons system that in the eyes of the Soviets makes NATO's deterrent highly credible, the Pershing II.

Before you respond to that, if you will, I just want to point out that the SS-25 has been tested in the intermediate-range mode, and threatens Western Europe as much as the SS-20. How do you respond to General Rogers argument? I understand he opposes the INF Treaty.

How do you respond that the Soviets are only giving up 3 percent of their warheads and the remaining 97 percent can still threaten Western Europe, whereas NATO is giving up the one and only weapons system that in the eyes of the Soviets is a credible deterrent?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, the key question is whether NATO retains robust deterrent. And we think that it does. Although, as we have said, both before and after the treaty, we think the risks are higher than we are fully comfortable with.

The treaty on balance, in the military judgment of the Chiefs, lowers that risk. Obviously, the Soviets can retarget their strategic systems. We can do the same thing, for that matter.

But it is very important that they do not have a theater capability that can strike the harbors, depots or rail lines that we need to reinforce in Europe. So we go back to what has already been said a number of times. Militarily, on balance, we think this works to our advantage.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you just say they will not have weapons to strike the ports?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I said they would not have theater weapons. They can certainly retarget their strategic systems on the ports and harbors. But this is an overall decrement in their capability.

For example, using a one-warhead SS-25 to replace a three-warhead SS-20 to strike Bremerhaven, that disrupts their planning, it disrupts their program a bit because they would have to use three SS-25s.

It is not without its effect on their strategic systems, if they decide to retarget them.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, may I say a word? It is true, of course, that this is only a small slice of their total inventory. Nobody has ever pretended otherwise.

General Rogers says that it is not a matter of warfighting. The Chiefs disagree with that. We believe that deterrence is related to your warfighting capability.

And in determining whether you have a good deterrent or not, you must make some calculations on balance of what they lose and we lose, and what the results in warfighting capability are. And we feel that in this exchange, we get the better of the deal.

We also believe that we will have some systems that can hit the Soviet Union theater systems when this is over, and we can implement flexible strategy.

And one thing that General Rogers never mentions, because it was not in his area of responsibility, is the benefits of this to Asia, which are not even in his calculations. And I believe this is a virtue of this treaty, a very significant virtue.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe, in your statement you referenced a lower nuclear threshold resulting from poor sustainability.

In light of the budget, how will we improve sustainability, maintain modernization and develop necessary technologies for future systems?

Admiral CROWE. Well, we are just going to have to put a lot of effort into sustainability, Senator. NATO has seized that.

And as I mentioned, some of the NATO initiatives recognize that deficiency. It is improving, but it is going to be a long time, and we are going to have to continue that effort before it is where we want it.

As was discussed here at the table just a moment ago, obviously if the trends in appropriations are what we predict they are going to be, we are not going to be able to buy all the weapons systems that we prefer.

But I think the advantage of the program that Senator Quayle has laid out and that the Pentagon is studying, and what we call competitive strategies, is that we try and look at some systems with very high leverage, so that we spend our money in a wise way to take advantage of Soviet weaknesses, and keep their level of uncertainty very high.

Not buy everything we want or need, but buy those systems that give us the highest return on investment. And that is what our plan is now—try and deal with this turndown in appropriations and still do what we have got to do, and try to keep the level of deterrence manageable.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, given the existing sentiment in the Federal Republic of Germany, how do you assess the prospects of modernization of artillery-launched atomic projectiles?

Admiral CROWE. Well, as we mentioned a moment ago, Senator, I am sure that there will be some people in Germany who oppose modernization of that particular weapons system, or particularly any increases.

But we are studying that in NATO. We are consulting, which we are constantly told to do in the NATO forum. And we have seen considerable support, both in the DPC and the North Atlantic Council from all these countries for the recommendations of the High-Level Group, which are to modernize, and that is one of the systems they address.

And I am hopeful and at least confident to a certain degree that we will be able to do that. Although there will be some opposition, there is no question about it, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, the United States is still very short of capabilities to reinforce NATO with a total of 10 divisions in theater in 10 days. Airlift cannot fill the need alone.

What does the JCS see as the solution to this problem?

Admiral CROWE. Well, number one, I do not know that I would characterize it quite the way you did, Senator.

We have not reached the goal that we want to reach, but we have considerably improved our capability to reinforce NATO in the last few years, and we have seen some dramatic improvements in both our airlift and sealift.

We have a ways to go. And if the appropriations stay down, like they are presently tending, we will have to stretch out those programs. But our ability to reinforce NATO has improved by quite some quantum steps. And that is one of those deficiencies we have to continue to work on.

However, given the fiscal climate that was talked about a moment ago, we will not correct that problem as quickly as we should.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, what would be the tradeoffs necessary for the United States to build an adequate fleet of large-capacity, rapid sealift ships based on the capacity and speed of the SL-7?

Admiral CROWE. I am not so sure I am up to answering that question. I would like to submit that for the record, if I could.

Senator THURMOND. That would be all right. Just submit it for the record.

I want to thank you very much. I think you both have made a very fine impression here today.

[The information follows:]

TRADEOFFS

Admiral CROWE. As we develop and plan our budgets we make measured, prioritized choices among elements which fall in the general categories of mobility, readiness, sustainability, and force structure. These elements often compete based upon the philosophies upon which they are based, i.e., the primacy of one over another. It is essential, however, that these elements be carefully balanced to provide the desired synergy. This, of course, is the procedure we execute in our normal budget formulation process. In this instance, in order to increase rapid sealift, we would have to give up other competing programs. As part of our mobility assessment, we have deemed it prudent to rely upon commercial shipping to provide a portion of our requirements. In addition, we are investigating the feasibility of surface-effects fast sealift ships to meet a part of our future requirements. As to the specifics of your question, we have acquired a total of eight SL-7s (which we converted to the roll-on/roll-off configuration). These ships were unique to the Sea-Land Corporation and were purchased when they proved not to be commercially competitive during the last oil crisis. The cost to build a similar ship today (with similar 33 knot speed) from the keel up is approximately \$250m.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just three other areas. Two of them are fairly narrow, one of them is broad.

Let me just say I am not trying to bring these issues up to get down in the bowels of legal interpretations of the treaty. But unfortunately, you are the only administrative witnesses that we are going to have between now and I think after the middle of February.

And in the spirit of authoritative testimony, I have got to raise some of these questions that I have about the treaty to begin getting the channels moving.

So it is not in an argumentative sense, to get down in the bowels of legal interpretation that I raise these issues. These are just concerns, and I think, in my judgment, some ambiguities that I see that need to be answered.

The issue that I want to go to now is the similarity between the SS-20 and the SS-25. In accordance with the public statements, and also in the treaty, because of the similarity of those two missiles, that we allow the production of the first stage of the SS-20, which is similar to the first stage of the SS-25.

But what we want to prohibit, I believe, is the production of the second stage of the SS-20, which is also similar to the second stage of the SS-25. And I believe that is our stated, I think that is our stated goal and our objective. Am I not correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is our objective. To clarify a point, the second stages of the SS-20 and SS-25 are, however, distinguishable.

Senator QUAYLE. Just read with me article VI, section 2, where it says, and just read through and it is fairly self-explanatory except for the last part of the section.

It says, notwithstanding, paragraph one of this article, each party shall have the right to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile, SS-20, not limited by this treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar but not interchangeable with the stage of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile. That would be the SS-20. Right?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Having more than one stage, providing that the parties shall not produce any other stage. Now, this goes to the second stage. Right?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Right.

Senator QUAYLE. Which is outwardly similar to, now here is the catch, and I think it might just be a drafting error. But not interchangeable.

Secretary CARLUCCI. In my understanding, the second stage of the SS-25 has different measurements and is not interchangeable with an SS-20 second stage.

Senator QUAYLE. But what if they had something that was outwardly similar and interchangeable, then they could produce that? See the catch? See what I am saying?

I think that, but not, we do not want anything that can also be interchangeable. Unless I am missing something. I think it is just possibly a technical drafting error that you might want to look at.

Because I think a literal reading of this is that you would be allowed to have the production of the second stage as well.

Secretary CARLUCCI. There are two criteria. It has to be outwardly different and not interchangeable.

Senator QUAYLE. But if it is outwardly similar and interchangeable, then it does not fall into the second criteria.

Admiral CROWE. Then it is prohibited. That is the missile that is prohibited.

Senator QUAYLE. On the second stage, see, I think what you do in the first section, you prohibit the first stage and then you carry the

language on, and you allow it in the first stage but not in the second stage, and it looks like you just took the same language and dropped it down into the prohibition category that you used in the permissive category in the first part.

I raise that question, and maybe you can——

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is certainly the intent. We will clarify this for the record.

[The information follows:]

Senator QUAYLE. May the Soviets have a stage for a missile that is outwardly similar to, and interchangeable with, a stage of an SS-20?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, if it is outwardly similar to, and interchangeable with, the first stage or any stage of an SS-20, then it would be banned by the treaty.

Senator QUAYLE. I do not think it is the intent, but just reading this thing, if you go back and read that, I think we just ought to make absolutely certain.

Because it just seems to me it should be and, you do not want it to be interchangeable. And it says, but not interchangeable. You know, I do not bring it up as any major point. It just looks on first blush, and we can get a correction and get analysis now that I brought it up.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think the point is that this is designed to get at the SS-25, and the SS-25 first stage is outwardly similar but not interchangeable.

Senator QUAYLE. But if they would have something that would be outwardly similar and interchangeable. So they change it and they would make it interchangeable. Then by the definition of this, they would be allowed to produce that second stage. Do you see what I am saying?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I see what you are saying.

Senator QUAYLE. The reason I bring it up is because of this whole mish-mash of the SS-20 and the SS-25 similarity. But if it is just a technical defect, then we can clear it up very easily. And if it is not, then we will state that it is not.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We will clarify that.

Senator QUAYLE. The other issue that I am concerned about is the data base. And we now have a data base, a memorandum of understanding of a data base.

But it is my understanding that the real data base from which compliance will be measured will be given to us 30 days after the enforcement of this treaty. Is that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. Within 30 days after enforcement of this treaty.

My question is, what inspection rights and verification rights do we have, where you are going to have the discrepancies between the memorandum of understanding and the data base we have now and the authoritative data base from which we measure compliance 30 days after the treaty is implemented?

The reason I raise that is, here is what I am fearful of, is that you will have quite a bit of discrepancies, that in fact they can say, well, we eliminated that site, we eliminated that from November 1 to whenever this 30-day period may go.

And my concern is, just reading this, I do not see what inspection rights, what verification rights that we have. And I think we might run the risk of having a verification gap, because we will not be

verifying, from what we have now as of November 1, that we will be verifying for compliance purposes what we get 30 days after that data base is given. Has this been talked through?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Bear in mind that on-site inspection is not the only means of verification. We have national technical means that we will continue to operate.

But we do have the baseline inspection of the operating facilities, and the support facilities. But that presumably does not get at a concern of clandestine SS-20s somewhere.

Senator QUAYLE. We would have different inspection and verification rights, different from the data base that would be given to us 30 days after than what the data base that we have as of November 1, 1987 that they gave us. Is that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. If they give us another data base——

Senator QUAYLE. Which they will, I understand. Is that not true?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thirty days after the treaty goes into effect.

Senator QUAYLE. And that is the real data base from which compliance is measured. Is that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is right. And then we go and have the baseline inspection.

Senator QUAYLE. What kind of inspection rights do we have, where you have discrepancies or changes from the data base of November 1 to the, let us use the hypothetical July, June of this year, whenever that may be.

That is my concern is that we may be getting ourselves into this verification gap.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, we get to inspect every facility that is in the November 1 data base.

Senator QUAYLE. Even if they say it has been eliminated, we do?

In other words, if you have an operational site where they have done it, and they gave it to us in this memorandum as of November 1, and all of a sudden it is not in the data base that they give us 30 days after the enforcement date of this treaty, we have the right to go back in and look at that place? We have it to do one time?

General PARTLOW. That qualifies as its close-out inspection as well.

Senator QUAYLE. That was unclear to me as to whether we had that right.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have that continuing right, because we can use it on the short notice inspection, because the cutoff date was November 1, 1987.

So anything that is converted subsequent to that date, we have the right to inspect under the short notice inspection provisions.

Senator QUAYLE. My time is up. I will share with you the relative article here that I would like to make certain that we do have those inspection rights that we are talking about.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, that is not the alarming scenario. Because once there is a discrepancy like that, we are going to be all over them with national technical means.

I mean, the alarming scenario is something that is not in any of the data bases. And we do not have a way to be suspicious of it, or we did not know it existed.

Senator QUAYLE. We may be all over them. But the treaty is a done deed. We may not like what we have, but there is no way we can go back, because we are ratifying this on good faith that they are going to give us a good data base 30 days after the enforcement of this treaty.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are going to have the means of making that baseline inspection, including facilities that might have been closed.

With regard to the clandestine missiles, I agree with Admiral Crowe that that is a more difficult problem. But let us bear in mind that over a period of time the chances are that we would catch some of that. And certainly over a period of time, if they are unable to test them, the missiles lose their military utility.

And this, of course, begs the other question: What incentive do they have to do that kind of thing?

Admiral CROWE. They face some really difficult problems. The more they have, the more military merit it may have, but the more the chance of discovery.

The longer they keep them secured, the less the chances of discovery and the less the chance they will be useful. So there are some real problems in these scenarios, for whoever is trying to do it.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Chairman, I have one final question.

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead, Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. As I have said, I felt that giving up or conceding the ground-launched conventional cruise missile was a mistake.

I wonder, as far as START purposes, whether you contemplate giving up the ALCM or the SLCM, a conventional ALCM or SLCM?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely not. That position has been made very clear to the Soviets.

What we did in INF, in this case, does not serve as a precedent for START.

Senator QUAYLE. I thank the Chair, and I certainly thank our two outstanding witnesses for their responses. I look forward to clearing up the record, and any potential ambiguities that I have raised here today.

Chairman NUNN. All the ambiguities will be cleared up in Agreed Statement D, Senator Quayle. [Laughter.]

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I join you in again expressing our appreciation to these two very outstanding public servants, both of whom bring great knowledge at a critical time.

As I look back on the several years that I have had the privilege to follow the INF negotiations and travel back and forth to Geneva, it seems to me that one of the principal reasons we are here today and that the President was able, with General Secretary Gorbachev, to succeed was the unity in NATO.

I am certain that that structure will observe very closely the manner in which the Senate deals with this treaty.

The question to you is, do you see the same solidarity and unity in NATO as we are proceeding with the negotiations on START?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, definitely. I think our NATO allies are at least as anxious to get on with the strategic reductions as they were with INF. There is solid support.

I briefed my ministerial colleagues at the DPC's last meeting. And there was very good support for a START agreement.

Senator WARNER. The majority leader, and perhaps the good Senator Nunn and myself are contemplating a trip to consult with the heads of state and government in Europe, specifically in reference to this treaty in February. We, of course, basically know their positions now.

Do you find that the second and the third level likewise corroborate those views?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I cannot speak from first-hand experience, quite candidly, Senator Warner, because I have only attended one meeting, and have not been in direct contact with the second and third level.

My impression is that they do share those views. Maybe Admiral Crowe could comment.

Senator WARNER. Admiral Crowe, specifically to the military side?

Admiral CROWE. I suffer from some of the same problems the Secretary has mentioned. I am not sure what my exposure is to those levels.

But from what I see at the Military Committee meetings, when we gather, which we do four and five times a year, with staff support, yes, I believe that is true. That is a small sample, of course, of the whole military.

Senator WARNER. Last, Mr. Secretary, you were integral in your final days as National Security Advisor to the President in coming to the Congress and assisting in resolving some differences that we had with the President on key provisions relating to arms control, which in my judgment had a direct impact, or could have had a more serious impact, on this treaty.

I anticipate that you will continue in that role. I am hopeful that we will have few of those disagreements. But the Congress in its actions, not only in terms of the authorization and appropriations bill, but more specifically the Senate as it considers this treaty does have a very definite impact on those negotiations. Do you concur in that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I concur very decidedly. Congressional attitudes are extraordinarily important in terms of one's negotiating leverage.

Senator WARNER. I wish us well this coming year. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Admiral Crowe, to wind up, I want to ask you a couple of questions.

You state in your bottom line assessment, which is on page 8, "The JCS have unanimously concluded that on balance this treaty is militarily sufficient and also adequate verifiable."

Could you give us your definition of militarily sufficient?

Admiral CROWE. I believe by doing this the military balance we currently enjoy, depending on your perspective, is not harmed.

In fact, that is what we would mean by militarily sufficient. We actually think the balance is improved somewhat by the treaty.

But the term "militarily sufficient" would be that after both sides have completed and implemented the treaty, that we would not be in a worse situation than we are now.

Chairman NUNN. Also, the term "adequately verifiable," could you give us your meaning of that?

Admiral CROWE. We believe that if there is a significant violation, we will detect it in time to be able to cancel or counter it.

Chairman NUNN. You said significant, if there is a significant violation? That means we are not able to count, to know about every single violation?

Admiral CROWE. No, we are not. And interestingly enough, we do not do that today, Mr. Chairman.

We have no system that tells us every time we go over exactly how many systems, weapons, airplanes, et cetera. It is an iterative process where we use all our resources and we follow them with time.

Chairman NUNN. In your view, is there a difference between the term "adequately verifiable" and the term "effectively verifiable"?

Admiral CROWE. I do not believe so. No, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Have you heard the term, "effectively verifiable," used?

Admiral CROWE. I have seen it used often. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. You have?

Admiral CROWE. I have seen it used, yes.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any difference between "adequately verifiable" and "effectively verifiable"?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not. No, sir. And I do not know if any of our experts would.

Admiral CROWE. This word was not chosen to make some distinction.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We will submit something for the record on that, if you would like.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Lehman can tell us the difference if he would like. We would be glad to hear it.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The words are indistinguishable, is the short answer, Mr. Chairman. It is a question of what administration used what word.

Chairman NUNN. Well, the term "adequately verifiable" was heavily criticized by a number of people in this administration in the early stages, having been used by the Carter administration in explaining SALT II.

I just wondered whether there was any difference, or whether anything had changed.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We take your point, Senator. [Laughter.]

Chairman NUNN. You take it, Mr. Secretary, but what are you going to do with it? [Laughter.]

Secretary CARLUCCI. Do you want us to go back to "adequately verifiable"?

Chairman NUNN. I would ask you both, do you mean by "adequately verifiable" the same thing the Carter administration meant by "adequately verifiable"? Or is there a difference?

Admiral CROWE. I do not know what the Carter administration meant by it.

Chairman NUNN. As far as the Joint Chiefs are concerned, Admiral Crowe, your term "adequately verifiable," is the term that has been consistently used?

Admiral CROWE. No, I am not so sure it was. This was just written in this statement to represent my view. And my understanding.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have used the term "effectively verifiable" and I happen to think that in the general sense of the word there is not much to distinguish that from "adequately verifiable."

Chairman NUNN. The terms "adequately verifiable" and "effectively verifiable" are effectively the same terminology. Are they adequate for the circumstances.

Admiral CROWE. I have evidently stepped into a legal quagmire, a political quagmire.

Chairman NUNN. We have all become lawyers here, whether we are or are not lawyers.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think there is a fundamental point here, though, of course. This treaty does establish new standards for verification with on-site inspections.

Chairman NUNN. I agree. I think that is a positive step forward and one which can help us in future arms control negotiations.

But the point all of us need to realize, and which you are making very clear, is that this is not a perfectly verifiable treaty. You are not going to be able to verify everything under it. Nor are we going to have any treaty that is absolutely and totally verifiable.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I agree with that. But we would argue that we have made a quantum leap forward in the verifications provisions.

Chairman NUNN. The real question is whether you can discover a militarily significant violation soon enough to take corrective steps before it does harm as far as national security is concerned.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct, and we think we can in this case.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral Crowe.

Admiral CROWE. This is a challenge, and we believe we can, and I am firmly convinced, based on my own experience, that we will improve daily.

That has been our experience in the past. Even though we are going to have to do things we have not done before, once we are engaged, and once we are concentrating. And we will have people dedicated to this task. Our ability to verify will improve consistently.

Chairman NUNN. I can see Mr. Lehman is going to have some kind of answer for the record on this one. We will go ahead, I know he is going to have all sorts of distinctions between that and times past.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We hope he will be up for his confirmation hearing soon.

Chairman NUNN. We look forward to hearing from him, and we may ask him this question then. I am sure he will be prepared.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Crowe, in all likelihood we will have to have a closed session at some point. I hope you would be available to come back for that kind of session. By that time, we may have other questions that have come up that we will have to get back with you on. If we could just keep you on notice, we will work

with you and your staffs to find a convenient time for you. We appreciate both of you being here today. You have given very helpful testimony, and you have gotten us off to a good start in examining a very important treaty. Thank you very much.

Tomorrow morning we will be here at 9, unless the weather precludes.

[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]



NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
Washington, DC.

STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR NATO DEFENSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Caucus Room, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, Symms, and McCain.

Also present: Senator Stevens.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Gerald K. Bankus, Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, T. Kirk McConnell, Frederick F.Y. Pang, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, research assistant; and Barbara B. Brown, Debra A. Rice, and Mickie Jan Wise, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

This morning, the committee meets to conduct its second hearing on NATO Defense and the INF Treaty. Yesterday, the committee received testimony from Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe on strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, including the implications for the INF Treaty. Today the committee has the opportunity to receive an outside perspective on these same subjects.

It is a particular pleasure to welcome today's witness, an individual we are all very familiar with, Dr. James R. Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger has had a distinguished career in Government service, including assignments as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence. In recent years, he has been a key contributor to this committee's work on defense reorganization, U.S. national security strategy, and many other subjects.

As always, Dr. Schlesinger, the committee looks forward to your testimony. We will go ahead and get started this morning, unless some other committee member has an opening statement.

[The opening statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Dr. Schlesinger before the committee this morning. No one is more qualified to address the issues before this committee. Dr. Schlesinger, your experience as the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy and the Director of Central Intelligence, will serve us well as we exercise our responsibilities relative to the INF Treaty.

Dr. Schlesinger, one of the points that emerged very clearly from the testimony we received yesterday was the importance of maintaining the NATO nuclear deterrent, particularly ground based tactical nuclear weapons. It is clear from your prepared testimony that you share that view.

At the same time, the overall strategy issues that we will be pursuing today and in the weeks ahead dictate that we consider the proper balance of modern conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic forces. I am reminded of your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974, in which you advocated a triad of forces—not the triad of strategic nuclear forces of which we are so familiar, but a "NATO Triad" consisting of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic forces of the Alliance, most of which are contributed by the United States. You noted that we consider these components of the NATO triad as mutually reinforcing, not as substitutes one for another, and that to the extent that they are substitutes, they are poor substitutes. I am interested in hearing whether you still find this to be the case, and if not, what has changed since your testimony in 1974.

The committee also expressed an interest yesterday in the relationships between the INF Treaty before us, and the precedents that it represents for a START agreement. I noted with interest, Dr. Schlesinger, your cautions about transferring the INF regime to a START agreement, and look forward to your testimony on these issues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I make a brief opening statement?

Chairman NUNN. Certainly.

Senator HUMPHREY. If I correctly understand the situation, Mr. Chairman, we have now announced the first 11 witnesses, is that correct?

Chairman NUNN. We have that. We are still trying to fill some gaps in there. We had hoped to have some European witnesses and that did not work out, so we have got a few gaps. But that is the situation.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, as I analyze the list so far, and I know it is not yet complete, only 2 of the 11 announced witnesses could be construed as opponents of the treaty. And I am neither an opponent nor a proponent, but I would like to see and truly hope to personally benefit by a balanced and objective presentation.

And I wanted to lodge a complaint this morning that so far this list is very heavily stacked in favor of those who favor assenting to

ratification. And I hope that we will see, as the list develops, we will see an evening out so that in the end we will have heard from approximately—from a list of persons approximately split in their opinion on the treaty.

I do not think that is asking too much.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey, we will take your witness request under consideration. Senator Warner and I have to make the decisions on that. It is just a necessary part of running the committee, and we have been working very closely together.

We will have a balanced perspective overall, there is no doubt about that. We had hoped to have a framework first. This committee is not the primary committee of jurisdiction. The Foreign Relations Committee is looking at the details of the treaty itself.

We will be looking at the treaty, but we will be getting into that a little bit later in terms of looking at the details. Now, inevitably every witness that testifies is going to get into some of the details of the treaty. So we will get that as we go along.

I can assure you, we will hear from the people who are opposed to the treaty, as well as those who are in favor of the treaty.

Senator KENNEDY. Would the chairman yield?

Chairman NUNN. Yes.

Senator KENNEDY. It would seem to me, looking over that list, rather than identifying people that are for or against the treaty, you have assembled an enormously impressive list of people who have served in high-level security positions in past administrations, Republican and Democratic alike.

Chairman NUNN. Well, the Senator from Massachusetts makes a good point.

Senator KENNEDY. We talk about General Galvin, we talk about the service chiefs, we talk about Mr. Perle. You can look down the list: Ridgway, Lehman, Brzezinski. The whole list seems to me to be a rather distinguished roster of individuals who have had important positions in a variety of administrations.

And I think that in fairness to both the chairman and the ranking minority member, it seems to be a rather distinguished list. I am more interested in their qualifications, than in giving them a blood test about whether they are for or against the treaty. But that is just an editorial comment.

Chairman NUNN. Well, the Senator is absolutely correct. As a matter of fact, except from what I have just read in the paper casually, I do not know the views of any of these people on the treaty itself. I have not talked to them about the treaty.

I do know their backgrounds. I know their overall expertise in the field of national security. If Senator Humphrey has, for instance, anybody that was a former Secretary of Defense, that is what we are hearing from today, or a former national security advisor who is opposed to the treaty and if he will give us the names, we will be glad to invite them.

But we will hear from critics. We will hear from people on both sides of the issue.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, if I just may conclude very briefly, we all understand human nature. Those who serve in the administration are bound to support the treaty, including the military officers. Those who support the treaty who are not in the ad-

ministration as a matter of human nature for the most part are going to put the best face on it.

And if we want to be objective, we need to have a balanced presentation. So I stand on my remarks.

Chairman NUNN. The Senator is entitled to his view, and we will work with the Senator and listen to whatever he has to say as we go along on this.

I would say that our witness today, for instance, has been a very outspoken critic from time to time of this administration. I do not think anyone could say that Dr. Schlesinger echoes the Reagan administration.

If anyone wants to read his views on Reykjavik, there are some very long articles about the way the administration handled that very important summit. So I would say, of all people I have known in Government, Dr. Schlesinger is capable of very objective views, no matter who is in the White House, Democrat or Republican.

He is very objective and analytical, and frankly he and I have discussed the treaty itself very briefly. But I am sure that we will be enlightened by his testimony this morning.

Dr. Schlesinger.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I may, I might start with a comment on what Senator Humphrey has just said. There have been many people, Senator, who have been critical of the leadup to the treaty. They were apprehensive about signing this treaty. Many of those, I think the overwhelming bulk of them, now favor ratification, having seen the treaty signed.

There is a difference between——

Senator SYMMS. Is there something wrong with that mike, Mr. Chairman? I can't hear.

Chairman NUNN. It may be that that mike is not properly plugged. Let us put both of them together, if you would. That one sounds like it is live. I think that is better.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Is it alive?

I was commenting, Senator Humphrey, that there are many people who have been apprehensive about this treaty. There is a long, honorable list of those people, starting with President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and so on.

I think that if you look at that list that you will find that most of them now favor ratification, even though they were critics of the treaty. They feel that the political consequences, including in Europe, of failure of the Senate to ratify would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.

That does not say that they did not and do not so believe that the movement toward the treaty was a mistake. But having signed the treaty, most of them that I have talked to would favor ratification and swallow their reservations about the wisdom of having gotten to where we are.

Senator HUMPHREY. That does not say too much about the merits of the treaty. It just says something about the political situation, international political situation.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is quite correct.

There is a perception overseas, if I may say so, that the United States is not to be relied upon in its decisions, and that when the executive branch makes a commitment, Congress may reverse it. That has happened on several occasions in the past.

It causes considerable worry, and I think the worry about that, if I may say so, Senator, in Europe exceeds the worry about the details of the treaty. There is great concern, which I hope to cover in my statement, in Europe about the psychological condition of the alliance. And that concern, it seems to me, exceeds the worry about the specific details.

But we can get into that later on.

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to appear before this committee once again as it proceeds to evaluate the INF Treaty and examines its implications for national security strategy, and in particular its impact on the NATO strategy. This treaty has been interpreted by some as the successful culmination of a long and arduous process, by others as a potential cataclysm for alliance relations that will start a process, perhaps now unavoidable, of the unraveling of the NATO alliance.

I believe that the first interpretation is closer to the truth. However, I would also say that there does exist in this treaty a potential for further developments that is worrisome. Under the proper conditions, if all of us take care not to be swept away by euphoria or by panicky reactions, this treaty can be of unquestionable net benefit to the United States and to the alliance.

I shall address these matters by presenting a series of observations. First, since I shall be later pointing to some possible dangers and suggesting some admonitions, I should state unequivocally at the outset that the Senate should proceed with the ratification of the proposed treaty.

The administration may justifiably take pride in the negotiation of this treaty. As I just mentioned, there should be no great apprehension regarding proceeding toward ratification.

There should be somewhat more, though not significantly more, apprehension regarding the impact of the proposed reductions, even if successfully verified, on the relationship of the Warsaw Pact forces to alliance forces. Yet, on balance the treaty, when its terms are finally carried out, should have a favorable impact on the military security of the Western World.

Let me stress this important point. Arms control agreements can only be assessed on balance. If one were to weigh any arms control agreement, as is so frequently done, exclusively in terms of its impact on U.S. forces, one must inevitably conclude that the pact is not in the national interest.

Any military advantage that comes from an arms control agreement stems not from its impact on U.S. forces, but rather on the reductions or the restraints it imposes upon the forces of a potential opponent. To elicit such restraint, presumably enforceable, the price we must pay is restraint on our own forces.

Consequently, I urge the committee not to be too beguiled by observations to the effect that, when viewed unilaterally, this treaty imposes some sacrifice of U.S. capabilities. That is inevitable. It is inherent in the arms control process.

In military terms, the only question is whether the overall impact of the restraints on both sides are favorable to our interests. Note also that I have said military terms. Of course, there is in addition a political dimension, which in this case is less clearcut in terms of its effects and to which I will turn later.

When the agreed terms are ultimately fulfilled, the Soviet Union would then have sacrificed a ballistic missile force capable of delivering more than 1,600 warheads in exchange for a mixed American force capable of delivering some 400 warheads.

This 4 to 1 exchange ratio is a remarkable achievement, quite astonishing in light of prior Soviet behavior in negotiations, and probably quite implausible to those American officials who proposed the zero option in 1981.

At that time, the proposal was viewed as so much in the American interest that the Soviets could never accept it. Perhaps we might ponder the advice never to look a gift horse in the mouth.

But more appropriately, we should recognize that the Soviets have accepted a specific exchange lopsidedly in the Western interest, for motives that as yet are not entirely clear to us.

But we should recognize that, insofar as the arrangement goes, it is to our advantage. Any time one can reduce the number of warheads targeted exclusively on so densely populated an area as Western Europe, one should acknowledge the benefit.

In the past, and particularly when the Europeans both urged us to press on with arms control and, more specifically, to do something about the SS-20, the European attitude was then wholeheartedly in favor of such an outcome.

Unhappily, our European partners tend to be rather mercurial. Thus, as the earlier hopes have been transformed into emerging reality, they have tended to develop doubts, which they are more inclined to express privately than publicly.

Since the deployment of the SS-3's, SS-4's, and SS-5's in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union has had what we have lately advertised as a monopoly of intermediate range weapons directed against Europe, while until the past 4 years there have been no American European-based missiles that could reach the Soviet Union.

For most of that period, we were unconcerned about this monopoly, believing quite correctly that American strategic forces provided a more than sufficient counterweight to these regional Soviet advantages.

The 1979 NATO decision to deploy Euromissiles was a dual track decision. The intent was to use the prospective deployment as a way to persuade the Soviets to constrain, if not to terminate, the deployment of the SS-20, a matter of great concern in Europe.

The strategy worked. The main task originally assigned in Europe to Pershing II and cruise missile deployment has been accomplished even beyond the expectation of 1979. But in the course of achieving deployment of the missile force in Europe in the period since 1982, we have developed a rationale and a way of facilitating deployment which we now find hard to abandon.

This is the illusion of concreteness. As weapons systems are deployed, they take on presumed virtues and an apparent indispensability that did not exist prior to such deployment. Nonetheless, we should cling to that original vision.

A Soviet monopoly which has existed for 30 years, though it has only bothered us in quite recent years, is about to be removed. All in all, that is a substantial accomplishment. The administration has made a great point of the fact that "For the first time in history, we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons."

I can well understand why the administration chooses to do so. In PR terms it is a powerful point. Nonetheless, with all due respect, I would hope that the members of this committee would not be particularly swayed by such an argument.

Eliminating entire classes of weapons is not in general a good thing. In general, a mix of weapons systems tends to complicate a hypothetical attack plan by one's potential opponent and thereby adds to deterrence. This was a point reiterated by the Scowcroft Commission, which pointed to the increased stability and deterrence provided by the mixed force of bombers, SLBM's, and ICBM's.

I would hope that this committee bears this in mind as it examines this and prospective future agreements. One should not want to generalize from this specific agreement to the hypothetical virtues of eliminating entire classes of weapons systems.

In this particular case, the balance of advantages is quite clearly to the West, in light of the fact that the Soviets have accepted the principle of asymmetrical reductions, an exchange ratio significantly favoring the West, and the reduced weight of a prospective attack against Western Europe.

Because of the vulnerabilities and the short flight times in this particular case, the agreement also probably adds to overall arms stability.

But one must not generalize from this that there are advantages in removing classes of nuclear weapons systems in general. That is the path to increased vulnerability, reduced flexibility of forces, and in most cases reduced crisis stability.

Nuclear deterrence for Europe will be altered, and this is a critical point, if I may stress it to members of the committee—nuclear deterrence for Europe will be altered, but ought not to be significantly reduced by this agreement. Altogether too much alarm based upon faulty premises has been expressed on this point.

It has served to concentrate attention on the conventional imbalances in Europe which need to be corrected, but on the faulty premise that the role of nuclear deterrence in the protection of Western Europe will have been fatally weakened.

Deterrence depends upon Soviet perceptions of the strength and will of the United States, reflected in its declared intent and in its capabilities. While there are those in certain military headquarters and in some European capitals who suggest that the nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union is provided only by forces assigned to Allied Command Europe, this has not been the case in the past and should not be the case in the future.

The Soviet Union is deterred by the overall power of the United States, whether or not forces are specifically assigned to NATO. It

is a form of parochial geocentrism in Europe to suggest that the Soviets have basically been deterred by a relative handful of warheads in Europe, none of which were deployed before 1983.

It is overall strength of America's strategic forces that has been the principal element in Europe's nuclear deterrent in the past and will remain so in the future. If the Soviet Union is not deterred by the 12,000 warheads in America's strategic forces that can reach Soviet soil, then the Soviet Union will not be deterred by the 12,400 warheads that could reach Soviet soil when we throw in that handful of weapons presently based in Europe that will be withdrawn under this treaty.

Nuclear deterrence need not be weakened and should in certain respects be strengthened by the treaty. To achieve this is primarily a matter of getting the perceptions right, especially through our declaratory policy. We should be endeavoring to make this clear both to our allies and, to the extent necessary, to the Soviets.

Regrettably, the administration has been all too reticent on this issue.

There is no question that the INF Treaty has imposed serious strains on the alliance. Perhaps it should not have done so considering the strong military posture of the alliance. Perhaps it would not have done so had the treaty not come in the wake of Reykjavik, which badly shook allied confidence in the steadiness of American policy and even in American understanding of time-honored alliance strategy.

However, coming as it did in the wake of Reykjavik, the INF Treaty seemed to suggest that the Americans might agree to or even seek the denuclearization of Europe, a view unfortunately reinforced by some high level U.S. statements.

Since the denuclearization has been stated by Gorbachev to be a near-term Soviet objection, and since it has been a Soviet continuing objective since the inception of NATO, it would seem ill-advised for the United States to seem to confirm such a goal as valid.

Not only has the security of Europe rested on the threat of nuclear deterrence in the past, it is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It is vital for the United States in my judgment both to recognize the present fragility of the alliance and to rebuild its cohesion.

The United States should begin to rebuild European confidence by stating certain things quite clearly. First, it should point out that irrespective of what Mr. Gorbachev may say or may hope, there will be no denuclearization of Europe.

Second, the American nuclear deterrent will be available to sustain the security of Europe so long as it is required. And the United States does not see any end to that necessity for the foreseeable future.

Third, all targets that are necessary to cover to provide nuclear deterrence can be either better covered or adequately covered by U.S. strategic forces.

Fourth, we need to remind the Europeans that the chief beneficiary of the elimination of 1,600 warheads targeted for the most part against European targets are the Europeans themselves. That is why the Europeans earlier demanded these negotiations.

While it is true that what ails the alliance in the wake of the INF Treaty is psychological rather than military, those psychological issues require careful handling by the American Government. Much emphasis has been placed in the wake of the INF Treaty on the long standing defects in NATO's conventional posture. Those deficiencies deserved to be corrected in the past, and they deserve to be corrected in the future.

By itself, however, the INF agreement does not significantly change the situation that has prevailed in the past. In light of those deficiencies, allied conventional forces required back-stopping by nuclear deterrence in the past and will require such back-stopping in the future.

Yet, over the years the change has generally been favorable. The conventional deterrent, while still needing significant improvement, is far more robust than it was 30 years ago when the alliance relied overwhelmingly on the nuclear threat. The INF Treaty needs to be explained against its historical background and not as if it removed the principle element of nuclear deterrence.

Indeed, the handful of weapons scheduled to be removed from Europe are so to speak the tail of the dog of nuclear deterrence, and not the dog itself. The most immediate and important tasks regarding NATO's security are to remind the allies that nuclear deterrence remains in place for Europe, and that Europe will continue to need and to have such a deterrent.

Still, there is more to be done with respect to correcting the deficiencies in the allied conventional posture. About this however, one should be realistic.

First, there is not likely to be substantial volume of additional resources available either here or in Europe. Second, the degree of confidence that one may repose in the conventional deterrent is unlikely ever to be sufficiently high that one can dispose of backing by the nuclear deterrent. However, improvements can and should be made. Many of these are well known, indeed have been preached over the last quarter of a century. More equipment and appropriate training, particularly for reserve forces is one important item.

It would be highly desirable for example for German reservists to be effectively equipped and organized into truly effective combat units. Improved deployments are another item. The layer cake deployment of the allies along the central front represents a long standing problem.

Other known items include matters in which this committee has already done substantial work; aircraft shelters and adequate stockpiles of munitions and other supplies.

The point is that much of an improved conventional capability comes not from miraculous new insights but simply doing better what we have known all along we should do.

It would also help to the extent that the Germans have doubts about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, for them to accept the desirability of new defensive barriers in Germany. That the Germans, because of the political implications have never been prepared to construct barriers against the Warsaw Pact attack reveals in my judgment that they have considered the risk of such an attack as quite low.

If there are serious doubts about the continued efficacy of nuclear deterrence, it would seem appropriate to approve conventional deterrence through barrier creation. Who knows but that the new European anxieties might actually permit the alliance to accomplish something more.

I should note however, that I would be careful about regarding either new doctrines or new technologies as panaceas. While much is heard about emerging technologies, one must be aware that they are in reality slow to emerge. Such discussion is particularly seductive since it appeals to an American belief in substituting technology for a force structure, and substituting equipment for manpower. That can only be carried so far.

We must remain aware that the Soviets and their allies still have immense if cumbersome forces and immensely more numerous reserves. One should be careful also not to put too much reliance on new doctrine, such as certain aspects of the air land battle, useful as that exercise may be. Generally speaking NATO will of necessity generally remain confined to defense. Our allies are notably defensive minded. The numerical limitations of Western forces and serious logistical problems will make it difficult for the West to rely on major offensive action.

The main point however to bear in mind is that we do not seek perfection. Conventional forces can be so improved and made sufficiently robust that the Warsaw Pact will lose much of whatever temptation it may have to test them.

If the chief item that must be attended to in the wake of the treaty is to shore up alliance cohesion morale in forces, there are other vulnerabilities that we must be aware of. Notable among such vulnerabilities is the rigorousness of the system of verification. The administration quite properly takes great credit on the breakthrough with the Soviets in allowing on-site inspection, which is unprecedented.

Welcome as such a development is, the committee must remain aware that it does not ensure compliance. Inspectors will be permanently stationed at Votkinsk, but this is only the assembly point for the SS-20. Inspectors will not be stationed at production facilities.

Other areas subject to inspection include the designated deployment areas. But this represents only a minute fraction of Soviet territory, some 20,000 miles out of 11 million square miles. In other words, if the Soviets were to cheat, which I do not think likely, we would have to rely on other means to detect such cheating.

I believe that the likelihood of cheating is low because the incentives to do so in this case are low. One is here dealing with only a very small part of the Soviet forces. Consequently cheating, which might seriously damage Soviet political objections, does not hold out the prospect of significantly altering the overall military balance. What is more, the elimination of various categories of weapons means that any detected system in these categories would represent a violation. Since there is a ban on flight testing, the value of a hypothetical covert force is further reduced. But pointing to the weakness of Soviet incentives to cheat in this case is rather different from having confidence in our capacity to ensure compliance.

While I believe that verification measures are adequate for the INF Treaty, and that the treaty on balance conveys benefits to Western security, one should not be deceived about the rigorouslyness of the verification regime or the capacity readily to transfer it to future agreements.

To put it briefly, the greatest danger would be to accept that this verification regime provides an adequate precedent for a prospective START agreement.

All that remains for me to do now is to indicate what these observations regarding the INF Treaty may imply about the future, particularly the future of arms control. The clearest inference to be drawn is that of a yellow traffic signal. While we should proceed, it is indispensable that we proceed with great caution. This is mandated by three crucial considerations, two relating to the arms balance and one relating to verification.

In the first place, it must be strongly emphasized that the INF agreement, removing from European soil missiles that have served, however temporarily to help deter a Warsaw Pact attack expands the role in overall nuclear deterrence that must be played by U.S. strategic forces.

The level of these forces in providing extended deterrence is therefore an increasingly preponderant one. That implies that there is smaller tolerance for error in any adjustments of the strategic forces than there were previously. It therefore implies that any downward adjustments made under START must be even more carefully scrutinized.

Second, it is essential to examine the character of any strategic arms agreement. In 1982 the administration established as a prerequisite for arms control negotiations that "A START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces." Thus reductions, however popular, are not enough. A prospective arms agreement must be judged by this criterion, especially in light of the enhanced importance of strategic forces for extended deterrence.

The present direction of the negotiations is at best ambiguous. Consequently, the content of those negotiations must be carefully monitored. In particular what is presently on the table is that the Soviet SS-18 force, their most notable counterforce weapon would be reduced by 50 percent. But the sublimit on ballistic missile warheads suggests that the number of aim points in the United States could shrink by more than 50 percent.

In other words, the ratio of Soviet RVs with counterforce capability to U.S. aim points might actually increase. Such a possibility must be carefully watched. For if it were to do so, it would not "promote strategic stability".

Avoiding increased vulnerability is a more important criterion for any strategic arms agreement than simple reductions per se.

Third, we must fully understand that the verification regime for the INF Treaty would be quite inadequate for a prospective START agreement. The chief risk in the INF verification regime is that it might be taken as an acceptable precedent. The reasons that we can have measured confidence in Soviet compliance in INF are three.

First, by reducing intermediate range missiles to zero, the task of detecting violation is made comparatively simple. An observation of any missile in the proscribed category would mean a violation.

Second, the elimination of the entire class of weapons permits a ban on flight testing. The utility of a covert force would be significantly reduced if one is unable to test the vehicles.

Third, the INF agreement applies to a very small fraction of Soviet capabilities, none of which could be targeted against the territory of their principle opponent, the United States of America. Since detection is easier, and since a relative handful of covert weapons would not upset the strategic balance, the Soviet incentive to cheat is quite weak.

But bear in mind that none of these considerations would apply in a perspective START agreement. First, the number of strategic delivery vehicles that would have to be monitored in such a regime would run into the many hundreds. Detection of violations would be much harder since the conditions would be inherently more ambiguous.

Second, unlike the INF case there could be no total ban on flight tests. Since flight testing would continue, any covert force would have greater strategic value.

Third, unlike the INF agreement which applies to a small portion of total Soviet capability, the START agreement would apply to the bulk of Soviet forces and all those forces could reach North America.

As the number of vehicles falls for the two sides, the premium on cheating would rise. Consequently in the START case one cannot rely on the weakness of the incentive to cheat.

The conclusion is clear. Caution must be the watch word. The details of and the prospects for verification are immensely more important in START than in INF. We must bear in mind that in the new world of mobile missiles the problems of verification are inherently more difficult than when we were simply monitoring silos as under SALT I.

In this emerging world, never again shall we have a treaty as easy as the INF agreement to have measured confidence in Soviet compliance.

Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, I thank you for your attention. Let me conclude with the following observation.

It has frequently been observed, both by those who are cautiously sympathetic to arms control and those who are hostile to arms control that the greatest danger in an arms control agreement, even one as attractive as the INF agreement is that it will create euphoria and cause us to let down our guard.

The fear is that a well-founded agreement will sweep us along in a torrent of good feeling and cause us to embrace other agreements that are ill-advised. Regrettably I must conclude on this somber note. Such apprehension is amply justified. As we proceed with further arms control discussions, we must be cold eyed, if not cold blooded regarding the terms of any perspective agreements.

Mr. Chairman, I shall be happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the committee may have. Thank you.

[The statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]

STATEMENT OF
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HEARINGS ON
"THE INF TREATY RATIFICATION AND BEYOND"

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee

It is both an honor and a pleasure for me to appear before this illustrious Committee as it proceeds to evaluate the INF Treaty and examines its implications for national security strategy, in particular its impact on NATO strategy. This Treaty has been interpreted by some as the successful culmination of a long and arduous process; by others as a potential cataclysm for Alliance relations that will start a process, perhaps now unavoidable, of the unraveling of the NATO Alliance. I believe that the first interpretation is closer to the truth. However, I would also state that there does exist in the Treaty a potential for further developments that is worrisome. Consequently such possibilities must be carefully monitored. Under the proper conditions, if all of us take care not to be swept away by euphoria or by panicky reactions, this Treaty can be of unquestionable net benefit to the United States and to the Alliance. I shall address these matters by presenting a series of observations.

1. Since I shall be later pointing to some possible dangers and suggesting some admonitions, I should state unequivocally at the outset that the Senate should proceed with the ratification of the proposed Treaty. The Administration may justifiably take pride in the negotiation of this Treaty. As I have just mentioned, there should be no great barrier toward proceeding with ratification. There should be somewhat more, though not significantly more, concern regarding the impact of the proposed reductions, even if successfully verified, on the relationship of

Warsaw Pact to Alliance forces. Yet On balance, the Treaty, when its terms are finally carried out, should have a favorable impact on the military security of the western world.

Let me stress this most important point: arms control agreements can only be assessed on balance. If one were to weigh any arms control agreement, as is so frequently done, exclusively in terms of its impact on U.S (or Alliance) forces, one must inevitably conclude that the pact is not in the national interest. Any military advantage that comes from an arms control agreement stems, not from its impact on U.S forces, but rather on the reductions or the restraints it imposes upon the forces of a potential opponent. To elicit such restraint, presumably enforceable, the price we must pay is restraint on our own forces. Consequently, I urge the Committee not to be too beguiled by observations to the effect that when viewed unilaterally, this Treaty imposes some sacrifice of U.S. capabilities. That is inevitable. It is inherent in the arms control process. In military terms, the only question is whether the overall impact of the restraints on both sides are favorable to our interests. Note also that I have said military terms. Of course, there is in addition a political dimension, which in this case is less clearcut in terms of its effects--and to which I will turn later.

2. When the agreed terms are ultimately fulfilled the Soviet Union would then have sacrificed a ballistic missile force capable of delivering more than 1600 warheads--in exchange for a mixed American force capable of delivering some 400 warheads. This 4:1 exchange ratio is a remarkable achievement--quite astonishing in light of prior Soviet behavior in negotiations and probably quite implausible to those American officials who proposed the zero option in 1981. At that time the proposal was viewed as so much in the American interest that the Soviets could never accept it. Perhaps we might ponder the advice: never to

look a gift horse in the mouth. But more appropriately, we should recognize that the Soviets have accepted a specific exchange lopsidedly in the Western interest for motives that, as yet, are not entirely clear to us.

But we should also recognize that insofar as the arrangement goes, it is to our advantage. Any time one can reduce the number of warheads targeted exclusively on so densely populated an area as Western Europe, one should acknowledge the benefit. In the past, and particularly when the Europeans both urged us to press on with arms control and more specifically to do something about the SS-20, the European attitude would have been wholeheartedly in favor of such an outcome. Unhappily our European partners tend to be rather mercurial, thus, as the earlier hopes have been transformed into emerging reality, they have tended to develop doubts--which they are more inclined to express privately than publicly.

3. Since the deployment of the SS-3s, SS-4s, and SS-5s in the late 1950s the Soviet Union has had, what we have lately advertised as a monopoly of intermediate range weapons directed against Europe, while, until the past 4 years there have been no American European-based missiles that could reach the Soviet Union. For most of that period we were unconcerned about this "monopoly" believing, quite correctly, that American strategic forces provided a more than sufficient counterweight to these regional Soviet advantages. The 1979 NATO decision to deploy Euromissiles was a dual-track decision: the intent was to use the prospective deployment as a way to persuade the Soviets to constrain, if not terminate, the deployment of the SS-20, a matter of great concern in Europe.

The strategy worked. The main task originally assigned in Europe to Pershing 2 and cruise missile deployment has been accomplished--even beyond the expectation of the time. But in the course of achieving deployment of the missile force in Europe

in the period since 1982, we developed a rationale, as a way of facilitating deployment, which we now find hard to abandon.

This is the illusion of concreteness. As weapon systems are deployed they take on presumed virtues and an apparent indispensibility that did not exist prior to such deployment. Nonetheless, we must cling to that original vision: a Soviet "monopoly" which has existed for some thirty years and (though it has only bothered in quite recent years) is about to be removed. All and all that is a substantial accomplishment.

4. The Administration has made a great point of the fact that "for the first time in history we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons". I can well understand why the Administration chooses to do so. In PR terms it is a powerful point. Nonetheless, with all due respect, I would hope that the members of the Committee would not be particularly swayed by such an argument.

Eliminating entire classes of weapons is not, in general, a good thing. In general a mix of weapon systems tend to complicate a hypothetical attack plan by one's potential opponent and thereby adds to deterrence. This was a point reiterated in recent years by the Scowcroft Commission--which pointed to the increased stability in deterrence provided by a mixed force of bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. I would hope that the Committee bears this in mind as it examines this and prospective future agreements. One should not want to generalize, from this specific agreement, to the hypothetical virtues of eliminating entire classes of weapon systems.

In this particular case the balance of advantages is quite clearly to the West in light of the fact that the Soviets have accepted the principle of asymmetrical reductions, an exchange ratio significantly favoring the West, and the reduced weight of a prospective attack against Western Europe. Because of the vulnerabilities and the short flight times, in this particular

case the agreement also probably adds to overall arms stability. But one must not generalize from this that there are advantages in removing classes of nuclear weapons. That is the path to increased vulnerability, reduced flexibility of forces, and in most cases reduced crisis stability.

5. Nuclear deterrence for Europe will be altered but ought not be significantly reduced by this agreement. Altogether too much alarm, based upon faulty premises, has been expressed on this point. It has served to concentrate attention on the conventional imbalances in Europe, which need to be corrected, but on the faulty premise that the role of nuclear deterrence in the protection of Western Europe will have been fatally weakened. Deterrence depends upon Soviet perceptions of the strength and will of the United States reflected in its declared intent and its capabilities.

While there are those in certain military headquarters and in some European capitals who suggest that the nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union is provided only by forces assigned to Allied Command Europe, this has not been the case in the past and should not be the case in the future. The Soviet Union is deterred by the overall power of the United States, whether or not forces are specifically assigned to NATO. It is a form of parochialism in Europe to suggest that the Soviets have basically been deterred by a relative handful of warheads in Europe, none of which were deployed before 1983. It is the overall strength of America's strategic forces that has been the principle element in Europe's nuclear deterrent in the past and will remain so in the future. If the Soviet Union is not deterred by the 12,000 warheads in America's strategic forces that can reach Soviet soil, then the Soviet Union will not be deterred by the 12,400 warheads that could reach Soviet soil when we throw in that handful of weapons presently based in Europe that will be withdrawn under this Treaty.

Nuclear deterrence need not be weakened, and should in certain respects be strengthened, by the Treaty. To achieve this is primarily a matter of getting the perceptions right, especially through our declaratory policy. We should be endeavoring to make this clear both to our allies, and to the extent necessary, to the Soviets. Regrettably the Administration has been all too reticent on this issue.

6. There is no question that the INF Treaty has imposed serious strains on the Alliance. Perhaps it should not have done so considering the strong military posture of the Alliance. Perhaps it would not have done so, had the Treaty had not come in the wake of Reykjavik, which badly shook allied confidence in the steadiness of American policy and even in American understanding of the time-honored Alliance strategy. However, coming as it did in the wake of Reykjavik, the INF Treaty seemed to suggest that the Americans might agree to or even seek "the denuclearization of Europe", a view reinforced by some high-level American statements. Since "the denuclearization of Europe" has been stated by Mr. Gorbachev to be a near term Soviet objective and since it has been a Soviet continuing objective since the inception of NATO, it would seem ill advised for the United States to seem to confirm such a goal as valid. Not only has the security of Europe rested on the threat of nuclear deterrence in the past, it is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

It is vital for the United States, in my judgment, both to recognize the present fragility of the Alliance and to rebuild its cohesion. The United States should begin to rebuild European confidence by stating certain things quite clearly. First, it should point out that, irrespective of what Mr. Gorbachev may say or hope, there will be no "denuclearization of Europe". Second, the American nuclear deterrent will be available to sustain the security of Europe as long as it is required--and the United

States does not see any end to that necessity for the foreseeable future. Third, all targets that it is necessary to cover to provide nuclear deterrence can be either better covered or adequately covered by U.S. strategic forces. Fourth, we need to remind Europeans that the chief beneficiary of the elimination of 1,600 warheads targeted against European targets are the Europeans themselves. That is why the Europeans earlier demanded these negotiations.

While it is true that what ails the Alliance in the wake of the INF Treaty is psychological rather than military, those psychological issues require careful handling by the American government.

7. Much emphasis has been placed in the wake of the INF Treaty on the long standing defects in NATO's conventional posture. Those deficiencies deserved to be corrected in the past--and they deserve to be corrected in the future. By itself, however, the INF agreement does not significantly change the situation that has prevailed in the past. In light of those deficiencies Allied conventional forces required back-stopping by nuclear deterrence in the past and will require such back-stopping in the future.

Yet, over the years the change has generally been favorable. The conventional deterrent, while still needing significant improvement, is far more robust than it was thirty years ago, when the Alliance relied overwhelmingly on the nuclear threat. The INF Treaty needs to be explained against its historical background--and not, as if it removed the principal element of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, the handful of weapons scheduled to be removed from Europe are, so to speak, the tail of the dog of nuclear deterrence--and not the dog itself.

8. The most important immediate tasks regarding NATO security are to remind the Allies that nuclear deterrence remains in place for Europe and that Europe will continue to need and to

have such a deterrent. Still there is more to be done with respect to correcting the deficiencies in the Allied conventional posture. About this, however, one should be realistic. First, there is not likely to be substantial volume of additional resources available either here or in Europe. Second, the degree of confidence that one may repose in the conventional deterrent is unlikely to be sufficiently high that one can dispose of the backing by the nuclear deterrent.

However, improvements can and should be made. Many of these are well known, indeed have been preached over the last quarter of a century. More equipment and appropriate training, particularly for reserve forces is one important item. (it would be highly desirable, for example for German reservists to be effectively equipped and organized into truly effective combat units) Improved deployments are another item; the layer cake deployment of the Allies along the Central Front represents a long standing problem. Other known items include matters on which this Committee has already done substantial work: aircraft shelters and adequate stockpiles of munitions and other supplies. The point is that much of an improved conventional capability comes not from miraculous new insights, but simply doing better what we have known all along we should do.

It would also help, to the extent that the Germans have doubts about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, for them to accept the desirability of new defensive barriers in Germany. That the Germans, because of the political implications, have never been prepared to construct barriers against a Warsaw Pact attack reveals, in my judgment, that they have considered the risk of such an attack as quite low. If there are serious doubts about the continued efficacy of nuclear deterrence it would seem appropriate to improve conventional deterrence through barrier creation. Who knows but that the new European anxieties might actually permit the Alliance to accomplish something more.

I should note, however, that I would be careful about regarding either new doctrines or new technologies as panaceas. While much is heard about emerging technologies, one must be aware that they are, in reality, slow to emerge. Such discussion is particularly seductive since it appeals to an American belief in substituting technology for force structure and substituting equipment for manpower. That can only be carried so far. We must remain aware that the Soviets (and their allies) still have immense, if cumbersome forces--and immensely more numerous reserves.

One should be careful also not to be too much reliance on new doctrine, such as certain aspect of the Air-Land Battle, useful as that exercise may be. Generally speaking NATO will, of necessity, generally remain confined to defense; our Allies are notably defensive-minded. The numerical limitations of forces and serious logistical problems will make it difficult for the West to rely on major offensive action.

The main point, however, to bear in mind is that we do not seek perfection. Conventional forces can be so improved and made sufficiently robust that the Warsaw Pact will lose much of whatever temptation it may have to test them.

9. IF the chief item that must be tended to in the wake of the Treaty is to shore up Alliance cohesion, morale, and forces, there are other vulnerabilities that we must be aware of. Notable among such vulnerabilities is the rigorousness of the system of verification. The Administration quite properly takes great credit in the breakthrough with the Soviets in allowing on-site inspection, which is unprecedented. Welcome as such a development is, the Committee must remain aware that it does not ensure compliance. Inspectors will be permanently stationed at Votkinsk, but this is only the assembly point; inspectors will not be stationed at production facilities. Other areas subject to inspection include the designated deployment areas, but this

represents only a minute fraction of Soviet territory. In other words, if the Soviets were to cheat (which I do not think likely) we would have to rely on other means to detect such cheating.

I believe that the likelihood of cheating is low because the incentives to do so in this case are low. One is here dealing with only a very small part of the Soviet forces. Consequently cheating, which might seriously damage Soviet political objectives, does not hold out the prospect of significantly altering the overall military balance. What is more, the elimination of various categories of weapons means that any detected system in these categories would represent a violation. Since there is a ban on flight testing, the value of a hypothetical covert force is further reduced.

But pointing to the weakness of Soviet incentives to cheat in this case is rather different from having confidence in our capacity to ensure compliance. While I believe that verification measures are adequate for the INF Treaty and that the Treaty on balance conveys benefits to western security, one should not be deceived about the rigorousness of the verification regime or the capacity readily to transfer it to future agreements. To put it briefly, the greatest danger would be to accept that this verification regime provides an adequate precedent for a prospective START agreement.

10. All that remains for me to do now is to indicate what these observations regarding the INF Treaty may imply about the future--particularly the future of arms control. The clearest inference to be drawn is that of a yellow traffic signal. While we should proceed, it is indispensable that we proceed with great caution. This is mandated by three crucial considerations--two relating to the arms balance and one relating to verification.

In the first place, it must be strongly emphasized that the INF agreement removing from Europe missiles that have served, however temporarily, to help deter a Warsaw Pact attack expands

the role in overall nuclear deterrence that must be played by U.S. strategic forces. The role of these forces in providing extended deterrence is therefore an increasingly preponderant one. That implies that there is a smaller tolerance for error in any adjustments of the strategic forces than there was previously. It therefore implies that any downward adjustments made under START must be even more carefully scrutinized.

Second, it is essential to examine the character of any strategic arms agreement. In 1982 the Administration established as prerequisite for arms control negotiations that "A START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces". Thus, reductions, however popular, are not enough. A prospective arms agreement must be judged by this criterion--especially in light of the enhanced importance of strategic forces for extended deterrence.

The present direction of the negotiations is, at best, ambiguous; consequently the content of those negotiations must be carefully monitored. In particular, what is presently on the table is that the SS-18 force, the Soviet Union's most notable counterforce weapon, would be reduced by fifty percent. But the sublimit on ballistic missile warheads suggests that the number of aim points in the United States could shrink by more than fifty percent. In other words, the ratio of Soviet RVs with counterforce capability to U.S. aim points might actually increase. Such a possibility must be carefully watched. For if were to occur, it would not "promote strategic stability." Avoiding increased vulnerability is a more important criterion for any strategic arms agreement than simple reductions.

Third, we must fully understand that the verification regime for the INF Treaty would be quite inadequate for a prospective START agreement. The chief risk in the INF verification regime is that it might be taken as an acceptable precedent for verification in START. The reasons that we can have measured

confidence in Soviet compliance in INF are three. First, by reducing intermediate range missiles to zero, the task of detecting violations is made comparatively simple. An observation of any missile, in the proscribed category, would mean a violation. Second, the elimination of the entire class of weapons permits a ban on flight testing. The utility of a covert force would be substantially reduced, if one is unable to test the vehicles. Third, the INF agreement applies to a very small fraction of Soviet capabilities, none of which could be targeted against the territory of their principal opponent, the United States of America. Since detection is easier and since a relative handful of covert weapons would not upset the strategic balance, the Soviet incentive to cheat is quite weak.

But bear in mind that none of these considerations would apply in a prospective START agreement.

First, the number of strategic delivery vehicles that would have to be monitored in such a regime would run into the many hundreds. Detection of violations would be much harder, since the conditions would be inherently more ambiguous. Second, unlike the INF case there could be no total ban on flight testing. Since flight testing would continue, any covert force would have greater strategic value. Third, unlike the INF agreement, which applies to a small portion of total Soviet capability, the START agreement would apply to the bulk of Soviet forces (and all those forces could reach North America). As the number of vehicles falls for the two sides, the premium on cheating would grow. Consequently, in the START case one cannot rely on the weakness of the incentive to cheat.

The conclusion is clear. Caution must be the watchword. The details of and the prospects for verification are immensely more important in START than in INF. We must bear in mind that in the new world of mobile missiles, the problems of verification are inherently more difficult than when we were simply monitoring

silos as under Salt I. In this emerging world, never again shall we have a treaty as easy as the INF agreement to have measured confidence in Soviet compliance.

Mr. Chairman and other members of the Committee, I thank you for your attention. Let me conclude with the following observation. It has frequently been observed both by those who are cautiously sympathetic to arms control and those who are hostile to arms control that the greatest danger in an arms control agreement, even one as attractive as the INF agreement, is that it will create euphoria and cause us to let down our guard. The fear is that the a well-founded agreement will sweep us along in a torrent of good feeling and cause us to embrace other agreements that are ill advised. Regrettably I must conclude on this somber note: such apprehension is amply justified. As we proceed with further arms control discussions, we must be cold-eyed if not cold-blooded, regarding the terms of any prospective agreements.

Mr. Chairman I shall be happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger. Senator Kennedy has another important hearing this morning, and I am going to swap places with him in line.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are going to be taking up the Civil Rights Restoration Act on the floor in just a short period of time Mr. Secretary, and I appreciate the courtesy of the chairman to permit me to question you briefly.

First of all, I want to express our appreciation to you for putting this whole INF agreement into historical terms and into our strategic and tactical relationship in Western Europe. We have not really had that kind of review previously. We have just started on these hearings, but I think it does give us a better sense and better balance to evaluate this particular treaty. We are grateful to you for your review of the history.

We heard both from Admiral Crowe yesterday and Secretary Carlucci that one of the important military advantages of this treaty is that it reduces the potential danger to a number of the port's staging areas, and areas where we have prepositioned various military equipment. They both reviewed at different places in their testimony, the importance from a military point of view of this particular agreement.

The point that I raised with them is that it would seem that those military advantages could be quite easily overrun if the Soviets were to retarget their SS-24's or SS-25's, primarily I suppose the SS-25's. And so I was trying to explore with them the importance of a follow-on agreement to sustain what military advantage, other than just the reductions in the total numbers, which are significant and which you have touched on.

In terms of some follow-on agreement that would limit the Soviet Union in terms of building additional SS-24's and SS-25's, the authorization bill last year established a policy of interim restraints on strategic forces—as long as there is progress in START and as long as there has not been an indication that the Soviets are breaking out of SALT, the United States will follow a policy of interim restraints so that we do not see building up of additional weapons.

I am just wondering if you would briefly comment about your view about what military advantages result from the INF Treaty whether you believe that there is a real potential to override those advantages unless we obtain follow-on agreements, which can be verified and are consistent in terms of the criteria which your statement has spelled out for us this morning.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We have great vulnerabilities in Western Europe, particularly the United States, because of the focus of our military resources, so important in Western European defense on a very limited number of bases and acreage. And for years as we have looked across the line into East Germany with the deployment of the short-range missiles, we have been quite concerned that those bases might be subject to sudden attack and that we would be crippled conventionally.

This reduces that concern. Even if the warheads that the Soviets were to employ are not nuclear, whether they be chemical warheads or high explosive warheads, that we have vulnerabilities which are now lessened. The vulnerabilities of the Western force, because of the thinness of our strategic depth in conventional war, and because of the concentration of resources on limited acreage is greater than that of the Soviet Union.

By eliminating these forces, we reduce that.

Now as one looks out to the future, I do not think that we will ever be in the position that if the Soviet Union wanted a bolt from the blue with a limited number of nuclear warheads that we could protect our soft facilities in western Europe. However, the Soviet Union would have to decide under those circumstances on two things.

First, it would have to decide to involve the Soviet Union directly and immediately in an attack against West Germany, which is a substantial political step, and second the Soviets would have to decide that they can attack West Germany, the depots in West Germany or airbases and the like without attacking the United States.

They have always shied away from such a decision. They have always known that American resources would be forthcoming under those circumstances, and consequently they have known that an attack against the base structure in Western Europe from the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons would be self-defeating.

The comforting thing is, under those circumstances it would be very hard for them to have other than a nuclear attack that would be effective against this base structure.

Senator KENNEDY. I am sorry to move quickly, but we are under time constraints.

In the area of modernization, I have been a supporter of modernizing our conventional force. We are going to have to have modernization of various weapons systems. That has been understood for a period of time.

The concern that I expressed yesterday is whether modernization of tactical nuclear weapons should be of such a nature that it would move us right up to the level that has been agreed on in INF. With regard to the follow-on system for Lance, what is your own perception in terms of the Germans and other Europeans, not only from the military point of view but the political point of view, of what that might mean in terms of the alliance?

Do you think we would run into another row over there? Is it your position in modernizing our nuclear weapons that we ought to go right up to the limit of INF, or should we be trying to make some kinds of adjustments in those areas as well in terms of the agreement?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In this case, Senator, I believe we must proceed with considerable caution, with some rules that we should recognize. First, the mood in Germany, in which most of these weapons would have to be based, is not at this juncture hospitable or receptive. I think that that is a mild statement.

And consequently, for the United States to appear to be forcing weapons on Germany again would be damaging to the cohesion of the alliance. And as I have hinted, the cohesion of the alliance is more important than any specific military deployment.

Second, we should be very careful in my judgment not to move back to a particular limit at the sacrifice of conventional capabilities by putting weapons upon aircraft. One of the reasons we have done these things is to improve our conventional posture.

Third, any weapons that deserve to be produced and deployed on their own merits, on their own military merits, we should proceed with, but not simply in order to refill a vacuum.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am sure the committee would like you to lead off.

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead. I will come back.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity and I apologize for being briefly late.

General Rogers, whom we all have admired these many years that he has appeared before this committee, as near as we can determine, voices concerns for disapproval of the treaty with the thought that it would undermine our strategy of flexible response.

As I listened today to your very valuable testimony, you seemed to take a different view, and I wonder if you could draw a parallel between the two.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. Let me make a preliminary observation. Amongst the critics of this treaty, starting, as Senator Humphrey earlier suggested, with President Nixon, Mr. Kissinger, General Scowcroft, and so on, the principal concern has been political, the impact on the alliance.

There are a few who have raised questions about the military consequences. That does not include the gentlemen that I have referred to, and the most prominent critics have been General Rogers and General Haig—I think I can begin to refer to “General Haig” as opposed to “Mr. Haig” again—who are both ex-SACEUR’s. They are our commanders in Europe.

A commander quite naturally likes to have forces under his command and control. I referred in my testimony to the belief that only those forces assigned to Allied Command Europe are useful to deterrence. That I do not think to be the case.

A SACEUR who is dependent upon some Air Force general in Omaha or, if I may say so to a former Secretary of the Navy, even worse, a Navy admiral in Norfolk, feels somehow constrained.

But all of these decisions depend upon the President of the United States. The same President who would authorize the use of nuclear weapons by SACEUR will authorize the use of nuclear weapons by CINCSAC. And therefore, I think that the desire of SACEUR’s to have weapons under their own command and control, while understandable, is not central to the point of preserving nuclear deterrence.

We can continue to have flexible response. We must use weapons that are in what we describe as our strategic forces. But we can reassign those strategic forces to SACEUR if that will give him comfort and, more important, the European allies comfort.

As you know, we have several hundred weapons today in submarines that are assigned for SACEUR’s use. We can add to that number to replace the several hundred weapons that are being withdrawn from Europe.

Now, there are those who will say—and you may ask General Rogers this—there are those in the European headquarters who will say, the Americans will never use strategic weapons in the defense of Europe. I regard that as a parochial view.

The Americans are equally likely to use strategic weapons in the defense of Europe as they are to use weapons deployed on European soil.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Schlesinger, following on then, looking at your testimony, you characterize NATO as a fragile alliance. Further on you mention as the chief item that must be tendered to in the wake of the treaty is to shore up the alliance cohesion, morale, and forces.

In testimony yesterday, and specifically in response to a question that I posed, the Secretary of Defense said it was this strong cohesive force of the alliance that really made possible this treaty. There were periods of time when there was doubt, but when they came together in a cohesive way, the treaty came into being.

What you are depicting here in my judgment somehow conflicts with the impression we received yesterday. A number of us are quite anxious to learn firsthand from the heads of state and gov-

ernment of the NATO allies and others as to their views. We have heard and read what they have stated.

Are you implying that beneath those statements, which I think uniformly are in support, is a serious misgiving, and that they are not being forthcoming to the United States and the rest of the world?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Perhaps not being publicly forthcoming. I think that you will find interesting views expressed when you and other Members of the Senate go to Europe shortly. I can well sympathize with Secretary Carlucci's position. Under circumstances of this sort one must indulge in poetry, and that is poetic.

There was cohesion of the alliance. Cohesion of the alliance is a bit of capital and some of that capital was spent in the course of getting to this treaty, not because of the details of the treaty, which benefit Europe, but because of the preliminaries and most notable Reykjavik, and because of the rationale that we have publicly employed, that this is a step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Everyone in Europe understands the security of Europe has rested on nuclear deterrence, and we have seemed to question it. The British and French in particular, and the French in the most explicit doctrine, stress the dependency upon nuclear deterrence. And all of a sudden the Americans seem to have forgotten that.

It is that I think, Senator, that has caused the alarm more than the negotiations or the details of this treaty.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, we cannot rely on poetry at the time we cast our final votes. We must have hard facts, solid opinions, and they must be corroborated. Are you suggesting that that will be forthcoming?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think so, Senator. I think that that will depend not only on members of this administration—and I think Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe have been quite explicit on these questions—but it will require the backstopping by Members of Congress.

When senior Members of the Senate go to Europe and say, we have heard about how we are looking into a glorious future in which nuclear weapons are eliminated, that may come, but that will be the day of kingdom come; until such time, let us assure you that the U.S. Senate is not going to allow the nuclear deterrent to be weakened in such a way that Europe is unprotected.

When Members of the Senate make that statement clearly and unequivocally, that will strongly influence European opinion. And this is elite European opinion that I am referring to. The great bulk of the European public is delighted with the arms control agreement.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Schlesinger, I associate myself with your concluding remarks.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I believe Senator Kennedy is next on the early bird list, and I swapped with Senator Kennedy, so I will take his place at this point.

The question that you have just been addressing with Senator Warner, does this not also get very much into the rhetoric about immorality of deterrence?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. The Western World has depended upon nuclear deterrence for its security, and the European arm of the Western World has probably depended upon it in terms of perception even more than it should.

And for that reason, for the United States to say that deterrence is immoral and may be replaced at some future date by some other capability weakens what has been the foundation of Western security.

Chairman NUNN. I want to shift gears over to the conventional arena, Dr. Schlesinger. In your written statement, you state:

The conventional deterrent, while still needing significant improvement, is far more robust than it was 30 years ago, when the alliance relied overwhelmingly on the nuclear threat.

Now, yesterday Admiral Crowe went into this in some detail. I do not have it before me, but he in effect said, without quoting him, that NATO, through the low level of sustainability items and munitions, has progressively lowered the nuclear threshold since flexible response was adopted in 1967.

So he said that the nuclear threshold has been lowered since that time, since we moved from massive retaliation to flexible response. It seems to me that is in direct conflict with your statement that our conventional defenses are far more robust than they were 30 years ago.

Now, his date would really be in the late sixties and yours is in the late fifties, so maybe there is a 10-year gap there. But I will just ask you the question: Do you think our conventional defenses vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have gotten progressively weaker or stronger since the late 1960s?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. They have fluctuated, Senator. I do not mean to be mischievous. If I go back 30 years ago, there was no rearmament of Germany. The Germans were just getting into the business of creating armed forces. It was not until the middle sixties that you had powerful German units in place.

Now, at the close of the sixties—and that is the period to which Admiral Crowe refers—we did switch to flexible response, in 1967. It was just about the time that the United States was beginning to withdraw its forces from Europe to deploy into Vietnam.

Senator Warner and I, who were in the Pentagon together, will recall that in the period of the early seventies our forces in Europe were in deplorable condition. And they have been only restored since the mid-1970s.

So if you take a period from, let us say, 1967 to 1973 or 1974, there was deterioration. From 1973 or 1974 until later on, there was substantial improvement.

In recent years, the Soviets probably have been modernizing their forces at a faster pace, and I fully sympathize with Admiral Crowe's concern. What the shortage of munitions implies is the need to have early recourse to a nuclear response. It foreshortens the period, rather than lowering the threshold.

But his point is well taken. We should have in place enough munitions so that we can continue to defend ourselves. And it is more important for our allies to do it than for the United States, because we have not been the chief culprit.

I remember during the 1950s the discussions of nuclear deterrence in which it was stated that if the Soviets, after a pause, failed to cease their attack after 72 or 96 hours, that we would respond with nuclear weapons, and therefore we did not need to have supplies for a 60- or 30- or 90-day war.

And the question quite reasonably was put to these spokesmen: What happens if we are winning? Do we turn nuclear when we are winning, simply because of a shortage of supplies?

The answer to that I think is quite clear: We should not. Therefore, we should have sufficient supplies throughout the alliance to outlast the Russians.

Chairman NUNN. Moving from that subject on to conventional arms control—and that is going to be or should be one of the top priorities in arms control for NATO over the next several years.

What do you believe NATO's goal should be, in conventional arms control?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We have two goals. The first is to preclude the possibility of successful surprise attack by the bloc, and that is a goal that we have sought for better than 10 years, on and off, by forcing the Soviets to reduce the offensive punch of their forces deployed throughout Eastern Europe.

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, we have proposed in the past that the Soviets withdraw a number of tank armies. It is sometimes said that the Soviets must maintain forces in Eastern Europe, the degree of politeness varies, but for garrison purposes.

And they may indeed have to maintain forces, from their perspective, for garrison purposes. They do not need to have tank armies with the capacity for launching a blitzkrieg against West Germany.

So our first purpose should be to get them to pull back in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack.

Second, we must recognize that their reserves, their overall force structure, are substantially greater than those of the West, and therefore a purpose that we should seek out—and I have no formula—is to provide a force structure for the West that under mobilization can continue to handle the forces that the Warsaw Pact can throw against us for 30 or 60 days.

If you can handle it for 30 or 60 days, the temptation will be very weak on the other side. I think that the Soviets have great concern about their domination, their political domination of Eastern Europe, and unless they see the possibility of a relatively quick victory they are not going to start anything.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. My time is expired.

Next on our early bird list would be Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, let me go back to the point that I think we nailed down pretty effectively yesterday in testimony. Even though again you have come pretty close to it here, I would like to be sure that we have got it on the record. As we discussed the problem yesterday, one of our problems in debating any issue in the Congress is that both sides set up straw men, and as a result we often never get down to the bottom line and discuss the real issue that is before us.

Part of our problem in talking about treaty and its military impact in Europe is that many of the people who have already decided they are against the treaty talk about denuclearization of Europe. And in fact, if you read the articles that are written, they start off talking about the treaty, but their primary thrust is the impact of denuclearization.

Looking at this treaty and looking at the banning of short and intermediate range missiles, do you believe that the implementation of this treaty strengthens or weakens or leaves basically intact the military balance of Europe from the American point of view?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It should—and I underscore “should” because it requires some retargeting by the United States, but it should strengthen the military balance, because it reduces Soviet near-term capabilities that could add to the prospective punch of a blitzkrieg.

It does not denuclearize Europe.

Senator GRAMM. The second point I wanted to touch on, that I went into some detail on yesterday, was the whole problem in the treaty, not of verification, but of forcing compliance or at least having a response mechanism. I pointed out that we had some very strong statements made at this point in the SALT II negotiations.

In fact, President Carter suggested that if the Soviets did not live up to the SALT II agreement it could actually mean a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets. We had similar statements from the Joint Chiefs.

As we now know in fact, there is general agreement—in fact, I have not met anybody in the Congress that would argue that the Soviets have not violated SALT II, encrypting telemetry on missile tests, deploying a new class of missiles.

And yet, despite the fact that we never ratified the treaty, if we had ratified it it would have expired by now, and the fact that the Soviets have clearly violated it, the Congress in both Houses last year voted to bond the United States to the SALT II limits.

Do you have any suggestions as to what we might do in the form of an amendment, in the form of an independent legislative action, that would set into place a response mechanism that could be agreed upon, where if the Soviets violate the treaty and we have clear verification of that violation, that at least the burden would be on those who want to keep the treaty in place so that they would have to act to in essence say, and have a reaffirmation that, even with a violation, we want to continue to operate within the treaty?

Do you have any ideas along those lines as to what we might do?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me state at the outset that I would be very careful about any amendment of the treaty or reservation, but along those lines Senator, I think that the legislative history and possibly an expression of judgment by the Congress could be important. And the main point it would seem to me is that when violations are detected on the Soviet side that the United States would respond in a similar manner proportionate to the crime.

Those violations would have to be nailed down very carefully. But if it is clear for example that the Soviets are reintroducing a class of banned weapon systems that the United States under those circumstances should feel, should examine the possibility at least,

at least examine the possibility of reintroducing a similar number of weapons.

That would be more, once again, in this case. I keep stressing the uniqueness of this case. For the psychological impact on the alliance than because a small number of Soviet weapons are likely to upset the overall balance.

Senator GRAMM. A final question. Obviously the biggest criticism of the treaty is that it delinks the United States from our European allies. It induces the Germans especially to move closer to an accommodation with the Soviets.

What do you think we can do or should do to try to minimize that danger?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. On the danger itself, let me say that having observed this process over the years, that any change in the status quo disturbs the Europeans. When we moved weapons into Europe in 1983, you will recall that the argument against them was that it was decoupling. The introduction was decoupling in that the United States was planning to fight a nuclear war on the European continent, decoupled from our strategic forces. When we moved the weapons out, we hear the same cry, decoupling. Under all circumstances, we hear that cry, decoupling from the Europeans. This is a recorded announcement.

So I would take with a grain of salt, no pun in this case, with a grain of salt these kinds of expressions. The purpose of the United States has been to keep its strategic forces linked to the security of Europe. And this treaty actually furthers that goal.

If we handle it right, and that comes to the heart of your question. The United States must understand the European concerns and particularly I might say the German concerns. Germany is not in 1988 a strong country. It is still divided. It was badly mauled in World War II, much more so than in World War I. The division of Germany has created a lack of confidence over the period since 1945. The Germans, in place of their own self confidence, which as you know the French visibly have, not only visibly, but perhaps excessively have, the Germans have depended on the United States to shore them up. And whenever we seem to be wobbling as we have in the last year or so, and during the period of the Carter Presidency as you referred to earlier, it causes great concerns.

American steadfastness, American understanding of the psychological problems of Europe, the response when necessary to those psychological problems will heal what ails this alliance.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Gramm's time has expired. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to congratulate you Jim on your statement this morning. I read through it last night and again this morning. I really did look at it very carefully and it has a great deal of meat in it. I think it is an excellent statement, and I wanted to congratulate you on it.

A couple of comments. You are for the treaty. There are some things you say in there though about future treaties such as START. I want to point these out and then ask a couple of questions.

In point eight, you state that conventional weapons will still need a nuclear backstop. You do not see that really changing.

Under point nine, you said that the verification provisions of the INF agreement would not be sufficient for future agreements.

Under your point 10, there were several points that an INF agreement means that we may have to play an even greater role with our other strategic forces. So it does not come for free. And this was another point too, that reductions alone are not enough to go on to START, that the objective must be to reduce U.S. strategic vulnerabilities. That has to be the overall objective, not just reductions that everybody looks at as being the ultimate goal.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That was stated by the administration, Senator, not by me.

Senator GLENN. Well good, you too.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I certainly endorse it.

Senator GLENN. And the present negotiations as you have seen them are somewhat ambiguous. We could wind up with a situation where the Soviet RV to target aim point ratios put us in even greater vulnerability with a reduction in overall missiles as I understood your point. And it is an excellent point that verification is harder under START. Now I have one additional point that I would like to ask about.

I have been concerned that we do not deal with warheads. We remove those and keep them in our stockpile. The Soviets can put them on their missiles, we can put them on our missiles or other means of delivery—warheads and guidance systems are taken off.

I think that can hardly be the basis for going on down to the 50 percent, 25 percent, or 20 percent reduction level. We could not do that and still have 10,000 or 12,000 nuclear warheads in the stockpile on each side and feel safe. You did not mention the warhead, lack of dealing with the actual warhead situation. Does that concern you?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes sir. It is in a sense a secondary matter, because the critical variable now is the capacity to delivery and delivery vehicles. But if we shrink the number of delivery vehicles in the way that some have suggested and you have remarked upon, then the warhead situation could become worrisome.

We cannot afford to let the Soviets sit over there with let us say, 25,000 warheads and we shrink down to 5,000 or 6,000. It creates a vulnerability and we must watch that with some care.

Senator GLENN. What we will be doing, it seems to me, is trying to figure out other ways of delivering warheads. As we destroy some missiles, we will just be looking at other delivery systems.

During our strategic hearings last year, you stated that the United States needs a new framework for strategy in the nuclear age. The old rules of strategy do not work. As I understood your testimony then, you based this need for a change in strategy on the premise that for the first time in our history, the U.S. homeland was vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack, and our safety was essentially dependent on Communist restraint.

You have stated that the glue, as you put it, of the Atlantic alliance was nuclear weapons. Since that testimony last year, an INF Treaty is likely, and a START agreement may well be a possibility

by this summer. These are rather remarkable changes during the past year.

Do you still believe that a new framework for a U.S. strategy is required and will you comment on what it should be?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, the circumstances that create a different military framework have existed since the Soviet Union developed its counter deterrent in the 1960s. Up until that time, the United States was perhaps unique amongst great powers in modern time, invulnerable.

The creation of that Soviet counter deterrent made us vulnerable and therefore we could not do what we have historically done, World War I, World War II, which was to bash the opponent, to destroy him, to demand unconditional surrender. Why did we not do it, because he had the means of destroying American cities and American civilization. It created a different situation from the sort of condition described by Clausewitz for example. That is the condition that we continue to face today.

We must, however, be able to sustain sufficient forces to deter the Soviet Union from the use either of their weapons against our cities, which I think is relatively easily done, and to refrain from the use of their other weapons against significant targets, the most important of which is Western Europe. That can also be done, that requires skill, ingenuity, dedication, never allowing a long period to lapse out of complacency.

Senator GLENN. As we move toward START, whether it is the 50-percent reduction level or subsequent negotiations beyond START, we have to get into the conventional balance issue. And somewhere in this process, we cannot ignore the fact that there are other nuclear powers in the world besides the United States and the Soviet Union. If we had gone to the Reykjavik summit and eliminated everything, we would have made the P.R.C. the predominant nuclear power in the world.

The point being that somewhere in this process the other nations must be brought into the negotiations. In the START talks as now proposed at 50-percent reduction levels, would you feel comfortable signing that as much as we know about it now, unless we have some absolute requirements on the conventional balance and unless we bring other nations into this equation?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well it depends on the character of the agreement whether I would feel comfortable signing it. I would like to see essentially a reduction of Soviet counterforce capability directed against the United States in such an agreement. At the moment, I do not think the prospects of negotiating that are bright for a variety of reasons.

I would not hesitate to sign a proper START agreement recognizing the international responsibilities of the United States either because of the third powers, China, France, and Britain, simply because of the number of weapons we would have, 6,000 weapons, a 50-percent reduction would still continue to dwarf their capabilities. If you continue to push me, get me down to 1,500, 2,000, 1,000, at that point, we have created a multipolar nuclear world. Whereas now we have a world that is clearly dominated by the United States and we cannot allow ourselves to go in that direction.

It would be ill advised for us. I think that we should move toward conventional arms reduction. It is the Soviet conventional forces that have worried us since 1945.

Senator GLENN. But the Soviet conventional forces are what our nuclear deterrent has been all about. Would you demand that there be a balance there?

Chairman NUNN. Senator Glenn, we have been running over, so I think I had better interject right there. I would like to pursue this later, those are good questions. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, you stated that our European partners have tended to develop doubts which they are more inclined to express privately than publicly. Have some expressed doubts to you?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. And what are those doubts?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the doubts reflect this concern that has been created by the repercussions of Rekyjavik and the Americans do not understand what has for 30 or 40 years been the strategy of NATO, which is to deter Soviet pressures, military pressures by the ultimate sanction of the introduction of nuclear weapons. Suddenly we are talking about something else. And that was a serious psychological blow, particularly because they had not been consulted in advance.

Senator HUMPHREY. Leaving apart the fact that it had not been adequately consulted, it is a psychological blow, is it not, because of the reality that we are removing or would remove the only two missiles which can strike Soviet targets which are not strategic weapons?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. From European soil.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. There was an interesting article in yesterday's Washington Times in which the reporter cites one Michael McGuire of the Brookings Institution who postulates that the Soviet goal nowadays and for some time has been to in fact delink Europe from the U.S. strategic forces. It suits the Soviet purposes to reduce strategic forces to their lowest possible, to the lowest level of parity he says, and at the same time work to improve the Soviet conventional imbalance. It would seem that the Soviets are succeeding in that, especially if we go for these huge reductions in START.

They will have reduced parity—they have achieved parity, no question about that at the very least, they are seeking now to reduce parity to the lowest possible level. And at the same time have vastly improved their conventional forces.

You mentioned in your own testimony the concern about the continued worrisome imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. What about it, I mean is not that the nub of it? We are taking out of Europe the only two weapons, nonstrategic weapons capable of hitting Soviet territory, and doesn't that make a Soviet conventional—doesn't that make a Soviet victory in Europe more possible and leave the United States with only a strategic nuclear response, leaving the only nuclear response for the United States to strategic forces which obviously we are not going to do except in extremes?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yours is an enormously complicated question, Senator.

First, you are quite right, that is the nub of it. On the second point, are the United States and her allies more vulnerable under these circumstances? Potentially yes, but there is no need for that if we do the right alterations in our targeting doctrine and our declaratory policy.

Why do I say that? Why is this the nub of the problem? I refer to this as the illusion of concreteness. These are forces that were deployed in Europe, the reason for deploying nuclear weapons aside from battlefield weapons in Eastern Europe generally has been the psychological support that it has provided to Western Europe and we are reducing that psychological support.

Moreover in this case, the European leaders have invested their political energies and their political capital in the introduction of these weapons.

Some of you will remember Senator Young of North Dakota back in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was signed. Milt Young was irreconcilable. Why, even though that was a good deal for the United States because our system did not work and it was driving the Russians upward, he had gone before his people in North Dakota and said this is essential to the United States. He was out on a limb. Now some of the German politicians are out on that same kind of limb.

Senator HUMPHREY. Way out, they went way out, God bless them.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Therefore, you are quite right. This is sort of cutting them off that political or psychological limb.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well there is no question about that.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. But on the other side, yes, we can handle all of the targets necessary to handle.

Senator HUMPHREY. With what weapons, what about this retargeting, how would you do that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well let me say that the Germans are now talking about a triple zero, some Germans are. They are making a great mistake. Why, we must keep battlefield weapons in Germany while removing intermediate-range weapons because there is no substitute for battlefield weapons other than being located near the battlefield.

Senator HUMPHREY. But that does make Germany the only nuclear battlefield.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. No. If those weapons—the purpose of those weapons is once again to deter. There are a variety of ways, a variety of strategies for the deployment of nuclear weapons. In the event of the use of nuclear weapons, only one of which would involve using nuclear weapons around the FEBA. Others could involve selective strikes against the Soviet Union or strikes into Eastern Europe, strikes against economic targets.

The heart of deterrence is to have a range of options for the United States and the Soviets need not guess. Now we can handle those problems with our strategic forces better.

Senator HUMPHREY. But that is provocative, that is the difference. Once you get into strategic forces you are really much more provocative.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We have had 200 warheads on our Poseidan forces assigned to SACEUR as part of his strike plan. I do not think that the Soviets distinguish between the 200 warheads assigned to SACEUR as part of a strike plan from other warheads in the U.S. strategic forces. You could make more of an argument about those that originate in the United States. I do not regard that as provocative. I regard that as part of the seamless web of deterrence.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well still Mr. Secretary——

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey, I do not want to interrupt, but we have run over time here.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just one quick brief because this is so very interesting.

Still if you were President or Commander in Chief in a bad situation and the Soviets are ravaging Europe, you are going to want first to use battlefield weapons. You are going to want to use anything short of strategic weapons if you possibly can. I mean that is just prudent so as to not invite a retaliation by strategic weapons. I mean that is just prudent and very straightforward.

But a President will not be left with anything short of strategic weapons that can quickly and accurately target Soviet territory.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well that is what links the U.S. strategic forces to the security of Western Europe, the fact that the President is placed in this position.

Now I do not see any reason and as some of you may recall, I talked in the 1970s about selective strikes against the Soviet Union, the removal of various military capabilities around the periphery, such as Henhouses. I think that the Soviets should always feel that such facilities might be vulnerable in the event of an attack against Western Europe.

It is the will of the United States, the strength of the United States that is critical, and if it is clear, the Soviets are never going to be tempted to indulge in a massive attack.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey, I have just got to interrupt. We have gone several minutes over.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand.

Let me just say it removes the flexibility that we now have, and that is the point I was trying to make.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It removes our flexibility. It also reduces the Soviets'.

Now, if we were in a position in which we could have the Pershing II and the cruise missiles in Europe and we could get the Russians to dispense with what they have in this treaty, I would prefer that situation. But as a Russian leader, I would be somewhat reluctant to sign that.

You commented earlier, Senator, about how few opposition speakers there were before this committee. I have been surprised by what the Soviets have permitted in this treaty, and I have speculated, as everyone has, on their motives, but this is almost like the Austrian State Treaty. You know, this is a good deal for the West in terms of the details of the treaty, in terms of the trade.

It is a bad deal for the reasons that you have mentioned, that German politicians are out on a limb.

Senator HUMPHREY. I did not mention that. I do not consider that weighty. You did. You mentioned it.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey, we have now just about doubled the time, so it has got to stop at some point.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am delighted you are here this morning, and I join with those who are impressed by your good testimony, as ever.

Earlier this morning you said that our most important goal is to retain the cohesion of the alliance, and that we want to keep that in mind first and foremost.

It seems to me that one thing we have to do to retain that cohesion is provide some political cover to those in Europe who have stuck their necks out in support of the INF Treaty. And it seems to me that part of providing that political cover ought to be the very clear indications by the United States and the rest of the alliance, particularly to the Germans, that we are serious about taking additional steps after INF.

Is that not the case?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator WIRTH. If that is the case, then we want to consider a variety of next steps, and some of those you addressed in your opening remarks related to the strategic arms reduction talks and what we ought to be careful about in that area. It seems to me we also have to address the issue of conventional arms control as well. Is that not correct?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I am not sure that it is a necessity. It certainly is highly desirable.

Senator WIRTH. Well, if it is highly desirable, and going to Senator Nunn's—

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We should pursue it. Now, how accommodating the Soviets will be, once again there will have to be asymmetrical reductions.

Senator WIRTH. No question about that. But it seems to me as part of the cohesion of the alliance, we have to make sure that those forces in Europe that, say, would like us to move toward a triple zero, can perhaps be drawn back a bit from that if we show that we are serious about some other initiatives, and they can come in under that umbrella. That is the only point that I would like to make on that front.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator WIRTH. Therefore, to go to Senator Nunn's question, which was, what should be our goals in conventional arms control? The first that you mentioned was to "preclude the possibility of successful surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, that that should be our number one goal in the area of conventional arms control, is that correct?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator WIRTH. If that is the case, then it seems to me that we have to look at a variety of means of precluding a successful surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, and that we normally assume that the way to preclude a successful surprise attack is to increase our conventional capability. That is presumably the number one means that we pursue.

What I would like to ask you about are other means for precluding a successful surprise attack, and I wanted to ask you to comment, if you might, on how successful you think the agreement reached in Stockholm in 1986 has been for us, what we have learned from the so-called confidence building measures, if in fact those are important for us to be pursuing.

Again, if our goal is to preclude a successful surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, it would seem that confidence building measures of a variety of kinds would be important to achieve what you have said is the number one goal for conventional arms control.

Would you comment on that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, you are absolutely right that these measures are desirable and that confidence building measures will reduce the perceptions of a surprise attack and may reduce the temptation to surprise attack under most circumstances but not under all circumstances.

Why do I say that? Because they build confidence only when one of the sides is not intent on organizing and implementing a surprise attack. Under those circumstances, the confidence building measures do not help.

Now, I do not think that the Soviets are planning a surprise attack this year or next year or the following year, and therefore in these circumstances they were helpful. But if you were to contemplate, let us say, a bold leader like Adolph Hitler in the Kremlin, then those confidence building measures would, under those circumstances, not be helpful. This is to say only that they have their limitations, not that they are not desirable.

Senator WIRTH. What if we were to broaden those confidence building measures that we have right now—the Soviets have to tell us that they are having an exercise of 17,000 men or more, and we send observers. If we believe that they are having exercises and that they are above 17,000 people and they are not telling us, we can challenge them and send in challenge inspectors.

What if we broaden the confidence building measures beyond that to include, for example, the ability of the United States to watch key rail junctions in East Germany, the ability of United States inspectors to watch Soviet concentrations of prepositioned equipment, the exchange which we talked about yesterday with Admiral Crowe and Secretary Carlucci, the exchange of general officers for discussions and getting to know each other, the examination of military strategy or doctrine, depending on how you define it, on both sides, to build a number of steps in addition to our abilities to observe and inspect their maneuvers.

It would seem to me that all of those would be important if in fact your first goal is to preclude the possibility of successful surprise attack.

If we are there watching them, seeing what they are doing, and they are doing that with us, each side is going to be less likely to be surprised by the other side, is that not the case?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Absolutely.

Senator WIRTH. So therefore, what we ought to do is to develop a more—it would seem to follow that we ought to develop a more aggressive program of confidence building. Maybe confidence building measures is the wrong term, that it sounds as if you are just trying

to get to know the other guy and get to like each other; rather, confidence building measures really means greater and more careful inspection on the ground of the Warsaw Pact, and them on the ground on our side.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Absolutely. I have, as the chairman and Senator Warner well know, I have strongly supported these movements over the course of the last 5 years, and I think that due to the leadership of this committee, that that has resulted in a successful culmination by the administration.

So I have no problem with that.

Senator WIRTH. It seems to me that there is great potential for this, Mr. Chairman. We should be considering and pursuing this very aggressively. Again, from my recent experiences, I have found an enormous amount of enthusiasm and feeling of potential for this among our commanders, among those of our allies, and certainly a lot of discussion from the military leadership of the Warsaw Pact with whom I held discussions, feeling that there is a lot of potential in this and that we jointly ought to be pursuing this very aggressively.

In any case, thank you very much.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Wirth.

I agree with that thrust. That now has a name called "operational arms control"—everything has got to have a name—as opposed to structural arms control. But I think that area is one that ought to be pursued in terms of our own thinking. We have to think through what it is we would like to know in the event there was an Adolph Hitler in the Soviet Union. Presuming the worst scenario with the Soviets—combining their military forces with the worst intentions—what is it we would want to know to increase that warning time that Dr. Schlesinger said should be one of our main goals to prevent a surprise attack.

So I would agree with that. I think we ought to all do some thinking on it, and I hope the administration and the alliance does.

Senator Symms, you are next.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, I want to thank you for the obvious hard work and thought that you put into this statement. I find it very helpful as a member of this committee, to hear the points of view that you put up here this morning. I know you know this, but what concerns me after a trip last week where I was in Pakistan and then also in Europe at SHAPE headquarters, is that the Soviets being the chess players that they are, are going to maximize their signing this treaty for every ounce of political gain and support that they can get. I believe there is no question about that.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. They are doing very well at it, too.

Senator SYMMS. Yet in Pakistan, it is very apparent, and is public knowledge that the Soviet Union is running a state-supported terrorist action out of Kabul with a large number of KGB agents, perhaps in excess of 1,000, that are blowing up innocent civilians and children and women, and since Mr. Gorbachev became the head man of the dictatorship, they have increased those state-supported terrorist acts. Obviously he must know that that is taking place.

So on the one hand, he can become Time magazine's man of the year and on the other hand, in Pakistan approximately 400 people were killed last year and another 1,000 maimed and injured by bombs that were Soviet supervised. All this being done to terrorize the Pakistanis to stop supporting the Freedom Fighters.

Interestingly enough, they are having a difficult time and are getting it handed to them in Afghanistan. But we can be sure if they leave, they'll try to make it look like that they left because they're good guys, not because they are losing on the battlefield.

If you go to Europe today and talk to our leaders and the leaders of SHAPE, they will indicate that they believe the NATO forces per se are in better shape than they have been in 40 years. This is in part because General Rogers called for and got the P-II and the cruise missile, to give the alliance maximum flexible response. We have had a lot of testimony here this morning about what we have to do now. And I agree that we are not completely without some alternatives. But what do we do as a nation to help with the political strength that it will now take in Western Europe to come up with an alternative to the flexible response that the Pershing and the cruise missile provided? Knowing, in fact, that the Soviets will have already retargeted the same areas that the SS-20's target, with SS-24's and SS-25's, maybe from the same locations?

So what is the answer then? How do we get to the situation where we take what used to be the evil empire, but who is now our new partner in peace, and convince people in Western Europe and taxpayers in the United States that we still have the same threat, that we still have an evil empire that is blowing up innocent women and children and supporting state-supported terrorism and so forth?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, it is damned hard, Senator. The fact of the matter is that if you look at Mr. Gorbachev, with all of his charm, that it makes one nostalgic, from a narrow standpoint, for Mr. Chernenko. You know, he was feeble and not attractive to anybody. He did not provide this kind of attractiveness to the Soviet Union.

That was great for the United States, and it was great in the competition, but that is no longer the case, and the game is going to get much harder. It is much harder. In Western Europe, a year ago, the German population, 55 percent, if I recall it, felt that there was a military menace from the Soviet Union. Today the number is 24 percent. The German population tends to credit Mr. Gorbachev more than Mr. Reagan for the INF agreement. More than 50 percent of the German population now expresses support for unilateral disarmament.

So the psychological change——

Senator SYMMS. Would you repeat that number again? More than 15?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. More than 50, five zero. So the change that has come in the last year is dramatic and provides substantial corroboration of what you have said.

Now, under those circumstances, the United States must demonstrate its wisdom and steadfastness if we are to hold these European allies. It is much easier to hold the alliance together when the Soviets are vaguely menacing than when they appear friendly.

Let me also just add that given the regional aspects of Europe, that pointing to what the Soviets and their minions may be doing in Pakistan will not change European opinion one whit. They are interested only in what is going on in the locality. It is going to be tough.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Symms.

The Senator from Illinois.

Senator DIXON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The opening statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, the committee today is beginning its second day of hearings on the strategy and capabilities of NATO defense, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Our witness this morning is Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I look forward to Dr. Schlesinger's presentation on the various aspects of the U.S. national security strategy given the INF Treaty.

Dr. Schlesinger's outstanding background will allow the members of this committee to hear from an individual who can clearly identify the objectives and capabilities of the U.S. military and the strategy that links the two.

I have the utmost respect for Dr. Schlesinger's views on the subjects before the committee. I am delighted that the chairman has seen fit to include Dr. Schlesinger as a witness on this extremely important subject.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Secretary, may I echo the observations of several other members of the committee when I say that I think your statement is an excellent, useful, and informative statement. I appreciate it very much.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DIXON. Both Admiral Crowe and Secretary Carlucci essentially came to the same conclusion yesterday that I think you come to today in response to the question that what is our situation after we remove the short- and medium-range nuclear deterrence in Europe so that both sides are now relying on the strategic nuclear deterrence. I believe you all come to the conclusion that we are in a better position, that the balance of power is more favorable to us than it is now.

Is that a fair statement?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It is a significant but a slight improvement, if I may put it that way.

Senator DIXON. Well, I wanted to pursue that, Mr. Secretary.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It is clearly an advantage, but it is a small advantage.

Senator DIXON. All right, now——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The reason we were able to agree on this is because it is a modest agreement.

Senator DIXON. Okay, now, General Rogers, of course, comes to a different conclusion, having been a distinguished recent NATO commander, and I wanted to just get you on the record about this.

When the INF Treaty is adopted, we will then be in the circumstance where in the view of many of us the balance of power in Europe with respect to conventional and chemical capability will be heavily in favor of the Soviets.

Now, I am not using any classified material, Mr. Chairman. This actually is a newspaper article. But I would like to just read this to you very quickly and put it in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT

THE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Manpower		
Total active ground forces	2,385,000	2,292,000
Total ground force reserves	4,371,000	4,276,000
Ground Force Equipment		
Main Battle Tanks	22,200	52,200
Artillery, Multiple Rocket Launchers, Antitank guns	11,100	37,000
Mortars (120-mm and over)	2,600	9,500
Antitank Guided Weapons (ATGW), ground-based	10,100	16,600
ATGW, helicopter-borne	470	1,050
Antiaircraft Guns	7,400	12,000
Surface-to-Air Missiles	2,250	12,850
Armed Helicopters	780	1,630
Land Combat Aircraft		
Bombers	285	450
Attack	2,108	2,144
Interceptors/fighters	899	4,930
Naval Forces		
Submarines	196	231
Carriers	24 (8)*	4 (2)*
Cruisers	16	24
Destroyers	124	50
Frigates	196	50
Amphibious	200	100
Naval Air		
Bombers	38	250
Attack	379	177
Interceptors/fighters	180	12
Antisubmarine Warfare	145	150
Fixed-wing Aircraft		
Antisubmarine helicopters	390	224

*Figures in parentheses indicate helicopter-only carriers included in total. Statistics on naval forces apply to European and Atlantic waters.

SOURCE: "The Military Balance, 1987-88," the International Institute for Strategic Studies

SOVIET-AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARSENALS

THE GLOBAL BALANCE

United States		Soviet Union	
Number deployed	Total warheads	Number deployed	Total warheads
ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)			
1,000	2,261	1,418	6,440
SLBMs (Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles)			
640	6,656	928	3,344
Bombers			
317	4,956	165	1,260
Total			
1,957	13,873	2,511	11,044

SOURCE: "The Military Balance, 1987-88," the International Institute for Strategic Studies

ILLUSTRATION BY BOB GALE FOR BAE

Senator DIXON. This newspaper article, examining NATO and Warsaw Pact nations on the balance of conventional forces there, it says, battle tanks, we have 22,000; they have 52,000. I am rounding out these numbers. Artillery, we have 11,000; they have 37,000; 120 millimeter mortars and over, we have 2,600; they have 9,500. Anti-tank guided weapons, we have 10,000; they have 16,000. Antiaircraft guns, we have 7,400; they have 12,000. Surface-to-air missiles, 2,200 for us; 12,000 for them. And so forth.

And of course, Secretary Carlucci and others have told us what we already know, that the chemical capability of the Soviets is overwhelming, greater than the rest of the world put together. It is just in recent history, the short time I have been on this committee, that we are now funding binary chemicals and beginning to make some moves. And incidentally, it was highly unpopular when we did it, as you well know, Mr. Secretary.

I guess my question then is, given all of this, assuming that we do not move rapidly into a conventional/chemical arms control agreement with the Soviets, what do we do then, and are you concerned about these numbers if we do not do something?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, I am concerned. I have been concerned about those numbers for roughly 30 years, the Soviet advantages.

The fear that we always had in the 1950's and 1960's, and increasingly, is that as the Soviets developed a counterdeterrent, that it might feel free to use its advantages of conventional arms. We have never been able to give up the reliance upon, the ultimate reliance on nuclear deterrence because of the shortfalls of conventional forces. Let's build up that conventional capability, let us make it more robust.

Senator DIXON. Well, Mr. Secretary, I guess the heart of that, though, and this is what I am interested in developing with you, assuming we do not quickly get a conventional and chemical arms control agreement, and I have to assume that is not particular advantageous for them, I do not think they are going to hurry to do it, now, then, you follow along with the fact that twice we appropriated the funds for chemical binary weaponry on a tie vote with the Vice President breaking the tie, very unpopular in the country. You see the line going down on appropriations for conventional weaponry. My subcommittee has developed that we are going to be back in the same position in 1991 that we were in 1981, believe it or not, after all these expenditures.

In view of the pragmatic circumstances before us, how do we resolve this problem? What do we do?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I do not have a panacea. I see elements of a solution, and I hope that the members of the committee will continue to work at those elements of the solution.

In the first place, there are many things that can be done to improve our conventional forces very cheaply.

Senator DIXON. Name a few, would you?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Like providing adequate shelters for aircraft. If the aircraft are all vulnerable, we are at a great disadvantage simply because they can be destroyed, but in the absence of such destruction, the Western World, even though the numbers are unfavorable, has a clear air edge, a clear edge in tactical air because

of the superiority of our aircraft and the superiority of the training of our pilots.

Senator DIXON. I would concede that point.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. So one must push beyond the numbers, and there are these kinds of things, the equipment shortfalls, the failure to protect, to shelter aircraft and the like.

Then there are other things. The improvement that should come in terms of joint production, of interoperability, of joint R&D projects that are serious rather than a pork barrel kind of thing. All of these matters will permit us to make greater use of the resources that we have.

If, as I mentioned in my report, if the Germans can be persuaded to have a barrier formation in the center of Germany, we will have a radical improvement in the capacity for defense of the alliance. They have never been willing to do that, because that symbolizes the division of Germany, which is the last thing that they want to allow.

But there can be improvements in the barriers, and the Soviets will recognize that. There are many things that can be done without substantial expansion of the budgets, the defense budgets of our allies.

Now I personally would like to see such an expansion, but I am bowing at least temporarily to political reality. And therefore we must learn to do those things, those basics more efficiently, without significant increase in budgets and we can do them. The deployments in NATO are deplorable. It was, as General Crowson said, you know, if the Soviets come at us, we can defeat them. But that I think refers to the forces in the southern part of Germany, American forces. General Crowson I think, although you can deal with him directly, was referring to the situation outside of this area of operations.

They look at that, and the Belgians do not have the proper equipment and the Dutch are stationed in Holland rather than forward and that layer cake deployment is one of the greatest conventional vulnerabilities that we have that is inherently curable without a 40-percent increase in conventional force budget. We could have a more robust capability. But we probably will never match the Warsaw Pact. But we can improve it to the point that they are not tempted.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Secretary, I am about to yield to the next Senator for his questions, but may I quickly ask you before I do that, I was interested in your points about verification and eager to ask this one question.

Is there anything you would add to this document, or suggest to the Senate regarding possible additional protection from a verification standpoint other than what is inherent or already in the agreement?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Dixon, that is a difficult question, because tradeoffs have been made by this administration. Under this agreement we are permitted to inspect something like 20,000 square miles in the Soviet Union. The presupposition of this agreement is that if the Soviets were to cheat, they would cheat in the previous deployment areas which are designated. Now if I were a Soviet leader and I were intent on cheating and I am not saying

that they are, but I am hypothesizing, I would certainly not plan to deploy, excuse me, to hide covert missiles in the 20,000 square miles that we are permitted to inspect as opposed to the roughly 11 million other square miles of the Soviet Union.

We decided that we did not want to allow the Soviets to roam around freely in the United States and that therefore, for this agreement, it was enough. And I think that when you make that trade off as you deliberate on the floor, that you may come to the same agreement. It would be very pleasant for us to be able to inspect elsewhere in the Soviet Union other than in the designated deployment areas.

Senator DIXON [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I yield to Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you indicated that some European leaders have expressed private doubts to you about the wisdom of some of the United States' policies, particularly those espoused at Reykjavik indicating perhaps the Americans failed to understand the history of the NATO alliance. I would respectfully suggest publically that apparently at least one member of NATO, namely the Germans, do not fully understand the history of NATO either, and I am talking specifically about the resolution that was reached by the foreign ministers in Reykjavik which indicated that we should deter reductions in tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons until such time as the conventional and chemical weapons capability had been restored. And yet Mr. Gencher is now proposing to move forward with tactical nuclear reductions. So I would suggest that perhaps Germany has not fully appreciated the lessons of history either.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that there are differences within the German Government.

Senator COHEN. You also indicated I think—

Dr. SCHLESINGER. But your point is well taken. I think it is driven in part by public opinion.

Senator COHEN. I understand. Perhaps our policy has been driven by public opinion as well. But I would assume that you would favor some modernization of the tactical capability, but not at the point of appearing to drive the Lance, the follow on Lance down the throat of the United Kingdom, perhaps France and others that might be achieved and that Mr. Gencher might realize that public opinion should not overrule judgment in his case.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Precisely.

Senator COHEN. A number of us are going over shortly to meet with our European counterparts. Would you recommend that we repudiate the document called Discriminate Deterrence? Let me phrase it in a way—

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I suggest that you be selective in your support?

Senator COHEN. Let me be selective in how I intend to raise this issue. I think you have indicated by your testimony that you believe that extended deterrence is alive and well and the United States should reaffirm that capability and that commitment.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I correct that? The potential for extended deterrence.

Senator COHEN. But that particular discriminate deterrent document, and I have not had a full briefing on it, and I hope to before I leave, it seems to me that calls into question the doctrine. As a matter of fact, let me just quote from one section. It says:

However, the alliance should threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a wider more devastating war, although the risk of further escalation would still be there, but mainly as an instrument for denying success to the invading Soviet forces.

It seems to me that that statement calls into question the reliability of the extended deterrent theory. And so you now have the Germans not knowing quite what to anticipate. Are we talking about more battlefield capability, or should we still rely upon the competence and the capability of extended deterrence. I think that is an issue that we ought to address while we are there and I will seek your private counsel as to how it should be approached.

The Senator from Illinois just talked about chemical arms reductions and once again, I would like to point to discriminate deterrence as a question to be raised. It says:

For the foreseeable future it will not be realistic to pursue an agreement to eliminate all chemical weapons. A ban on chemical weapons could not be verified.

Now that is a statement in this document, and the question I have is that this seems to go in direct conflict or be in direct conflict with the draft convention that we have submitted in Geneva to ban chemical weapons. And a statement by President Reagan last year that we have proposed a chemical weapons ban that is verifiable.

Now the question that I have is whether or not we should either number one, withdraw the draft convention we have laid down, or do something about increasing and enhancing our verifiable capabilities as such—verification capabilities. But right now we may be faced where the Soviets may in fact pick up and accept a draft proposal that we now find unacceptable.

Would you comment?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, the first point is I think it unlikely that the Soviets will pick up that proposal.

Senator COHEN. It was unlikely they would pick up a zero zero 3 years ago.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is right. But in the conventional area, they have—excuse me, in the chemical area they have disproportionate advantages. The one thing that we had going for us was a Soviet fear if not paranoia about the Pershing II. They were willing to pay a price to get the removal of the Pershing II, which I myself think is excessive. But if they are willing to pay it, that is fine.

I see nothing like that in the chemical area. And therefore—

Senator COHEN. What should we do with our proposal if when we submit it as being verifiable and now according to this document we cannot verify it. What should we do, leave it on the table, and someone may or may not pick it up, or should we try and appropriate the money, which we have not done, notwithstanding the authorization by this committee last year we have not appropriated the money necessary to enhance chemical weapons verification procedures.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think we ought to shore up our chemical capability, Senator. With regard to the proposal itself, the withdrawal of that proposal might be embarrassing. I would hesitate to see it consummated.

Senator COHEN. You want to leave it out there just to wither on the table?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well nonfulfillment, nonconsummation was the goal here. A lot of the discussions in the arms control area tend to be propagandistic, either for international purposes or for domestic constituencies. And people do not like chemical warfare, and this sounds pretty good.

Senator COHEN. I understand that particular problem. Let me ask you one final question.

There have been discussions reported in the newspapers that the French and the Germans have proposed some sort of a joint effort, perhaps a European nuclear force, that has been described as sort of a Copernican revolution for the neo-Gaullist factions in France.

Let me ask you whether or not such a Copernican revolution would in fact be perceived as an acceleration of the disintegration of NATO or whether it would be seen as a strengthening of NATO.

In other words, if the Germans and the French decide, perhaps the United States in the wake of INF, in the wake of a number of statements that perhaps we ought to have a European solution and a European deterrent, does that accelerate the disintegration or lead to the strengthening of NATO?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It should be the latter. There is no reason that it has to present a disintegration of the alliance. The United States should welcome increased cooperation amongst the European allies. Reconciling German and French doctrine is a very tricky gain, because prior French doctrine basically was to treat West Germany as a nuclear free fire zone which is not welcome in Germany.

But they are a long, long way from having an adequate nuclear deterrent for West Germany.

Senator COHEN. Let me just ask you this final question.

To the extent that the United States appears to endorse the notion of greater cooperation between France and Germany and endorses the development of a nuclear policy, this may be a recording, a recording, a recording, but would the German population or others in Europe then see that as a reaffirmation of the notion once again, there goes the United States pushing us off on our own, endorsing this holy alliance while they intend to retreat to fortress America?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think our declaratory policy should be dual. And before any statement, which should be in a minor key, yes indeed, we encourage further cooperation amongst our allies. The first statement is that the United States will remain as long as it is necessary. And that you should strengthen yourselves, but not strengthen yourselves out of fear of an American departure, because that is not coming. And that that should be the prelude to any discussion with regard to further French-German cooperation.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome Mr. Secretary.

I would like to go into this issue of verification with you and note that you said that you did not think it is likely, just reading from your testimony——

Dr. SCHELSINGER. Likely that the Soviets will cheat.

Senator QUAYLE. It is not likely that the Soviets will cheat, and you go on, basically because the incentives are low. Is there any historical precedent where the Soviets have complied with a bilateral arms control agreement with the United States?

Dr. SCHELSINGER. The Soviets have tended to push into grey areas and sometimes outright defied the terms of an agreement. Sometimes it is a genuine grey area. But some of the times it just flat out is violation.

Senator QUAYLE. In your judgment, are there any past bilateral arms control agreements where they are just in the grey area and that there are not violations? Or do you think that there have been violations of past agreement?

Dr. SCHELSINGER. I think that until the Krasnoyarsk radar, which is a flat out violation, that the Soviet's position with regard to the ABM Treaty may have been confined to grey area experimentation.

Senator QUAYLE. Krasnoyarsk takes them out of the grey area in your judgment?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Krasnoyarsk is clearly a violation.

Senator QUAYLE. So what in fact we are saying then is if in fact there is compliance with this treaty, it will be unprecedented, is that fair to say?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Soviets, that is fair to say, it is not a complete picture. The Soviet violations have tended to be limited. And I would not be surprised in almost every case for the Soviets to probe as they have, as you know.

In this case, since you have a flat out prohibition on these vehicles, probing becomes quite difficult. But as you may have noted in my statement, I did not rely on Soviet good faith. I think that their interests in this case may not be to cheat.

Incidentally, there may be a major change in Soviet attitudes with regard to cheating that has come from the failure of their past practices to give them any benefits.

Senator QUAYLE. I want to get to some of the grey areas that I find in this treaty and to go through them with you. But I want to get a clearer understanding of your statement on Soviets less likely to cheat in this, because we are basically assuming, and I do think it is fair to say that it would be some, it would be unprecedented if in fact there is compliance.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If the Soviets see——

Senator QUAYLE. If they comply with this treaty it would be unprecedented. So we are basically saying it would be new, not saying that there is new trust, but it would be new. Maybe the incentives are different. Let me ask you this. Would the incentives for cheating be different if we had a START agreement?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, yes.

Senator QUAYLE. I concur with that.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Very clearly and the last three pages or so of my statement deals with that. None of the reasons that we can have some measured confidence in Soviet compliance with the INF agreement would apply in the START agreement, none of them.

Senator QUAYLE. I concur wholeheartedly with our statement on page 11 that the greatest danger would be to accept this verification regime, meaning the INF verification regime, provides an adequate precedent for a prospective START agreement. I completely concur that we may have adequate verification for verification purposes in INF, but it would be inadequate in START.

Furthermore, I also agree that there would be greater incentives for the Soviets to cheat in the INF agreement if in fact you have a START agreement. And I think that you essentially agree with that.

Now let me get into some of the areas where I think we are going to have some troubles with this treaty and I think we may get into grey areas or we may get into outright violations.

The Soviets have talked about going forward with their generic terminology in the military sense, our nonnuclear reconnaissance strike complexes would be used on a reconnaissance mission or does the word strike mean weapons delivery system.

In this treaty, we prohibit certain classes, the ground launch cruise missile and the ballistic missile. But we do not define what a new type is. You have a lot of experience with the SALT I, I think, on this new type. We got into this a little bit yesterday with the Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is not a definition of what a new type would be.

What I see in this area is that the Soviets will in fact get some new types, get into these reconnaissance strike complexes. The treaty says well if it is a weapon delivery system it would be prohibited. But if it is not a weapons delivery system and it would be a new type, it would be allowed.

Now, can you see the grey area that this treaty provides, and would there not be an incentive for the Soviet Union to push in this area, and then say we are within the terms of the treaty and at the same time we are looking at some of these systems as well. And we get into this Article XIV of the treaty which is the so-called noncircumvention issue that the Soviets say to us at the same time, you cannot go forward with that system. And the Congress, if history is any judge, might help them with that. And at the same time they are able to push in their area saying this is a new type. We do not have a definition in the treaty of a new type, and it is reconnaissance and not a weapon strike system.

Wouldn't that be an area of general incentive for the Soviets to push the edges?

The reason I bring this up, I think it is very important for us to get an understanding of some of these grey areas and be able to tie them down as tightly as possible so that we do not get in a debate with the Congress and the administration years down the road on what is in fact a new type, what in fact is noncircumvention of this treaty.

Can you give me a general response, I think you understand the thrust of my question. How do we deal with this?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that to the extent that you can pin these things down and have understandings between the legislative branch and the executive branch, to the extent that you cannot have such understandings, a legislative history that ties down these areas of possible further exploration on the part of the Soviet Union, the better off that you are.

Now I would like to point out why I think the disincentive to cheat is weak in this case. It is a political factor. Senator Symms a moment ago described quite eloquently the political gains that the Soviets have been making as a result of appearing to be the peace-maker, most notably in Western Europe.

To the extent that the Soviets are caught cheating for very modest gains in this case as opposed to the START case, they would forfeit some of those political gains. And I think that they might hesitate to do so. Anytime that it is in the Soviet advantage to cheat, I would not rely upon any sense of self inhibition.

You pointed also Senator to the asymmetrical quality that we are more inclined to adhere, either through public opinion or for congressional reasons or perhaps executive branch reasons to a strict interpretation of a treaty even if the Soviets are seen to be pushing out. I do not have a solution to that problem. That is part of the difference between totalitarian systems and democratic systems.

Senator QUAYLE. But that would be the reason that we ought to really work to tie this down. I am not worried this year or 3 or 4 years from now.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, your time has expired.

Senator QUAYLE. I am worried 10 years from now when we get into some of these systems and people are going to come back and look at this and say we did not tie this down. We are not exactly sure what you meant.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think it is clear Senator that the Soviet Union wants a breathing spell. That was Mr. Gorbachev's objective. Going head to head with the United States has not been beneficial to the Soviet Union at this time. What the longer term objectives of the Soviet Union are, however remain to be revealed. And when you point to a period such as 10 years out, I think that we can have no confidence about what Soviet ambitions and actions may be in such a period.

And the near term I think however is as you describe it.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, welcome to Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you and our friend and colleague, the ranking member for having set a very ambitious schedule of hearings on the INF Treaty, as I think is proper.

While it is certainly true that it is without parallel in terms of actually reducing the inventory of offensive weapons and setting a new standard for intrusive verification procedures, I think it does require of us the kind of close scrutiny that you clearly intended it be given.

Dr. Schlesinger, I must say that the concerns which my friend Senator Quayle has just expressed I share, in particular, the emphasis on what is really the other side of the coin, the vagueness with which we may be proscribed on the NATO side from improv-

ing our situation, from modernizing either a nuclear or a conventional capability under article XIV of the so-called noncircumvention provisions.

It troubles me a great deal, but I think you and Senator Quayle have adequately outlined that.

What I would like to pursue with you is something that is related to what you have already expressed as I think a very proper caution with regard to the INF verification procedures, however precedent setting they may be, serving as a precedent for the much more important follow-on negotiations leading to a possible START agreement.

In that connection, we, I think, need to be also concerned with how we defend against certain Soviet actions that may be taken. And I think the real question that Senator Quayle was asking you was would they, as in the past, contend that they are not cheating, but that there is in this instance sufficient room for interpretation so that certain steps that they take may not be called cheating.

But let us assume that they do something that is now in the context of the START negotiations a point of clear difference between the Soviets and ourselves. We in our position are for the elimination of the mobile missile. We think that it would contribute greatly to the difficulty of verification, and I think it is clear that mobility, particularly of weapons that are in addition clearly designed to deceive and not be plainly visible, does make for what may be an almost impossible verification situation.

That being true, it would seem to me that our position is the correct position. On the other hand, if the Soviets refuse to go along with that—and if seems to me rather clear that they will—are we not therefore much more concerned with the adequacy of our defenses against a ballistic missile attack when it is almost given that we will be unable to verify compliance?

And that is assuming that their inventory never approaches anything more than 30 percent, that their mobiles are never more than 30 percent of their total inventory. Is that not therefore a reason for us to move with the greatest alacrity on the development of an antitactical ballistic missile defense for NATO and, for that matter, for Israel?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If we can have a successful, cost effective, and undetectable ballistic missile defense, by all means let us proceed in that direction. I have vigorously in the past, I hope vigorously in the future, supported a substantial research and development program in that direction.

When some of those technical uncertainties have been resolved, then perhaps we should certainly broach the subject of deployment. At the moment we do not have to make that decision, but we should be working in the direction of forcing that decision upon ourselves, as it were.

Senator WILSON. In your judgment, should we enter into a START agreement that does not provide for a ban on mobile missiles?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes. I did not share your views with regard to mobiles, because there is a kind of a tradeoff. The mobiles make verification very difficult. Mobiles have something to do with survivability. That is the reason that we are moving toward the rail

garrison mode for the MX, and I hope that the Congress will continue to be sympathetic to that system.

Some of your colleagues remain quite enthusiastic about the Midgetman, and we have a tradeoff between verification and survivability. I'm not sure whether or not our proposal to ban mobiles, given our own movement in the direction of mobiles, is wholly genuine.

Senator WILSON. Let me suggest something to you——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. But your point is be wary, and those are circumstances in which we have to have greater capacity for verification by far than exists under the INF agreement.

Senator WILSON. And I would suggest that perhaps may be possible.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That may be true.

Senator WILSON. That being true, why not challenge the Soviets to join with us in what might be the best of all possible worlds, and that is the achievement of the survivability of your deterrent through mobility, but with the ability to verify, which I would suggest is possible if you achieve mobility with a submarine force, which both of us can do and in fact both are hell-bent upon doing, they more than we.

But it seems to me that it is certainly an easy or certainly much easier, a much more certain process with respect to verification, if what we're verifying is a submarine capability.

Submarines must come to port. We can determine whether or not they are armed and how they are armed. We cannot in a nation that is 11 time zones wide ever know what the inventory of mobile land-based missiles is.

So it would seem to me that we can achieve that. And speaking of eliminating an entire class, that might be one instance in which it is well advised to do so.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I had not thought of that before, Senator, and it has clear attractions. One cannot be certain, even under those circumstances, that the Soviets would not have land mobiles, even if they agreed only to have mobiles at sea. So the verification problem for land mobiles does not disappear.

Senator WILSON. It does not disappear, but it becomes much easier.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. But it becomes much easier, as you would point out.

One reason that I have always favored—and these views of course are those that were expressed in the Scowcroft Commission—the need for American ICBM's is because of the need for extended deterrence, in which ICBM's at least historically have played a major role.

And for that reason, I have been worried about that. But I think that your thought deserves very careful examination because that ICBM capability might still be provided by fixed, though vulnerable, sites.

Senator WILSON. My time is expired. I was going to ask you one question just to put it into the record. Have you had an opportunity yet to examine the Rand report on the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I have had an opportunity, but I have not seized it. I should.

Senator WILSON. Well then, you and I are in the same situation. But I, just glancing at it, have noted that they do not make the same optimistic assessment that our colleague Senator Levin has. And in fact, to quote just one paragraph in a news release put out by the Rand Corp., it says:

Because Soviet and East European offensive strength is so great and NATO's defenses are stretched so thin, reductions that are smaller or less lopsided would actually aggravate NATO's current manpower and equipment disadvantages and tend to weaken deterrence, contend authors James Thomson and Nanette Gantz.

Overall, the report cites a 5 to 1 ratio of—

Senator WARNER. This is the Rand report to which you are referring?

Senator WILSON. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that in a related hearing we will want very much to get into this Rand note to which I have just made reference, because it bears greatly upon the future of the alliance and the steps that we are going to have to take to try to achieve some kind of symmetry, either by persuading the Soviets in some way to engage in an asymmetrical reduction or persuading our allies, which may be more difficult, to engage in an asymmetrical rate of buildup.

But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that in that regard this treaty itself may very well be not only useful in itself, but even more importantly, useful as a vehicle for some reservations, which will be by no means killer amendments, but in fact very useful instructions to our own side as it relates to the future negotiations leading to a possible START agreement.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wilson. I do not know whether your time has expired. Has it?

Senator WILSON. Unhappily, it has.

Chairman NUNN. I would say that I have seen that Rand report and spent a considerable amount of time looking at it. I think it would be very helpful to our committee to take a look at that. I think it would be helpful.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If I may comment on that, Senator, in the first place, your point about the need for radically asymmetrical reductions is well taken. If the Soviets are not prepared radically to reduce their forces, then conventional force reduction might be disadvantageous.

Second, there is a critical mass. When I was in the Pentagon, I was extremely worried about the mutual and balanced force reduction exercise, because it might reduce U.S. forces below their critical mass.

Both of those points are well taken. I think that James Thomson is a very capable man, and I would take that Rand report quite seriously.

Senator Levin's point, if I understand it—I have not read his document, either—

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt the witness?

Dr. SCHLESINGER [continuing]. Is that bean counting is not enough, which everyone can agree with.

Senator WARNER. I have to depart for the funeral for Dan Daniel. I must express my apologies to our distinguished witness. My second round of questions can be submitted to the witness, and I thank you for this opportunity to be with you this morning.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, we will make sure your questions are given to Dr. Schlesinger.

I am a little reluctant to have a voluntary private who has to make a living and load him up with a lot of questions for the record. So we will go over those carefully with you, Senator Warner and Dr. Schlesinger. I am sure you do not mind him billing you for his time.

I think it would be very helpful, Senator Wilson, to get that Rand study. And I think it is the most comprehensive that has been done.

One of the interesting features of it is that, since there is that critical mass and the Soviets have such an excess beyond that critical mass and we are on the ragged edge, on the short side of that critical mass, increased NATO forces would make a lot more difference in the balance than increased Warsaw Pact forces.

But the counter of that is also true. A 1-to-1 reduction or even a 2-to-1 reduction or even a 3-to-1 reduction causes us a great deal more detriment in our ability than the Soviets. It does relate to that critical mass, as has been observed.

I think that would be very interesting to have that. I do hope we can focus these hearings as we go along before we conclude more and more on conventional arms control and the conventional balance. I think that is enormously important, and where we have got to focus a lot of our attention.

NATO has just started thinking through that in the last 6 months and has not been thinking through it very thoroughly for a long, long time. I think we have been put to sleep by MBFR.

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out, not just recently but some time ago—I guess that is because we have permitted them to do so—our Japanese friends as well.

Chairman NUNN. That is correct.

We are now ready for the next round. Senator Humphrey, I will start with you.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Inasmuch as Secretary Schlesinger has kind things to say about the author of that Rand report and the chairman has requested copies, why do we not go a step further and ask the author to appear as a witness?

Chairman NUNN. That is what I am saying we will do at some point.

Senator HUMPHREY. Good, excellent. I thought you were just requesting the report.

Mr. Secretary, relative to the conventional force imbalance that certainly, at least in my mind, is one of the central questions in whether we ought to assent to ratification, you say—and someone on that end took you up on this and I would like you to expand on it a little if possible—you speak of the need to do more.

You say there is more to be done with respect to correcting the deficiencies in allied conventional posture, and noting at the same

time that it ain't likely to have too much support in the way of funding on this end, and then go on to say further that it would seem appropriate to improve conventional deterrence through barrier creation.

Now, one, what can we do to correct—given the unlikelihood of substantial funding increases, what can we do to correct these deficiencies in allied conventional posture which you cite?

And two, what are these barriers? That is an interesting concept, barrier creation. What do you mean? What can we do there besides hardening, providing hardened shelters for aircraft?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Fortification. These barriers have been of all sorts, including radiation barriers. I hesitate to mention that in these circumstances.

But in the center of Germany, no fortifications have been made simply because of the political implications. But if there were prepared defenses, more than throwing Western units against hypothetical Warsaw Pact attack, then a smaller force like ours would be better able to turn back such an attack.

Senator HUMPHREY. Can you give us examples of what you would build?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The nature of such fortifications are I think quite clear.

Senator HUMPHREY. Not to me. That is why I am asking. You are talking about old-fashioned revetments?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Prepared positions in the center of Germany that could be utilized by forces as they move forward. You prepare positions for your tanks, you have fortifications.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that really practical in the age of ever-increasing mobility?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, it is practical. It is not worth as much as it was in World War I, in that there you had very clear, fixed lines.

But there have been a number of studies, including some Rand studies, with regard to the preparation of barriers in Central Europe. But such studies have never been taken seriously in military terms because of the political objections.

Senator HUMPHREY. Apart from these barriers, what can be done to correct the imbalance in conventional forces?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I mentioned a few earlier. The Germans have armed forces of one-half million men, but, as Chancellor Schmidt used to observe, in 48 hours they could put 1.3 million people in the field.

The problem was that those people were not appropriately equipped, that they were not organized into truly effective combat units. They tended to be reserve or support units. Now, if one can turn them into effective combat units, one has substantially augmented the conventional strength in Europe.

There are all sorts of problems with that, including the fact that the Germans have been reluctant to spend the additional money. But it is not that much money over a period of years.

The other allies, our other allies in Western Europe, have always been ambivalent about Germany. They wanted, as the saying goes, Germany to be strong enough to take on the Soviet Union by itself, but sufficiently weak that it could not conquer Luxembourg.

That kind of ambivalence has made the other allies look with concern about expansion of the combat capability of the German forces. If we can overcome that, we can move in the right direction.

And there are all sorts of other basics that can be discussed which this committee has looked into in the past, and I hope will continue to do so.

Senator HUMPHREY. In this context——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Quayle has—I do not know whether it is legislation proposed, but he has made a speech on the subject of NATO defense initiative, the gathering in of certain programs of the Department of Defense.

Now, the trouble with conventional forces is that they are not romantic or not grandiose, and therefore all those little basics tend not to get the support that nuclear forces get.

Senator HUMPHREY. In the context of the need to find creative ways to address the conventional forces imbalance, to what extent are you concerned about foregoing the option of one of the most useful and accurate of all weapons, namely ground-launched cruise missiles conventionally armed? To what extent are you concerned about the requirement that we forego such a useful weapon?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Immensely concerned, and that is my gravest reservation about this treaty. I have always felt that the cruise missile in its conventional role could enormously buttress conventional deterrence, particularly on the flanks. And I regard that as regrettable.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is one of my greatest concerns. If you could call a weapon magnificent, that is one of the most magnificent and promising weapons to retard—first to deter and second to retard, and hopefully stop, an invasion on the horizon.

And I think it would be very unfortunate. I am not sure it is worth the price. That is one of my concerns.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that that is a very legitimate concern, Senator. It was one that in the 1970s I opposed the banning of the conventional cruise arms control for precisely this reason. As you know, the conventional defense on the northern flank at the moment is quite flimsy.

But the Soviets have vulnerabilities in the form of the nearby northern fleet. And I had planned or hoped to deploy conventional cruise missiles as a deterrent that would shore up the north flank.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey, your time has expired on this round.

Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me pick up on some of the specifics of the potential NATO defense initiative that I have talked about and shared my views on with the Secretary and Admiral Crowe yesterday.

In essence—and I reiterate this—if these are not new programs or new ideas or new creations because of INF, they are programs that are in the bowels of the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense that they have examined. I think now is a great opportunity for this committee, under the strong leadership of our chairman, to look at what we need to do in the conventional force area, conventional arms control process, yes, but also what we need to do to increase our deterrence capability from a conventional force basis.

We started this back when we went to the flexible response. We said, well, we are going to do more in conventional forces. Now that we have got this INF agreement, it gives us a great opportunity to examine this.

In simple terms, what I am talking about is a defense, a NATO defense initiative or a theater defense initiative, one that would require us to maintain a nuclear deterrent, and the nuclear deterrent relates to the conventional forces. For example, by having tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviets are not able to mass their forces like they might do otherwise. They would be forced to echelon them and things of that sort.

I do not believe this is understood very well, that there is this relationship between the tactical nuclear deterrence and the way it impacts on conventional forces. So we must proceed, and if time allows, I want to again get into your strategy on Montebello because you said proceed with caution, which I think we ought to, but I also think we need to proceed.

If we take the implementation of Montebello, which means reductions but modernization in maintaining that nuclear deterrent, plus some of the specific recommendations that are in the Department of Defense's Competitive Task Force Strategy Report. These go to some of the things that I think you expressed an interest in, particularly on the conventional cruise missile. I concur with you that that is one of the mistakes of this treaty, that they gave up this ground-based conventional cruise missile. General Galvin was 90 percent there in coming up with this requirement. Quite frankly, the reason that I was given why we gave up the conventional cruise missiles is that there was no requirement.

As you well know, it is sort of an easy thing to fall back on, that we have not gotten around to the requirement, so therefore, why do we need it? It was 90 percent there, yet it was dropped.

Yesterday the Secretary of Defense reiterated that they do not intend to give up the conventional cruise missile, the ALCM or the SLCM in the START agreement. That is one proposal that we ought to look at on conventional cruise missiles, particularly if we can get down to zero CEP.

Another thing Senator Wilson brought up is to look at some of the extended air defense, or ATBM. It seems that if what we are going to get to more dual-capable aircraft and those airfields become bigger and juicier targets, that we are going to have to go beyond just this point defense and look at what Manfred Vernor and others have talked about in this extended area defense.

Also smarter munitions and smarter artillery, these are the types of things that I am talking about. The question is, should we look to protect some of these programs in the budget, because they have been in the budget before, but very, very minor, protect them in the budget, get them going, and look at tradeoff. This is what the Secretary of Defense is prepared to do. I would like to hear your answer. He says, I agree with you, Senator, I think it is on the right track, but the tradeoff is going to be in this fiscal climate of mine, I am going to have to look at the force structure to protect some of these programs that you are interested in.

Is that a fair tradeoff, and where do we look at this balance? As we look at some of these programs that will enhance our conven-

tional forces, and what they are going to cost. Is the tradeoff force structure, given a flat Defense budget picture for the next 5 years?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Not precisely. There are other elements in the Defense budget. I think that we have moved into a climate in which our concern about readiness may be slightly less than it was, let's say, 3 or 4 years ago, and that in the great pots of money which are readiness investment and that is procurement and R&D and force structure, that one might be able, might be willing to save on readiness now to a degree that one would not before the transformation, as it were, of the Soviet regime into one that is actively seeking a breathing space.

I do not think that the tradeoff is as stark as it has been presented.

Your other points, I generally endorse with regard to the need for nuclear capability as a way of enhancing conventional forces. It is that interplay that has been critical and is one of the mechanisms that has permitted a conventional capability on the Western side as robust as it is. Though it is not satisfactory, it is more satisfactory than it would be if the Soviets felt free to mass in the way you have indicated.

Other things that you have mentioned, indeed we should be pushing. Now, pushing may either be R&D activity or it may actually be procurement. One does not begin to procure, however, until one has a reliable product and it has satisfied the cost effectiveness criteria.

Senator QUAYLE. Just one followup. In other words, some of those programs I mentioned like the conventional cruise missile with long-range capability, the extended air defense, potentially ATBM capacity, some of the smarter munitions that we may be able to use, these are all ideas and potential budget items that could be protected on a priority basis as we look to augmentation of our conventional forces?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would think so. One of the tragedies of any budget reduction is that the new and interesting and relatively inexpensive things are the things that so frequently are cut out, and I think one of the roles the Congress can play is to protect such items.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, if you have other questions, you are the last questioner, so why do you not go on?

Senator QUAYLE. Let me just explore your strategy for the implementation of the Montebello decision.

I am very concerned about this because I believe that there seems to be—well, let me say there is this potential for the third zero. I think that is a bad idea, and I think that you concur.

The next position you hear, well, maybe we ought to produce down to common ceilings. I have heard this, that if we can get them to reduce down, which would have to be radically asymmetrical. You talk about an imbalance in the INF category. There is a larger imbalance in the battlefield and the tactical category.

But what disturbs me the most is I hear that we cannot do it right now and Germany is very, very critical. We do not know what the politics are going to be now that we have put these missiles in and taken them out.

I believe I heard one of the Senators respond go slowly, do it with caution, which I do not dispute, but as we go with due deliberation and with caution on an implementation of Montebello, from a strategy point of view, it seems to me that, one, we have to show the interrelationship of these nuclear weapons with our conventional force capability. That has not really been developed.

Second, we really have got to commit ourselves at least in a period of time of, say, the next 15 years or maybe even beyond, that we are going to have a viable, modernized nuclear deterrent in Europe. We must not get away from that.

I am just curious if you might outline or develop with us things that we ought to be thinking about from a strategy point of view to have this implemented because I really think this is going to be a very sore political issue. It is fraught with all sorts of political peril, depending on change of governments, whether it be here or in Germany or whatnot.

We just really need to come to some definite consensus on how we are going to proceed with something that I think is vitally important to our security there.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, I think we ought to think long and hard about the issue and have American leaders and European leaders discuss it. For the moment, I think that we have an overload in the public systems, and I would prefer to perfect these plans in private rather than to test the political system, particularly overseas, with new, publicly discussed deployment plans.

Let me make three points. First, with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, we should determine what we need. Whether this is 3,000 weapons in Europe or 4,000, we should determine what our needs are, recognizing that the United States and its allies depend upon nuclear deterrence because of the weaknesses of the conventional forces. The common sense position there, this is my second point, since we are dependent, that we ought to be very, very cautious and probably never get there, talking about a common ceiling, particularly if that common ceiling seems to weaken our own tactical nuclear deterrent, and the interface between that and the conventional forces.

My third point, Montebello. Montebello, what was it, 4,400 weapons that we are supposed to go down to? Now, I have got to say that in our stockpile in Europe in past years, if not at present, we had the most unimaginable garbage in that stockpile, weapons that were totally obsolete or did not have any function whatsoever, and those weapons could have been removed. I wanted to remove them in the 1970's. I was told by various colleagues of mine that if you ever go below the 7,000 nuclear weapon mark, NATO will inevitably collapse. Those are the political prognostications that one hears.

They have disappeared. We have taken 1,000 out, 2,000 out of the stockpile, and most of it has been rubbish.

Now, one gold nuclear weapon in the stockpile has far greater deterrent effect than three inappropriate ones. But I think we can live within the 4,400 Montebello ceiling because we had this happen in the 1950's and 1960's, of piling up weapons in Europe for their symbolic value and sometimes because of Interservice rivalry that did not have a direct connection to the deterrent function.

Chairman NUNN. If I might interject there, it also had a detrimental effect to deterrence because it weakens your conventional capability. You spend so much effort in guarding and finding ways to get those nuclear weapons to the front and trying to protect them in peacetime and wartime that you really deplete your manpower capability and your conventional weapon capability. I think you also have to watch that on dual-capable weapons, too.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. If they are dual capable, by the very definition of it, you are going to have a very hard time deploying them conventionally if you want to keep them in reserve for nuclear. So you have got a tradeoff on all of this that I think interplays with conventional very strongly.

I remember when you were blocked by the State Department back in the Nixon administration from making certain steps to make our nuclear policy more sensible in Europe. At that time every nuclear weapon was looked on as being a trading bait for a Soviet tank division.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think it also shows that NATO can be a lot tougher than the prognostications of the moment.

I have noted that all of the former Defense Secretaries are in favor of the ratification of this agreement, that alarm has been expressed not by former Defense Secretaries but by former Secretaries of State. And that reflects, I think, their concern about the, their correct concern about the political aspects, even though the details of the weapons changes are maybe beneficial.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Dr. Schlesinger. It is always a pleasure to hear your words of wisdom.

This is a very important issue, and I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that what evidently you went through back in the 1970s, numbers are not necessarily important. It is what you have, a political point of view, remember the build-down concept we were talking about, this is what Montebello is. It is less numbers, but a modernized system that gives you enhanced, credible deterrence, and particularly that interrelationship with conventional forces. It is a major issue, and I hope we can get into this later on in some specifics because I think that the very question that he brought up, what do we need? What do we need for a tactical nuclear weapon, whether they are dual-capable aircraft or they are short-range battlefield weapons, to be credible? I imagine you probably will get an answer all over the lot.

Chairman NUNN. Well, that is right.

The interesting thing is I went to Europe back in 1974, when Jim Schlesinger was Secretary of Defense and came back alarmed because we had such terrible security around those nuclear weapons. We were having so many problems in terms of manpower, and that was after the Vietnam war. There was a real question about our capability—how many of our personnel were physically and mentally capable at that stage of protecting nuclear weapons—and I came back and introduced an amendment requiring some kind of report. The Secretary of Defense had been thinking along these lines for a long time.

Actually, there was a darned good report in 1975 done by Dr. Schlesinger, and that report lingered for years and never could get

implemented because of diplomatic reasons. There has been such an addiction to nuclear weapons of any kind and such a reluctance to look at the picture in reality over there. When the alliance started undertaking another review that led to the Montebello decision in the early 1980s, I was in Europe and talked to General Rogers and he said he was undertaking that kind of comprehensive review.

I said, well, it has been done once back in the mid-1970s. You ought to take a look at it. They never had seen it in that command. So there was no real corporate history. I think they did get a copy of it.

But it has been thought about a long time.

Senator QUAYLE. I would imagine if you might take that same trip today, that you would find some improvements, but I bet you might even be surprised at what we have there today not only in the protection and the safety aspects, but in the capability as well.

I think we have had improvement, but I think it goes to a fundamental problem. I am not so sure how effective we really are even today.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is an old story at the Pentagon about somebody who requested permission to throw out old files, and the report came back that he could throw out the old files so long as he reproduced the documents in triplicate.

Some of that has applied to nuclear weapons. Now, in this era, nuclear air defense makes very little sense. You are detonating those weapons over your own soil, which is not welcome, and we have so improved conventional air defense capabilities that we could knock down these aircraft. Look how well the Mujahideen are doing in Afghanistan with a very simple air defense weapon.

But the tendency is, when you pull weapons out of the stockpile, to say they only leave when there is a replacement. Maybe you do not need a replacement. Some of those nuclear weapons were invented in the 1950s and 1960s and today have no purpose.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Schlesinger, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony. It has been very helpful, and we will continue to rely on you as we go through this from time to time.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

START AND SDI TESTING

Senator KENNEDY. The crucial next step in arms control is in the strategic arena.

START negotiations face a number of internal hurdles: Sublimits; SLCMs; mobile missiles; verification.

But the real show stopper is U.S.-Soviet inability to agree on adherence to the ABM Treaty.

Paul Nitze, the administration's top arms control adviser, has proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union negotiate a detailed list of acceptable space weapons tests.

The Soviet Union has indicated strong interest in this idea.

And a recent Washington Post article suggests that the JCS now supports this proposal.

Do you see this proposal as a promising way to break the impasse over adherence to the ABM Treaty that is the most serious obstacle to a strategic offensive arms accord?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I myself believe that the concept of providing a detailed list of acceptable space weapons tests may, but only may, provide a way of extricating the two sides from the deadlock over what is permissible under the ABM Treaty. I therefore believe that this approach deserves careful study by the American Government—and perhaps a decision to negotiate on these issues with the Soviets. Nonetheless, one must bear in mind that the acceptability of moving in this direction depends upon the administration's overall strategy regarding limitations on strategic weapons and its hopes for rapid timing of development of strategic defense capabilities. It is plain that the administration not only will be, but should be, reluctant to yield too much on this issue—until the overall nature of the strategic offense strategic-defense trade is in view.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER

NATO TRIAD

Senator WARNER. Dr. Schlesinger, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974, you made a distinction between a NATO triad and the strategic triad. Specifically, you stated that a "NATO triad consists of the conventional forces [in Europe], our tactical nuclear forces, and the strategic forces of the alliance, most of which are contributed by the United States." Continuing, you stated that "We regard these components of the triad as mutually reinforcing, not as substitutes one for another. To the extent that they are substitutes, they are poor substitutes."

Do you still endorse a "NATO triad", and what priority order do you attach to modernization of tactical nuclear, conventional, including chemical weapons programs, and strategic nuclear programs in view of the current budget constraints?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Both the concept and the phrase, NATO triad, were invented by me early in my tenure as Secretary of Defense—to deal with the circumstances not too dissimilar from those today. In the first place there was a good deal of concern in Europe regarding alliance strategy and capability in the late-Vietnam period. The Europeans were concerned with the movement, exemplified by the Mansfield amendment, to reduce our forces in Europe, and generally for America to pull in its horns and withdraw from its overseas responsibilities. Indeed some of those concerns, though in modified form, have reappeared in the last year or so in Europe.

The NATO triad laid stress on the two legs of the triad that the Europeans tended to understate in terms of their importance. I stressed the conventional forces, for reasons that are increasingly clear today, because it was necessary to have a robust conventional capability to help deter the Soviets. One did not want to rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation. I stressed that nuclear forces and conventional forces were mutually reinforcing. I did this in part because, when Secretary McNamara started to stress conventional capabilities in the early 1960's, he seemed to be suggesting that conventional forces were a substitute for nuclear deterrence, a suggestion that had badly frightened the Europeans. It is clearly the case that a good conventional capability augments the deterrent effect of the nuclear capability—and vice versa.

I also stressed the strategic forces, partly as a consequence of the new targeting doctrine that I was introducing at the time as a substitute for the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. It was important for both the Soviets and the Europeans to understand that nuclear deterrence did not rest primarily, or even initially, on weapons that were deployed in Europe. The strategic forces represented the bulk of America's overall nuclear deterrent. Need I add, that this is today an immensely important point to emphasize in light of the widespread worry in Europe about the withdrawal of the intermediate range missiles—even though they were not deployed in Europe until 1983.

The phrase about "poor substitutes" still is at base important, though I probably overstated the matter in 1974. It seems clear to me, for example, that newly expanding nuclear weapons are a very poor substitute for a robust conventional capability. The substitution at the margin just does not give one much more in the way of overall deterrence. It also seems quite clear to me, given the continuing reliance of the allies on nuclear deterrence, that there is no adequate substitute for deployment in Europe of battlefield weapons. The movement in Europe toward the third "zero" is I think quite counterproductive. What the INF Treaty does is to remove those inter-

mediate weapons for which we have a perfect or almost perfect substitute in the strategic forces. However, we must retain in Europe those battlefield weapons for which the strategic forces are a most wholly inadequate substitute.

The doctrine of the NATO triad was important in 1974 as a way of boosting alliance self confidence in the late-Vietnam period. It reflected then changing strategic realities. It is as important today both to sustain confidence amongst the allies and to point to the continual need for the three different types of capabilities—despite the changes brought about by the INF Treaty.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the committee adjourned.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; and Inga B. Schoonover, special assistant; Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, William E. Hoehn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, T. Kirk McConnell, Frederick F.Y. Pang, Mark B. Robinson, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, research assistant; Tiffany E. Berger, Barbara B. Brown, Barbara Gallo, Lori M. Jackson, Mary J. Kampo, Debra A. Rice, Richelle M. Turner, and Mickie Jan Wise, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig and William J. Lynn, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, Assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Robert K. Griffith, assistant to Senator Wirth; Richard Roberts, assistant to Senator Shelby; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; and James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Armed Services Committee meets this morning to conduct its third hearing on the defense of NATO and the INF Treaty. This current series of hearings continues the review of U.S. national security strategy that the committee began in early 1987.

In our first two hearings this year, we heard testimony from Secretary of Defense Carlucci, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Admiral Crowe; and former Secretary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger. These distinguished witnesses presented their overall views of the implications of the INF Treaty for NATO's military strategy and capabilities.

Today's hearing will offer the committee the opportunity to focus its review to a certain extent on the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance and recommended changes to NATO's military strategy and forces. The witnesses who will address these subjects this morning are well known to the Armed Services Committee. I would like to welcome particularly Ambassador David Abshire, who is the former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, a man we have all known over the years and greatly admire. After his outstanding service in the Department of State and the White House, Ambassador Abshire is now the President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS. Testifying with him this morning is a highly respected defense consultant, Mr. Phillip Karber. Mr. Karber is a senior executive at the BDM Corporation, and I personally have known him and relied on him for advice for a number of years.

Ambassador Abshire and Mr. Karber have undertaken an ambitious project to formulate a defense resources strategy for the United States and its allies. As part of that project, they recently recommended a plan to NATO for conventional defense improvements and armaments cooperation.

I believe that much of their testimony today will be based on that plan.

Before we go to our witnesses this morning, Senator Warner, I will call on you for any observations you may have.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I join you. I worked with both of these gentlemen for many years, and indeed Mr. Moodie has been in the background for Mr. Abshire for some period of time.

We welcome them and look forward to their comments.

Chairman NUNN. At this time, I would like to have Senator Dixon's statement inserted for the record.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, the committee today is beginning its third day of hearings on the strategy and capabilities of NATO Defense, including the implications of the INF Treaty.

Our witness this morning is Ambassador David M. Abshire, former Permanent Representative to NATO. I look forward to Ambassador Abshire's presentation on the various aspects of the U.S. national security strategy given the INF Treaty.

Ambassador Abshire's outstanding background will allow the members of this committee to hear from an individual who can clearly identify the objectives and capabilities of the U.S. military and the strategy that links the two.

I have the utmost respect for Ambassador Abshire's views on the subjects before the committee. I am delighted that the chairman has seen fit to include Ambassador Abshire as a witness on this extremely important subject.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. We also have Mr. Mike Moodie at the table this morning. He will be of assistance to Ambassador Abshire. He is one of the valuable people who have been down at CSIS for a long time, and he was also in Europe with Ambassador Abshire.

Some people say that he writes all of Dr. Abshire's material and others think that he just makes a substantial contribution. But in any event, we welcome all of you here this morning.

Dave, if you would like to lead off.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. ABSHIRE, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO, AND PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL MOODIE, SENIOR FELLOW, CSIS

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this invitation to address this committee on the implications of the INF Treaty for alliance security. In considering the elimination of intermediate range missiles in the context of both Europe's broad security environment and NATO's overall strategy, this Committee is making an invaluable contribution to the truly salient issue: Can and will the alliance forge a comprehensive approach in its post-INF challenge.

In the most fundamental terms, the signing of the INF Treaty is a great victory for NATO. The treaty is a vindication of alliance strategy enunciated in the 1967 Harmel report calling for strength and negotiation.

At their 1984 meeting in Washington, the NATO foreign ministers reaffirmed this so-called Harmel doctrine—I will call this Harmel revisited—which added the emphasis that strength and cohesion come first and must be the foundation for effective negotiations.

The deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles, beginning in 1983 created the leverage for the successful INF negotiations. NATO followed Harmel and maintained its cohesion amidst great domestic difficulties in what may well have been the alliance's finest hour.

The Soviets came back to the table and eventually all the SS-20's were eliminated. Most importantly, the principles of unequal reductions and equality were established. We have come a long way in the negotiating process since SALT II and what a distinguished member of this committee, the late Senator Henry Jackson, referred to then as "sub-parity for our side."

The questions now before the alliance are whether the will exists to re-apply the lessons of INF and the Harmel Doctrine—negotiating from strength and whether NATO can build strength as it prepares for negotiations on meaningful conventional reductions. Or will the alliance choose to abandon Harmel and simply rely on Mr. Gorbachev's good will?

NATO's first test will come at the March summit. It is critical that this meeting be more than a show of allied political solidarity and that it focus on more than arms control negotiations.

NATO heads of government must take the lead in forging a comprehensive strategy to confront all the difficult issues facing the alliance. We need a clear mandate from NATO leaders like the one we inserted into the 1984 NATO defense ministers communique calling for development of a conventional improvements strategy.


I am astonished at the shortness of our institutional memories on how we achieved that past success. Alliance leaders and publics are in danger of losing sight of the fact that we can start by thinking smarter, if not richer. This is the conclusion, not only of the CSIS net appraisal which Phil Karber will give shortly, but also I believe

of the report, "Beyond the Bean Count," of Senator Levin's subcommittee.

In my testimony before this committee a year ago, I described in detail the elements of a strategy for better use of NATO's superior resources, a nine-step resources strategy.

This is what we started at NATO in 1985. You will recall this amoeba chart that I used before. The point is that NATO is neither universally weak or universally strong; it is uneven. And if we are to develop an investment strategy for better use of our resources, it is important to identify specific vulnerabilities so that our investment can be directed to obtain force multipliers.

THEORY OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION



Now, a critical element in this kind of alliance resources strategy is a net assessment, because it identifies specific vulnerabilities that must be targeted. In my last appearance before this committee as Ambassador, I suggested that NATO needed to do such an assessment at a classified level.

I am sorry to report that they still have this requirement in Brussels, but no one document. When I returned to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, with Phil Karber as team leader, we developed the kind of comprehensive appraisal of the balance of forces I wanted as NATO Ambassador. But we have done this on a totally unclassified basis.

Not only identifying problems, we also produced a report outlining some 30 recommendations to deal with the most serious problems our assessment highlighted. Mike Moodie, who was with me at NATO and is here today, served as our chief of staff for this enterprise.

Mr. Chairman, some people viewing this limited briefing—and we will be happy to provide the members with a more detailed briefing at a later date—might find some difference with the

highly commendable study done by Senator Levin and his Subcommittee.

In contrast, I am struck not only by the similarity of the basic issues in both studies, but also by the possibility that both studies could be misinterpreted, the Subcommittee's report in terms of a depreciation of the threat, and ours that the threat is unmanageable.

Both interpretations are wrong. There is in fact fundamental agreement on many of the basic issues confronting NATO in the 1990's.

The threat and the conventional balance are manageable, but only if we develop a strategy to manage them. Now, our analysis contains both good and bad news for NATO. On the bad news side, by the mid-1990's, as a result of the combination of Warsaw Pact forward deployment of forces, changing Soviet operational concepts, and readiness and sustainability asymmetries between the alliances, the Warsaw Pact could have the capability either to preempt many of the responses NATO now assumes will be available in the event of conflict or to force a pace of conflict that the West simply cannot match.

NATO foreign ministers are to be commended for recognizing this threat—this was a huge step forward—in their 1986 Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, which urged priority attention to "the elimination of the capability for surprise attack on the initiation of large-scale offensive action."

Moving to page 10 of my testimony, the net effect of all of these trends could be to isolate Europe, increasing the possibility that NATO defenses would be overwhelmed before vital reinforcements arrive.

At the outset, I want to define what I think is almost always the key issue of controversy in the debate over the conventional balance. It is one that often does not surface and thus leaves the debaters taking swipes at one another from entirely different assumptions.

It is the issue of how NATO responds to warning, whether it performs like clockwork, just as planned with an opponent operating just as we planned, or whether it performs in a fog of potential war and confused diplomacy, delayed mobilization matched by preemptive Pact measures and even some surprises.

Now, many who work in the academic and intelligence communities assume a clockwork performance, totally unlike the onset of World War I or World War II or other wars that I know of. They overlook the role of ambiguity, misperception, and miscalculation, and they tend to assume that the condition of crisis management and the time available in the 1960's will be those of the 1990's.

My service at NATO, as well as my study of history, makes me profoundly skeptical of what I call these "rationalists." The threat outlined in our briefing is not so much the product of adverse force ratios, but NATO's own processes. NATO has not configured itself nor invested its superior resources in preparing to manage the danger of the shorter-warning attack in time to thwart it.

Having seen NATO make real progress in terms of readiness and reinforcement in recent years, I am not prepared to throw up my

hands and say that nothing can be done to deal with the situation I have described.

NATO can deal with the new Warsaw Pact challenge, but it must act now. It must face up to its own maldeployments. In the short-term, a series of low or no cost remedial measures must and can be implemented.

I mention briefly six measures NATO could pursue at no cost or low cost. First, NATO must undertake a net appraisal of the dynamic balance of forces for consideration at the highest political level. The Secretary General and NATO authorities should take that appraisal to capitals and discuss it with cabinets, with finance ministers included, so that they understand the problem.

Second, a thorough review of NATO's crisis management should be undertaken, for the reasons that I have given.

Third, a special study should be mandated on how NATO must face up politically to precarious maldeployments and readiness problems in the Northern Army Group. Phil Karber is going to give some detailed practical solutions for that problem.

Fourth, the administration should engage Congress in finding new tradeoffs with allies. We have a number of suggestions such as transferring less-preferred ammunition to a war reserve stock for NATO military commanders in return for improvement of national logistical infrastructures, particularly in the Benelux area.

Fifth, NATO needs a renewed effort at armaments cooperation, a cooperative effort under the Balanced Technology Initiative, in addition to the ongoing Nunn-Roth-Warner programs.

Sixth, we need a mandate for long range discussions involving both Government and industry for better use of defense resources.

Then we have some measures that are of a low cost nature which we have offered on armaments cooperation, but I will not review those in detail because they are in my paper, and Phil mentions some in his briefing.

NATO's first critical task in these areas is to reinforce the real progress that we have achieved over the last 3 years.

Another critical step is to link more closely the establishment of military requirements and force goals with armaments planning, and I am happy to see that at the December 1987 Council meeting real steps forward were made in this direction.

Mr. Chairman, I note in my testimony—I will not read this part in detail—there is one area in particular where I want to commend the Pentagon. It is in the Competitive Strategies effort. I am proud that Dennis Kloske, who was at CSIS and U.S. NATO, now Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, is leading that effort.

As you know, this initiative disciplines our technology to exploit points of weakness in the opposition. I think that builds upon the Balanced Technology Initiative and helps us immensely as we attempt to move forward.

In conclusion, before Phil's briefing, let me move back to the broad agenda of a comprehensive NATO political strategy based on Harmel. We must be grand strategists for no other reason than Gorbachev has turned out to be a brilliant one.

We cannot proceed ad hoc. The March summit, if it is to be more than a show of allied solidarity, must move NATO towards this comprehensive strategy.

In addition, we need now, I believe, a commitment to a second NATO summit a year from now to bracket the development of a NATO action plan. This can give European allies a sense of continuity through our election period, badly needed continuity.

Only by building strength and maintaining continuity will NATO create the leverage to engage the Warsaw Pact in meaningful negotiations on conventional arms reductions. As we move into the conventional negotiations on the Atlantic to the Urals, we will thus synergize our efforts to eliminate the danger of shorter-warning blitzkrieg attack through our own twin approaches of robust improvements and skillful negotiations.

With the economic constraints in the Soviet Union, we might well have a chance of repeating our INF success at the basic level of military instability, at the conventional level.

I have stressed grand strategy. No great strategy can be formulated for NATO unless there is a creative partnership between the executive and legislative branches. No resources study and strategy for thinking smarter can be developed without partnership.

This committee already has played such a central role that I am encouraged that we can succeed. If so, then the INF Treaty and its hearings will have become a great asset.

In introducing Phil Karber's briefing, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we took a version of this briefing across Europe and met with the NATO Council, and with the Military Committee. We spent 2 days with the Supreme Allied Commander and his staff.

We met with leaders of the opposition British Labor Party and the SPD in Germany. We spent some time in France. So I think we created, even for those who might not have agreed on every aspect of this net assessment, a very serious dialogue and a better realization that the conventional instability is at the heart of the problem; and second, if we think smarter, there are things that we can start doing about correcting that vulnerability immediately, which will also give us further leverage in our conventional negotiations.

Phil.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abshire follows:]

STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE DAVID M. ABSHIRE
PRESIDENT
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you very much for the invitation to address this committee on the implications of the INF Treaty for Alliance security. In considering the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in the context of both Europe's broad security environment and NATO's overall strategy, this committee is making an invaluable contribution to the truly salient issue: can and will the Alliance forge a comprehensive approach to its post-INF challenges?

In the most fundamental terms, the signing of an INF Treaty is a great victory for NATO. The treaty is a vindication of the Alliance strategy, enunciated in the 1967 Harmel Report, of strength and negotiation. At their 1984 meeting in Washington, NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed this so-called Harmel Doctrine -- I will call this Harmel revisited -- which added the emphasis that strength and cohesion come first and must be the foundation for effective negotiations.

The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in 1983-84 created the leverage for successful INF negotiations. The Kremlin was stunned, for it obviously believed that it could divide NATO Europe from America, and Europe within itself. It said it would never negotiate while we deployed, and never agree to any solution eliminating SS-20 missiles. NATO followed Harmel and maintained its cohesion amidst great domestic difficulties, in what may well have been the Alliance's finest hour. The Soviets came back to the table, and eventually all the SS-20s were eliminated. Most importantly, the principles of unequal

reductions and equality were established. We have come a long way in the negotiating process compared to SALT 1, and what a distinguished member of this Committee, Senator Henry Jackson, referred to as "sub-parity for our side".

The questions now before the Alliance are whether the will exists to reapply the lessons of INF and the Harmel Doctrine -- negotiating from strength -- and whether NATO can build strength as it prepares for negotiations on meaningful conventional reductions. Or will the Alliance choose to abandon Harmel and simply rely on Mr. Gorbachev's goodwill?

NATO'S NEED: A POST-INF ACTION PLAN

NATO's first test will come at its March summit. It is critical that this meeting be more than a show of Allied political solidarity and that it focus on more than arms control negotiations. NATO heads of government must take the lead in forging a comprehensive strategy to confront all the difficult issues facing the Alliance: nuclear arms control and modernization, conventional improvements, Atlantic to the Urals conventional negotiations, chemical weapons, and armaments cooperation.

We need a clear mandate from NATO leaders -- like the one we inserted into the 1984 NATO Defense Ministers' communique -- calling for the development of a conventional improvements strategy.

I am astounded at the shortness of our institutional memories as to how we achieved past success. Alliance leaders and publics are in danger of losing sight of the fact that we can start by thinking smarter if not richer. This is the conclusion not only of the CSIS net appraisal that Phil Karber will give shortly, but also of the excellent report, Beyond the Bean Count, of Senator Levin's subcommittee.

NATO has already shown it can make more effective use of its

resources to enhance conventional forces. The 1985 Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) effort was the most important step forward in NATO's effort to focus defense spending on its most critical conventional weaknesses. I am heartened that at their December 1987 meeting, Defense Ministers affirmed the importance of CDI in Alliance planning to improve conventional forces. In calling for a more vigorous CDI effort, the Ministers recognized "the need for initiatives designed to offer cooperative solutions to potential problems which can be better dealt with collectively than by nations individually". But we must move from the generic to the specific. What we need is an additional NATO Action Plan.

A DEFENSE INVESTMENT STRATEGY

In my testimony before this committee a year ago, I described in detail the elements of a strategy for better use of NATO's superior resources -- a 9 step Resources Strategy. I called upon NATO to be classical strategists not just in the military sense, but in the use of our superior resources in peacetime, with harmonization of resources and objectives, improved planning, division of labor and multiplier effects. This is what we started at NATO in 1985. You supported the Nunn/Roth/Warner and Quayle amendments. These efforts now need a new shot in the arm. Today I'd like briefly to revisit some of those ideas for "thinking smarter, not richer," if I may borrow Phil Karber's great line, as background for some of my specific recommendations for new NATO efforts.

The basic idea of a defense investment strategy, or if you will, resources strategy, is not to throw more money or technology at our problems, but to target those resources to overcome specific vulnerabilities and create force multipliers. For NATO, this means not reinforcing strengths as we have traditionally done. Sophisticated platforms have strong constituencies in NATO's navies, armies, air forces, and

parliaments. Building stocks of ammunition and spare parts or increasing NATO's maneuver capability is less glamorous, but that is where we must direct our attention.

A DYNAMIC NET ASSESSMENT: NATO'S 'PROBLEMS IN THE 1990'S

A critical element in the kind of Alliance resources strategy I am describing is a net assessment of the conventional balance, so that specific vulnerabilities can be pinpointed. At the U.S. Mission to NATO, working with Phil Karber and others, we began an effort to integrate the wealth of available classified material for an assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and trends on both sides. In my last appearance before this committee as Ambassador, I suggested that NATO needed to do such an assessment on a classified level. I'm sorry to report that they still have this requirement in Brussels, but no one document.

When I returned to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, with Phil Karber as team leader, we developed the kind of comprehensive appraisal of the balance of forces I wanted as NATO Ambassador, but on a totally unclassified basis. Not content with only identifying problems, we also produced a report outlining some 30 recommendations to deal with the most serious problems our assessment highlighted. Mike Moodie, who was with me at NATO and is here today, served as chief of staff for developing our report on what was to be done. I am particularly happy that Phil will have the opportunity today to present the major findings of our appraisal of the balance of forces.

Mr. Chairman, some people viewing this limited briefing -- and we would be happy to provide the members a more detailed briefing at a later date -- might find some differences with the highly commendable study done by Senator Levin and his subcommittee. In contrast, I am struck by the similarity of both

studies and the possibility that both studies could be misinterpreted: the subcommittee's report in terms of a depreciation of the threat, and ours that the threat is unmanageable. Both interpretations are wrong. There is in fact fundamental agreement on many of the basic issues confronting NATO in the 1990s. The threat and the conventional balance are manageable, but only if we develop a strategy to manage them.

Let me highlight our conclusions about NATO's situation in the post-INF environment of the 1990s. Again, I want to make it clear that I am not talking about today's situation, but about the challenges we face in the years ahead. Our analysis contains good and bad news for NATO. First, the bad news.

First, by the mid-1990s, as a result of the combination of the Warsaw Pact's forward deployment of forces, changing Soviet operational concepts, and readiness and sustainability asymmetries between the alliances, the Warsaw Pact could have the capability either to preempt many of the responses NATO now assumes will be available in the event of conflict, or to force a pace of combat the West cannot match. NATO's Foreign Ministers recognized this threat in their 1986 Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control by urging priority attention "to the elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large scale offensive action."

The most disturbing trend in the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance has been Moscow's introduction of large amounts of modern conventional weapons into Central Europe. Over the last 20 years, the Warsaw Pact and NATO have introduced roughly 40,000 conventional weapons systems into Central Europe, at a ratio of just under 4:1 in favor of the Pact. Tanks and armored fighting vehicles have dominated this buildup, but the Warsaw Pact has also tripled the number of artillery tubes deployed by active units since 1967.

The most significant element of the Soviet-led buildup is

clearly armor. Today in Central Europe, roughly 17,000 Pact main battle tanks face some 6,500 NATO tanks, and the Warsaw Pact also has an advantage in the number of new, so-called fourth generation tanks in the field. More than any other development, the forward deployment of ready armored forces by the Warsaw Pact increases their capability to execute an armor-spearheaded, shorter-warning attack against NATO.

Second, growing Soviet strengths are matched against key NATO weaknesses, such as maldeployment, readiness and sustainability problems -- especially in the Northern Army Group area which compound the dangers of a shorter-warning attack scenario. In peacetime, for example, more than 50% of NATO's active brigades are out of their Corps sector and/or stationed more than 100 kilometers from their general defense position.

Mr. Chairman, let me speak plainly. The potential military instability in north Germany is there and growing, in part due to this forward deployed Soviet armor configured for a lightening attack. But the instability is in part due to NATO itself. NATO has allowed this Soviet threat to be matched not by strength but maldeployment and ready forces in this very same critical area of northern Germany. Only we, not the Soviets, can be criticized for this self-created vulnerability. We should correct our vulnerabilities before we get very far along in our conventional arms negotiations.

Third, Soviet and Warsaw Pact efforts in Central Europe are paralleled by a buildup of air and naval forces in the high north which could contribute to a potential for preemption. Recent Soviet naval exercises have demonstrated the capability to surge quickly the Northern Fleet's surface and submarine combatants into the Norwegian Sea, and, in joint operation with elements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, establish what 17th Century naval strategists called a "fleet in being" to dominate these strategic waters without firing a shot.

Under the guise of exercises, Soviet naval forces could deploy astride NATO's vital sea lines of communication more rapidly than U.S. forces could arrive to protect them. By doing so, the Soviet navy would threaten NATO's ability to move critical reinforcements from North America to Europe. A Soviet naval capability deployed in this way could also provide considerable political leverage against individual NATO members. If Denmark or Norway, for example, found itself behind a Soviet naval barrier, isolated from its Allies with critical reinforcements blocked, the government of the day could well be reluctant to join any Alliance mobilization or other action.

Finally, in a crisis, NATO decision makers will be under intense pressure not to appear provocative for fear of sparking the very conflict NATO is committed to deterring. This political dimension, requiring courageous decisions, further complicates the shorter-warning scenario in which time emerges as a key NATO resource.

The net effect of all these trends could be to isolate Europe, increasing the possibility that NATO defenses would be overwhelmed before vital reinforcements arrive. The ultimate impact would be to shift to NATO the burden of deciding between accepting defeat or escalating the conflict in a situation - with or without INF forces - in which the Alliance no longer enjoys nuclear superiority at any level.

NATO'S KEY: RESPONDING TO WARNING

At the outset, I want to define what I think is almost always the key issue of controversy in the debate over the conventional balance. It is one that often does not surface and thus leaves the debaters taking swipes at one another from entirely different assumptions. It is the issue of how NATO responds to warning -- whether it performs like clockwork just as planned with an opponent operating just as we plan, or whether it

performs in a fog of potential war and confused diplomacy, delayed mobilization matched by preemptive Pact measures, and even some surprises. Many who work in the academic and intelligence communities assume a clockwork performance totally unlike the onset of World War I and II. They overlook the role of ambiguity, misperception and miscalculation, and they tend to assume that the condition of crisis management and time available in the 1960s will be those of the 1990s. My service at NATO as well as my study of history make me a profound skeptic of what I will call these "rationalists". The threat outlined in our briefing is not so much the product of adverse force ratios, but NATO's own processes. NATO has not configured itself nor invested its superior resources in preparing to manage the danger of the shorter-warning attack in time to abort it.

Having laid out our sobering conclusions, let me turn to our good news. Some of the good news is that in recent years NATO has made significant progress in reinforcement and mobilization capability that would be needed to respond to the traditional scenario of 10-14 days of warning. NATO's problem is time. Given time, NATO can organize a coherent defense utilizing some of the most capable forces in the world.

IMPROVEMENTS: READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

Having seen NATO make real progress in terms of readiness and reinforcement in recent years, I am not prepared to throw up my hands and say that nothing can be done to deal with the situation I have described. NATO can deal with the new Warsaw Pact challenge, but it must act now. It must face up to its own maldeployments. In the short-term, a series of low or no-cost remedial measures must and can be implemented. These measures not only could help prevent a shorter-warning scenario from becoming an attractive option, but they also promise significant opportunities to reaffirm the trans-Atlantic partnership.

The recommendations in our first report looking at U.S. and Allied defense investment identify a wide range of improvements in NATO's force planning and decision making process, in Alliance force structure, and armaments cooperation. These measures could provide a basis for a comprehensive NATO Action Plan that meets the challenges of the post-INF security environment in Europe.

Let me highlight only six measures NATO could pursue at no or low cost. First, NATO must undertake a net appraisal of the dynamic balance of forces for consideration at the highest political level. It is important to move from general discussions to concentration on specific problems so that investment priorities are clarified. The NATO appraisal must show strengths, weaknesses and trends on both sides and emphasize their meaning for conventional improvements and arms control. The Secretary General, the Chairman of the Military Committee, and major NATO commanders should take such an assessment for discussion with national Cabinets, with Finance Ministers also present. There should also be Parliamentary briefings.

Second, a thorough review of NATO's crisis management capability is critical. The threat of a Warsaw Pact reduced-warning attack in Central Europe imposes enormous new pressures on NATO's less than streamlined crisis management machinery. Our report also highlighted the possible dangers of an overburdened alerts system discussed in Senator Levin's study.

Alliance assumptions about warning time need to be revisited. NATO Headquarters exercises should also be re-examined to ensure that a proper range of contingencies are considered, that planning assumptions as well as procedures are tested, and that national participation is coordinated at an adequately senior level. A singularly important measure in this regard could be more NATO simulation exercises focusing on a range of contingencies (such as Soviet Northern and Baltic fleet actions as a precursor to conflict). Again, the cost of these

measures is literally zero, with high potential pay-off.

Third, a special study should be mandated on how NATO should face up to potentially precarious maldeployment and readiness problems in the Northern Army Group area. Both SACEUR and the Defense Planning Committee need to identify how the danger of Soviet armored breakout in the north, which can invalidate all countries investment in NATO, can be met more collectively. Here again specific solutions, perhaps like some of our proposed measures, need to be found to rectify this critical weakness if we are to have leverage in the Atlantic to the Urals negotiations.

Fourth, the Administration should engage Congress in finding new trade-offs with the Allies, such as transferring less-preferred ammunition to a war-reserve stock for NATO military commanders in return for rationalization of national logistical infrastructures - particularly in the Benelux. Trade-offs could also be possible in response to additional terrain preparation measures by the Allies.

Fifth, NATO needs a renewed effort on armaments cooperation. A cooperative effort under the Balanced Technology Initiative in addition to ongoing Nunn-Roth-Warner programs would emphasize to Europeans our determination to target our technology investment to rectify conventional imbalances. The perception of a new NATO effort under way could in itself have an incredible effect on the Soviets, as they so fear our creative use of technology.

Sixth, we need a mandate for longer-range discussions involving both government and industry for better use of defense resources. This could include emphasis on more off-the-shelf purchases as well as a search for more trade-offs like the Roland/Patriot deal with Germany.

ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO FORCES

In addition to these initial no-cost steps, our study

highlights a wide range of more specific measures for improving the readiness and sustainability of NATO's forces and advancing armaments cooperation.

As the Warsaw Pact becomes increasingly capable of preemptive attack, a clear priority for NATO is to ensure that existing in-place forces are as effective as possible. Throughout the Central Region, but especially in the Northern Army Group area, maldeployed units hinder NATO capability to create rapidly a coherent defense. Allied maldeployments also create potential opportunities for an aggressor to interdict NATO forces moving forward and put tremendous pressure on units initially covering the front. These maldeployments build instabilities into potential crisis situations.

Beyond maldeployment problems, many of NATO's active units are manned at less than 100% in peacetime, requiring time to be brought to full strength. Further, units that will have to fight side by side often lack compatible communications equipment or interoperable weapons and ammunition. One possible remedy for NATO's readiness problems in the Northern Army Group area could be the creation of an Enhanced Ready Covering Force. This force would be composed of up to half of the existing active brigades designated for priority attention.

To be effective, Covering Force units would have to come under the Alliance's integrated command at an early stage NATO alert, be 100% ready in terms of manning, equipment and stocks, and deployed in areas near where they will have to fight. Such a Covering Force would also require synchronized peacetime command, adequate infrastructure support, joint training at the Army Group level, and interoperable equipment and communications.

We do not kid ourselves, however. There will be costs for maintaining and equipping the Covering Force units. To ease the funding burden on any single Ally, NATO should establish a common or joint fund to create and maintain the Covering Force. Ample

precedents exist for a such an approach -- air defense in the 1950s, the ACE Mobile Force in the 1960s, and AWACS in the 1970s.

Giving priority to the readiness of some of NATO's standing forces does not imply decreases in overall force levels. However, demographic, economic, and political pressures limiting NATO's ability to field and maintain ready forces must be recognized. This is a coalition problem, and a problem that demands a coalition solution.

NATO forces must also improve their ability to sustain combat at the conventional level. To overcome critical ammunition shortfalls, for example, NATO must give top priority to meeting agreed goals of 30 days of key munitions stocks. The buildup of NATO stocks must be balanced so that critical types of ammunition are available across the front. Above all, NATO needs a more flexible system to deliver ammunition to the sectors where it will be needed most. As long as logistics -- including the buildup of ammunition stocks -- remains a national responsibility, adequate flexibility will not be achieved.

To achieve greater flexibility, NATO should authorize the creation of an Ammunition War Reserve under SACEUR's command to which all member nations would contribute. Such a Reserve could initially include only the most critical and most common munitions such as 155mm artillery shells. Once conflict begins, the Reserve could be allocated by SACEUR with appropriate logistical support to the sectors in greatest need.

LONGER-TERM IMPROVEMENTS

In the longer-term, the types of limited measures to improve NATO process and force posture I have described must be augmented by more fundamental improvements in NATO's logistical infrastructure, in its unit deployments, and in a better rationalization of national mission roles. One increasingly important question is the future role of France in the Alliance.

At CSIS, we have a series of studies underway which will attempt to provide some answers to the more fundamental questions of NATO's future structure.

ENHANCING ARMS COOPERATION

An essential element in achieving a greater return on Alliance defense investments is better cooperation among the Allies in armaments development, production, and procurement. As the members of this committee know, I strongly believe armaments cooperation is the cornerstone of an effective Resources Strategy. It is the only way the West can harness the rising cost of modern weaponry, ensure the translation of promising technologies to the battlefield, and reverse what Tom Callaghan so accurately described as NATO's "structural disarmament." Again, we find a strong recognition of the need for expanded armaments cooperation in the Subcommittee's report.

A solid foundation exists today upon which NATO can build future initiatives to advance Alliance armaments cooperation. The Chairman of this committee, along with Senator Warner, Senator Roth and others introduced the imaginative landmark amendment creating a fund for collaborative defense research and development projects with the NATO Allies. As you know, there are now twelve Memoranda of Understanding on cooperative programs under the rubric of the Nunn-Roth-Warner legislation. These programs are all addressing a critical NATO military need, and are the cement of an effort to build an Alliance defense investment strategy. Most importantly, the Nunn/Roth/Warner amendment helped synergize a much larger effort at NATO to think smarter not richer on use of defense resources. We Americans were able to institute the Reenforced North Atlantic Council meeting with Deputy Defense Ministers including the French. Will Taft has made such a superb contribution in this effort, which is without precedent since 1950.

NATO's first critical task in this area is to reinforce the real progress achieved over the last three years. Most importantly, the United States and the European Allies should expand joint research and development initiatives within the existing Nunn-Roth-Warner framework. An important focus for new Alliance efforts, for example, could be the common requirement for a follow-on to the HAWK medium-range surface to air missile for NATO's air defense and ATBM requirements in the 1990s.

NATO ARMAMENTS PLANNING

Another critical step for the Alliance is to link more closely the establishment of military requirements and force goals with armaments planning. Last year Lord Carrington proposed the creation of an Alliance Armaments Planning System, arguing that a closer linkage between force planning and armaments decisions would "create optimal opportunities for enhanced cooperation."

At the December 1987 North Atlantic Council meeting, Alliance Foreign Ministers approved a two-year trial for the NATO Armaments Planning System. The planning documents that will now be generated at NATO should be extremely valuable in that they will identify specific opportunities for cooperative endeavors and highlight deficiencies in armaments planning in relation to national and NATO requirements. The recommendations developed through the new NATO Armaments Planning System must receive attention at the highest political levels of government.

COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES

Another important transmission belt for the cooperative exploitation of emerging technology is the DOD's Competitive Strategies Study. The Study's Task Force on Mid to High-Intensity Conflict in Europe, under the guidance of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Planning and Resources Dennis

Kloske, has produced the Department's first proposed strategy for matching the strengths of NATO's technologies and operational concepts against Soviet/Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities on the battlefield of the future. NATO must begin a parallel effort to pinpoint emerging technologies with the highest potential payoffs for the conventional defense of Europe in the 1990s.

I am happy to see that the Ikle/Wohlstetter Commission, although the newspaper account and allies seem to have missed it, also calls for vigorous procurement of advanced conventional weapons such as stand-off weapons, smart munitions, improved target acquisition technologies, low observables and stealth technology that are necessary for a "Follow-on Forces Attack" capability.

I take special pride in the Competitive Strategy Study because it has been led -- brilliantly, I think -- by Dennis Kloske, who was originally with me at CSIS, then at USNATO. One of the reasons for his success is that he understands NATO from his front line experience and he sees the urgency for classical strategy in better application of our resources to battlefield potential.

THE BALANCED TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE

Beyond focusing on how today's technologies can be exploited to enhance NATO's conventional forces, the Alliance must also seek to translate the West's advantage on the frontiers of technology to the battlefield. The year-old Balanced Technology Initiative is the current vehicle for strengthening and focusing American advanced technology research in conventional weapons systems and military equipment.

The Pentagon's effort, ably led by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology Dr. Ronald Kerber and his Special Assistant Dr. William Snowden, has made significant progress in disciplining the selection of promising

technology research projects in terms of the criteria of the 1987 legislation, which include focus on "smart" munitions and anti-armor technologies.

If the American Balanced Technology Initiative and Competitive Strategies efforts are to have a major impact on Alliance conventional defense capability, they must be placed within a NATO framework which engages America's European partners in the endeavor. Our CSIS study recommended to the Pentagon and Congress that a portion of 1988 or 1989 BTI funding be made available for collaborative programs with NATO Allies. Deputy Secretary Taft has stated before a subcommittee of this Armed Services Committee that the DOD would "have no difficulty" with such an approach to spur the Allies.

IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT

In our report we raise the idea of a European Technology Center to coordinate jointly-funded Allied research and development and to become the instrument for response to new American initiatives. To alleviate European concerns about any bureaucratization of research efforts, such a Technology Center must be developed in partnership with Europe's most successful defense industries.

Critical to the success of trans-Atlantic armaments cooperation will be improved technology security arrangements. A coordinated Allied research and development effort would make technology security guidelines far easier to set in place and monitor, and would allow Alliance cooperative development programs to transcend the current level of technology sharing. A major NATO conference, bringing together national governments and industry -- with ministerial participation -- is needed to address the broad agenda of technology protection policy and the structure of Alliance defense trade.

Defense industry remains far ahead of national governments

in forging efficient international consortia. One crucial no-cost first step to unleashing further private industry cooperative initiatives is a thorough review of U.S. government technology export licensing procedures.

In this testimony I have outlined what I believe is a realistic agenda for an new NATO effort to improve its conventional deterrent. The various recommendations for short-term, relatively low-cost improvements in Alliance crisis management and decision-making machinery, enhancements of conventional forces and expansion of armaments cooperation efforts in the CSIS report would provide an excellent basis for a NATO post-INF Action Plan.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Let me move from the conventional improvements agenda back to comprehensive NATO strategy based on Harmel. We must be grand strategists for no other reason than Gorbachev has turned out to be a brilliant one. We cannot proceed ad hoc.

The March summit, if it is to be more than a show of Allied solidarity, must move NATO towards such a comprehensive strategy. In addition, we need now a commitment to a second NATO summit a year from now to bracket the development of a NATO Action Plan. This can give European Allies a sense of continuity through our election period.

Only by building strength and maintaining continuity will NATO create the leverage to engage the Warsaw Pact in meaningful negotiations on conventional arms reductions.

As we move into the conventional negotiations on "The Atlantic to The Urals", we will thus synergise our efforts to eliminate the danger of shorter-warning blitzkrieg attack through our twin approaches of robust improvements and skillful negotiations. With the economic constraints on the Soviet Union, we might well have a chance of repeating our INF success at the

basic level of military instability -- the conventional level.

I have stressed grand strategy. No great strategy can be formulated for NATO unless there is a creative partnership between the Executive and Legislative branches. No resources study for thinking smarter can be developed without partnership. This Committee already has played such a centre part that I am encouraged that we can succeed. If so, then the INF treaty and its hearings will have become a great asset.

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP A. KARBER, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS, THE BDM CORP.

Mr. KARBER. Mr. Chairman, the study that we did really covered these points on this brief summary chart.

RESOURCES FOR STRATEGY

REGIONAL BALANCES

NORTHERN EUROPE

CENTRAL EUROPE

- STABLE FORCE STRUCTURES
- GROWING IMBALANCE IN FORWARD DEPLOYED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY
- FORCE COMPARISONS
 - ARMOR/ANTIARMOR
 - ARTILLERY
 - AIR/AIR DEFENSE
- INCREASING DYNAMICS OF COMBINED ARM'S COMBAT

SOUTHERN EUROPE

CRITICAL COMPARISONS (4 R's)

READINESS

REINFORCEMENT

RELIABILITY

RATIONALIZATION

PROBABILITIES OF VICTORY

STRATEGY FOR RESOURCES

That is, we first went through and looked at the various regions—northern Europe, central Europe, and southern Europe—

looked at the trends both in quantity and quality of forces, modernization, sustainability, and then examined the operational concepts, both changing operational concepts that the NATO commanders have developed and also those that the other side has been doing to implement their offensive concepts.

What we found is that virtually every balance has a series of what we call intervening variables, and we have four of those, and those variables change quite drastically between the northern, center, and southern regions.

For example, in northern Europe there is an absence of ready forces——

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Karber, I am informed that we have a vote at 9:30. I think we all would like to hear this. Rather than get right in the middle of it and have people wandering in and out, I am going to ask for about a ten minute recess while we go vote, and then we will start at the beginning.

So we will come back in about 10 minutes, and we will all have a chance to vote and hear the whole presentation.

[Recess.]

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Karber, will you take up where you left off. I know you were just getting started, and I think everybody will be coming back here in a minute.

Mr. KARBER. The key point I wanted to raise is that on what we call the critical comparisons there are a whole host of what we call intervening variables, which are really quite different across the regional balances.

In the northern flank there is a real readiness problem. The Norwegians have strong forces, some 14 brigades, but in peacetime only one of them is active. They have to virtually go through national mobilization to be able to field a force. For example, of the Norwegian Air Force, only half of it is manned in peacetime.


And on the southern flank, where you have large standing active armies, you have a severe modernization problem and almost no sustainability for any prolonged combat. So there are major differences between the regions.

Last, in terms of thinking smart, not rich—and I will come back to those sort of summary points when we finish. I am not going to give the full Ambassador Abshire 3-hour version of that slide; I am just going to pick a couple of highlights. But if there are any questions, we would be glad to go back to any of those key points.

If one looks at the central balance, what is interesting is that by the traditional measures, the ones that people look at in measuring conventional force—manpower, divisions—over the last 20 years in Central Europe the number of divisions has remained virtually constant for both sides. The manpower has been a slight change, a slight decline on the NATO side, a 20 percent increase on the Warsaw Pact, but nothing really dramatic.

CHART 2

CENTRAL REGION BALANCE TRENDS



What has been going on, though, is underneath those superficial measures has been a major conventional arms race in Central Europe. It is an arms race that NATO has not been winning in terms of active forward deployed forces.

To give you an idea, in 1967—and I am using that not only because it is convenient, two decades ago, but it was the year that NATO adopted its current strategy of flexible response. Since 1967, the Warsaw Pact has added more conventional weapons into Central Europe than NATO fielded in 1967.

Or to put that another way, they have added the equivalent of 30 divisions, as if in 1967 they had mobilized and brought in 30 reinforcing divisions from the western U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, had they done that over several weeks we would have counter-mobilized. But because it has been done over 20 years, we have not reacted in building up our own forces.

Chairman NUNN. When you say 30 divisions, are you talking about 30 equivalent divisions? If so, would you define that term for us?

Mr. KARBUR. Yes. If one looks at the conventional combat capability either in numbers of weapons systems or in terms of scoring it, it comes out to the equivalent of 30 divisions being added forward. And yet, if you look at the number of division flags, it has barely changed.

There has been a major increase in the conventional combat assets of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe inside the divisions. Another way of looking at that is that that increase in forward deployed capability gives the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact the same

force ratio they would have had after 30 days of mobilization in 1967.

Another way of looking at it is that they have been adding four conventional weapons to the central front for every one that NATO has been adding.

Now, in our report we talk about what we consider the unstable nature of the imbalance in Central Europe. What this map illustrates is the location of tank battalions, ours and theirs. The red are Soviet.



Now, what is interesting about it is that opposite the greatest mass of Soviet armor deployed in northern East Germany is NATO's thinnest element of its own armored capability. Now, many people would rightly say: Ah, yes, but with mobilization time we can redeploy our tanks into northern Germany.

A major NATO initiative has been the creation of the U.S. Third Corps which, after about 10 days to two weeks, could be flown over and fall in on their POMCUS equipment to be able to serve as an operational reserve in the north. And NATO has strong antitank capability that we have invested a lot of money in for its infantry. So the infantry, if they have time to deploy in dug-in positions surrounded with minefields, entrenchments, barriers, would be able to put up a very stiff fight against that armor.

The danger is that all of those remedial actions, all those things that one would intuitively say we could do, all of those things that we have invested in, take a substantial amount of time. They essentially require NATO to call up full mobilization, something that NATO has never practiced.

Now, while we have the central region map up, just the location of the tanks themselves, one could argue, well, the Soviets have been there for 40 years, what is really new?

There has been a definite attempt by the Soviets to exploit that potential NATO vulnerability. For example, just since 1980 the Soviets have increased the number of tank divisions opposite NATO's northern sector by 50 percent by restructuring and redeploying units. Another way of looking at that central region map is at the time you, Senator, did your report with Senator Bartlett, people would say: Well, but do not be too concerned because, after all, they still have to restage a large amount of their aircraft to be in range of NATO targets. Today they do not—the Soviet air offensive can be launched without restaging their aircraft.

People would say: Well, they do not have a theater operational command and control system set up to implement a war plan immediately; that will take them some time and it is very visible; we would see them doing it. Today they do. They have a TVD with a commander, former chief of the general staff, Marshall Ogarkov, sitting at Legnica, Poland, commanding that infrastructure.

In the late sixties, early seventies, one would have said: Well, but the Warsaw Pact does not have enough ammunition forward stocked in Eastern Europe; they would have to load up literally thousands of trains of ammunitions from the western U.S.S.R. and move that ammunition into Central Europe.


Today they have 80 percent of the ammunition required not just for the forces that are deployed there, but for a total of 90 divisions to fight for a month and a half. In other words, the vast majority of the ammunition for a 90 division threat, not just the 55 that are deployed there for today, is already located forward in Central Europe.

There has been a methodical, systematic buildup of their forward capability.

There has been a lot of interest in tanks in the last year, and I am not trying to awe people with a bean count, but merely to show what the assumptions are that we are using in our study, assumptions which we have verified by both visiting the commands in Europe and actually visiting the units where the tanks are deployed.

CHART 4

TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION MAIN BATTLE TANKS




If one looks at tanks in terms of generations—the fourth generation tank listed on that chart is a tank by our definition with a high velocity gun that can kill any other tank on the battlefield, and yet has the armor protection to essentially repel in normal engagement range any other weapon other than a tank high velocity gun—what one sees is the Warsaw Pact has three times the number of those “survivable killer” tanks as we do fielded in Central Europe. And yet, the common perception is that NATO’s qualitative advantage offsets quantitative inferiority.

That is not true in most of the indices of conventional power deployed in Central Europe. There are many areas where we have a technological lead in the laboratory or our allies do, but it is not evident in the field today. As one looks at the two sides in Central Europe, it is much closer to parity.

Chairman NUNN. Now, are you speaking about ground forces? Are you including air in there, too?

Mr. KARBUR. Yes, I will be showing you the air slide.

TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION COMBAT AIRCRAFT



This is the air slide. As you can see, NATO has a larger number of high performance, more modern aircraft. But we are outnumbered by about two to one in recent vintage third generation aircraft. The Warsaw Pact has made a major modernization and is now entering essentially its third Soviet full-scale replacement of aircraft in less than two decades.

But in the air, I would say that we still plane for plane, pilot for pilot, have a qualitative advantage. But across the total spectrum of conventional forces, whether it is tanks, conventional artillery, antitank guided missiles, multiple rocket launchers, increasingly, and now in new conventional munitions, areas where we thought we had a major qualitative advantage, we now have a rough proximate technological parity between NATO forces and particularly the Soviet forces on the other side.

One of the arguments that would have been used to argue that, "well, do not worry, a short warning attack is not something we are going to have to worry about," was tied to the fact that the Soviet fleets are essentially home-based, less than 20 percent of their assets are out at sea at any one time; it would take them a substantial amount of time to deploy those fleets; and yet, they would not, obviously, go to war leaving their fleets at home.

CJMP 6

NATO'S NORTHERN REGION: EVOLVING SOVIET NAVAL THINKING



A significant change in Soviet operational concepts, particularly in relationship to the North Sea fleet and Soviet Baltic fleet, is their testing of those fleets to pulse, that is to move out of port very rapidly, and under peacetime or, as they portray it in their exercises, crisis conditions, but before the war starts, actually getting those fleets out very fast—the dumping of up to 80 submarines at one time.

And I point out that if they start dumping their attack submarines fast, they can get to the GI/UK gap, the gap between Greenland-Iceland and England, two days before our boats can get there from Norfolk. The side that starts moving first, because of their closer proximity, has a chance of making substantial penetration.

Now, again, as in the air but even more so, our naval forces are qualitatively superior to the Warsaw Pact. Our own assessment is that they would beat and defeat the Warsaw Pact, particularly Soviet naval forces, if we had time to mobilize and redeploy our naval forces.

But that is going to require an active decision, and it takes about a week or so to conduct that redeployment.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. May I just add one very important thing on this last slide? The Soviets will have a capability, what used to be called in naval strategy a "fleet in being," and that means that they will be able to dominate the Norwegian Sea under exercise conditions without ever violating international law.

They held such an exercise, Summerex, two years ago. And in the 1990's that capability will be vastly increased. What has happened when they do that? They have automatically blocked our capability to reinforce Norway. They have automatically isolated Denmark.

Now, the mindset that many NATO people have, which was born in the 1960's, rather than looking to the 1990's, envisions a vertical escalation up stairsteps, and that will not be the way the crisis takes place. It is going to be on a horizontal basis where this political potential is used for political purposes in the north. Combined with operational maneuver groups, that political potential will give them, if these trends are not changed, far greater payoff than they ever got from the SS-20 missiles, which ultimately prompted the allies to rally round their nuclear protector.

In this kind of situation, with discriminating conventional power, you can divide up an alliance and deal with it piecemeal.

Mr. KARBUR. In the past, all too often people have been awed by the quantitative numbers of the Warsaw Pact. So we put this slide together which shows where all the divisions of not only NATO and the Warsaw Pact are, but also neutrals, because most of the neutrals, whether it is the Yugoslavs, the Austrians, the Swiss, the Finns or the Swedes, will in our view at least defend their own territorial integrity. They may not mobilize quickly enough, but we believe that they will try and defend themselves, given the opportunity.



What is interesting is, in terms of this mass of Soviet conventional strength—the little red dots are all the divisions, but if one of those dots is hollow that means that a division is not ready in peacetime. It essentially has a cadre of about 30 to 50 percent of its manpower and requires essentially Soviet mobilization prior to that unit being committed and entrained and sent to whatever direction it would be moved in.

So what is interesting is that the threat that we see emerging is not one of sheer quantity, the traditional view of the red hordes. It is more of a qualitative and deployed threat forward, that in a


crisis if we saw the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact begin to mobilize, we do not know what the D-day is in their war plan.

In fact, they may have several. And once we start reacting to that mobilization, they will then still have, with that strong forward force in Central Europe, the opportunity, a window of preemption, if you will, to launch an attack in the center with substantially higher odds of succeeding.

This shows the peacetime location of NATO brigades and the "Chinese fire drill" that they have to go through to solve their maldeployment in a crisis. In essence, well over half of NATO's ground forces are not close to their own positions. That means in peacetime they do not really get to know the local terrain, they do not get to know the defensive positions.

CONT 8

CRISIS RE-DEPLOYMENT: BELGIAN, DUTCH, CANADIAN FORCES



In the past, people would argue that a defender should be able to withstand close to three times the amount of attacker coming into his position. But that assumes that he has entrenchments, that he has dug-in defenses, minefields, a prepared defense.

The maldeployment of NATO forces is in the center, particularly in northern Germany, with 85 percent of the Dutch corps still in Holland, with 65 percent of the Belgian corps in Belgium, with even the British corps, which is not badly maldeployed, but requir-

ing mobilization and reinforcements that would double the manpower that is there now for them to fight and sustain their defense for longer than 48 hours.

So what one has is not the absence of strong forces. In our own view, NATO has sufficient conventional forces to meet and, if not totally defeat, at least give an extremely impressive defense "if" we have time to mobilize and prepare those defenses.

We see this as the number one danger. It is an emerging threat, but it is also a more manageable threat, because we are not saying that we need necessarily larger forces. What we need to do is get the forces we have got and not have them to be sent to their battle positions with a fraction of their assets, not being able to take advantage of terrain, not being able to have sufficient manpower to get them ammunition, not being able to get local air defenses because the reservists who man them take too long to be called up.

Again as I said, there is the traditional past perception that the Warsaw Pact needs to mobilize and bring all those divisions forward to get their best force ratio. What we found in our analysis is that they get their best force ratio by "going ugly early," by making an attack before our defenses are ready, rather than waiting for a prolonged time of mobilization, mainly because once they have fully mobilized they cannot bring all their force to bear at one time and they are doing it against a prepared defense.

The longer we have had time to mobilize, the more reserves we have available to counter a penetration. So what is interesting in the short warning attack is the extensive advantages they do get, and those are the best numbers, force ratios that they will get against NATO's defenses in any attack scenario.

Now, in summary, in pointing this out, while it is not an optimistic message, on the other hand there is a lot more hope than merely decrying the massive Soviet quantitative conventional capabilities.

What we are talking about is a finite threat, a finite window in which they are in danger of preempting our defense before we have had time to prepare it. So that means that the remedial actions in building up our own conventional defenses are much more realistic and potentially attainable.

It means we need to focus on not just the quantities and qualities, but a lot of the intangibles that stem from various acts of sovereignty and have prevented countries from rationalizing our best defense.

It also means that there is much more hope for the impact of conventional arms control. One does not have to ask the Soviets to disband 100 divisions to make NATO feel comfortable.

NATO/WARSAW PACT MOBILIZATION SCENARIOS "Guns of August"



To reduce the kind of threat that we see emerging, what one needs is for those forces that are situated opposite the place where we are vulnerable to be withdrawn. That is a much more manageable size and task for conventional arms control.

This is a guide summary of our major points, and I think what we will do is just leave it, Mr. Chairman, for your discussion to go into any of those or any of the others.

CHART 10.—Conventional Arms Control

A conceptual arms control framework is needed to:

Define "stability".

Identify critical elements.

Determine the impact of reductions on: Prospects for force improvements; nuclear weapons decisions; confidence and security building measures; and defense budget decisions.

CHART 11.—Technology Trends

Making future combat more lethal, mobile, and decisive.

Increasing the incentive to preempt.

Approaching the effect of nuclear weapons.

Uncertainty about what will be fielded and in what combinations.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Mr. Chairman, if I could say, you have seen the tip of the iceberg. The full briefing runs 3 hours, with 180 slides. We also have a version that is about 35 minutes. This room was not conducive for it, but we would be happy to give you that briefing upon request.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. It is very helpful to get this overview.

Now, in the 35-minute version what do you get that you did not get in this version?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Three times as many slides, and you get more on the flanks.

Chairman NUNN. More on the northern flank, southern flank, and so forth.

The Rand Corporation has done a study that is somewhat different from this because it was primarily, as I viewed it, aimed at looking at what kind of conventional reductions would be necessary. But it started with sort of the assumption that we were not going to do very much about deployments or the subtleties that you talked about that we could change.

And conventional arms control, it seems to me, and even the beginning position of NATO on arms control, depend on those assumptions. Do you assume with your conventional arms control positions that we are going to continue to have maldeployments, that we are going to continue to have a situation where we do not have a ready NATO capability to react to warning time, that we do not have a political mechanism?

What are the assumptions for conventional arms control that we ought to proceed with? In other words, I guess my question is do you believe we ought to table a conventional arms control proposal based on the assumption that NATO is going to do business as usual?

Mr. KARBER. Definitely! We would be fools not to. It is interesting that the Rand study basically came to roughly the same conclusions that I have. I am now speaking strictly for myself here. The project team does not necessarily concur with it.

But if one looks at what one would want the Soviets to get out of Central Europe, what is it that is making things balanced and in a crisis stable, it is that the Soviets have roughly twice as much as is natural for anybody to have in Central Europe.

We want about half of those Soviet divisions out. Now, the Rand study came to roughly the same conclusion, using a very different methodology, using war gaming and computer simulation. If you can reduce Soviet forward forces by about 13 divisions, you have reduced enough of their potency so that you do not have as much pressure on NATO then to have to sustain such high levels of readiness in its active forces, to be able to react to maldeployment in crisis with absolute speed, no hesitation—all the dangers that we see.

So it greatly ameliorates that. But it seems to me that we give no incentive to the other side to negotiate unless we admit that we have got a problem and start working on it.

And then if, by the grace of God, arms control works and the threat is reduced, then I think if the Soviets pull out their forces, cut about in half their conventional forces in proportion to where they are located, it would essentially solve most of the problems that we identified in the study.

Chairman NUNN. When you say the Soviet forces, are you talking about Warsaw Pact forces or Soviet forces?

Mr. KARBER. One needs to be very careful here. There is an enormous danger in the West of generalizing to the Warsaw Pact. The forces that really threaten us on that tank battalion slide, that concentration of red dots, those are not East German dots, they are not Czech and Polish dots. They are Soviet dots.

The Soviets alone have more conventional weapons forward deployed than all of NATO has on the Central Front. It is unnatural.

The Soviets should not have that much conventional force in Central Europe, and we need to focus on getting the Soviets to back out.

In our own view the Czechs, the East Germans, the Poles are not unnaturally high in their number of forces.

Chairman NUNN. Would you say the Soviets have a lot more forces there than they would ever conceivably need even if the Warsaw Pact nations were to try to overthrow Soviet military rule?

Mr. KARBER. I think that if they cut their forces in half, that would still leave them with about 10 divisions in East Germany, two and a half in Czechoslovakia, and one in Poland. And that number is enough to assuage anybody but the most paranoid about being overtaken by the locals, particularly considering, for example, the Poles are surrounded on the other side, as are the Czechs, by the western U.S.S.R.

So it is still a very large force to deal with local contingencies.

Chairman NUNN. Are you saying that from a structural point of view NATO's arms control goal ought to be roughly, in broad terms, to find a formula to reduce Soviet forces by one-half?

Mr. KARBER. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. In Eastern Europe?

Mr. KARBER. In Eastern Europe. Focus on: (1) Soviet forces; (2) the size of the cut needs to be about half; and (3) in proportion to where they are currently deployed.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on this and then go back to your first question?

The basic objective is to eliminate a blitzkrieg type capability. In going back to your basic question, our arms control proposals must assume NATO forces as they are. By the same token, there is no leverage for negotiations if we do not get a follow-on effort on robust conventional improvements.

Chairman NUNN. In other words, as I understand it, you are saying we ought to assume NATO business as usual when we table arms control proposals, but we ought to be entirely against NATO business as usual in terms of creating leverage and giving ourselves a chance to achieve that arms control?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Absolutely. And I think if we go into a summit, a NATO summit March 2 and 3 there needs to be a remit from the heads of government for a 4-month study program on correction of all of these things, many of which are low-cost/no-cost that get across national considerations in maldeployment. We need to be operating at two levels—first, on the technology level, with the programs that this committee has sponsored, and the competitive strategies effort. The Soviets see smart technology being used—which creates enormous leverage for us. They give us credit for greater creativity than we have.

The second level is the conventional: readiness and sustainability. In effect, what has to happen, is for our "correlation of forces" to be brought together. The condition in northern Germany—and we had some members of the SPD admit this—is in part due to the forward concentration of Soviet armor and in part due to NATO maldeployment.

The maximum strength of theirs is concentrated against NATO's most vulnerable areas. In other words, in rough terms you are repeating the situation of May 1940, and if we strengthen strength that does not help us. We have got to eliminate the vulnerability. And I think if this is not begun at this summit, we will have missed a great opportunity. We have tried to say that the first consideration is not money but being strategists focusing our efforts on needed corrections. If we do this, then we have the leverage in conventional negotiations as well.

If we do not, there is no leverage. We must repeat the reason for the success of INF. We deployed. We built strength while we negotiated, and that is why we won the negotiating victory. And if we do the same on the conventional level, it may well be at some point that we can help negotiate the end of that blitzkrieg capability.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much. My time has expired. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer to Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Abshire, we are glad to have you with us. There is a recognized need to modernize our remaining nuclear weaponry in NATO, but there is also a need for conventional force improvements on a very large scale. In an era of declining defense budgets, how would you prioritize modernization efforts, nuclear assets or conventional assets, at the top of the list?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Senator, I will comment and then Phil can comment. I do not think that if you have what I call a defense resources strategy, a wise investment strategy looking at tradeoffs, that these priorities need to conflict. To follow through on what we call the Montebello decision and nuclear modernization, we planned that anyway, and it is a U.S. defense budget item.

The need to correct the situation in the Northern Army Group, which you see portrayed on the map, much of that must be done by allies, and our role should be thinking smarter in the tradeoff of some of our existing assets, such as less than preferred ammunition stocks, to form a war reserve for the Supreme Allied Commander to have in this vital area.

Now there is another requirement for what we call an enhanced ready force in this Northern Army Group area that under the first alert, Military Vigilance, under one decision, would pass to the Supreme Allied Commander. This would necessitate a joint fund. The first round of conventional correctives can be enhanced by a range of tradeoffs with allies where the nuclear modernization is purely an American budgetary decision.

Mr. KARBER. Unfortunately, when people think about the nuclear modernization—

Senator THURMOND. Would you speak a little louder?

Mr. KARBER. I am sorry, sir. Unfortunately, when people talk about NATO's nuclear modernization, we act as if the balance in tactical and battlefield systems was where it was in, say, 1979—just 8 years ago. We tend to forget what has happened because not a lot of attention has been called to it.

But in 1979, when NATO made this two-track decision and also decided to start modernizing or wanted to modernize the tactical

systems—and we have not yet—when we made that decision the Soviets had no nuclear artillery deployed forward. We had it; they did not. We saw it as an inherent advantage to us if nuclear fire was initiated that we would be able to use it to offset their advantage in armor.

Today they have more nuclear artillery in central Europe, the same general locations where all those little dots are, than we do. Since 1979 the Soviets have doubled the quantity and range/payload payload of their in-theater, in-central-Europe nuclear-capable aircraft, so they have roughly twice the number that we do for certified nuclear missions.

After the INF Treaty, in which we get a good trade for our missiles for theirs, they are going to have five times the number of tactical surface-to-surface missiles in this region right here than NATO has remaining. So my point is, we do not have the option of deferring, in my opinion, the modernization. It is not a luxury that it was in 1979 or 1981 or 1982.

If we want to stay in the nuclear deterrent game, deterring their first use of battlefield nuclear weapons, modernization is a necessity. So, as the Ambassador said, it seems to me that the conventional and nuclear modernization programs in essence have to go on hand in hand.

Now many of those conventional improvements do not necessarily mean spending lots more money. They do mean the NATO membership giving up some of their sovereignty that they have jealously been able to guard, by inefficiently expending resources. When I say "give up sovereignty," I mean being willing to commit forces to react in a crisis earlier by being willing to share logistics and ammunition rather than everybody building their own stocks, by being willing to buy each other's ammunition or new weapons so that you get an efficient procurement of that weapon rather than each country going off and buying its own.

So in answer to your question, sir, I think that it has to be a simultaneous double track, if you will; otherwise it is a fundamental mistake.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, as I construe from what you say, you would not necessarily put the priority on either. You have to run a double track, more or less.

Mr. KARBUR. We cannot afford to do one or the other, to treat them as mutually exclusive. The day is gone when we can solely depend on nuclear deterrence because in a conventional attack, if we cannot hold that northern sector, that sector will be overrun before we ever fire the first round.

On the other hand, we cannot merely go about building a strong conventional defense and the other side has the incentive to go to nuclear first use with decisive battlefield effect. Particularly with the INF systems gone, one would not have an ability to respond as we might have, say, in the 1970s or the 1960s. So we do not have the luxury that we thought we did even less than a decade ago.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Senator, could I add, to make a point that I tried to get at earlier, if we put money into strengthening the Fifth and Seventh Corps, the U.S. Fifth and Seventh Corps, it would be a little like the French strengthening the Maginot line in 1938. We are relatively strong in that area, so the vulnerability, if

you get to the Northern Army Group, is where we have the Belgian, the Dutch, and another German Corps, and Danes up to the north.

That is the fragile area and the problem at NATO. In the Defense Ministers meetings they tend to talk in the generic and not the specific. At lower levels they talk in the specific. What they need to mandate out of this next summit is to get at the specifics of the tradeoffs so that we can get the corrective in this most vulnerable area in the north, which is not primarily our forces. Our reinforcements according to the scenarios we draw, will probably never arrive in time in the face of this blitzkrieg-type capability.

So I am saying we are not talking about vastly more money for the United States Army for conventional defense; we are talking about tradeoffs, getting allies moving by thinking collectively, building a joint allied fund so that we restore flexible response at the most basic level in the Northern Army Group, the most vulnerable area to attack, with a ready force that is transferred to NATO's integrated command at Military Vigilance. With this force you have not only created a signal, but you get some capability.

That is just one example of five corrective measures that we have for that Northern Army Group area. But simply to improve the U.S. Army's conventional defense will not necessarily affect that business one bit. We have to have a strategy of tradeoffs, of multiplier effects, and allied cooperation. And that is what this summit in early March needs to mandate.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. I am a little bit flabbergasted by some of the things you have said here this morning. I do not question them. I think you are probably right. But let me ask, you have indicated several deficiencies that I would certainly expect the military commanders to have already acted upon—maldeployment, NATO command and control.

I was interested in your second point in the testimony, at page eight. Let me read that back to you again because this is a pretty damning indictment of our situation, it seems to me.

Second, growing Soviet strengths are matched against key NATO weaknesses, such as maldeployment, readiness and sustainability, especially in the Northern Army Group area, which compounds the dangers of a shorter-warning attack scenario. In peacetime, for example, more than 50 percent of NATO's active brigades are out of their core sector and/or stationed more than 100 kilometers from their general defense position.

Then you go on. "Mr. Chairman, let me speak plainly." I already thought you were speaking pretty plainly.

The potential military instability in North Germany is there and growing, in part due to this forward-deployed Soviet armor configured for a lightning attack, but the instability is in part due to NATO itself. NATO has allowed the Soviet threat to be matched not by strength but by maldeployment and ready forces in this very same critical area of northern Germany. Only we, not the Soviets, can be criticized for this self-created vulnerability.

What on earth did the NATO commanders say when you read that to them? I hope you told them that. What was their response?

What have they been doing? Somebody is wrong. Either they are wrong or you are wrong, and I will add I think you are probably right. What on earth are we doing with maldeployed forces over there, lacking sustainability, and readiness?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. General Rogers and General Galvin are equally concerned.

Senator GLENN. Well, they need to be more than concerned. What are they doing about it?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. The problem is not them. The problem is that we ended up in part with this deployment for historic reasons with the Americans in the south since the end of World War II. At the time that we pulled back forces during the Vietnam war, the Dutch and the Belgians pulled back 60 and 80 percent of their forces.

And in those days this situation was not critical because we had done quite well to have the capability to meet a longer-warning attack, the kind of attack that was the greatest threat in the 1960s. It is this forward deployment that has created a new danger that is not adequately perceived.

The correctives cannot come from the Supreme Allied Commander/Europe or Supreme Allied Commander/Atlantic. They have to come from political decisionmakers. By the way, there is nothing—I think I am quite correct in saying this—in Senator Levin's report which conflicts with this analysis. The good news is that we think corrections are possible if we will move now politically at the top level. It is an unevenness that was not of a danger 20 years ago or 10 years ago, but is going to be of enormous danger in the 1990s.

Senator GLENN. Let me address very briefly this political will that you talk about because I think that feeds over into another area. In the post World War II era we have been determined not to permit Soviet expansion around the world, and we sought to provide worldwide stability so that everybody could recover economically. We had the Marshall Plan and we assisted Japan, very successfully.

By and large, this economic missionary effort was very successful, to the point where a lot of those nations are now outcompeting us. And there is a great impression in this country, that Europe is still trying to freeloader off the United States in the defense sector.

Now we retain our forces in the Far East, but at the same time we have shifted resources to the Persian Gulf. The allies are helping there a little bit now after a slow start. We are spending somewhere between \$400 million and \$500 million a year, by current estimate, in the Persian Gulf.

But Congress has initiated legislation such as the Mansfield annual proposal to withdraw from Europe. Even our Chairman, Sam Nunn, in a moment of frustration several years ago, introduced legislation which I supported to withdraw a number of our forces from Western Europe to send a message that we expected the allies to do more on their own.

Chairman NUNN. Unless they took the steps to correct the problems that Ambassador Abshire is identifying that have been identified now for about 12 years in a row.

Senator GLENN. That is right.

Chairman NUNN. This is not something new. This has been going on for years and years and years. I was about to say that the Ambassador was endorsing the "bad" Nunn amendment a minute ago when he emphasized something had to be done.

Senator GLENN. I know you are familiar with my SDI amendment. The Europeans would not support SDI. So the President, in effect, bought them off by giving them SDI research money without requiring the allies to contribute research money. Well, we successfully fought that out on the floor, and so we have some restrictions on that now. We know how our allies viewed SDI research. In West Germany, they sold the SDI program by placing the research program under the Economic Ministry rather than the Defense Ministry.

Anyway, we now find the Warsaw Pact nations expanding their superiority, and NATO still turns to the United States and basically says, "what are you going to do about it?" They are not really doing that much on their own, and they still have, this big brother-little brother concept that is no longer valid.

Military strength only comes as we have a strong economic base. Once we were the only dominant economic power, and we chose to take the responsible course. Now we are less economically dependent in the world, and our impression is that Europe is still dependent on us while doing very little on their own.

What is Europe's response to the Warsaw Pact's superiority besides just asking the United States to do something? Are we more concerned about it than they are? They are the ones that are going to get overrun if something happens. I would think they would be terribly disturbed about this problem and are doing something about it. Instead, they seem to turn to us. What is the response to that?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Senator, we took this net assessment around Europe, and I want a classified net assessment that the Secretary General and the NATO commanders take to capitals, to finance ministers and others, to discuss the specifics of it. The problem is that at the top level these things are generalized. There is a discussion of shortage of ammunition. There is a discussion of lack of air defense. But you do not get down to the Belgian First Corps and where it is deployed.

The big problem is with the smaller nations, and a more creative collective approach has got to be used to deal with these critical problems. Let me explain. In the 1950s, we had an air defense problem. We had a very creative SACEUR, (General Norstaad). He said this could not be solved on a national basis; we moved on a collective basis.

In the 1960's, we had a problem on the flanks and through a joint fund they put together something called the ACE Mobile Force. And then we got into a surveillance problem, and in a joint effort we put together the AWACS.

We have looked at this particularly precarious area and we have come up with about six measures that should be done collectively, not simply left to the Dutch or the Belgians. I do not mean this in terms of letting them off the hook; I mean it in terms that this now is the critical area, and a joint fund, such as the Infrastructure Fund, is needed to get this enhanced ready force. I would also like

to see us take some of our less-preferred ammunition that is in existence and make that available to SACEUR, and to better review the whole logistics system.

We have got about six measures there that can get at this problem, but most involve a new mental attitude to developing collective solutions rather than simply going through the defense ministers meetings and generalizing how bad things are. And I think we are close to being able to do that. I think Manfred Woerner understands these conventional problems. We have discussed this report with him, as we discussed it with all of the NATO Ambassadors.

But most of the past NATO briefings have not been put in terms of these specifics.

Senator GLENN. My time is up but, I would just make one comment. This is very disturbing to me. I am glad to have your testimony this morning. What it tells me is that if war started in Europe we would be forced to use the nuclear option sooner rather than later. If we are this disorganized and the Soviets are getting stronger, it means that the likelihood of the nuclear threshold being passed early on in any conflict is enormous and growing.

Mr. KARBER. It is even worse, Senator, in that when we talk about the modernization of the battlefield and short-range systems, if you look at where those systems are, 60 percent of those systems are with U.S. forces on 25 percent of the front.

If one looks where NATO's battlefield and short-range systems are, they are not up in the north (not in near the density that they are in the south) where the major threat is. So one could face a situation with those northern forces being overrun in which there is not the tactical or short-range systems to actually try and halt that threat militarily. It is one of the reasons why the Europeans like to depend upon a symbolic capability that could help to hit deep into the Soviet Union.

If I could, Senator, on your point, neither the Ambassador nor I would try and let the Europeans off the hook. But there is a couple of points that we as Americans I think need to be sensitive about. If you look back 30 years ago, United States forces in Central Europe represented 47 percent of NATO's conventional capability. The Soviets also represented 47 percent of the forward Warsaw Pact forces capability.

Today, the United States represents only 27 percent of NATO's forward-deployed assets. The Soviet Union has grown to 57 percent. That is evidence of the superpower commitment to their respective alliance bloc. The United States has been going down; the Soviet Union has been going up.

There is only one NATO country on the central front, with forces in Central Europe, in the last 15 years that has pulled out a brigade. You know what country that is? It is the United States. The United States withdrew an active forward defense brigade in 1984 so that we could man the GLCMs with that manpower pool under the manpower ceiling.

We pulled out. We withdrew conventional combat capability to put the GLCM's in. Now one could think, as a European, that was going on at the very time, after 7 years of us selling them on doing more, and their perception is, every time we do more, then instead

of being for the common defense you, the Americans, draw down your conventional capability.

Senator GLENN. My time is way over now, but when you say that we are maldeployed, not ready and not sustainable, the percentages do not make much difference.

Chairman NUNN. I believe next on the list under the early bird rule would be Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome to this committee. It was an excellent presentation. I am one of those who would be willing to submit to the additional slides, because I think it is a very important presentation.

In fact, it is a rather striking contrast to the report that I just read that was prepared by Senator Levin. And I might add, it was prepared by Senator Levin. It was not a subcommittee report, since the minority did not participate in that report. Otherwise I have some confidence there might have been some minority views.

But I only have 6 minutes and I would like to give Mr. Karber some questions, and ask you to either provide detailed answers for the record or begin to address them during the time that I have.

Mr. Karber, I would like for you to address the problems you see in the data and methodology on the NATO and Warsaw Pact balance and this year's IISS military balance and in the report issued by Senator Levin, what you feel the correct data and methodology should be in each of the areas touched upon in Senator Levin's report, and what you feel that the major weaknesses or mortgages in each Central Region army and air force that would have to be corrected to provide NATO with a robust conventional option. Let me define a robust conventional option here as the ability to fight a theater-wide war in the forward area of the Federal Republic of Germany for at least 2 weeks.

I would also like you to address the current rate of comparative modernization that you now project in NATO and Warsaw Pact Central Region forces, discussing only those improvements actually reflected in recent force changes, productions and procurements, and force plans. I will provide you with these questions in written fashion.

Could you give us your initial views and then provide detailed comments for the record on the comparative rate of improvement in the Warsaw Pact conventional balance and short range theater nuclear balance, and on the comparative trends in NATO and the Warsaw Pact nuclear strike and short range nuclear force modernization?

On the issue of surprise attack, could you describe in detail the problems in the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance that contribute to the Warsaw Pact surprise attack capability, which I think you did some of today.

I may have other written questions for you, but I would be grateful if you could give priority in your oral response to my question about the problems you see in the data and methodology used in Senator Levin's report.

Mr. KARBER. I am glad you slimmed it down, Senator. All in 6 minutes?

As Ambassador Abshire said, I think there is a lot of similarity to many of the conclusions between our own assessment and many of the conclusions Senator Levin has in his report.

But I would not subscribe to the tenor of the Levin report. Really, two things would bother me about that report. One is in the bashing of bean counting, though the Levin report relies very heavily on bean counting. I am an old bean counter from way back, and I am proud of it.

To me, counting beans is essentially rules of empirical evidence. The alternatives to bean counting are appeals to authority or appeals to emotion. What the bean count is to me is consistency, comparability of data, and transparency of assumptions and analysis.

There is no reason why a bean count needs to be merely an appeal to Soviet quantitative superiority. In fact, Senator Levin's report uses a large number of quantitative indicators, not just to measure quantity but to measure readiness, quality of weapons systems.

And I think that is good. I mean, I think it is a healthy way to conduct analysis. My complaint would be that by my count the majority of them were based on data that was in my view actually wrong, or inconsistent, assumptions which I could not figure out.

So they were not very transparent, with substantial problems of inconsistency and comparability of the data. That is, when you are looking at an analysis of the juxtaposition of forces, you define the question in such a way that the answer is whatever answer you want it to come out. But to me, that is not legitimate. I do think that is a real fundamental problem in understanding conventional forces in the United States.

I think it is a shame that the Department of Defense, with all its resources, has not put out its own detailed, comparative, consistent analysis of the balance on the central front, unclassified.

Instead we rely on, say, the IISS and civilian institutions, or we put out glossy documents that merely show U.S.-Soviet comparisons, which really do not help. And so in a lot of ways you cannot complain when civilian analysts or non-insiders do their best to make assumptions and guesses and come out with the wrong answers.

Having said that, there are in my view some significantly wrong answers in the Levin report. For example, it describes NATO as having four times as many modern tanks as the Warsaw Pact, using a definition as to when the tank was designed. But the data base that it draws on gave dates for Soviet tanks without taking into account the significant upgrades of those tanks. While that analysis did take into account western upgrades, it did not take into account eastern upgrades.

And so by putting a date on a T-64 tank for 1966, one gets the impression that it is a 20-year-old design. In fact, that vehicle was redesigned and reentered into production with composite armor, a new barrel, a new gun, a laser range-finder, and now retrofitted with reactive armor that makes it a qualitatively different tank, and that came out of production in the late seventies and going into the early eighties.

So those of us who track those numbers, whether it is the T-64B or the T-72M, and see them forward, we see those as modern

tanks, as "survivable-killers" against our antitank weapons, and they concern us.

And yet, I cannot totally blame other analysts who are not on the inside, who look up in authoritative sources and it says, oh, this is an old tank. And the tendency is to say: Oh well, gee, therefore we have a lot more modern tanks than they do.

In fact, if one uses truly comparable numbers and asks the same question Senator Levin asks, since 1975, how many modern tanks have been introduced in the forces of the two sides, and what is the ratio, instead of being 4 to 1 in our favor it is 2 to 1 in their favor.

On the central part of the northern plain of Germany, the part that the Ambassador and I have been talking about, that ratio of modern "survivable-killers" is 4 to 1 in their favor.

So from my view, it was not an illegitimate question. It needs a legitimate response. Hopefully, the committee will be able to have some closed testimony from the Department of Defense, because they have got the numbers, they know how to count them right, and somebody will ask them.

And I think having a closed hearing would—you do not have to take my word for the data—would give you a perspective on it.

So what I am trying to say is I think there is a tendency in the Levin report to rely on that open material and write off what we see as a major trend that has been going on.

But in terms of the questions that are asked, the focus of analysis of what are the right areas that ought to be looked at, I think that report serves as very useful framework. It is not a lot different than the framework that we used.

And so hopefully the Levin report could be treated as a hypothesis, raising questions and trying to get people in authority to provide answers.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. I will look forward to receiving your written comments and data.

Chairman NUNN. Senator McCain, your time has expired.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Next is Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Karber, I believe last fall that at the conventional hearing you spoke of INF a bargaining chip in dealing with the conventional imbalance was INF. Did we give away our trump card?

In other words, what are we going to do now to leverage the Soviet Union in Vienna on conventional reductions?

Mr. KARBER. Clearly, the Soviets had a major incentive to want to get the INF Treaty, more than I think anybody guessed, looking back at it. And for those of us who have lived with the balance for the last 20 years, we sort of grew up thinking of nuclear weapons, not for their own sake, but nuclear weapons to compensate for the conventional imbalance.

NATO strategy is a vertically integrated strategy. We are saying "direct defense," try and have sufficient conventional capabilities to prevent a surprise attack, but if after they massively reinforce, if they should break through we should have the option of "deliberate escalation."

If they come back with deliberate escalation and start blowing Western Europe off the face of the map, then NATO's strategy,

current extant NATO strategy, invokes "general nuclear response." That is, American strategic forces hitting the Soviet heartland.

Maybe that strategy needs to be changed, but that is the current NATO strategy. The problem is that we have essentially approached arms control on a horizontal axis strategic to strategic, theater nuclear INF forces to INF forces, conventional to conventional.

We could probably get away with it at the strategic level for quite a while. The problem is, as you work down into the theater force level there is some point where that continued horizontal negotiation cuts across, in essence severs in half your own strategic concept.

So it seems to me that it is imperative that we aggressively take a position relating conventional arms control discussions with nuclear discussions. Now, one could ask, are there some positive elements in the INF going on, and I think there are.

I think in a way there is high risk, but also high potential payoff. In this sense, the INF Treaty is much more high stakes arms control than we have ever played before. In terms of high payoff, by having that treaty it does help establish an era of negotiation in Europe. It brings attention in the alliance to the very issues that we are discussing here and hopefully will be remedied.

It has led Gorbachev to be the articulator of conventional arms control, and it is he, not us, who has been saying: OK, come let us get together and try and resolve our concerns on conventional imbalances. And I do not think we can assume that he is not interested until we at least try him out.

So if I have a criticism, it is not that we necessarily did INF first, but now that we are in the process of ratifying INF we ought to be able to articulate forcefully to ourselves, to our allies, and to the Soviets what it is we would like them to do if they were willing to do it.

Senator SHELBY. Doctor, what if we go to the triple option there, which looking at the German political scene that is not impossible. If that happened and there is no real breakthrough in the imbalance on conventional weapons, what have we wrought?

Mr. KARBER. I said high payoff, high risk. I think there are three down sides of the high payoff, high risk, three potential areas of risk.

One is that we will not hold tough and do the nuclear battlefield modernization that we said we wanted to do for the alliance. If we do not, in essence then INF is changing our strategy, whether we admit it or not.

The second big danger is, if we do not try to remedy our conventional vulnerabilities by being smart and not throwing money at the problem, but being smart with some of these conventional problems.

The third is if we cannot articulate a militarily significant conventional arms control option. The irony is that Gorbachev has been waiting for a year and we have not answered him. We are the ones who are wasting the time, we in the West, in being able to respond.

And I think we need to get with it.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Senator, I think that we have tremendous potential leverage if we will use it. Marshall Kulikov and others are frightened to death that we may apply a creativity in the use of our smart technologies.

Senator SHELBY. Like what?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, all of the complex that makes up follow-on forces attack, things that are in the Nunn-Warner program, and in the Balanced Technology Initiative, the Competitive Strategies work that is being done at the Pentagon, and the Conference of National Armaments Directors work.

I am sorry that Senator Glenn has left because I could talk about the good news at NATO. It has gotten its central headquarters organized now to make better use of its resources. Five or six years ago that was not so.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, just a few minutes ago you were talking about how their tactics were not working, about the maldeployment there, nothing had been done about it for 12 years.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. In the Northern Army Group area, we have a maldeployment situation that cannot be taken care of with smart technologies. I am an old infantry man. That situation should be taken care of with redeployments. That is common sense.

I think this is something that we can get at in the next go-round at NATO. That is one reason we have produced this assessment.

But in terms of the tactical concepts on the use of these smart weapons, we know from intelligence and from reading the Soviet literature that they think, perhaps wrongly, that we might be able to reverse the conventional balance. They have been very worried that we will be smart enough to take the investment in the Strategic Defense Initiative—I am not talking about the basic systems, I am talking about looking at the translations of sensor technology, of robotics, a range of things—and get those translated to battle-field capabilities.

And that not only can help us get with the second echelon attack, but can also help us manage this first echelon attack. Emerging technologies will help us get at the second echelon attack in terms of interdiction. This will provide tremendous leverage, just like the Strategic Defense Initiative that has driven the negotiating agenda onward in these other areas.

Emerging technologies at the tactical level can help provide conventional negotiating leverage because the Soviets know if we get organized they cannot compete on that level.

Senator SHELBY. My time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I would like to try to get your perspective on several procedural aspects of the conventional arms control subject. I recall when I was in the Department of Defense Stanley Reyser sailed off, I think in 1973, to start the MBFR talks, which have now gone on for some 14 years.

I now read statements by leading political figures in our country that we must link the arms control talks with any INF Treaty or START Treaty and the like.

Let us come back specifically to my first of three questions. I have tried in the last few weeks to talk to several of the U.S. Ambassadors who are directly responsible for the commencement of these new rounds of talks to take place between the 23 nations.

There seems to be on the surface a difference of viewpoints between the Department of State and the Department of Defense on just how we are going to bring together these talks. One group is now discussing the framework of the talks. If they agree, I understand, the matter goes to the CSCE, which will link the talks, so I am told, with a variety of issues relating to the Soviet Union, including human rights.

If it successfully emerges from the CSCE, then a new forum will be established with the 23 nations.

Could you enlighten me on your understanding of the procedure by which our Nation together with others begins to address the conventional arms control issues?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, this has been a difficult subject because of the French position that they wanted these arms talks directly under the framework of CSCE. And it has been the correct position of our Government that we need a very tight framework. An initial compromise was worked out with the French when the Deputy Secretary General of NATO chaired what is called the High Level Task Force, so that we could have a NATO caucus.

Now, in this grey area at Vienna there is an attempt to protect this framework while having some vaguer connection with CSCE. I think part of the answer in resolving this is getting the French more serious about conventional defense, which I believe is coming.

Senator WARNER. Let me move on. Realistically, when do you think the talks will start in earnest amongst the 23 nations?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, Mike Moodie says CSCE will not conclude its review until after Easter, and at the earliest it will be in the autumn. But my concern is that we are organized at that point substantively.

Senator WARNER. If I understood him, I think he said in autumn. That corroborates a viewpoint that has been given to me, and that is on the assumption it can get out of CSCE linked with a variety of other issues, which are regional, human rights, and the like. Is that not correct?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Karber, do you wish to enter into this at all?

Mr. KARBER. I would just point out that the MBFR talks are still alive. We have not formally closed them. That is another option that one can think about.

Senator WARNER. Revitalizing MBFR?

Mr. KARBER. Neither we nor the Russians have closed it down. It is still on the table. In fact, our negotiator for the stabilization talks has the same hat for MBFR. So there is another mechanism of not being held hostage or blackmailed to one ally.

Senator WARNER. Ambassador Abshire, do you want to amplify on my earlier question?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Mike Moodie was correctly emphasizing that the problem with CSCE is the clarification of the mandate,

and once the mandate is clarified then we are back to that strong structure of discipline that I mentioned.

Could I add a footnote? It is very important to develop a conceptual conventional arms control framework for the stability talks. We are working on that at CSIS, and we have most of the people in government involved in these discussions.

What we would hope some months from now is to have a framework—

Senator WARNER. I want to try to get two more questions in in this brief time.

Do you gentlemen feel that the discussions of linking the outcome of these talks to either INF or START is a realistic approach?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. No.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Karber.

Mr. KARBER. I will not comment on how realistic it is in terms of American politics. I think I will phrase it in terms of the question earlier about Soviet motives. I cannot think of any more compelling motive to the Soviets than to have the two linked.

But in a way, linking them is a bit unfair since we are the ones who are not able to articulate what it is we want. So until we can, it is kind of hard to say—

Senator WARNER. That leads me to my next question. We are talking about a forum getting under way in the autumn with the schedule as outlined by the President. INF will hopefully be completed by early to mid-spring, with START moving right along thereafter in some comparable timeframe, probably concluding some time in early fall, at which time we may be able to obtain from CSCE the mandate and the charter just to begin these arms control talks.

Now, the last question is, how do we establish this baseline? We have our distinguished colleague Senator Levin, who has done his work. We have your work. There seems to be a considerable disparity.

How do we begin to set a baseline so we can commence the talks in the autumn?

Before you start going into a series of talks, you must know what you want to talk about, and you must establish a baseline. You see the obvious differences between Senator Levin's perspectives on this, Senator McCain's perspective.

Are we going to be able to reconcile enough of these disparate viewpoints to have a baseline to go into those talks by autumn?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. My point, and then I would like Mr. Moodie to say something, is that I think that unlike what we have done in the history of arms control heretofore, we should not back into ad hoc positions. We need a conceptual framework for stability, and it is against that that we should judge proposals.

And that is what we need before the autumn.

Mr. MOODIE. If I might just add, Senator, that since last summer NATO itself, the international staff in particular, has been working on an exercise to generate the necessary data base that is agreed by all 16 allies that will serve for NATO as the baseline, the agreed baseline upon which it would begin to develop its position for these forthcoming talks.

So NATO itself and the International staff have been working on the figures, on their analysis of this, and it will be getting that agreed to by all 16 members that will then serve as a basis.

Senator WARNER. What is the likely timeframe in which that would occur?

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MOODIE. They have got some agreement on the eastern data already, and they are now in the process of agreeing on the numbers for the NATO side.

Mr. KARBER. The disagreement, Senator, is much more on what it is we want than on the data. The people who have access to the information—there is far less difference between countries on what the data is when they really play “peek-a-boo” and look at the intelligence. Virtually everybody confirms that.

There are a lot more apparent differences than real differences.

Senator WARNER. We are holding out to the American public and the world that this is an achievable concept, conventional arms control. I do not see the building blocks getting in place quickly enough within the timeframe that the public expects it.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, thank you very much.

I would completely agree with that last observation.

Senator Levin.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a procedural question? I am aware that nongovernment witnesses usually do not supply answers for the record, and I would request that these witnesses would be allowed to provide those answers to questions for the record if they would choose to do so.

Chairman NUNN. Well, certainly we always do it on more or less a voluntary basis. We ask them. What I do not like to do is have somebody who has given their own time come up and we load them down with a huge number of questions for the record.

But whatever the witnesses are willing to undertake, we would certainly cooperate with the Senators in doing that.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. And I think Mr. Karber and Dave Abshire have done so much work on this that they have all the answers, I would imagine.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. It just takes three hours.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join in welcoming our panel. Ambassador Abshire, in your written testimony you indicated you were struck by the similarity of your study and my study. I am too, may I say. I think the conclusions are indeed very similar.

I wonder if you could amplify on that.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I think both studies get at the heart of the problem, which is the basic instability which has been created in the Northern Army Group area. This is something that was not there in the 1960's to the same degree because of the recent forward concentration of Soviet armor. NATO's maldeployment and other sustainability problems created by particular political circumstances also contribute to the instability of the situation in northern Germany.

Second, I think your report and our report see the beginning point of managing the problem. I am not saying it will be, but can be managed. And you say it can be managed.

The beginning point in managing this is to start with lower cost and in some cases no cost measures. Now, we toured Europe, our group, and we found that the way to put people off, and I am sure the way to put the Congress off, is to start with talking about billions of dollars.

And what we are saying is if it is a choice between billions of dollars and being smarter in our approach, we would rather be smarter with the existing resources. If we prove to be good stewards of the resources we have, we can go to the public to get more money. So I think that is a second very basic similarity in approach.

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, I only want to suggest that I think I heard the majority leader say earlier this morning there would be the regular order on these rollcalls. If that is the case, I would like to tell my colleagues that this is a 15-minute rollcall.

Chairman NUNN. I think you are absolutely right. They are not going to hold the vote open at all. So when the 5 minute bell goes off, we will recess at that point in time.

We will let Senator Levin finish.

Senator QUAYLE. You will recess and then come back?

Chairman NUNN. We will recess and then come back.

Senator LEVIN. As I understood Mr. Karber's testimony, while he has disagreement with the tank analysis in the appendix—and I think reasonable people can differ on that—the point is that we have to look at quality issues. It is not just the quantity that you look at. We have to look at quality issues.

We have to look at interoperability issues. We have to look at reliability of allies issues. We have to look at sustainability issues. We have to look at readiness issues. We have to look at the issues you have pointed out, the most important being that deployment of forces which are threatening to us in Eastern Europe. That is the point of it.

So I think Mr. Karber's point could be agreed to or disagreed to as to whether or not the exact item in the appendix relative to the quality of tanks and whether the pre-1975 or 1965 tanks of the Soviets are indeed much better than indicated there. I think that is a point which one could make fairly.

But I gather that his testimony also was that he thought the approach, the matrix which was used, that you have to look at a number of components of the conventional balance, is a useful matrix to apply. And I am wondering if you would comment on that.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, we agree. In fact, you stole our line without knowing it. Our whole aim in this endeavor, in taking this exercise around Europe, was to get people to go beyond the numbers and force ratios and quantitative data. Because if one doesn't go beyond that it is impossible to develop an investment strategy to correct the specific vulnerabilities and one is left wasting money.

Senator LEVIN. One of the areas that you have looked at and we have looked at is the question of how you can buy some critical

time. There is a threatening deployment of forces on the east side of the inter-German border. In fact, that is the number one factor that we point out and the number one problem that arms control has got to solve or at least try to solve.

A number of approaches have been taken to address that, including the arms control approach, including redeployment which you point out, to have a ready force available. And I, by the way, think that is an excellent idea. I am all for it, including a fund to provide for the sustainment for that force, which I happen to support.

One of the things which we have looked at which is very cheap, but politically sensitive in Germany, is the tank barrier issue, which might buy us a few days. It is not a very long term remedy, obviously, but it might buy us a few days.

Is that a possibility, that the tank barrier approach could be used?

AMBASSADOR ABSHIRE. Let me comment first and then Phil. I very strongly believe in that. We, for diplomatic reasons, call it terrain enhancements, because the Federal Republic of Germany looks towards unification in theory and they do not like to think of barriers between them and East Germany.

I think this is a perfect example of a very low cost measure, and I believe that there has been some progress in a greater recognition in the Federal Republic of the wisdom of moving in this direction.

And let me say, when I speak about it in Germany I always emphasize that it is the Germans who wanted us to be committed to forward defense, not to trade space for time; therefore the terrain enhancements become a vital part of forward defense.

SENATOR LEVIN. Now, in my report of a trip I made to Europe, that I made to Senator Nunn and the other members of the committee, I suggested the following, which is fairly close to what you are talking about in your testimony, but slightly different, and I would like you to comment on it.

Perhaps Mr. Karber also would like to comment. I suggested there that we deploy multinational integrated battalions—

CHAIRMAN NUNN. Senator Levin, your question is very important. I think we ought to reserve the balance of your time and recess now, before we get into this, so everyone can make the vote. Senator Byrd is going to enforce the clock now, so we will be back in approximately 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

CHAIRMAN NUNN. The committee will come back to order.

We were right in the middle of Senator Levin's questions. Senator Levin, we interrupted you, so let me add one minute to your questions. Wherever you were, we will add one minute and go from there.

SENATOR LEVIN. In that case, you can interrupt me any time you want, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was in the middle of reading a recommendation which I had made to you in an earlier letter following a trip to Europe. I wanted to get the panel's reaction. It had to do with the following: recommending that we deploy multinational integrated battalions on or near the inter-German border.

The goal of such deployments—now I am just quoting my own letter—would be to ensure that a Soviet attack anywhere along the

border in any NATO core sector would immediately involve the personnel of numerous nations of NATO and always involve American forces.

The desired effect would be to increase the conventional linkages within the alliance, thus enhancing deterrence.

I wonder if you have a reaction to that. It is not quite the same as what you are talking about, because these would be battalions which would be stationed there all the time. For instance, it might be an American radio crew and a German something else kind of crew as part of a battalion. But they would be stationed there.

So it would not be something which comes quickly in the event of need. It would be something that if they hit us first, the battalion would be there wherever they hit and would thereby involve every NATO country automatically. Some of their boys would be there if the Soviets crossed the border.

Do you have a reaction to that?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Well, I will comment and then Phil will comment.

Let me say that our enhanced ready force is moving us in that direction, towards integration. I think that when you go up with the AWACS crews and you see the multinational performance, it is really inspiring.

And I think there is some merit in your proposal. I would take our ready force first, and go to an attempted full integration second. I think the deterrent effect of having those nations involved early on is very important, because we are so concerned about that decisionmaking process in crisis management.

And if you have got people on the ground being shot at, that involves countries quickly.

Senator LEVIN. If I could just interrupt your response, perhaps Mr. Karber, for a minute—these would be to some extent symbolic forces. They would not be fully-integrated NATO forces in all sectors.

This would just be battalions at various points along the border which would be integrated. So it is short of a fully integrated NATO force.

Mr. KARBER. Well, you raise an extremely valid point. When we visited the Germans, the German First Corps, as the Corps commander told us, is the strongest corps in Christendom, five full divisions.

The trouble is one division goes up north of the Elbe, another covers the Dutch until they arrive, another covers the British, and another covers the Belgians. So what happens if that attack should come and NATO has only started to mobilize and the strongest corps in Christendom is essentially spread out for 500 kilometers, and basically it is Germans fighting Russians? We have seen that movie before. But it is not healthy in terms of the alliance sense of shared risk. And I think you are capturing the essence of it in your question.

In terms of the solution, I would put a couple of points. One, a battalion is too small for combined national forces. The lower you go, the greater the inefficiency in doing it. So if one is looking for a combat potential—and frankly, I think we need all the combat po-

tential we can get—I prefer not to make it more inefficient or squander its combat potential by making it too low.

My own view is that going integrated with anything below a brigade is probably undoable. I mean, I just do not think it would happen or should happen.

But let me hit the second point, and that is the symbolism, because we have gone around this for 30 years in NATO with the first symbolic nuclear strike. I personally do not think we buy much with symbolism.

If the general staff is sitting looking, under some crisis conditions, at various options, the fact that we made a symbolic gesture I do not think is going to be as persuasive as having a realistic military capability.

In that sense, I do not agree with your solution, but I do not want to throw the baby out with the bath. The United States has a brigade up in the north. Right now that brigade basically goes to an assembly area and waits for ten days until the rest of its corps gets there.

I do not know why, if we should decide to bring back the brigade that we pulled out to put the GLCM's in, we could not put that brigade up in the north rather than back in the south, and perhaps even move another brigade from the south so that instead of having one brigade in the north we had three American brigades.

Then what you are talking about is not little battalions stretched out, but you are talking about an iron fist, division-sized counterattack force that is integrated with the forces up there.

And I could conceive of making that offer to the Europeans and saying: By the way, we do not want just one little Dutch brigade forward; we Americans will put those two brigades additional up in the north, and we expect the Dutch to add one of theirs.

In other words, every time the United States leads in the alliance, when we get out of the trench and say, follow us, we are doing something, and it is amazing what we get in return. Every time we sit back and lecture and manage and say, oh, by the way, you guys get out of the trench, that is when they sit on their hands.

So I think you have a good idea, but I would disagree with the more symbolic and lower level of it.

Chairman NUNN. I would have to say, Mr. Karber, I do not completely agree with you that every time we lead, we look around and they are following. I think every time we lead and we have a leash on them as we are coming out of the foxholes and we drag them with us and advance and make it a quid pro quo, that they follow.

But every time we lead, they usually sit in the foxholes and wave at us and say, cheers, fellows. We have been leading in a lot of respects where we have not been followed.

I mean, look at 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, what we did in those years. I do not see the following at all.

Rebuttal if you would like. That is not out of Senator Levin's time.

Mr. KARBER. In fact, I went back and looked. Every time a European country dropped their force commitments in the last 40 years of the alliance, every single time on the central front, it followed a United States drop. In 1968, it was the Belgians and the Brits and

the Canadians. The United States literally gave them the logic with our Reforger concept: We are going to pull units back, but do not worry; they can come back real fast. The Europeans turned around and ended up using our logic, our rationale.

The Brits used the same logic and rationale when they were taking men out of BAOR to send to Ireland, that we used in sending troops to Vietnam, saying: Well, they are going to get combat experience, toughen up our troops.

Back in the fifties, the same issue. Every cut that I could find has in fact—the logic and rationale for the alliance has been led by the United States. I am sure that many times we have led and they have not followed.

Chairman NUNN. You are saying when we move downward they follow. What I am saying is when we move upward I have not seen it. Where is the upward following?

Mr. KARBER. I think, for example, there has been some very good positive progress that, when we are worried about the threat, we tend to ignore. AWACS is one, the shelter program. The co-located operating bases, the German buy-up of new improved conventional ammunition. The Germans made a choice. They could add more quantity or they could add more quality, and they moved, with an enormous investment, from essentially zero to substantial stocks now.

Chairman NUNN. When was that?

Mr. KARBER. It has been going on the last four years, and it will be heavier by 1990. But they made the commitment to buy the new sophisticated ammunition.

Chairman NUNN. I know it was completely coincidental. Most of it has come since the "bad" Nunn amendment. Complete coincidence, no relationship.

Mr. KARBER. That is leadership, Senator.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Mr. Chairman, could I just put in one line?

I think, as compared to the past, the kind of U.S. leadership that is needed in the future is in a strategy on the better use of our resources, so that the whole alliance thinks more synergistically.

It is not just us putting in more; it is to come up with a way to maximize these kinds of tradeoffs and force multipliers with us taking the lead because of our larger base of technology. That is the kind of leadership for the future that is needed.

And the "good" Nunn amendment contributed a great deal to that.

Chairman NUNN. I guess both of you would agree, as we are leading out boldly, though, we should look over our shoulders occasionally to see if there is anybody behind us, would you not?

Mr. KARBER. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin, I have been taking all this time. What is the time situation? I would not deduct any from Senator Levin's time.

Senator Quayle, it is your turn.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to focus on a little bit of the testimony of Ambassador Abshire on what we need to do now and how we can proceed to move forward. I believe, to use your words—and I was not here to hear your testimony, so I use your words from the last time that

you were here—Mr. Karber may have used these words, too—is that we do not need a new commitment to NATO, we need a recommitment to NATO; and as we recommit ourselves, that we can use this INF Treaty to take a look at where we are on the conventional force and military balance and perhaps figure what we need to do.

We have had some discussion, and I think Mr. Karber went into it on some detail, on the importance, that we do not have the luxury of not implementing Montebello. It is long overdue and we have got to do that.

What I am looking for is an initiative that we can begin to take to our European Allies, picking up on the Chairman's words, just to see how much they are willing to come out of foxholes and whether they are willing to follow, and whether we can collectively come to an agreement.

A time schedule for that looks like March 2 or March 3, when the President is going to be going over there. And what I am looking for is if not a package, but an initiative that we could begin to talk about in rather specific terms.

And what I have just laid out for discussion purposes is a NATO defense initiative that is not terribly complicated but rather simple and direct. First, it does implement the Montebello decision that we can reduce, but we have to modernize, that we must in fact maintain a nuclear deterrent, which I hear Margaret Thatcher, Mitterand, Chirac, others talking about quite publicly, these days.

Second, on the conventional side, if you will take—and Ambassador Abshire, you referred to this as an excellent report in your testimony—the competitive strategies task force study, that talks about arms control cruise missiles, air-launched and sea-launched.

It talks about the importance of some air defense. It looks at, on a conventional basis, of getting smarter munitions and some enhanced artillery capability.

Those are some specific items, and I would just wonder if you might just comment specifically on those two elements, the implementation of Montebello and some of the specific weapons systems that have been mentioned in the competitive strategies task force study as a potential for an initiative that we could see what kind of cooperation we would get from our European allies.

Ambassador Abshire, what do you think of that type of approach?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. I think you are on the right track. And I think that, if there is a recommitment, it could come in the Nunn-Warner fund, the Balanced Technology Initiative fund, and the Competitive Strategies initiative.

I think if a compact with the Congress can be developed between the four committees on the hill and the Pentagon, it will become a part of this broader initiative. We need to do some of these low cost measures that we have talked about in the NORTHAG area, and support the follow-on forces attack concept. Those programs really form a package.

For example, if in the Appropriations Committee you get one or two or three knocked out of the package, you destroy the whole concept.

Now, we have testified before Congressman Chappell's committee, and there is a lot of understanding on how these programs fit into a concept. So this kind of commitment I think gives enormous leverage in Europe to synergize the alliance into moving into some of these other things that we were talking about.

I am sure Phil would have a comment.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Karber, do you have any comments on that, and specifically on the conventional cruise missile, the air and sea-launched, because the ground-launched we have basically given up in INF?

Looking at some air defense extended along the lines of what Manfred Wörner has been talking about, the extended air defense, smarter munitions, longer range conventional artillery, getting into the non-nuclear side, leaving aside the Montebello Decision—on those specifics, is this a way we ought to proceed, to try to address the conventional imbalance that both of you talked about?

Mr. KARBER. Yes, I think there are a number, and I would be glad to give you my set.

I will tell you my first one. It is interesting that for 40 years we have basically faced the Soviet armor threat and we have thought of every excuse and every alternative except building tanks ourselves: we depended on nuclear weapons, we are depending upon ATGM's, now we are going to depend on gee-whiz-bang.

It is amazing how we essentially avoid the fundamental issue that another tank kills an attacking tank real well and very efficiently. Now, I think we have got a very severe, in my own opinion, a very severe armor-antiarmor problem, particularly in Central Europe, particularly against NORTHAG.

The ATGM is only a fraction as effective as it was just a couple of years ago. We need a better fleet of armor that can penetrate Soviet tanks.

And if you asked me for my number one priority, it would be that. It would be a cross-national crash program, not a joint development pie in the sky, but a very real crash program with a 3-year drop-dead line to get something in the field.

That is how severe I think the problem is. Now, everybody accuses me of being Tanker Karber, so I will not focus on that only. But if you asked my priority, that would be the number one priority. We have got to stop that armor drive with things on the ground that kill tanks very well and can survive and move, and that is basically a tank.

I think there are several other areas. The cruise missile has a number of potential advantages. It allows us to disperse our basing better and not use our high performance platforms in very high risk profile missions over the eastern air defense.

It complicates Warsaw Pact air defense life a lot. They can be used very synergistically for the kind of air attack the Soviets at least seem to be planning, that is, where they will use frontal aviation to attack NATO's air defense belt, use the forward-based interceptors to escort the Smolensk Air Army bombers in against the high value NATO targets.

By having cruise missiles, the ability to attack the Soviet air bases—and we have a map like this that shows the air bases on both sides and the air defenses. If you look at where their air bases

are and where their fighters and interceptors have to regenerate to be able to fly the multiple missions that they are planning, the ability not to kill airplanes on their air base, but to disrupt the flow of the tempo of that air offensive has enormous potential.

And the cruise missile has some unique potential there. So I think there are some very strong advantages.

If that is not compelling enough, I will flip it around and point out what the other side is doing with the standoff cruise missile. We have tended to assume that we always have the unilateral advantage in new technology, particularly with munitions.

The Soviets are currently marrying up a very effective, a different type than we have, fuel air explosive with a large cruise missile and with surface to surface missile launchers. It puts out a very high peak pressure over a fairly large area.

It is extremely dangerous to our air defense sites and to our airfields. And as that comes on in numbers, not so many of their aircraft are actually going to be being shot down by our interceptors on our side of the border because they will be launching these things before they ever cross the border.

So the potential for substantial cruise missile technology is there. And the interesting thing is, the other side is probably closer to realizing it operationally than we are right now.

So if a conventional buildup for its own sake is not compelling enough, I will scare you to say—and I am not exaggerating—that the development of what they are doing in munitions is going to be our big hand-wringer, is going to be our big ulcer-causing concern 2 or 3 years from now, when suddenly everybody discovers the new Soviet munitions capability.

It is one of the areas, by the way, that is hardest for our intelligence to track, because you can see platforms, but it is very hard to know what is inside bombs or munitions. And it is only because the Soviets have been using these things very effectively—and it is not just the fuel air, it is a material called liquid fire, dispersible bombs—in Afghanistan that we have even the slightest idea how effective and significant it is.

And they have done things differently engineering-wise than we have, and they are turning out some very effective munitions. And the number one lesson when you talk about parity in munitions is when the other side has a superiority in platforms, because then the platforms multiply the effect.

And it is true with artillery munitions and it is true with air. So I think the cruise missile approach is important.

On the air defense missile or tactical ballistic missile, I think Manfred Wörner raised the right questions. There is a problem where we start spending ourselves silly. That is, we are worried about an armor threat, so we depend on expensive, high performance aircraft to intervene on the battlefield to offset our lack of tanks.

They then invest in surface to surface missiles that can attack our airfields and, if not kill our planes, at least greatly drop our surge sortie rate. So we then invest in an ATBM system to intercept their SSM's. It is cute, it is high tech.

The problem is we are typically speaking about \$40 to \$50 billion investments in an ATBM system to keep this daisy chain from hap-

pening, and when I turn around and say, my God, how many Leopard II's can I buy to stop the problem at the beginning, because if I can stop the tanks the rest of it does not really bother me?

So there is a point where we play the high tech game back and forth and spend ourselves into corners that are not in my view as productive as trying to go back to the first basic causes, which is how do you slow that offensive down. That is not a rationale against ATBM. It is more of an example of a warning that we need to keep in mind—what is the objective.

Senator QUAYLE. Could I have one quick follow-up there? I agree on the synergism between the air and the land but we also have the air battle, too, away from the land, and that is where an ATBM or extended air defense system protecting those airfields, and particularly as we now have fewer targets, taking the P-II's and the ground-launched cruise missiles out, I think we are going to have to think really hard about how we provide that extended area defense.

I think that is just another equation. We did not really get into that, and the Chairman noted it, too, on the air balance, which is a very important and complicated issue. And I just point that out.

Mr. KARBUR. It is particularly important and something that, without expanding on it, I would rather just give you a suggestion of where the committee look, and that is, GLCM's when they were introduced had a major benefit to NATO's conventional air capability in that it freed up our tactical fighters and our F-111's so that their commanders could commit them much more decisively at the most critical stage of the conventional battle than they had ever had before.

As the INF systems go out and you do not add additional aircraft in, you merely turn the aircraft back, rerole them back to nuclear missions, into dual capable roles, you end up cutting back the very conventional capability you thought you had increased over the last few years.

What I am saying is that the more fixed-wing aircraft are given a nuclear delivery role in Central Europe, the point that they are going to be needed—the point when their conventional capability is needed most is the very point that they will be standing down and not be able to participate when they are given a dual capable nuclear role.

So we need to think very seriously about how big is that impact of pulling off the INF systems and just giving them to the in-place theater fighter-bombers, because we are in essence cutting back, by at least one calculation cutting back FOFA to a level below where we were in capability when General Rogers first raised it, in other words putting it back eight years in capability, unless we add additional platforms or play smarter with some other systems covering those targets.

So to the extent that we do that—dependence on fixed-wing aircraft, and make that nuclear dependence on those systems much heavier—then they are also much more vulnerable, and the costs of dispersal and costs of protecting them go up substantially.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Could I just add? I think Phil has got the down side on INF very well placed conventionally. I think conventionally the up side is that, with the elimination of the SS-23's and

Scaleboard, billions of dollars that NATO would have had to put into developing an ATBM system under extended air defense will be greatly reduced. This is what Manfred Wörner talked about, Soviet preemptive capability, when he raised this subject 2 years ago at the Nuclear Planning Group.

But the costs would have been great, because the SS-23's, conventional and chemical capability to disrupt NATO's reinforcement of Europe by hitting ports and command centers would have been considerable.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, once again we greatly appreciate your being here. I recently was attempting in a probably awkward and inaccurate way to transmit to General Sir Brian Kenney, the commander of NORTHAG, the work that you all have been doing.

He is placing a number one priority on the issues of interoperability and was fascinated to hear of your work. And I sent you a note on that. I hope that we can assure that all the material from you gets to him.

He is arguing that, while discussions of greater cooperation occur perhaps at the political level, there has been all too little pressure coming from below, from the military of each one of the countries, demanding or requesting greater cooperation, greater interoperability. And he feels that that is his number one priority over the next 2 or 3 years, however long he is in that position.

So I just wanted to say that for the record. And we will figure out one way or another how to make sure that that material gets to General Kenney.

Mr. Karber, let me pick up a little bit on your discussion of the daisy chain. How much money gets spent on Army procurement versus, say, Air Force R&D? Is there a way of looking at whether or not we are encouraging the daisy chain by priorities that we place in the budget?

Should we break into the daisy chain by putting more emphasis on conventional procurement for the Army? Is there a way of looking at that, looking at those numbers, to maybe get a summary view of the daisy chain argument as you make it?

Mr. KARBER. I am not sure. The Army, by the way, for the last 5 or 6 years has had the lowest R&D budget of the three services, by a substantial amount, and I think probably the lowest procurement budget as well.

Senator WIRTH. But that kind of a comment should not be an aside, should it? If in fact the daisy chain that you talk about is a significant problem in terms of bleeding off resources that might be spent more accurately, should we be cutting into the daisy chain earlier by putting greater emphasis on that?

Is that the argument, you mean, putting greater emphasis on Army procurement and less emphasis elsewhere? Is that the conclusion of the daisy chain argument?

Mr. KARBER. That was not the point I was trying to make. When I made the daisy chain, I was really thinking more operationally.

Senator WIRTH. I understand what you were saying, but it seems to me you would come back to where priorities need to be set. It

seems to me that maybe that drives a different kind of analysis of the budget. Does it?

Mr. KARBER. It does. And the reason I am caveating or hedging here on you is you can do that in an auditor sense, put those priorities in, but they do not really mean anything unless the people who are implementing it have got the mission statement in their hand and they are trying to implement it.

I think, for example, of the late Carter administration when Ambassador Komer in his armament cooperation effort said: Hey, the U.S. Army needs an air defense gun; the Germans have a great air defense gun; let us either rent, lease, or purchase this German air defense gun, and we will put our R&D investment elsewhere.

We did not do that. We went out and decided to build our own as essentially a model of the German gun. It failed. Today U.S. troops still have the same air defense gun as we had in 1967, 20 years ago—worse than the Soviets, worse than our own allies.

And there was a management initiative that could have broken into the chain.

I guess what I am saying is, merely saying we are going to take money away from the Navy and give it to the Army misses the challenge—I think the real focus should be what is it that we want to be achieved?

It seems to me that we ought to pick four or five areas as high priority, find out not only for our own Army, but for the little guys as well—remember that 80 percent of Dutch and Belgian equipment they buy outside their country. It is somebody else's workers that are making it.

So we need to figure out—and that is why their efficiencies of scale and productivity are so low. It is costing them virtually double in a pain sense, a tax sense, of staying conventionally modern.

So it seems to me we need to think, in breaking the daisy chain, we need to say, where are our deficiencies. And they may not be strictly in the U.S. services. In fact, my own view, on the central front they are not.

And then the question is, how do we pick those deficiencies that we want to remedy so that the other allies can get healthy, too?

Senator WIRTH. Let me go back to your statement that what we want to do is pick our priorities and focus on what is the most important thing. This really gets us to basics. Yesterday, Secretary Schlesinger said that the first—to paraphrase him, that the first priority of a conventional defense was to eliminate the possibility of successful surprise attack by the Soviet Union or by the Warsaw Pact. He said that was our first priority.

In his testimony, Ambassador Abshire said that the key issue in controversy in the debate over the conventional balance is the issue of how NATO responds to warning, how, given a warning, how do we as western democracies respond, and do we respond in time and do we respond effectively.

Do not both the argument that you were just making, Mr. Karber, and your definition of key issue argue that we ought to have a priority placed on getting greater information about what the other side is doing, so that they are less likely to be in a surprise attack, so that we have more time for a political response?

And if time becomes a priority, does that not argue that we ought to focus more of our attention on the successes of Stockholm, if there have been some, and on further measures that ought to be developed to give us greater certainty or better information about what the Soviets are doing?

Now, I think I remember, Mr. Karber, that you have been something of a skeptic about the confidence-building measures coming out of Stockholm, and maybe you could give us a sense of your thinking on that and whether we ought to be pursuing a more aggressive regime of measures like that.

Mr. KARBER. I am all for glasnost and openness, and I think there are some aspects here that we could profitably pursue.

Senator WIRTH. I think this is very different from glasnost.

Mr. KARBER. I was saying that teasingly, but opening up the other side in terms of getting inspection regimes and a greater sense of confidence.

The problem is—and it is both—the two solutions that you mention, Senator, are both noteworthy. One is more intelligence and the other is faster alert through some kind of inspection regime.

The problem is that there is a point where the opponent's ability to move inside your own reaction loop is not a matter of intelligence; it is essentially a matter of your own strength, your own reaction ability.

It is a little bit about the argument that system analysts spend 95 percent of their time chasing the last five percent of the problem. And I think the ability to get a lot more out of intelligence or on-site observation, without either improving our own forces or reducing the unnatural offensive strength of the Soviets in Central Europe, is essentially working on that last bit. There is not a lot left to gain.

And I will give you an example—

Senator WIRTH. I do not think anybody is saying that one thing is mutually exclusive of another, but that they are done in concert and done in a cooperative effort; that if you do not do anything else, maybe you are working on that last five percent.

But if in fact you combine a greater emphasis on both sides having a better understanding of what the other is doing, the likelihood of a surprise attack being effective perhaps can be reduced, just as the likelihood of a successful attack is reduced.

Mr. KARBER. I do not think the issue is really surprise. Frankly, I think the American intelligence community will be able to come up to the Hill if there is a war, if we survive, and say: We were not surprised; we gave you clear, unambiguous warning, and here it was. The problem was that that clear, unambiguous warning was not enough time for us to really be able to use it.

When we met with General Rogers, his view was that confidence-building measures bought time in hours. The problem is that NATO today takes about 5 to 6 days of reaction time to get the defense in place.

I am not against an additional 24 hours, but what I am against is presuming that by having established a CBM that we can now relax and that we have solved anything more than 5 percent and not 95 percent of the problem.

So if we have meaningful reductions, confidence-building measures, on-site inspections and so forth can greatly increase our own sense of security that those reductions have taken place and are being met. But in the absence of substantial reductions, measures that buy us a legitimate 24 hours nevertheless, to the extent that they mislead us into thinking that we have bought more than that, it seems to me are very dangerous.

I cannot think of a confidence-building measure that we could put in place that the other side, when they finally have to deal with it, take our inspectors at the end of the runway and arrest them or shoot them, that it gives us much more than about 24 hours of alert.

And the trouble is that, if we have only got that 24 hours of clear, unambiguous reaction, it is too late. It takes us about 4 or 5 days to get our first rapid reactor air over. It takes us a good 3 or 4 days to get the maldeployed troops moving in. It takes another week to 10 days to get the terrain prep in.

Our time lines are too slow relative to the magnitude of the forward threat. So I am all in favor of increased intelligence and increased confidence, but we need to be very careful that we do not mislead ourselves. And to me that is probably the biggest danger, the internal one, just listening to the hyperbole that has been associated with Stockholm, as if it really has produced some meaningful level of stability on the central front. In my opinion it has not.

Senator WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, my time has long expired.

There is a lot of debate as to whether or not we get more than 24 hours. I think the evidence suggests that there are a variety of measures that give us more than that. And there is another school of thought, and we will obviously have the opportunity to explore this.

I appreciate that, Phil, and I look forward to a time you and I can sit down and talk about this more, which I would like to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Has everyone now had one round?

[No response.]

Chairman NUNN. I am just going to ask one final question myself. Ambassador Abshire, the summit conference of the NATO leaders is coming up in March, and I know that is something you have been very much in favor of and a promoter of for some time.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Since March 1987.

Chairman NUNN. You are just about one year behind.

The Abshire formula—and I would happen to agree with the Abshire formula. It should have taken place, I believe, prior to INF signature if at all possible.

But we are here now and the summit is coming in a month and a half. What would be your major suggested agenda for the top political leadership to address at the summit?

Ambassador ABSHIRE. First, they should reaffirm what I call Harmel revisited, where in 1984 and 1985 we said that strength comes first and negotiations follow. And I am dealing now with the conventional agenda.

So, to build that strength first, there should be a remit, (there is not time to do that much in the run-up to the summit) from the

Secretary General for an intensive, 4-month study to report to Defense and Foreign Ministers. The study should include first a re-examination of the military balance and identification of NATO's specific vulnerabilities, as well as our strengths and our accomplishments. Second, NATO must identify no cost/low cost remedies that can be commenced immediately. Third, in the technology area, we must continue this transmission belt that we have now successfully set up from the two funds I've mentioned, through Competitive Strategies and from the work being done in the Conference of National Armaments Directors.

There should be a review of the negotiating picture, with an attempt to get the French more involved in support of the High Level Task Force work and to see in general on the conventional level how the French might be more supportive.

There is a great deal that can be done there but it is a very delicate political subject.

On the third zero option, I think it is important to get a political pause. While I am very much against any kind of INF link to these improvements, and I think any INF holdup would be devastating to European cohesion at this time, I do think that third zero is something that should be reserved as we look at this conventional improvement.

Lastly, I think it is very important that a modality be worked out to show the bipartisan support of the Congress, plus continuity through this election period. And the simplest way to do that is a further link to a summit with the new President.

So just as Gorbachev was clever enough to bracket his work program and his grand strategy with two bilateral summits, we ought to bracket over a greater period of time a grand strategy with a summit geared to the election and after the election, because zig-zags in our policy at a time when Gorbachev is making himself increasingly appealing in Europe would be a very dangerous thing.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much.

I believe, Senator McCain, you are next on the second round.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Abshire, I think that you have done a superb job in recent years in preserving and improving the Atlantic alliance, and all of us appreciate the outstanding work you have done, both in and out of government.

As you may have heard, however, I think we need to start making a very clear distinction between real progress in improving our forces and capabilities and politics and studies. Your answer to the Chairman's previous question I think outlines for us quite well what I think needs to be done.

I think, however, that we need to make a very clear distinction between the fact that we and our allies are always making some improvements in our conventional forces and making the kinds of major shifts that actually change the military balance.

I would appreciate it if you could provide us for the record with a statement of what each individual NATO country in the Central Region would have to do to overcome the major weakness in its land, air, and naval forces, and the probability that those nations would indeed make that kind of commitment.

I think that such a detailed statement might give us substantial help, because I think it has a direct bearing on how we treat this particular Treaty. So if you would do that, I would appreciate it.

Mr. KARBER. I cannot take any more work. [Laughter.]

Senator McCAIN. Could you just discuss for us for a moment the military balance, the problems that you see in the military balance, as issued by the International Institute of Strategic Studies? What problems do you have with them?

The reason why I ask you that is because, as I was discussing with the Chairman earlier, we have an abundance of information and opinion on these issues, but the data and answers vary so much. We have gotten radically different views from a very prestigious organization such as yours, the Rand people, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Senator Levin's very important and valuable report.

We have to winnow out the truth. Along with you giving that answer, do you not think it might be nice, as the Chairman and I were discussing, if we could get this kind of assessment from the administration, from the Department of Defense?

Mr. KARBER. That is really—

Senator McCAIN. Excuse me. A credible net assessment.

Senator QUAYLE. If I might just interject, we had some closed hearings in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee from Andy Marshall's shop on the net assessment, which I thought was very, very good, and quite frankly does not subscribe to much of what was said in the Levin report.

Chairman NUNN. That was a real breakthrough for your subcommittee. We have been trying for years to get net assessments. I remember when Senator Goldwater was chairman we called for a net assessment and we had a briefing that purported to be a net assessment, and we both walked out shaking our heads.

But you did get Andy Marshall's—

Senator QUAYLE. We got Andy Marshall's testimony on the net assessment not only—and I think what Senator McCain is going to is a very fundamental point, as he asked Ambassador Abshire—on the ground imbalance, but we also had the air imbalance and a little bit of the sea. But the air imbalance was very, very important and instructive to me.

And so the Department of Defense is concerned I cannot go into a lot of detail because it was classified, but it is in the testimony.

Mr. KARBER. I think it is no accident that the Defense Reorganization Report of 1970 argued for two new offices to report directly to the Secretary of Defense: an Office of Long-Range Planning and an Office of Net Assessment.

Secretary Schlesinger implemented that blue ribbon decision, and if one looks at it, as the importance of having a net assessment has gone up, each successive Secretary of Defense has moved that kind of function lower and lower in his own bureaucracy, to the point that now people are discussing it disappearing altogether.

Senator McCAIN. Let me add to that if I could two points. One is that—and I think that Senator Quayle is right, there was a good briefing in that area. But it is vital to get unclassified reports.

Mr. KARBER. My point is you have to have it done well. If classified you have to have somebody able to declassify it and get it out.

And it strikes me that there is an institution designed to do that—OSD. I am not trying to make a cheap shot at other institutions, but the intelligence community is not capable of doing a net assessment, because they really cannot look at the details of U.S. forces.

U.S. services can't really do a net assessment because they live and die by a program that is budgeted around a given set of war plans and scenarios. So their ability to think of alternative scenarios or non-programmed contingencies or the unthinkable, it is like asking the wrong person to do it.

It can really only be done in an independent entity, and not be just for the eyes and ears of the executive. It seems to me that it should in closed hearings be available to the committees, and that in terms of the broader public debate that kind of material needs to get out.

The irony is that people are confused about the European balance because no official source in the West is giving them the real data on quality as well as quantity.

NATO tried when Ambassador Abshire was there and it finally fell apart because the Greeks and the Turks would not agree to talk to each other and release unclassified data on their own forces.

NATO cannot even get a public statement out on what the balance of forces is. And it seems to me that no wonder people are confused, no wonder that so many of the charts in the Levin report which borrow data from other places, 12 of 22 charts are wrong. I mean fundamentally inaccurate or misleading.

There is something wrong, and you cannot blame it just on the people who collect data. So it seems to me that the issue here is a fundamental issue, and that it is the administration, perhaps with some encouragement from Congress in pointing it out to them that must provide a comprehensive unclassified balance.

In terms of the institutions you ask about, they are laudatory.

Senator McCAIN. Before you get into that, let me just comment, and then I think it might be well if we would ask the Chairman if we could at least try again to get a comprehensive net assessment out of OSD this time, and one that could be declassified. The American people need to have this information, not just those of us who are privy to classified information.

I think it is crucial to get an unclassified net assessment in order to clear up a lot of the misconceptions that exist about the balance of forces and a lot of other information that I think the American people need to make these judgments, not only those of us that are in elected positions.

Chairman NUNN. I agree with the Senator completely, and I will certainly work toward that, with the Senator's help.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Please go ahead about the Institute for Strategic Studies.

Mr. KARBER. I have been critical of Senator Levin's data, and much of it came from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the London Institute. And they are a very good institution that have traditionally done work that no one else would do and been very helpful.

It just so happens that you have a confounding effect, and it is really surprising this year. They changed some methodologies, but

in little footnotes scattered throughout their basic annual report they at least explained a good number of the weird ways they were counting things.

People turn to that, and I can think of three studies that got international recognition—the Western European Union, another one called the Defense Trust in England, another one by the North Atlantic Assembly, not to mention Senator Levin's study—that took, each one taking from the other and compounding the misrepresentation and lack of understanding and inconsistency in that data, to the point of being very misleading and confusing. The reason I went apoplectic when I went over the data in Senator Levin's study, not the conclusions but the data, is because I know as sure as we have those stabilization talks when they finally start in Vienna, the first thing the Soviet delegation is going to do is say: Oh no, according to the U.S. Senate, quantitative numbers do not mean anything; you guys have us 4 to 1 in quality; why are you worried about our tanks?

They are going to take the Levin study and throw it on the table—they have done it before and they will do it again—and say quality offsets quantity.

And it seems to me that it is too important this time to allow ourselves to be confused either politically or publicly about what the nature of that imbalance is. It is too important to let bad data and sloppy work or inconsistency in assumptions be perpetuated.

What is amazing is to watch that progress of fallacious, bad assumptions and bad data go from one study to another to another, like a set of billiards balls. I will quit railing about it, but it has an enormous political effect.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Could I bring up a more basic reason on this net assessment business for the Congress, because I think some progress has been accomplished in reform at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and so forth. But we tend to view things service-oriented, Army, Navy, Air Force.

We are in a period of restrained resources, budgetary resources. We ran into that 4 years ago at NATO and that is why we began to argue that if you are going to correct the situation, you first had to do a specific net assessment of the problem.

The United States then was simply adding—was able to add to its defense budgets every year. Those days are over. Now, looking at this re-evaluation of our defense effort, it is now critical that we start examining, not just from a regional but from a global net assessment, what the problems, strengths, and vulnerabilities are, and move from there back to our resource base noting what our priorities and our national strategy should be.

So it is critical not just for the American people, but it is critical for the decisions for these committees, and it is critical in the fights over the allocations of the scarce resources in the Department of Defense.

But these things have to be viewed more as the commander in the field would view them, with another dimension, a timing dimension, a planning dimension, which has to come from the Pentagon.

Chairman NUNN. I see we have another vote up. I know we are not going to be able to come back now because we have another

hearing starting at 2 o'clock. I suggest we give Senator Wirth one question and Senator Quayle one question and then recess here.

Senator WIRTH. Let us just go vote.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Let me just ask my one question to try to clear up the confusion that Mr. Karber talks about and Senator McCain brought up, which I concur with. Can you give us in the committee your net assessment from your own personal judgment of what the European balance is today?

Mr. KARBER. Would you like us to sum it up?

Senator QUAYLE. What is the balance? That is what this whole discussion is about, because we have an issue. Some say it is an uneasy balance and some people feel that there is a significant disparity in conventional forces in the military balance right now between the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact-NATO pact.

The Warsaw Pact and the NATO pact, the conventional military balance, how would you assess it? What I want to do is try to clear up this confusion. I would like to get your terminology.

Mr. KARBER. I think that anybody who does "net assessments" ought to be asked to do it in terms of time, time really on two dimensions: one, historical (or trends) the other operational (or mobilization) time.

That is, all too often assessments are done as a snapshot. All too often, there is only one scenario or option looked at, and the power of looking at where you have been gives you a great sense of where you are going.

Senator QUAYLE. Put it both in historical and trend lines?

Mr. KARBER. I would sum it up in terms of what the change of NATO strategy has been, we have made progress on the threat that we were worried about, which was the 2-week rapid mobilization, the 90 divisions are coming. We have actually made progress and in my view we stand a better chance of stopping it and beating the heck out of it, if not killing it, than we ever have before. And that is progress we have made.

The threat is eking out on the short end of the stick, if you will, because of the forward imbalance. It is also eking out on the long end, just because they do have so damn much all the way back to the Urals that if they want to throw it all in and mobilize it for 60 days, there is a point where we finally run out of ammunition to shoot before they run out of tanks for us to fire at.

But we have made substantial progress in the threat that NATO considered and for the last 20 years has programmed its forces around. We should not just be impressed by it; we ought to give ourselves a pat on the back.

We have these other two we have to worry about.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Could I try one line? The major danger of the imbalance in Europe is an increasing instability as a result of short-warning attack capability. This instability can be corrected if we develop a resources strategy.

Senator QUAYLE. Is there a military imbalance?


Mr. KARBER. Yes, there is.

Ambassador ABSHIRE. Absolutely.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you both for your very helpful testimony.

We will stay in touch.

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Humphrey, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Brian D. Dailey, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, and David S. Lyles, professional staff members; Lucia M. Chavez and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig and William J. Lynn, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Edward M. McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Robert P. Savitt, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

This afternoon the committee receives testimony from two of its own members. We will refrain from putting them under oath this afternoon, since we have not been doing that with our other witnesses. We are pleased and delighted that they are here today. Senator Levin is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, and Senator Quayle is the subcommittee's ranking minority member.

Last year when Senator Warner and I developed the organization of the Armed Services Committee for the 100th Congress, we decided to broaden the focus of the subcommittees. We specifically chartered several subcommittees to oversee certain defense mis-

sions and geographic regions. The Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense Subcommittee has responsibility for overseeing the conventional dimension of a primary national security commitment, and that is the defense of NATO.

Senator Levin and Senator Quayle took that charter to heart and organized an excellent set of hearings last fall to assess the conventional military balance in Europe. Based on those hearings and other analyses, Senator Levin issued a well received report which he entitled "Beyond the Bean Count." For his part, Senator Quayle has proposed a NATO Defense Initiative, a 15-year program that would require a shift in NATO's military priorities in the post-INF environment.

Senator Warner and I feel that the subcommittee's hearings and the followup work of Senator Levin and Senator Quayle provide a valuable source of information to aid the committee in its overall review of NATO defense and the INF Treaty. We, therefore, asked both Senator Levin and Senator Quayle to appear before the committee today.

It is my understanding that "Beyond the Bean Count" is not a joint report, it is essentially Senator Levin's report. Senator Quayle will be commenting on Senator Levin's report or on his own views. At this stage we will ask Senator Levin to proceed and then we will follow with questions. We, will then hear from Senator Quayle, unless the parties desire to proceed in another manner.

Is that satisfactory?

Senator LEVIN. That is fine, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, is that all right?

Senator QUAYLE. He comments, I comment, and then we open it up for questions?

Chairman NUNN. That would be fine.

STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I welcome the invitation to appear in front of you and the full committee to share with you some of the findings of my report.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin, if you could pull that mike up as close as possible. You have to speak directly into the microphone.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the invitation that you extended to me to share some of the conclusions and findings of this report. As you indicated, it is a report which is based on a whole host of sources and materials, trips to Europe, trips around this country, in an effort to see if we cannot come up with a little more realistic assessment of the conventional balance between ourselves and the Warsaw Pact.

The reason it is entitled "Beyond the Bean Count" is because it is my belief that frequently what we see is an unrealistic statement simply of quantities, usually one or two charts, and that the realistic assessment of the conventional balance requires us to go beyond the one or two charts that we frequently see in the media which purport to sustain a conclusion that we are a conventional basket case in Europe.

As you yourself have put it, Mr. Chairman, if that is what we are, if we are simply a trip wire for nuclear weapons, then maybe it is time we acknowledged that and do something totally different with our resources. We are far more than a trip wire for nuclear weapons; we can maintain some significant conventional defense.

There are obviously weaknesses in it, there are places where we are weak, there are places where we are threatened, there are places where we are strong. We ought to build on our strengths, fill in the places where we are weak and get on with putting the kind of emphasis on conventional defense which we should put on conventional defense.

This morning Ambassador Abshire, in his testimony, made some very flattering comments on the report. I was grateful for them. He described the report as an excellent report and was struck, as he put it, by the similarity of both studies. I would agree with him.

What he described this morning and what this report describes are similar, namely that you have got to look at a number of components of conventional defense, not just at a quantitative component. As a matter of fact, the most threatening aspect of the conventional balance is the location of Soviet forces, and there was a map up this morning which showed that location.

That is a highly threatening feature of the conventional balance. That is the first component that we point to, point number one in the 13 components that we have identified is deployment of forces, the capability for surprise attack and effective defense in Europe. This is a highly threatening aspect of the conventional balance.

We summarize that as follows on page 13 of the report. The Warsaw Pact has a superior capacity for launching a surprise attack with little mobilization compared to NATO's capacity to defend against such an attack if its forces have not been mobilized. The forward positioning of large numbers of ready Pact forces, well-equipped for taking the offensive, is highly threatening to the West. The Pact's forward positioning of such forces is in stark contrast to NATO's dispersed deployment of active duty forces in peacetime.

The short warning threat is serious particularly because NATO's vulnerabilities in the north are real and this is the source of a great deal of the problem that NATO confronts in the Central Region. The Warsaw Pact's unique forward-based offensive capability makes asymmetrical reductions in Pact armored forces in the Central Region necessary. While the conventional military balance in Europe is complex overall, the threat posed by forward-based Pact armored forces is straightforward and must be addressed in any conventional arms control negotiations.

That is Ambassador Abshire's conclusion this morning. It is a conclusion which this report clearly shares.

The purpose of this report is to try to define and analyze the components of the conventional balance, to take us beyond a quantitative reporting, which can be misleading, and to take us into qualitative factors—very difficult, always open to misinterpretation—but essential if we are going to have a more realistic assessment of the conventional balance and make a correct decision as to where to put our dollars.

We are going to be making the wrong decisions in terms of defense expenditures. We will be sending exactly the wrong message to the Soviet Union if we do not have a realistic assessment of the conventional balance. It is a complex balance, as you know, as much as probably anybody knows, Mr. Chairman, because you have been the leader yourself in trying so hard to both assess our strengths and weaknesses, to try to increase our strength conventionally vis-a-vis the Soviet Union overall.

And I do not have to share with you too many of these conclusions, because I believe, as Ambassador Abshire said today, that most of these conclusions would be accepted. And, by the way, we have checked out those estimates; and the people that we have talked to, ranging from the various domestic agencies to people abroad, share our conclusions.

In terms of our estimate, would everybody share them? No. Would everybody share every estimate? No. The purpose of this report is not to get everybody to be persuaded that we are correct that there should be an X in the interoperability of forces in the Warsaw Pact column. That is not the purpose.

The purpose is to try to get us to look more complexly at the conventional balance than to simply say they have got 52,000 tanks and we have got 22,000 tanks. The same question was raised this morning. It is a good question. The data is subject to many different interpretations. Our data is from IISS, the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It was based on their data. It was extrapolated from their data. It can be interpreted in different ways; obviously one of our witnesses this morning did interpret it in different ways.

That is not the point. The point is we not only should look at the quantity of the tanks, we should look at the quality of the tank. We should look at the location of tanks. We should look at the quality and training of the gunners. How many rounds of live ammunition are fired each year by a NATO gunner compared to a Warsaw Pact gunner? Does it make any difference that it is 100 rounds of live ammunition for us and ten for them?

I hope it makes a difference because we are investing a whole lot of money in that ammo. Does it make any difference that they have an essentially conscript force, that our force averages three times the length of service that the Soviet force does? I think it makes a difference. How big a difference, we can argue. Should we consider that difference? I think we should.

Can we reach different conclusions? You betcha. The point, though, of this study is that we should look at the components of the conventional balance. Must they be defined or broken down that way? No. That is an effort to look at the components of the conventional balance so we get beyond the quantitative bean count. That is all it is.

Would every one of the members of this committee agree on this? I doubt it. Would any of the members of this committee agree on 13 specific ones? Probably not, although possibly they would, because there was a good deal of consensus, as a matter of fact, on these 13 as being a fair description of the components of the conventional balance.

Are these components weighted? They are not. Specifically stated, they are not weighted components. Are they prioritized? They are not, except I purposely put the first two where they are so that we could put at least some focus on the most threatening problem, which is the deployment of those Soviet forces, which over and over and over again this morning our witnesses said is the major part of the problem. And I could not agree with them more.

What are our conclusions? The conclusions in each of the 13 components are set forth in front of us. As to the assessment itself and the approach to it, we believe that you have to have a realistic assessment for a number of reasons.

You have to have a more complex assessment than simply a quantitative count for a number of reasons. First of all, without it, we can be misled as to the prospects for a robust conventional defense. And if we are misled about the prospects for conventional defense we could refuse to provide adequate funds or make the political sacrifices necessary to create or maintain such conventional capability.

So, first and foremost, the reason to look at the conventional balance more complexly than just simply one component is so that we can make the right decision on funding and so that we can determine that it is possible to have a robust conventional defense, and that will lead us to certain conclusions which the basket case analysis would not lead us to.

Second, Soviet leaders may be misled about our military capacity or our political will to mount a powerful conventional defense of Western Europe. If we continue to dwell on one component of this conventional defense, if we truly believe that there is massive conventional superiority overall and that we are a basket case and have no chance of defending ourselves and that the Soviets would be taking no great risk if they invaded Western Europe, if that is really our conclusion, then we are sending a signal to the Soviets which is very, very dangerous. It is not a signal I think we should send.

What are the chances of the Soviets achieving their military goal of a rapid victory in Europe? Those chances are better than ours of defending ourselves against such an attack. Are those chances sufficient for them to make such an attack against Western Europe? They are not. The risks of a Soviet attack against Western Europe are simply too high for a Soviet war planner or general to recommend to the Soviet leaders that they could attack Western Europe without a significant risk of not achieving their military goals.

Now that is a complex statement that I have just made. It is not particularly easy to make that kind of a statement, frankly, because it is complex. It takes two or three sentences and is easily misunderstood. But since it kind of summarizes the heart of the matter, let me just repeat it.

The Soviets have us in a very threatening position because of the massive concentration of heavily armored forces in Eastern Europe. That map that was on the board this morning, that map is in our book at a very prominent location directly after page 9. That in fact is basically the same map that was here this morning.

It is threatening to us because it opens up the prospect of a rapid, quick, surprise, blitzkrieg against Western Europe. We

should act to reduce that threat both through the way in which we operate and through conventional arms control.

Ambassador Abshire this morning pointed out a number of ways that we can defend against that threat, very few of which cost a lot of money, by the way, and he acknowledged that one of the things we can do, for instance, is to put up some tank barriers which will buy us a few critical days against that blitzkrieg.

There are a number of other things we can do in terms of the way in which we deploy our forces that he pointed out. Senator Quayle has pointed out a number of things that we can do to try to defend ourselves against that threat until we can figure out a way through arms control to reduce that threat against us.

So the Soviets have a greater chance, in my book, of achieving a military goal in Western Europe conventionally than we have of defending against such a threat conventionally. Their chances are greater. The risks are still great.

There are too many uncertainties for them, obviously including nuclear weapons, but even in the absence of nuclear weapons—uncertainties pointed out in this book in terms of the quality issues—the training of their forces, for instance, the reliability of their forces, for instance. There are simply too many uncertainties for them that they could attack or seek to achieve their military objective with any great degree of confidence.

Those are some of the reasons why we ought to have a realistic assessment, both so we decide how we are going to spend our money and deploy our forces—to make our decision realistically. Also so that we, as I indicated, do not mislead the Soviet leaders as to what we believe our capacity is, because when it comes to deterrence, it is important what the other guy believes, not just what the other guy has.

We have strengths upon which to draw. We ought to expand upon those strengths. They have weaknesses which we ought to exploit. We go into that in this report.

Mr. Chairman, I can go through each of these items, and I would be happy to go through each of these items, but I do not think that really is the point of this report in the first instance. It is the second point of this report, to go through each of the criterion and to try to make the best assessment we can, using available sources.

Almost all of these charts are based on data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. As I indicated when you had to step out for a moment, different people can reach different conclusions using the same data. That is not the point. The point is we should go beyond point two, which is the quantitative point.

You yourself, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this committee have spent a good deal of time on point one, which is the absolutely critical point, I believe, namely the threatening concentration of forces. That is why we put it first, although we did not seek otherwise to prioritize in this report.

I believe very deeply that we can have a robust conventional defense and we ought to do it, and we ought to get on with it. And we ought to attack the areas where we are not doing it. The lack of interoperability is inexcusable, as far as I am concerned.

The lack of taking simple actions such as tank barriers, which would reduce the threat somewhat—I do not want to exaggerate

how much it would reduce the threat—but which would reduce the threat somewhat of a surprise attack against us by those concentrated forces, the refusal to do that is purely a political problem in Germany. They do not want to have anything symbolizing a divided Germany.

So we say well, then, OK, put in some pipe, bury the pipe so you can put some explosive in there and blow it up in the case of an attack. That is what they are looking at now.

The point here again is, and I agree with Ambassador Abshire, there are things we can do and must do if we are going to have a robust conventional defense and rely less on nuclear weapons. We will not do them if we focus purely on the quantitative shortfalls that we have.

I would much rather have more interoperability and a much greater capacity on the part of a NATO commander to command integrated forces than I would to reduce the quantitative gap in some armament measure from 2.5-to-1 to 2.2-to-1.

So this is important not just because we have an INF Treaty which is in front of us, which focuses on the conventional balance and imbalance. This is important in terms of how we spend our money and it is important in that fundamental question you have raised over and over again. Are we there as a trip wire for nuclear weapons, or are we there because we believe that we either can realistically now or in the near future mount a conventional defense which is such that it would deter the Soviets from attacking.

That is what I believe the issue is, far beyond this INF Treaty. Of course, I have an institutional responsibility here which you all know. I happen to chair the Conventional Forces Subcommittee, and I wish that we had had time, by the way, to have batted around this report and approach in the subcommittee. It would have taken much too much time and never would have been offered in time for us to debate the INF Treaty, and it is relevant to the INF Treaty that we go beyond the quantitative bean count.

But it is my institutional position as well as my own belief that we can mount a realistic conventional defense such as to deter a Soviet attack upon us. If we cannot do it, then the course is clear. Put in the symbolic trip wire and nuke the hell out of them if they cross it. If we can do it, then let us get on with it, and I think we can do it. I am convinced we can do it because the raw materials, the raw materials for that are there.

Qualitatively, quantitatively, politically we are ahead of them, as we indicate—and I think most would agree—in some key indicators, including readiness. We are behind in sustainability. It is clear we are behind in sustainability and we so indicate. We are ahead in quality. The training of our forces is significantly better. They do not even have training of many of their forces before they come into the units. That is where they are trained.

So, Mr. Chairman, again we welcome the opportunity to present the report, and we will try to answer any questions that you might have.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin for an excellent presentation today. I think your 13 various components are thought-provoking. I think they are basically areas we ought to be looking at in a broader picture.

As I hear what you are saying, and what Abshire and Karber have testified to this morning, there are differences but there are also fundamental similarities. One of the messages they gave us this morning was that an awful lot of our problems do not relate to the complete analysis of US/NATO forces versus Warsaw Pact, but more nearly, as you made so clear this afternoon, where the forces are located, how they are maldeployed, and the strengthened Soviet forces aimed at our weakest sector.

The sustainability issues are matters that are inexcusable—NATO has had a policy for years of being able to fight for 30 days, yet so many countries within the Alliance will run out of ammunition before the 30 days.

So much money is being spent in the United States on rapid deployment forces that would come to the rescue of NATO within about 2 weeks. Yet by the time they arrive the allies will have run out of ammunition. Now, either the allies have to get up their ammunition stock, or the United States could save a awful lot of money by not pretending that we are going to be able to get there in time with the relief forces from this country.

The other big peeve I have is aircraft shelters. We have got the best pilots and aircraft in the world. Yet when they arrive in NATO they still do not have shelters. They are going to be in the middle of the largest conventional war ever fought, and they are not going to have any shelters. They have no minimum essential facilities, which is an obligation NATO solemnly undertook back in 1978. If NATO would simply carry out the obligations it has undertaken we would be in a better position.

Senator Quayle, we are delighted to have you. You have done a tremendous amount of work on this subject and other subjects. We would be delighted to hear from you now, and then we will have questions for both of you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN QUAYLE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First let me congratulate my colleague, Senator Levin, for putting forth really a very exhaustive report, one on which I know he and his staff have spent an extraordinary amount of time. He mentioned some of Ambassador Abshire's statements concerning the similarities, and I think that there are some similarities and certain things that I strongly endorse.

I endorse strongly the idea that we need to look more at the complexities. I could not agree more that we have to. I think—and I will get into it in just a moment—that the 13 points he has put there is a good starting point. I think there are a couple major points that have been left out.

And I also believe, as he said, we do not need to mislead the Soviet leaders on what we have, that we ought to try to, as much as possible, develop a consensus, and certainly this report is going to attract a lot of attention, which it already has, and also a lot of discussion.

We need to examine the Levin report and how it is similar or perhaps conflicts with our own estimates, net assessments—al-

though the report carefully says that it is not a net assessment, but in many cases it in fact is a net assessment. Senator Levin and I go back on this committee at least 5 years now, we have been either chairman or ranking member, one way or the other, and he knows my personal affection for him.

But I want to politely but firmly express concern that although this is a personal report of Senator Levin's, it still has unfortunately been publicized as a subcommittee report. I mean, certainly this report, just reading it, says it is a product of the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Conventional Forces.

We had detailed hearings on the balance. I did not know we were going to put forth a report. I wish we could have had an opportunity to look at that, but, be that as it may, it is not a point to dwell on, but I do think it is a point that the record should note, that this is not the subcommittee's report, and the minority did not have an opportunity to work on it.

As a matter of fact, I have just spent the last couple of days trying to examine it. Perhaps as we work toward a consensus we might be able to do it differently in the future.

Let me go into some of the things that concern me about this report and that is why I am here to testify, as the ranking member of the subcommittee, not in the individual capacity that I put out a report like this.

Mr. Karber said this morning, and I think Senator Levin referred to it, that 12 out of the 22 charts were wrong. I do not know whether Mr. Karber is right or Senator Levin is right. The only thing I know is, he stated on the record that 12 out of the 22 were wrong. He said that he thought, in his words, I believe there was sloppy staff work. That is what his comments were; they are not mine. So that needs to be stated.

The thing that is of interest is it asks who is right. Who is right on this side and, therefore, who is wrong?

And this is where I believe that we get ourselves into the problem. Because even though the chairman of the subcommittee does not refer to it in his letter to Senator Nunn, we had very, very good, comprehensive closed testimony from our net assessment office in the Department of Defense, Andy Marshall's shop.

And I can tell you without revealing anything classified that their conclusions were in significant conflict with the conclusions of the Levin report. So we will have instant confusion over who is speaking for the Government. Unfortunately, I do not think it will be interpreted as just one Senator's views, but perceived, perhaps, as an Armed Services Committee or at least a subcommittee report.

And I am not sure that, going back to Senator Levin's point, that we want to mislead the Soviet leaders on what we have, and I think it is very, very important that we do in fact try to, as much as possible, develop a consensus on where we ought to go.

I am also very concerned just at the political input and political twist of this report at this particular time. As I said, I think it is very well done—I do not agree with it entirely. I have not had that much time to examine all of it. There are some concerns I have, but the political spin—and we are always interested in the political

spin when we get into the INF debate—the political spin of this that things are really better off than what we thought they were, that therefore we really do not have to be as concerned perhaps as we were told.

I personally believe, though I am a strong advocate of the arms control process, that that is one of the problems of arms control, when you get into it, that it is an anesthetic to the west that we really do not have to do as much in defenses as perhaps we should, and as long as we have arms control going on that we have less tension so that we do not have to worry about that.

The arms control process is not the problem. The arms themselves are not the problem. The problem is the political differences between the governments that have to be resolved. And I was recently on a talk show with the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he was referring to this report of the Senate Armed Services Committee and his conclusion was that perhaps we really did not have to do as much in this conventional area as we thought we had, as someone referred to, the conventional imbalance.

And his response was, well, if you look at the Senate Armed Services report, Senator Levin's report, maybe we do not have to do as much as we thought we did. That kind of thinking, particularly as we move forward on this, I think is a troubling political problem that we have, a troubling political concern that I certainly have and one that I think that needs to be noted.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me just briefly take a look at the components because I think what Ambassador Abshire was saying and what I wholeheartedly concur with is that this is certainly, for discussion purposes, a way to get a hold of a very complex, important issue.

And I think that the 13 components—and Senator Levin said well, we probably could not have agreed on that or not—I am not so sure, because, quite frankly, I really only have two additional components that I would add. But I basically believe as we look at this that those components are fair, objective standards that we ought to look at.

I do want to note for the record that on item three, the quality of major weapons systems, that he has given NATO superiority. I think in lieu of the testimony today with Mr. Karber, particularly on the tanks, that that would not be the case, according to the testimony that we had today, and these are conclusions and in fact net assessments, if you want to use that word, these are conclusions. And the conclusion, I think, would probably be somewhat questioned after the testimony today.

The other item I have concerns about is the report's assessment of our economic and industrial strength, because you have to put in there "military" industrial strength. No doubt about it, NATO has economic industrial strength, but the testimony again today reaffirmed that when it comes to military industrial strength that the edge is certainly not to NATO, but the edge is to the Warsaw Pact.

As a matter of fact, we got into a very good exchange—I forget who it was with. I think Mr. Karber said that we have a technological advantage in the laboratory, but we do not have that technological and qualitative advantage in the field because we do not

field the equipment like the Soviet Union does. And therefore, when you look at economic industrial strength you must look at, and I add the word, military industrial strength, which is a very, very important component. And I would add to that on item 11.

The two components I think that we ought to consider that are not considered here first I believe we ought to look at reinforcements. I think that is a critical component. It is very important because we know NATO cannot survive long without reinforcements nor can the Warsaw Pact long persist in an offensive against NATO without them. What is our qualitative/quantitative assessment on this?

The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact can certainly rely on it much more than we can.

The other addition component that was left out—and this is where I go back to Senator Levin's statement that I wholeheartedly concur with that we should look more at the complexities before we determine what our net assessment or conclusions will be—was operational concepts. As a matter of fact, that is, to me, more important than the hardware or manpower that one side may or may not have in the so-called bean count arena.

Operational concepts. What do I mean? I am talking about objectives. I am talking about the doctrine. I am talking about the strategy. I am talking about the plans. We can go back into history to World War II. If the Nazis had attacked the entire Maginot line with all their forces, they would not have been successful. But where did they go? They went to the weakest point in the Ardennes and went and got into Paris in a period of 6 weeks.

And certainly this problem has been touched upon in our hearings today concerning our potential weaknesses. But we need to go for them. And I am going to list four important elements as we look at the complexities that we want to get into.

One, what are the objectives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO? The objectives of the Warsaw Pact are stated, and I could just read the new defense minister's stated objective, Defense Minister Yasov. He has recently gone on record stating the Pact must conduct "decisive offensive operations" that will defeat and destroy NATO forces. That is their objective. That is a very different objective than NATO's.

The objective of NATO is not to defeat and destroy Warsaw Pact forces but if in fact there would be conflict, to regain and maintain the status quo. That is a major, major difference between the objectives of NATO and what they are for the Warsaw Pact, and one that I would say is important to examine.

Second, what are the plans to achieve these objectives? We ought to know what the plans are to achieve these objectives. We know what is stated in the literature what the Pact's plans are—that they would mass their forces at a weak point, go through, apply the encirclement concept, and then go on to the Atlantic.

We need to see how that compares to NATO's plans. Then, once we understand what the objectives are and the plans to implement those objectives, then we get down to the military hardware, and Senator Levin's study is a very important first step to get clarity on the military deployment balance.

And then, fourth and finally, I believe that we have to look at what the change in the force structure is going to be in the future. Mr. Karber and Ambassador Abshire, and Dr. Schlesinger, too, talked about trends. Where were the trend lines going? And that gets into a lot of the political issues that are going to be coming.

Where are the trend lines? The chairman got into a very interesting discussion on the "good" Nunn/"bad" Nunn amendment and whether they were going to follow or not follow or get out of the foxholes. What are going to be the trend lines that we are going to have with NATO? What are the trend lines of the Warsaw Pact? This is a very important discussion and one that I think is missing.

And, finally, I believe that as we look at the ground conventional imbalance, that we have also got to look at the air balance. The air balance is very, very important. I mean, let's face it. NATO could not achieve its objective of status quo with the ground forces only. We must have, even to be in the game, our air forces and air superiority.

And do we have? Where is the balance there? We have to understand what that air balance is, because it is absolutely essential to achieving our objectives of deterrence and the status quo that we look and see where the air balance is.

So, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I again congratulate my colleague for a very thorough study. I know this is an issue that he is very committed to as chairman of our subcommittee, and I also know it is an issue that you are very committed to. It seems to me that what we ought to begin to do, and I am not exactly sure of the process and the coordination, that we need to sort of marry up some of these discussion points that we are having here today and which relate back to some of the strategy and strategy hearings that you so thoughtfully put forward and put this committee through in the first place.

Because I believe that those strategies and those objectives and the doctrine are very, very important, and I certainly again want to emphasize that I support strongly that we need to look more at the complexities of a very complex but very, very fundamentally important issue for our national security.

Thank you for allowing me to testify.

[The prepared statement of Senator Quayle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

HOW TO ASSESS THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE

On order to "help the Committee, the Senate and public understand the full complexity of the conventional balance" in Europe (which is the stated objective of the Levin Report), we must understand:

1. What the Soviets' war objectives are compared to NATO's.
2. How each side intends to achieve these objectives with the military capabilities they have—what each side's war plans and or operational concepts are.
3. What military capabilities each side has at its disposal to execute its war plan.
4. What the future trends are likely to be for the growth of the relative ability of each side to achieve its war objectives.

Getting a fix on the relative military capabilities of each side is important and difficult to establish, as the Levin report makes clear, but it is hardly sufficient to get a full understanding of what the balance is. In fact, fixating only on the military capabilities of each side can be misleading.

Unless we know what the Soviets intend to do with their military hardware, unless we know what their war objectives are and how they intend to use their military capabilities to achieve them, we may misunderstand what the true military strengths and weaknesses are on both sides. For example:

In 1940, the French and their allies had nearly equal forces, superior prepared defenses, superior military equipment, superior equipment to the Nazis and months of strategic warning that an attack was likely. Yet, the Nazis defeated the French in less than eight weeks because they had a superior operational concept—blitzkrieg, combined arms warfare—and were able to use it to penetrate the Ardennes and achieve localized force ratio superiorities of more than 4 to 1.

At Stalingrad, with only slight odds on their side—1.4:1 advantage in tanks and motorized artillery, 1.3:1 in field guns and mortars—the Soviets were able to encircle and annihilate a Nazi force of many hundreds of thousands of men given the Soviets' superior operational concepts.

Equally important, is identifying future trends in military technologies and operational concepts. When one side gets these wrong, they can suffer defeat at the hands of military forces equal or superior to their own.

The U.S. for instance, suffered defeats at the hands of the Japanese for nearly 2 years because we misunderstood their war aim—we thought they would only go south to gain Southeast Asia—and because we only caught on to their trend toward aircraft-carrier war after the Japanese had built their fleet around such ships.

These points are also relevant in assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance. NATO's war aims are very different from those of the Pact, as is its operational concept or war plans:

Where NATO's forces are dedicated to deterring a Soviet attack and, if war breaks out, to restoring the status quo anti by simply pushing Warsaw Pact forces back over to their side of the Inter-German border, the Soviets' forces are dedicated to offensive war objectives. As Soviet Defense Minister Yazov has recently gone on record stating, the Pact must conduct "decisive, offensive operations" that will "secure the destruction" of the opposing forces.

NATO's operational concept or war plan, as a result, is very different from that of the Warsaw Pact. NATO's operational concept is to deter war with a minimal number of nuclear weapons and to restore the status quo anti (push Soviet forces back on their side of the Inter-German Border if a war should break out with shallowly deployed conventional divisions supported by tactical air forces located near the Inter-German border). These forces would be reinforced, if there was sufficient warning, from reserves in the U.S.

The Warsaw Pact, on contrast, intends to defeat and destroy the NATO's forces by launching a massive, fast-paced ground attack, concentrated along critical NATO axes. While holding NATO forces where NATO is strong, the Soviets will penetrate deep against NATO where it is weak and engage in encircling operations intended to cut off NATO's forward defenses from its rear support areas.

This ground operation will also be supported by a massive, deep air, missile and commando attacks directed against NATO's air fields and ground air defenses, command, communication and control centers, nuclear storage facilities, ports, and POMCUS sites. These attacks will be designed to prevent NATO from resorting to nuclear weapons of their own or reinforcing its conventional forward defenses before the Central Front is defeated. Finally, the ground war will be reinforced with second and third echelon forces once NATO's central front begins to collapse.

These very different operational concepts result in very different capabilities for weapons that otherwise would seem to be the same. For example:

Our air forces are designed to fly many sorties over a long period of time—long enough to push the Soviets back across the Inter-German Border. Instead of many deep-strike bombers, NATO has many attack and air defense interceptor fighters on a handful of bases, that are defended by only two major types of ground air defenses.

The Soviets' air forces are heavily dedicated to medium and heavy bombers that can strike deep. Rather than flying many sorties for many weeks on end, these forces are designed to deliver several major blows. Meanwhile, the Pact's superior number of air defense systems and interceptor aircraft will cope with NATO's large attack fighter fleet.

Finally, the Pact's air war will be supported by thousands of tactical ballistic missiles that will clear out corridors in NATO's air defense belts. NATO has no similar missile fleet.

Likewise, the difference in operational concepts and war aims between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces makes Soviet employment of armor and artillery forces very

different from that of NATO. Pact armor has the logistical support to operate for weeks deep inside NATO territory. Just the opposite is the case for NATO armor.

Warsaw Pact artillery also differs from NATO's. There is not only much more of it; they have motorized artillery for support for deep offensive operations. Also, Soviet artillery has superior range. Finally, not only does the Pact have artillery in its divisions; it is also unique, dedicated artillery divisions—i.e., divisions with nothing but artillery in them dedicated to focusing additional artillery fire where it may be needed to break through NATO's forward defenses.

Finally, in assessing the conventional balance in Europe and trying to decide what NATO needs for its defense, it's critical to consider what each side will develop and deploy militarily in the future. If we do not understand or anticipate improvements in each side's existing force structure or new additions to that structure, we are certain to misread the meaning of the current balance and buy or fret about the wrong things. For example,

A larger percentage of Warsaw Pact tanks are older than NATO's but the Pact has more modern tanks than NATO. Furthermore, the older Pact tanks are being equipped with additional armor, improved range finders, and improved tank rounds.

As a result, many of NATO's anti-tank weapons can't defeat Soviet armor and only a handful of NATO tanks can even hope to do real damage to the modern Soviet fleet. NATO tanks, on the other hand, are vulnerable to a larger number of Soviet tanks and anti-tank weapons.

Soviet fighters now are nearly equal to NATO fighters due to their modern radars, increased range and payload, and modern munitions. NATO deployment of stealth technology may help us regain an edge in the air but that is still sometime in the future and we are not yet sure how effective those systems will be. In any case, it is doubtful that NATO air even with stealth will allow us to win an air campaign and at the same time use air power to compensate for insufficient ground forces.

The Soviets are developing accurate non-nuclear tactical ballistic missiles to help pin down and destroy NATO airplanes and ground air defenses. If NATO develops extended air defenses, this problem can be coped with. If not, all the tactical air additions in the world, including stealthy aircraft (which are not stealthy when they are parked on NATO airfields), will be of little value.

Assessing these four concerns—each side's war aims, war plans, war capabilities, and each side's future force structure changes, which are concerns beyond that static assessments of military capabilities contained in the Levin report—are critical to any full understanding of the complexity of the force balance.

As for the Levin Report itself, I think two additional components, beyond the 13 listed, might be added to get a better fix on the limited concern of what each side's military capabilities are:

The first might be called "Reinforcement." What does each side have to transport its forces? How effective, secure, and fast are these means? How vulnerable are the reinforcement nodes, the ports, airfields, etc. on each side? How many reserves does each side have and how well are they tailored to the missions they are assigned?

The second might be called "employment." How well does each side employ its forces? How well does each side mix offensive capabilities with defensive capabilities? How sound are the tactics and plans to use each side's forces? How sound are the command and control arrangements? Do communications networks support those arrangements? How integrated are naval air and ground forces?

Also, much greater attention needs to be focused on assessing each side's air war capabilities. The Levin Report and many of the other analyses publicly available focus almost exclusively on the ground war largely because that war is two-dimensional and is, therefore, easier to analyze in terms of numbers and map traces over time. The air war is three-dimensional and much more fact-paced. It, therefore, is very difficult to assess. Yet its outcome is critical to the outcome of the war. If NATO wins it, it has some hope of prevailing against the Warsaw Pact. If it loses partially or in whole, there's little hope.

Finally, it should be noted, that all of the concerns I've discussed are address in the net assessment done by OSD's Office of Net Assessment. Although the Conventional Forces Subcommittee received a briefing from the Office of Net Assessment last October, I understand that the full committee will get this hearing as well in the coming month as part of the INF hearings. I think it is worth seeing again and focusing on. Certainly, a full understanding of the complexity of new assessments of the balance is the minimum we need if we are to address the very real problems NATO faces.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

Senator Levin, let me start off here by asking both of you a question. How reliable do you believe the Department of Defense is, as opposed to outside organizations, in providing a dynamic net assessment?

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. I do not think we have an adequate capability to really do that thoroughly. We have seen the net assessment. I think we ought to put a lot more emphasis on it than we do. We have seen a lot of dynamic work done by Rand for the Defense Department. I think frankly there are some inadequacies in that, if I may jump that gun a bit, because I know we are going to hear from Rand.

They have been able to look at only one scenario instead of all of the scenarios, which I think ought to be looked at. We do have a net assessment office. I think we are going to have to find a way to both enhance it, to encourage it, and, frankly, to plug it in not only to us more often but to find a way to turn as much of its material as possible into nonclassified material. Obviously some of it has to remain classified, but some of it can be declassified.

We did have that net assessment hearing, as Senator Quayle mentioned. It was useful to us. I would differ with him as to whether or not any of their conclusions differed from this, because this is not a net assessment. This is a more static assessment, and I do not believe that any conclusions that they reached were different from any of these components. But that is not the point of your question.

I think we ought to have an enhanced net assessment. I think we ought to have a capability to do what Rand has done, which is to look at a whole series of dynamic scenarios, not just one, but a number of dynamic scenarios, because Senator Quayle is absolutely right. This is a static view. This is looking at our capabilities. It does not look at the strategy nor does it look at how these capabilities would work out on the battlefield if they met each other.

That is not the purpose of this. That is way beyond the purpose of this report, and we made it clear in this report indeed that it is not the purpose, and way beyond the purpose of it.

So I think that Senator Quayle is right that we have to look at net assessments. They are critical and I would put more eggs in that basket.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Quayle, I will ask you the same question. How good do you think we are in producing a dynamic net assessment, let's say within the building at the Pentagon?

Senator QUAYLE. I really believe that Andy Marshall and his shop have done a very good, capable job. They have put a lot of work into it. I felt that their testimony before our subcommittee was quite revealing, very important. I do concur with Senator Levin, and I believe it was also brought up either by you, Mr. Chairman, or Senator McCain this morning, that it is too bad that we cannot get some of that declassified. It would be very helpful for public discussion to get this declassified.

I think that I have a great deal of confidence in them. I might also point out I believe that the JCS, if I am not mistaken, is going to organize an office of net assessment, so they are going to pick up what Andy Marshall has started.

I know, Mr. Chairman, you have been very, very much in the forefront of pushing the creation of Andy Marshall's shop, and he was finally allowed to come up here to give testimony, though closed and classified, and we ought to figure out a way to get some of it unclassified.

But I think they have done a tremendous job over there and people that I talk to, whether it is in the JCS or the services or others that have been briefed on the job that they have done, have given them very high marks.

Chairman NUNN. I am encouraged by that. I have been pushing it a long time. We actually gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, under the DOD Reorganization Act, an explicit mandate relating to dynamic net assessment.

Senator LEVIN. They have made one that is a top secret net assessment, and it was helpful. We did read that.

Senator WARNER. I cannot hear you, Senator. I am sorry.

Senator LEVIN. They did at least preliminarily complete the net assessment which you required. It is a top secret net assessment and very useful, we found—very helpful in the preparation of this, as a matter of fact.

Chairman NUNN. Good. I will ask both of you how important a component do you consider conventional arms control, in terms of trying to achieve overall stability within NATO?

Senator Levin, I will ask you first.

Senator LEVIN. I think it is important and we ought to hope it achieves some success, but we should not rely on it. It has been a long time since we have made any progress in that area. You and other members of the committee have made some very important proposals. It is obviously going to take some major asymmetrical reductions in some of the threatening factors for us to have any success.

I believe that the Rand study in this regard is indisputable and I think this is nonclassified when I say that it is not only going to take asymmetrical reductions but that if the asymmetry is not enough, you could actually worsen your position with asymmetrical reductions.

In other words, unless the ratios are highly asymmetrical in some significant ways, you are actually worse off with some asymmetrical reductions than you would be just maintaining the status quo. So arms control, conventional arms control I consider to be a significant potential. I do not know how close it is going to be, but you have got to watch it because there is no magic in it. We hope it can lead to some stability. It is essential, I think, if we are going to get any of the reduction in that threatening component which we identify as number one.

But we ought to act in our own interests even in the absence of conventional arms control. Ambassador Abshire and others have identified some ways in which we can do so without great additional cost.

Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks you talked about the northern area, which both witnesses this morning identified as being our weakest link. Why is it that we do not bolster forces in the northern region? I believe it is mainly a political reason that

we do not bolster those forces in the northern region where we are weakest.

The Dutch and the Belgian areas is where we have an opportunity, I believe, to place some additional forces, but for the political implication—and this is what we were told in Europe—but for the political implication that the Dutch and the Belgians could not defend themselves. These core sectors were devised many years ago. They came about historically rather than based on what we need to do now.

And that is an area that I think we ought to bolster up without waiting for conventional arms control to achieve something, assuming it ever does achieve something. So yes, there is potential there, but we should not await that potential to be achieved before we do some things in our own defense with conventional capability.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired, but let me get Senator Quayle to answer that question.

Senator QUAYLE. I will be very brief. The reason that we need the continuation of the net assessment is because when we get into the area of conventional arms control and we start looking at proposals we better have a net assessment of what those proposals are going to do. So, therefore, the two really have got to go together because, as Senator Levin and a few others have pointed out, you may have asymmetrical reductions, but the net assessment on the imbalances could be worse.

So therefore it is very imperative that we have an ongoing snapshot that we can take of what our net assessment truly is today and what it would be with proposals that we would add in the future.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the chairman would address what appears to me to be a question of procedure regarding the imprimatur of the committee's work. I certainly do not raise this in any personal way. My good friend, Carl Levin, and I came to the Senate together and indeed we discussed this report when we were on what you might call a sabbatical leave, studying the Soviet Union.

We discussed a number of aspects of the report. But our colleague from Indiana, the ranking member of this subcommittee, raises what I believe are legitimate questions. I ask the Chair if at this time it is appropriate that the Chairman give the members some guidelines.

Senator LEVIN. Before the chairman answers, could I just quickly quote from my letter to the chairman on that, the last paragraph?

Chairman NUNN. Let me just respond quickly and let you supplement it. First, Senator Levin prepared this report on his own. This is not a committee report. This report was not printed by the committee. It is my understanding—and, Senator Levin, you correct me if I am wrong—that this report was prepared with your staff and your own resources. Is that correct?

Senator LEVIN. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. Second, Senator Levin made it absolutely clear in the January 19 covering letter, quoting the last paragraph, "In the hope that this report might be of some value to you and other members of the committee during our hearings which begin next

week I have decided to present it as Chairman of the Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense Subcommittee. There is simply inadequate time, since we will not be back in session until January 25, for the subcommittee to attempt to reach a collegial decision."

So I think it is clear to everyone that it is not a subcommittee report. Now Senator Levin is chairman of the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, and he is entitled to use that chairmanship, just as Senator Quayle is entitled to issue a report and say that he is the ranking member on that subcommittee or Senator Warner is entitled to issue a report or press release, as we all do, saying what the titles are.

So I see nothing inappropriate about it. If anyone has been misled, it is because they did not read it.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I did read it, and I must say to my good friend I respectfully disagree a little bit.

Chairman NUNN. Tell me why you disagree.

Senator WARNER. Well, I think that I have made my point and Senator Quayle has made his.

Chairman NUNN. Well, I have not heard your point. I do not know what it is, because if you read the letter the chairman of the subcommittee said it was not a subcommittee report.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Chairman, if I might just add, I think that the letter is self-explanatory. I think that you and other members of the committee are going to certainly know what this is, but I can tell you in the popular press that it has already been written up that it is a Senate Armed Services subcommittee report.

I think that the impression, if you go to a meeting somewhere in NATO or sit down with the Soviets, they will say, hey, here is what the Senate Armed Services Committee is saying, and I think it could be handled in that fashion. As I said, it is very self-explanatory, but I think that the perception and the politics, and that is why I raise it.

Chairman NUNN. Let me just pose this question to you and Senator Warner. How would an individual who is chairman or ranking member of a subcommittee give an individual assessment of his view? How do you avoid this kind of thing?

Senator QUAYLE. Any Senator can do anything that they want to, and I certainly do not think that Senator Levin is not within his rights. The only thing I was a little bit surprised by, as the ranking member, that the cover letter refers to the exhaustive hearings that our subcommittee undertook.

I did not know anything about this report, which supposedly covers all the hearings and then some, until 3 days ago. I just raise that politely, but I think in a somewhat firm way just to let the record speak for itself. I have no desire to pursue it and that is just my own personal opinion.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Levin, excuse me. I got in front of you there.

Senator LEVIN. I tried to make it very clear in that covering letter that it was a personal report. I hoped it was adequate. I made it very clear in the press conference that it was my report and not a subcommittee report. At least some articles have misdescribed it as subcommittee report.

Senator WARNER. You say some have? I am not aware of that.

Senator LEVIN. There was one article at least that called it a subcommittee report. It was erroneous in that, but I think that most of the articles said it was Senator Levin's report, which is all it is and all it was purported to be and what it was represented to be and what the covering letter to you said it was, and why it was, by the way.

And so I tried to make it clear, and I think Senator Quayle is being very fair in this in pointing out that he would have liked this to have been a subcommittee report. So would I, but the timing of this was such, as I indicated in the covering letter, that if I was going to get my conclusions before us for whatever value they have, that it had to be done at a time prior to or at least during the INF debate, and that there was not time for a collegial report, which will take months and months.

I accept Senator Quayle's comments. He is a good friend, and, as he knows, we work collegially and whenever I am not able to do it for whatever time limitation there is, I am very clear in representing that I am saying something purely in my individual capacity.

I tried the best I could, and to the extent I failed I am sorry that that was misrepresented by some press people.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, may I now start my questioning?

Chairman NUNN. Certainly.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, just roughly, the United States contributes or allocates or earmarks \$170 billion, roughly 60 percent of the defense budget, directly or indirectly to NATO. And we are here today saying that within that figure and within the Department of Defense we simply do not have the assets and the people devoted to making a net assessment, a dynamic net assessment.

I find that hard to believe. In my experience in the Department of over 5 years, we studied many, many assessments of what the Warsaw Pact forces presented by way of threat and the like. So much for that.

I think Senator Levin has made a very valuable contribution to this discussion, at least it is provocative. We have a hearing going and you have got a title which I think has caught on and one that we have got to follow, Beyond the Bean Count.

But let us go back to this question of the absence of a dynamic net assessment or the lack thereof. I am talking about a period of both Republicans and Democrats in charge of the Department of Defense. Has this been an ongoing thing, Senator Levin, in your judgment?

Senator LEVIN. I am not sure that I am a good historian on how many net assessments, how many dynamic assessments have been made. There is a net assessment office. It is run by a very capable person. We have seen that net assessment. I do not have any particular quarrel with it. We all ought to get the net assessment.

I have seen the Rand dynamic analysis.

Senator WARNER. I have seen that also.

Senator LEVIN. We obviously have the funds to pay for such dynamic analyses. We did it in the case of Rand which was paid with Defense Department dollars, I believe. My only question about Rand is whether they looked at enough scenarios, and frankly I

think they came to a conclusion—and I think again this is unclassified—which is very different from the conclusion we saw this morning.

I think the funds are there and I think they can do it, but it has not been done in a way that sifts through to us. Maybe that is the real problem.

Senator WARNER. That is a fair criticism.

We also heard this morning, in response to a question from me, Ambassador Abshire indicate that NATO is now making their net assessment. I have to assume that this is a follow-on of many net assessments that they have made over the years, drawing on the resources from this country and other members of NATO. So I expect it has been available, and if it somehow has not been formulated or transmitted in a manner to the Congress, then there is fault.

Senator QUAYLE. May I say something, Senator Warner? There is this dynamic net assessment. There is a study that the net assessment office has done. It has been given to our subcommittee in very detailed form, and it is a very, very comprehensive and very, very good study and one that, as I said earlier, is really in some cases in direct conflict with this report.

Senator WARNER. Senator Levin, you and I, during our discussion when we were on our sabbatical, so to speak, I brought to your attention my concern that we must establish a baseline for the upcoming talks of the 23 nations in terms of the arms control and conventional weaponry. It seems to me that this is going to be considered as we establish certain baselines for those talks.

How do you think this will be regarded in terms of trying to work out that baseline?

Senator LEVIN. How do I think this report will be regarded?

Senator WARNER. And, further, the work of the subcommittee and the committee as a whole?

Senator LEVIN. Of course the baseline one can argue about and try to reach a conclusion on, but I think it would be considered, as Ambassador Abshire said this morning, as a balanced contribution to that issue. It is not the last word, obviously. The last word is not in the hands of any of us, but it makes it very clear, in response to the concern that you raised, as to what the major threatening component is to us, and it happens to be precisely that same component which you, Senator Nunn, Ambassador Abshire, and others pointed to.

I mean, his map this morning is pretty clear. It is exactly the same map that appears in this study showing—

Senator WARNER. Let me have as a last question—

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. Heavy concentration of forces in central Europe on the eastern side of that boundary.

Senator WARNER. If I might just follow with this last question, I was very much taken with your suggestion. Indeed I think it is a good one, and I have conferred with persons here who know more than I about this situation, who have actually served in our armed forces in that NATO arena.

There is an absence of visible tank barricades. Was that a conscious political decision made by the Federal Republic of Germany

that they would not be put up, or was that decision made in the face of a recommendation of the military committee of NATO?

Senator LEVIN. I think the military committee of NATO has never formally recommended it because they knew it would be rejected politically.

Senator WARNER. That is a weak reason.

Senator LEVIN. It sure as heck is. I could not agree with you more. But, like all such committees, they find out in advance whether or not it is going to be accepted or rejected. If it is going to be rejected, they find out why. If it is going to be embarrassing, they want to know in advance, and I do not know that it has ever been formally made. But if it has not been formally made—and I do not think it ever has—it would be because it would be rejected and would be embarrassing to Germany to reject it.

Now that much I know from all my personal conversations. The NATO committee is now looking at it again. They are trying to look at this buried pipe proposal because it is not visible. It is important to the West Germans that it not be visible.

Senator WARNER. That is amazing. When you look back, you have Haig, you have the most recent former commander of NATO, who now is a critic of the INF Treaty. These men are known for speaking out, and apparently they did not speak out individually on this issue, apart from the military committee.

Senator LEVIN. Well, they speak out individually to me when we talk to them, but they do not want to embarrass their counterparts.

Senator WARNER. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Let me just add one word on that. I personally think there ought to be some barrier defenses set up. This is an enormously sensitive issue for Germany, the reason being that Germany does not relish the idea of a perpetually divided Germany, and that is one of the most sensitive subjects you could broach with the Germans, putting up some kind of permanent barrier.

You conjure up the Berlin Wall as a barrier in a city that was supposed to be undivided. It has military implications, as well as very serious political implications. There also is the history of the ADMs, the atomic demolition munitions, where they were going to have certain critical areas with holes dug for prepositioning. That was enormously controversial. Because of all the controversy, we had ADMs in Europe for years that we were not able to appropriately use.

We would probably give a saliva test to anybody now if they proposed that we preposition atomic explosives on our own territory. But that was talked about for a long, long time. This is not something that has not had a history. This issue has gone back for 20 or 30 years. It does not mean that we should not readdress this issue, nor does it mean that new technologies could not perhaps accommodate some of the military requirements without trampling on the political sensitivities. It is a worthy subject for exploration as far as I am concerned.

Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I first say, Mr. Chairman—and I am sure I express the view of the entire committee—that I think the testimony of our two distinguished colleagues has contributed a great deal to our overall understanding of what we need to do in light of the discussions that we have had and the probability of the approval of the INF Treaty.

I would like to start really by asking a question of my colleague, the chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Levin, on one of his conclusions that I think is at odds with the conclusion of the witnesses this morning. He indicates he believes our readiness position in Europe is superior to that of the Warsaw Pact nations.

I know he was a member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support that I chair and that he attends the committee hearings religiously. My recollection of the testimony last year was that one of our greatest weaknesses is that our combat support, combat service support units are way below strength and there is a strong possibility they could not support those combat units in Europe.

I wonder, in view of that and other testimony I have heard here this morning and other information that comes to me, how he came to his conclusion on readiness.

Senator LEVIN. The item that you point out is indeed a troubling one and is covered in the sustainability section. That is one of the major reasons why we fall behind in sustainability. That is where we put it. Some of these dividing lines are arbitrary, and you have to do the best you can in defining them.

Senator DIXON. In other words, you came to the conclusion that on sustainability, they are probably superior but you considered that category under that general definitive section of your report?

Senator LEVIN. Yes. Some of the readiness factors that we went into are set forth on pages 20 to 26, including the readiness of the divisions, comparing the readiness ratings, the criteria, including things like flying hours, how many rounds of ammunition are fired per year per gunner, including a whole host of other things that are set forth there.

So we tried to divide this in a fair way, and we did not run, frankly, into a lot of difference on this issue when we talked to experts. There may be, by the way. It may be that you would put readiness in a different place as we define it. It may be that you would define readiness differently than we would.

A greater percentage of our divisions are ready. Our Reserves are more ready. There are two elements that go into that.

Our training exercises are far better, and our troops have more of them. Our troops fire more live ammo per year. Let me just give you a couple of examples of that. A Soviet tank gunner might fire 10 rounds a year, compared to 100 or more rounds for a U.S. Army tank gunner. A Soviet foot soldier fires less than 50 rounds of live small arms ammo annually, versus the hundreds or thousands of small arms rounds fired by the American infantrymen in training every year.

Those are the elements we put into that. What I am saying basically is you might want to define readiness differently. You may want to reach different conclusions as to overall what your estimate is on force readiness than we did. The main point here is look

at it. It is important to look at it and not just look at tanks, artillery, and whatever, but look at how many rounds of ammo. What are the training exercises like?

All that this report really is about, is to start the discussion—to consider these important factors. But I agree with you there are some real sustainability shortfalls. That is why we put sustainability in the Warsaw Pact column.

Senator DIXON. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Senator Dixon, let me just add a note here, that on the readiness issue you are talking about on our side a lot fewer people than on the Warsaw Pact, and the same applies to the Reserves.

So if you want to look just at the small numbers on a readiness basis, I think much of what Senator Levin said is probably correct. The big problem, and I know the one that you focused on in the past, is readiness combined with sustainability. And we have small numbers. When you have small numbers against a very large force, sustainability becomes all the more important because large numbers can eventually overwhelm a smaller force unless they get that sustainability, and that is one of the vulnerabilities of the west.

Senator DIXON. Well, I appreciate the comments of both of you. I must say that some of the testimony I hear here, compared to what, quite candidly, our committee heard last year causes me to wonder which testimony has impressed the various groups the most.

Our subcommittee last year I think clearly came away from the hearings with the belief that on munitions, spare parts, depot maintenance, real property maintenance, all of those important categories that affect readiness and sustainability, that we were on the decline rather than on the ascendancy, one, and that by 1991, believe it or not, notwithstanding the fact that we doubled our expenditures for our national defense, that we would be back about the position of 1981, which I guess leads me to the final question.

Is what appears to be a fairly rosy scenario here due to our strength or their weakness in the analysis that you do, Mr. Chairman, in your subcommittee?

Senator LEVIN. The shortfalls which you have identified, which you and I have tried, along with other members of this committee, to remedy are indeed shortfalls. We do not meet our goals in sustainability. None of that testimony that you referred to so vividly and remember so well related to a comparison between our depot maintenance and their depot maintenance, between our days of supply and their days of supply.

That is what is in this report. So the shortfalls which you remember and I remember—and we ought to remedy them—are shortfalls to meet our goals, which are critical goals. They are real. Nothing in this report in any way changes that conclusion that you and I reached that we have some significant shortfalls, particularly in the readiness and sustainability areas.

And this again is a comparative chart and does not attempt to just look at our shortfalls.

Senator DIXON. I have run out of time, but I wonder if the Chair would indulge me in one quick question because I have to preside shortly and I will not be able to get back.

Chairman NUNN. Go ahead.

Senator DIXON. I am just curious. Some of these things are a relative question when you analyze them. On the simple question of ammunition, what about the Warsaw Pact in respect to the NATO nations with respect to supplies of ammunition for a period of time?

Senator LEVIN. They have got greater sustainability in that area, and that is one of the reasons we gave them the X in sustainability, that is one of the reasons. They have got greater days of supply.

That is, by the way, page 27 of our report, where we say the Warsaw Pact is believed to maintain very large stocks of consumable military supplies, forward-deployed—and that is very important, by the way, forward-deployed—in eastern Europe. The Defense Department publication, *Soviet Military Power*, in 1987 states, and then we quote it, that “there are more than 3 million metric tons of ammunition, along with over 9 million tons of petrol”, and so forth.

So we agree with your conclusion on it.

Senator DIXON. The only one thing I would like to say in conclusion, because my time is up, is this. I respect my colleague's statement about bean count. The only thing that does bother me that I must observe, Mr. Chairman, is when you look at the hard count and you look at hardware and you look at ammunition or anything else, our number is always bad compared to theirs.

I appreciate all the esoteric and analytical data that goes into it, but when you look at the numbers we are always in trouble.

Senator QUAYLE. Mr. Chairman, if I might just say to Senator Dixon, the way that you define readiness you are absolutely correct. You are absolutely correct, in my judgment. And I also think, you know, who is right. This is sort of the title of this thing. Some of the testimony that we have heard is not necessarily reflected, if you want to go down on a bean count basis and see who is winning and losing on this particular chart here.

And that is why I do not agree with a couple of the conclusions, and I think adding to those particularly the operations concepts will give you an entirely different picture because every witness we have had has said that there is a conventional imbalance of significant degree between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Senator LEVIN. May I add a 30-second comment?

Chairman NUNN. Yes, Senator Levin, then I want to call on Senator McCain.

Senator LEVIN. I would agree that many of the numbers are against us, and that is where our quantity listing is. But I would hope that at least in the bean count that we will not only look at tanks, planes, weapons, but that we will also look at some other bean counts, very bean count level things—flying hours, items like that—where we do all right.

All I am saying is, put them into the balance. I am not saying that it changes your ultimate conclusion that we have got some real vulnerabilities. All I am saying is put them on the scale. We invest enough in them.

Senator DIXON. I share my friend's understanding on that and I appreciate it.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dixon.
 Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to express my appreciation to both my colleagues, first of all to Senator Levin for the excellent work he and his staff have done on this study, and I think it will be a great contribution to the debate and our understanding of the issues, not only affecting this treaty but in the days that lie ahead in order for us to preserve our best defense in NATO.

I would also express my appreciation to Senator Quayle. He obviously has added so much not only to this debate but in previous ones.

I think that it would be important to recognize that Mr. Karber had some serious differences with this study that I think Senator Levin deserves to have a response to, including the 12 of 22 charts being, in his opinion, erroneous.

Perhaps most disturbing was his fear that the Soviets would at the bargaining table on conventional force reductions, would put the Levin study on the table as a basis for negotiations. And I certainly would be interested in hearing a response to that statement.

I also feel very strongly, as I believe the members of this committee do, that we need a conventional assessment that would give us the key trends and factors shaping the NATO and Warsaw conventional theater and nuclear-conventional-biological balance in the region. I would like to repeat if I could, Mr. Chairman, I think that study has to be unclassified.

I share Senator Quayle's view that the classified assessment is good but we have got to inform both the American people and other individuals outside of Government, many of whom have great expertise and opinions that need to be voiced. They cannot provide us with their viewpoints unless they have access to that information. I look forward to working with Senator Levin and the Chairman of this committee to try to get that kind of assessment from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I just have a couple of comments that I would like for perhaps both my colleagues to respond to. One of them is that we need to ask what our proper role in NATO really is, whether it is that of a "tripwire" or whether we are there to mount a robust conventional defense.

I happen to believe we should play both roles. I happen to believe that the presence of United States troops there continues to be a dramatic example of the United States' commitment to defending Western Europe. I believe it acts as a tripwire since our adversaries clearly know that we would not allow American soldiers to fight and die on the battlefield without the active participation of the United States.

I also believe our presence in Western Europe is by necessity, that of a robust conventional defense. We do not want simply a tripwire.

As far as concerns about misleading Soviet leaders, I am not worrying about misleading the Soviet leaders. Much to our tragic knowledge, we have found that the Soviets know a great deal about us, in fact way, way, way too much about us.

I also am not too concerned about what is said here in the halls of Congress when the Soviets are capable of the kinds of intelligence gathering which they have had a clear record of for a long, long time.

And I say that unfortunately, but given the nature of our society and the nature of our Government, the Soviets are going to be able to acquire the information necessary to make judgments without political leaders either leading or misleading them.

Finally, I would like to stress this aspect of any assessment that we must make. As Senator Levin mentioned, we tend to see the balance as a static view. In some ways, it is like looking at a picture of an airplane in the millisecond before it strikes the ground and using that static view and get one impression of how the airplane was doing.

I think that it is of the utmost importance to consider and to consider with the utmost seriousness, the trends in the balance that we have seen in recent years. Because we are shaping defense budgets for the future, shaping what we are going to acquire and develop, such an assessment cannot be simply a static view.

It has to be made on the basis of what the Soviets are doing in the area of modernization, what are they doing in the area of training, and in all of the other aspects of what any military force is doing.

Such an assessment will not only give us a view of what they are capable of now, but of what they will be capable of doing in the years ahead.

So once again, I would like to express my appreciation to Senator Levin and his staff for a very dedicated job and one which I think is a very important contribution to highlighting problems in methodology and I would appreciate hearing your responses to those points that I made.

Senator LEVIN. First, Senator McCain, let me thank you for your comments. As always, I am most appreciative of the kind of personal relationships which we have in the Senate, and never moreso than when one testifies in front of his colleagues.

First, on your last point, I could not agree with you more. I think an assessment of trends is very important, and I will leave it at that.

This does not purport to give us that. This is a snapshot basically of where we are, in an attempt to get the debate beyond the one quantitative debate we seem, or at least the media seems to dwell on, to simply say it is more complex, here is our way of addressing the complexity.

So I agree with you, trends are very important, just the way I agree with Senator Quayle's four-point analysis, that three of the four parts of that analysis are not addressed here in this report. This is just one quarter of it, an important quarter of it, an important quarter, but just one part of it.

Second, as to the comment that I do not think we should be misleading the Soviet leaders, what I do not want to misled them about is our will. That is what I do not want to mislead them about.

We are not a conventional basket case. We have got some problems. We can cure some of those problems. They are curable, some

of them, without a heck of a lot of money. Some of them are going to take some resources, some real resources, some without a lot of money.

But the point on the misleading is only as to what is our will, what is our determination, what do we think about what we would do in case of the conventional attack. Do we believe we are hopeless or do we believe we can put up such a defense that their attack would be greatly risky? That is the question, what are the risks?

And as I said before, their chances of achieving their goals, I believe, are greater than our chances of achieving our goals. And by the way, Senator Quayle is absolutely right, their goal is offensive, basically our is defensive.

I think they have got a greater chance of achieving their offensive goal than we do of our defensive goal. That does not make me happy. I want to improve it. But that does not mean that there is not great risk to them in seeking to achieve their offensive goal.

Their chances might be 50-50. Ours might be 20-80. That means their chances are greater than ours. I am just picking those numbers out of the air. They are not intended to be accurate.

But still, their chances may not be good enough to give them much confidence that they could achieve them, even though they are better than our chances of achieving ours.

And finally, in terms of the comment of one of our witnesses this morning about errors in the chart, these charts are based on International Institute for Strategic Study numbers for the most part, I think 80 or 90 percent of them.

We rely heavily on one of the most reliable sources of information. We went to a lot of other public sources of information. We made sure that we were comfortable with our conclusions by going to a lot of classified sources of information and talking to a lot of sources which could not be quoted, so that we are comfortable with our conclusions.

We are not saying they are perfect or absolute, but we are comfortable with them. And we think there is a lot of support for them. We are happy to change them where they need changing.

But in terms of errors in the charts, he would have to show us exactly what errors he is talking about. And then I think we could show them, now wait a minute, the International Institute for Strategic Studies shows, for instance on the tank balance, that these are pre-1975 tanks. And then the question is, well, but maybe you should have taken into consideration something else, like their enhancements. And that is a good arguable point.

But the IISS didn't do that; they did not do a lot of other things that you would like them to do. But basically, we do not think there are errors in these charts at all, and that his problem mainly is with the IISS analysis.

Senator QUAYLE. Very briefly, Senator McCain, as Senator Levin said, trends is the fourth item that I mentioned, and what I believe we ought to look at in operational concepts, and it is a very, very important one. As you heard the testimony this morning, the trend lines are not that good. They are not that good for fielding equipment, they are not that good from what one is to expect in modernization and things of that sort.

And it is a very important component, adding to, as Senator Levin said, the complexity of the issue. We need to look more at the complexities. Your questions go to some of the complexities and trends.

The other thing that you mentioned on the robust conventional defense or the tripwire, again not only why are we there but what are our objectives, and more importantly, one of the things that we are going to be discussing, particularly in INF, are we still committed and will flexible response be a credible deterrent.

And that is what we have to achieve, a credible deterrent, because our objective, unlike the Soviet Union, is not to defeat the Warsaw Pact and take over their countries; our objective, if conflict were to break out, is to maintain the status quo.

And finally, as far as the facts on this IISS report, obviously if the facts are wrong the conclusions are wrong. So if what goes in is wrong, then what comes out is wrong. So I believe that is a very serious question. I think we will have to resolve it.

If Mr. Karber is correct that 12 out of the 22 are just wrong—and I believe what we will probaly find out in a thorough analysis of this is that the changing of these numbers, what is unclassified and classified, and it gets back to what are we going to release, and I believe that that is one of the problems that we might run into when we examine this.

But obviously, I sure would not feel very comfortable with something coming out as a conclusion if the facts going in are wrong.

Senator LEVIN. Could I have just a brief comment, 10 seconds?

Chairman NUNN. You are on Senator Shelby's time, and have been on his time for about 3 or 4 minutes.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Karber did indicate when I was here that he did agree with most of these conclusions. I think he thought that there were some errors in 12 charts. That I have already answered.

That is International Institute for Strategic Studies data. For the most part, his quarrel really is with them. But he agreed with most of these conclusions, and that was his testimony.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I request that an opening statement that I have be made part of the record. And could I also mention that I understand that the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary have some differences of opinion on the Levin study that they would like to have included in the record.

Could we have those?

Chairman NUNN. We would be glad to have them included in the record, without objection. We will leave the record open. When do you think we can get that other material?

Senator McCAIN. I was told shortly, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. We will leave it open for that.

Senator LEVIN. Could the record also be left open, Mr. Chairman, for the statements of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense as to their agreements with the study as well?

Chairman NUNN. Agreements, disagreements, rebuttals, rebuttals to the rebuttals. The record will never be closed.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you Mr. Chairman. We are now in our third day of hearings on the impact of the INF Treaty on our force structure and that of our allies. I think we have already heard many of these reasons why President Reagan negotiated this treaty, and why we should regard it as a tribute to the efforts of both the Carter and Reagan Administrations to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

No one can seriously doubt that this treaty would have been impossible if we had dealt with the SS-20, and the other build-ups in Soviet theater nuclear strength, from a position of weakness. The USSR would have achieved a massive advantage—perhaps a decisive one—in intimidating our allies and decoupling the U.S. and Europe.

There is a clear lesson here, and one that tracks with all the military history I have ever learned. You deal with an opponent from strength. You deal fairly, but you never deal from a position of hope and weakness. If you do, hope and good intentions turn into compromise and appeasement and then into surrender and war.

We have many issues to deal with in discussing this treaty. Many relate to the interpretation of the treaty and many relate to whether it can be verified and enforced. I am increasingly of the opinion that we in the Senate should take some action to ensure that we will never tolerate any Soviet violation or disguise it in the name of good will, and will enforce the treaty through political, economic, or military means.

My primary concern, however, as these hearings proceed, is with the issue of whether we fully agree that ratification of this treaty can never be an excuse for weakness. That we agree on a bipartisan basis that we will never weaken our strategic nuclear, other theater nuclear, or conventional forces until we reach agreed arms reductions that meet every possible test of verifiability and that will act with absolute security to reduce the risk of war.

There are many strengths and advantages in this treaty, and many reasons I can support it. None of these advantages will matter, however, unless we are certain that it will not lead us down the slippery slope towards the kind of cutbacks in our forces and allied forces that will turn arms control into the preface for decoupling the U.S. from its allies, undermining or splitting NATO, and leading us into a crisis of actual conflict.

Let me be blunt, I do not believe that any responsible American or allied leader and political figure can ignore the need to keep all our remaining forces strong and to modernize them. I do not believe that any responsible analyst of the present situation can advocate the so-called triple zero option or reduced spending on NATO forces until we have reached a fully acceptable START Treaty and agreed on conventional force reductions that will end the military imbalance in NATO.

Further, I do not believe that we can maintain the strength we need simply through increases in our conventional forces. In fact, I feel it is the height of irresponsibility to decouple any discussion of the conventional balance, and conventional defense initiatives, from the discussion of what we must do to improve our short range nuclear forces and strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces.

It is particularly important that we in this committee do not focus on conventional balances and improvements in ways which mislead either the American people or our allies as to the absolute necessity of supporting the Administration in improving our short range nuclear forces. It is equally important that we agree that an INF treaty can only be safe if we support the Administration in carrying out its current plans to improve our strategic forces.

Let there be no mistake, we must retain and improve our capability to fight limited nuclear wars with both theater and strategic weapons as long as the USSR and Warsaw Pact continue to do so.

This is not simply because if we fail to do so, we will leave no deterrent between a conventional war that favors the Warsaw Pact and total nuclear war: A choice between defeat and devastation. It is because we and our allies have been promising ourselves an improved conventional balance for more than twenty years, and we have never delivered on our promises.

I believe that both we as a committee, and this nation, may be headed towards a dangerous illusion. We will kill tree after tree writing reports on how good our conventional options are going to be, but we will not fund a single extra capability to kill a Soviet tank. Strength does not consist of the U.S. Congress killing trees; it consists of the capability of U.S. forces to kill tanks.

Strength also does not consist of analytic revisionism. Every time we run into defense budget problems we attempt to deal with the resulting problems in the mili-

tary balance by changing the way in which we analyze the balance. This kind of revisionism may be comforting, but it will not and cannot solve our problems.

I think, therefore, that today's hearings will begin to lead us in one of two directions. The first direction is the acceptance of the INF Treaty based on a bipartisan consensus that we will mix arms control with strength. That we will not play games with words and numbers, or our nation's security. That we will not choose between conventional and nuclear modernization, or buy a few new conventional force improvements and ignore the major military weaknesses in NATO Central Region forces. That we will sustain our present force levels in Europe and Asia until we get the kind of force reductions that will end the Warsaw Pact advantage in both force numbers and surprise attack capabilities.

The second direction will lead us into an unacceptable degree of division, decoupling, a weakness which even the best treaty cannot survive. In fact, the greatest weakness I now see in the INF treaty is not the treaty, but in the risk that we will create a climate of illusion where we feel that having succeeded in getting an INF treaty with strength, we can now succeed in far more difficult and dangerous arms reductions with weakness.

We are not going to get something for nothing. We are not going to get a safe START or MBFR treaty without unity and strength. Above all, if we ever do get a conventional option, it can never be with the kind of spending projected in the FY 1989 budget or current FDYP.

This Mr. Chairman will be a critical issue for our hearings on the budget, but it is equally critical to our hearings today. I do not want smoke and mirrors, or high technology and econometrics. I want to know what it will cost to make a real world improvement in the conventional balance.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, DC, February 22, 1988.

Hon. JOHN S. MCCAIN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR JOHN: Thank you for your letter of January 26, in which you asked that I provide my views on Senator Levin's report "Beyond the Bean Count: Realistically Assessing the Conventional Military Balance in Europe."

Senator Levin's report points out some of the factors that comprise the military balance in Europe beyond strict numerical comparisons. As the enclosed paper points out, however, there are some areas where we take issue with some of the report's facts, data and interpretations, as well as some additional factors we believe should also be taken into account. Admiral Crowe concurs with the enclosed paper.

I look forward to your continued support in the months ahead as we seek to develop programs that will promote Western security in the post-INF period.

Sincerely,

FRANK C. CARLUCCI.

Enclosure.

DOD COMMENTS ON BEYOND THE BEAN COUNT: REALISTICALLY ASSESSING THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE

The Levin Report is correct in stating that the military balance in Europe is "complex" and that one should not rely on "bean counts". The CJCS Military Net Assessment and other OSD studies address the qualitative complexities of the balance in Europe. None relies on "bean counts."

In an endeavor to expand the scope of analysis beyond the quantitative, the Levin Report establishes thirteen very valid components of the military balance. While DoD would agree or disagree over various points, we would take some issue with the following specific points of the Levin Report:

Overall Assessment.—Realistic assessments of NATO defense should start from the perspective of NATO's objective of deterrence and, should deterrence fail, defense pursued through a strategy of flexible response. Instead of focusing exclusively on conventional defense capabilities, one should begin by addressing the spectrum of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces relevant to this NATO objective—strategic nuclear, non-strategic nuclear, conventional and chemical forces.

The Quantitative Balance.—While DoD agrees that there is a clear Warsaw Pact numerical advantage, we find significant differences between our data and that used in the Report for both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Additionally, the Report to-

cuses on specific numbers of weapons and personnel rather than providing a more comprehensive view of Warsaw Pact force structure.

Quality of Major Weapons.—There is no question that NATO enjoys qualitative superiority in many of its weapon systems. However, the aggregate qualitative advantages the Report accords NATO appear to be based on the anticipated deployment of future systems, like Stealth technologies and "brilliant" munitions—modernization that is vulnerable to possible budget reductions. Furthermore, for some significant weapons systems, the Warsaw Pact has equalled or surpassed NATO in quality, and is fielding these systems more rapidly and in greater numbers than is NATO, for example, in armor systems.

Force Readiness.—Given the great differences between NATO and Warsaw Pact requirements for readiness, it is very difficult to assess directly the impact of force readiness asymmetries on total force capability, especially given the different contingencies and scenarios in which those forces could be employed. Nonetheless, we agree that force readiness is a key NATO strength. Yet we note that readiness is one of the areas most immediately affected by budget cuts.

Numbers of Active and Reserve Personnel.—The Report rightly points to the dangers of "bean counts". Yet in analyzing the numbers of NATO and Warsaw Pact personnel in uniform, it fails to take into account the critical factor that numbers make a difference only when and where they can directly influence the critical battle. For example, Turkey's 500,000 + military forces would most likely have little direct influence on the battle on the Central Front.

Economic and Industrial Strength.—While we agree with the assessment of NATO's relative economic strength when compared with that of the Warsaw Pact, the time required for NATO to transition from their peacetime consumer/service-oriented industrial economies to a wartime footing may well prove to be excessive and leave NATO at a disadvantage when compared with the Soviets' existing military production capability and extensive military industrial mobilization plans and preparations.

There are also some other significant factors that are omitted from the Report.

The impact of strategy/doctrine/tactics is extremely important, as are the disposition and organization of forces (e.g., which forces are located in key areas of likely attack, the impact of NATO's layer cake of national corps sectors, and the requirement for forward defense versus defense in depth or trading space for time).

The Report omits naval and air forces, which individually and together have a major impact on the military balance on the Central Front. It also should consider other force components, such as those involved in strategic mobility and electronic warfare, which could impact significantly in certain areas.

The Report makes no reference to chemical warfare, which must be recognized as having a major impact on some of the areas of the balance the Report does address. Specifically, Soviet use of chemical weapons would have a major, deleterious impact on NATO's combat capabilities, readiness, sustainability and C3I, as well as on the morale of engaged NATO forces. NATO does not have a commensurate chemical warfare capability.

Because both NATO and the Warsaw Pact include nuclear operations in their strategy and concepts of operation, the nuclear dimensions of war—even at the conventional level—must be assessed.

The military effects of time and timing, surprise and even weather are major components of the outcome of any future conflict in Europe, but these factors are exceptionally difficult to assess adequately.

Although the Report has many good points, its most serious shortcoming is its failure to make the linkage between NATO's strategy of deterrence and the military risks and consequences to the Alliance should deterrence fail.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence.

—Senator Levin, I do not want to beat a horse to death and you are my friend and colleague. But it seems that a lot of your data here does not support your conclusions.

Let us get back into readiness just a minute. What is readiness? I suppose it is a composite of a lot of things. I believe that the report in your text reflects that there are 30 forward deployed Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, at the highest level of readiness. I believe that is your words.

That is 30 Soviet divisions. Does that not support a superior forward deployment? I believe you have acknowledge that.

Senator LEVIN. Oh, yes, we have acknowledged they have a very heavy concentration of forward deployed forces.

Senator SHELBY. And you said in your initial statement, and it has been discussed here, what is the Levin report? Is it a committee report? Is it your report, or what? But whatever it is—and I believe it is your report—will it not make it more difficult for our negotiators in Vienna to try to hammer out some things?

I mean, the report is going to be put on the table whether you want it there or not. And will it not also discourage a lot of our NATO allies from sharing more of the defense burden?

You know, they have got to go back to parliament and they are going to look at the Levin report as, heck, you know, look at it, we are in good shape; we do not need to change anything everything is well in Europe.

I would like to hear your comments there.

Senator LEVIN. Well, there is nothing in this report that they are going to be able to use for that conclusion, that we are in good shape and do not have to do anything in Europe.

Quite the opposite, we point out the areas where we need strengthening and we ought to honestly assess the areas where we need strengthening. We might as well note to the best of our ability what the facts are. Whether this is the best assessment of the facts or whether someone else can come up with a best assessment of the facts, we ought to have a more complex view of the facts than that they have got 52,000 tanks and we have got 22,000 tanks.

That is not an accurate or complex assessment, or at least a realistic assessment of the balance. You have got to look at a whole lot of other components.

So I agree with you, there are areas that we have got to strengthen in our conventional defense. We identify those areas here. That is doable, and that is the most important message here, is that we can have a robust conventional defense. It is doable, folks, if we will focus on it and not focus on things which are the wrong areas of focus.

One other comment about your statement about the report being put on the negotiating table——

Senator SHELBY. How do you redress the imbalances that you have pointed out in your report? Just take your report.

Senator LEVIN. Sustainability is critical.

Senator SHELBY. Readiness, too?

Senator LEVIN. There are readiness areas that I would focus on very, very heavily, by the way, and we have. I mean, we have tried that in a number of amendments which sought to improve both readiness and sustainability. I would put a lot of emphasis on the capability to move forces quickly from the United States to Europe.

That was the number one thing that our Army commanders were telling us, is that the most important thing we could do would be to put some ships and planes in there to get our forces there faster. We ought to do that.

Interoperability is critical. It is outrageous that we have got all the antitank weapons we do and all the radios we do among the

allies and they cannot talk to each other and they do not shoot the same weapon.

So there are things that we ought to work on. We identify them, and I think that is just simply honest and balanced. I do not think that helps the other side at all.

I think the thing that helps them is if we are unrealistic about our own needs, point to the wrong areas, and if we suggest that we do not have the willpower to respond to a conventional attack in Europe. We do have the willpower to do that.

There are some risks in it we ought to reduce. But I do not want to signal to our adversary that he may be able to move into Western Europe and he is going to face a basket case. I think that is exactly the wrong signal and can lead to some terrible miscalculations on the part of the Soviet Union.

Senator SHELBY. But not just your report here today, but some others that have testified earlier today, they have pointed out that NATO is especially vulnerable in certain areas, looking at how troops are deployed and so forth, to surprise Soviet attack.

Do you think there is any likelihood of that?

Senator LEVIN. I do not think it is likely.

Senator SHELBY. It is always possible.

Senator LEVIN. I think there is a risk and I think we are vulnerable and it ought to be addressed, and that is why we put that number one, and that is why we put that map in such a prominent place in our book as to what those concentration of forces are.

Senator SHELBY. We are vulnerable, but looking at your report, if you just read your report, would not an ordinary person not serving on this committee and not having access to other data, would they think that we were vulnerable?

Senator LEVIN. They would read, I hope, the first estimate on page 12:

Warsaw Pact has a superior capacity for launching a surprise attack with little mobilization compared to NATO's capacity to defend against such an attack if its forces have not mobilized. The forward positioning of large numbers of ready Pact forces, forces well equipped for taking the offensive, is highly threatening to the West. The Pact's forward positioning of such forces is in stark contrast to NATO's dispersed deployment of active duty forces in peacetime.

The short warning threat is serious, particularly because NATO's vulnerabilities in the north are real, and this is the source of a great deal of the problems that NATO confronts in the central region. The Warsaw Pact's unique forward-based offensive capability makes asymmetrical reductions in Pact armored forces in the central region necessary.

While the conventional military balance is complex overall, the threat posed by forward-based Pact armored forces is straightforward and must be addressed in any conventional arms control negotiations in Europe.

I do not know how to say it more clearly. It is our first estimate. And by the way, one other thing I must comment on——

Senator SHELBY. Senator Quayle.

Senator LEVIN. I think I have taken enough time. I will let Dan go ahead.

Senator QUAYLE. You raise, I think, a very valid political concern that I have, because if we would just have relied on, say, the testimony that our subcommittee had, if we would have relied on the testimony of our subcommittee, just the witnesses that came, the witnesses that we have had thus far, everyone has talked about a

significant conventional imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

And I believe from a political reading of this, the interpretation of it would be that we are far better off, folks, than what we have been told. And I believe that is certainly the spin, the initial spin that has come out of this.

If not, then I think we would just have relied upon what the public statements have been and what some of the professional submissions of reports have done. And I think that obviously, that is what the emphasis of this would be, and I think that is the concern.

Senator SHELBY. I think it will have to be clarified as to what it is and what it stands for. And I am sure some of it will come out today.

Senator QUAYLE. As I pointed out in my opening testimony, the talk show I was on with the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee referred to this report as really being better off than what we have been told and therefore maybe the conventional forces imbalance is not as bad as some folks think in lieu of this.

Senator SHELBY. Lull us to sleep or mislead us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Senator Levin, did you have something to add?

Senator LEVIN. Just a quick follow-on on that. This is Dr. Kugler's testimony. He is director of strategic concepts development center at the National Defense University:

The balance in my view is sufficiently close, closer than is commonly believed, such that the pursuit of a viable conventional posture is itself a viable programming goal.

Now, that is what he said. We can pursue conventional defense. And in response to what my dear friend—he is a dear friend—Dan Quayle just said, the witnesses have not all said there is a significant conventional imbalance. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of Defense very carefully avoided saying that, at least this time.

When I asked him the question point blank and pressed him on that question, at this time he did not say that you could describe it that way.

And my last comment is that this morning we had testimony from Dave Abshire, who said that only we, not the Soviets, can be criticized for the self-created vulnerability. He was talking about the maldeployment of forces. I think that is an honest statement.

Senator Glenn pointed that statement out this morning, and it hit you, Senator Glenn, with the same impact, frankly, that it hit me, like a ton of bricks, because here we have got our former Ambassador to NATO telling us that much of our problem is self-imposed by us.

Does that play into the hands of the Soviets? Is somebody going to throw Abshire's testimony down on the negotiating table, so the Soviets will say, see, Abshire says we are not the problem, you are the problem; you have not responded; it is all self-created, your vulnerability.

That is not what Abshire's point is, and I think that we ought to again look honestly at our posture and not focus on someone misreading it or misinterpreting it.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, could I take 2 seconds?

Chairman NUNN. Yes.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, the chart up there, I am sure we will see that in print, in the papers, or on television, or in articles. But that chart, like most charts, it is a summary chart.

Is that right, Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Senator SHELBY. And I am sure it will be used by our allies, the Soviet Union, and the media, to just in 10 seconds solve the whole problem we are talking about.

Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate you for putting this report together. Whether we agree on every facet of it or not I think is one matter, but I think the more studies we have, why, the more we finally come to an understanding of all of these issues.

So I want to congratulate you for taking the initiative in putting this report together. Whether it was by the committee or an individual Senator is rather immaterial to me. I think it is a good study and a good starting place for our talks.

I would point out, on the things that are on that summary sheet chart, I think you can break these elements down, as to timeframes in which they become important. And I think some of them are more important than others, obviously, at different times.

But the areas that David Abshire pointed out this morning that you already referred to here—maldeployment, readiness, and sustainability—those are three such basic elements, all the other factors here sort of have to fall into second place behind them.

You have to put all these factors together. In a combat scenario, it is not just deployment, it is not just sustainability, it is not just readiness. Combat has a dynamic.

I am more interested in our defenses against tanks and how we kill things, not just how many tanks we have. It is not always tanks outfighting tanks. You have other tanks that do some of that, but you have aircraft rockets, you have TOW missiles, you have land mines, you have shoulder-launched weapons, you have the geography of rivers and bridges that channel tanks into the few places they can go across and make choke points where you can concentrate your fire.

The point I am making is that, without putting all of these together in the dynamics of a wargame, it is extremely difficult, it seems to me, to lay out what the war-stoppers really are.

In one scenario in a war game, if they go a certain direction you have choke points where they have to come across bridges and you can concentrate your fire, your aircraft, your TOW's, and your shoulder-launched missiles. It is a whole different dynamic from going out across the desert, for example.

How much did you get into a net assessment of trying to match whatever their capability is against all the defensive forces we can concentrate on their force, whether it is air, or tanks, or ships? I do

not know how you do this, except in the complexities and dynamics of a war game, which is a sophisticated exercise.

Did you try and take any of the war gaming results, for instance, and apply it to the situation in Europe and then make some conclusions as to its dynamics? It seems to me you have to do that.

Senator LEVIN. We did not do a net assessment or a dynamic assessment. We were not able to do that. It was not what we set out to do.

Is it important? It sure is. Have I visited war gaming centers? We have been briefed. I think our chairman got us all briefed once with our war game, and I went over to Germany and looked at their war gaming. By the way, some very startling differences, but that is all classified stuff.

But I agree with you, the dynamic assessments, the net assessments, are critical. And this is not intended to replace those or displace those. This is intended to try to give us a little more complex view of the static balance. That is all it is intended to do.

And I could not agree with you more. This only gets you so far, even if it is perfectly accurate and everybody agreed on the 13 categories and how you mark the Pact and NATO inside the 13 categories.

Senator GLENN. To make this report and the work you have done even more valuable. We might want to take some of the people that do the war gaming over at the Pentagon and our service schools and say: take this report and look at where its differences are with what the regular war gaming assumptions and interject them into a war game dynamic, and then play this thing through and see whether you are closer to being right or they are closer to being right.

In other words, I would not want to take Carl Levin's report, who I know and trust and now vote for new weapons systems just on this basis.

But I would like to see some of the differences you have taken here with some of the conventional assumptions of the military and apply them in a war game situation and see whether they work or not.

It would seem to me then we would have something we really could put our teeth into, something of more value. I would suggest we might want to make inquiry and see if that might be possible of some of the people who do the war gaming.

Senator LEVIN. I do not think our assumptions are particularly different, but I would be happy to do that. In other words, I think the basic assumptions of the war game are here. There may be some differences.

We will get a letter, I presume, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs saying in this area or that area there are some differences. But I think for the most part the military establishment is going to say these are accurate static indicators.

You are not going to find too much difference, I do not believe, over these numbers. As to whether or not a pre-1974 designed tank, should have been put in a higher category because it has got enhancements, you are going to find some differences on that.

But for the most part, I believe that the war gaming which has been done has taken this material. All we have done is organize

this material in a public way to give us some more complex balances.

But I must tell you, I cannot resist adding one comment to what you have said. We went over to Germany. This is in the interoperability area. We went over to Germany and looked at their war gaming center. Do we share our war gaming results with them? Nope. Do they share their war gaming results or inputs with us? Nope.

You would think we were in different alliances. And it is so important. The war gaming you point out is so important. And I have enough confidence, frankly, in our allies that we ought to be able to share war gaming assumptions, inputs, and responses. I believe we ought to be able to do it.

But we do not do it. That is just an example of where something is very useful—

Chairman NUNN. Which of our war games was that? Was that the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force?

Senator LEVIN. None of them are shared.

Senator GLENN. Before my time runs out completely here, let me ask one thing. Any alliance has to stick together with a glue of credibility and commitment to shared objectives. In your recent trip to Europe and your discussions with European leaders, how damaging is the administration's reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty to reputation?

Are they concerned about us reinterpreting INF and our NATO commitments? Has this destroyed any of our credibility?

Senator LEVIN. I would not want to generalize on this. They usually start the conversation with how you interpret your treaties with the Soviet Union is your business and not ours, but, and then they will throw in some comments which are, I think, somewhat cautious, because they do not want to interfere in our internal affairs.

But there are some doubts in some countries as to what the impact of this is or appears to be, and I am stating that cautiously for obvious reasons. They really do not like to interfere publicly in how we interpret a bilateral agreement.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. I was hoping that subject would never come up again.

Senator LEVIN. I was hoping the chairman would bail me out on that subject.

Senator GLENN. I thought I would throw him a basketball at the end.

Chairman NUNN. That was just the little old Levin amendment which we debated last year.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Levin, I want to join with others who commented, not only on the value of this, but I think it is very important to have this kind of a discussion among members on a give-and-take basis. I think it is extremely valuable.

Let me just start by saying I get a little bit concerned when the argument is made, as it was for a little while today that if we have information in a democratic society and it gets put out on the

table, that somehow we should not do that because it is a dangerous thing to do.

We recognize the fact that we live in a democratic society and one of the weaknesses, presumably, is that at times that people have access to this information. It is my understanding everything in here was in the public record anyway.

Senator LEVIN. It is.

Senator WIRTH. And that is also one of our great strengths, and I just wanted to register for the record my concern from those that commented this morning that, whether that was in the intent or not, they were worried that maybe this would get used against us, get thrown down there. Well, that is what happens.

That is one of the costs of having the freedoms of a democratic society, and I think some of that was suggested this afternoon. I do not go along with it. I think this is much, much more positive than any down side that comes along, and I just wanted to say that as an opener.

I want to ask you a couple of questions about context. On page 13, you say that a short warning, short mobilization, attack is the most serious conventional military threat to NATO. The context: How likely is that to happen?

The two questions I am going to ask you on context are just important because we do not want to focus just on this, but on in what broader context are we looking at all this. How likely is that?

Senator LEVIN. In my opinion, unlikely, very unlikely.

Senator WIRTH. What do our commanders say about that?

Senator LEVIN. Very unlikely.

Senator WIRTH. So what does that tell you? If that is the biggest problem, the short warning, short mobilization attack is the most serious conventional military threat, and if that is very unlikely, how do those fit together?

Senator LEVIN. They would add another sentence, which is: It may be very unlikely, but the risk is greater than they want to handle. In other words, if it is a one in 50 chance or a one in 100 chance, they want to reduce that risk further.

They have not put the one in 50 or one in 100, but they put two sentences together. Number one, it is very unlikely—and by the way, if you talk, as you have—you have spent a lot of time over there. When you talk to our commanders, they come up with a much more balanced and realistic assessment of our capabilities than is frequently projected by the conclusion that there is a severe conventional imbalance in Europe. That is a very different conclusion than you get from our commanders on the ground.

But to answer your question, they would say that it is very unlikely that the Soviets would attack. If they did, there would be a high risk that the Soviets would not achieve their military objective. But they still want us to reduce the risk that they might.

I think they are right, we ought to always try to reduce the risk.

Senator WIRTH. But at what cost? It seems to me we have to also ask ourselves that. If it is extremely unlikely, if the highest threat is extremely unlikely, but we want to continue to reduce, you get into, it seems to me, some kind of a regression analysis which begins to say, as I think some of the thrust of the questioning in the last few days has gone, as to how much more can we put into

this particular arena which is focusing on NATO and Europe, given an overall context of a world that is changing very rapidly.

It is that context that I wanted to tease out of you a little bit and just see if you would comment on that. I think it would be extremely unlikely. How much more do we put into this particular area of our defense structure, given all the other needs we have as well?

Where do you balance that off?

Senator LEVIN. I do not know that there is an easy answer to where you balance it. My own balance would be that, although an attack on Western Europe is highly unlikely, as I have phrased it, and I think most of our commanders would agree with that, that we want to reduce the risk further; and that the threat of that concentrated heavy armor in Eastern Europe is threatening to us and we ought to address it in two ways.

One is through our own enhancements and ways, for instance, which Dave Abshire identified this morning, many of which can be done without a lot of money.

And second, through conventional arms control. To me that is a balanced answer. I do not know if it is as precise an answer as you deserve, but it is the best that I can give you.

There are things I would do to increase and improve our conventional capability, including a number of the things that Dave Abshire mentioned. I would do something else. I would have some integrated battalions everywhere along the front in each sector, because I think that the Soviets ought to know, if they ever did take that one-in-whatever-risk, that they would hit every single country's forces in the process rather than only a few.

It may be symbolism, but it is important to me. That might cost us a little money, not much.

I would put in those terrain enhancements.

Senator WIRTH. It seems to me it is very helpful if you suggested that this is the greatest threat, but that threat is unlikely. We do not have a vast number of resources to pour into this, but on the margin in order to counter that threat, therefore we want to look for the most cost effective ways of doing that, and therefore that leads one to the expensive alternatives suggested by Ambassador Abshire this morning.

It leads one to, I think, counter to what Mr. Karber was saying this morning, to a greater emphasis on trying to understand what the other guy is doing and he understanding us and following up on Stockholm. It means that we ought to be trading greater information on strategy or doctrine, depending on how we define it.

But there are a variety of lower cost routes that we can pursue, which is probably more realistic, given our posture in the world today, which is decreasingly just a bipolar world based upon a confrontation in Europe. The rest of the world is changing so significantly.

I think that that is one of the routes in which your report inevitably leads us.

Let me ask you one other thing on the context. We talk about sustainability. Is there ever any discussion on how long people believe a civilian population on the ground could sustain a conventional war in Europe?

Senator LEVIN. The population on both sides?

Senator WIRTH. One side, the other, or both sides. How long could people sustain the incredibly destructive conventional war that would occur in Europe? How long could the civilian population stand that?

Senator LEVIN. I do not think we address that, other than in a couple of indirect ways. One, in terms of the location of towns in Germany as barriers. It does not directly answer your question, but the location of those towns is a real deterrent, because the Soviets cannot just simply roll in. It is not like the North German plain.

And the second answer that I would give has to do with the Eastern bloc populations, as to how long they would be quiescent or accept the situation were Western Europe being attacked without rising up. Now, that is not a direct answer to your question, either.

Senator WIRTH. It seems to me they are both very important. We talk about how much money we are going to put into sustainability and how many days, you know, 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, or whatever. Those are very costly propositions.

And we have to measure against that how long we believe that in fact you could sustain a conventional military operation on the ground in Europe, how long would the civilian population stand for that going on. I would guess that the time is probably shorter rather than longer, given the power of modern ordnance and what the incredibly destructive conventional war would be.

I would suspect that you would not have a lot of sustainability on the ground by that kind of civilian population, and that you would have problems in the Eastern bloc as well. That is another variable that has to fit into the potential of our spending an awful lot of money on conventional military.

Senator LEVIN. The only comment that I would have on that is I think in defending one's own homeland the number of days, weeks, months, or years in the case of the Afghans that one would be willing to sustain operations, is a lot longer than would be true on the other side of the line.

But I do not know how many days or weeks or months that would be. It goes to the political will issue in one sense, what price people are willing to pay to defeat an invader. And having never been in that situation, it is hard for me to make that assessment.

I think, though, on the defense it would be quite a bit longer than just a few days. At least I hope so.

Senator WIRTH. It is a question we do not like to ask because we are sort of embarrassed by the possibility of asking. But it seems to me it is an important one and it is one that in fact I am not being original in raising it. It was raised by a number of commanders who are just now starting to think about that.

I just wondered if you had touched upon it.

The final question I would ask both of you, what is the therefore coming out of this? If you are making a recommendation, Senator Levin, to the Democratic candidate for President, what do you conclude from this that would lead you to the top recommendation you would make?

And Senator Quayle, what recommendation would come out of this that you would make to a Republican candidate for President?

Senator LEVIN. I think definitely on this one Senator Quayle ought to go first.

Senator QUAYLE. I would take from this that we have got to do more to enhance deterrence and have a credible deterrent. I would focus on where do we go from now in lieu of INF.

I believe that you have got to make sure that you maintain a nuclear deterrence in Europe and that you have got to do some things on the conventional forces. Now, you have talked about some of the less expensive things and I do not dismiss them, but unfortunately, if we are going to have a credible deterrence, particularly conventional deterrence, we are going to have to spend money.

I would encourage a Republican Presidential candidate to look at some promising conventional forces, conventional cruise missiles. I think the whole concept of what we are going to do on air defense is very, very important in Europe, and how we can extend and make our artillery conventional forces better and smart munitions is a way to making sure that flexible response is a credible deterrence.

One of the more striking comments that I heard in all the testimony was Admiral Crowe's yesterday, I believe, where we went back into the introduction of flexible response as a strategy back in 1967, 1968. And one of the Senators asked him and said: Is the conventional imbalance worse today than it was in 1968?

And he said it was about the same, but it is no better. Yet in 1968 we talked about flexible response replacing massive retaliation, that we had to do more on conventional forces.

I hope this time—and I hope that our Presidential candidates talk about what we can do in conventional forces to give us that credible deterrence.

Senator LEVIN. And I would probably tell a Democratic candidate: Try to obtain a realistic assessment of the conventional strengths and weaknesses. I would give him my own if he asked for it, but I would urge him to reach his own conclusions as to where we are strong and where we are weak. I would urge him to put some emphasis on conventional defense and conventional arms control.

And in the area of conventional defense, I would tell him that there are a number of steps which can and should be taken that are realistic and feasible, but are politically difficult to take, particularly in the interoperability area for one thing and the deployment area with the integrated battalion idea for another.

There are a number of areas that are politically difficult. I would urge upon him that they are achievable with some real leadership.

And then in the arms control area, we have got to take some of the initiatives which Senator Nunn and others have identified as the ones that we should be taking, because there is some real potential there. It might take us years, not months, but the potential at least is there.

But he ought to start with a realistic assessment, not just a static assessment as we have done, but a realistic net assessment as well, and reach his own conclusions, and not act on assumptions which are inaccurate or are simplistic assessments as to the conventional balance.

And then focus on both conventional defense and on conventional arms control.

Chairman NUNN. And not to mention any of that until after, right.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Both of you have done a great job. This will be a great help to us. We are beginning to get into the real discussion and debate, that I had hoped we would, in considering INF, because we are looking at a much bigger picture.

I consider today's hearings to be a major step in that direction. We will get into the details of the INF Treaty itself when we have the negotiators here after the Senate recess.

I do hope we can focus on a larger picture, and that the committee report will reflect not only on our examination of the INF Treaty, but also on the larger picture, or what NATO does in the future.

Senator Levin, thank you for your great contribution. Senator Quayle, thank you for your great contribution. We appreciate it.

We will not have another hearing until Friday morning at 10 o'clock. We will hear from former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. We will hear Friday afternoon from former U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick.

[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

